Pub Date : 2008-03-10DOI: 10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2009.10.007
P. Maskara
{"title":"Economic Value in Tranching of Syndicated Loans","authors":"P. Maskara","doi":"10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2009.10.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JBANKFIN.2009.10.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118592959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In general, indigenous livelihoods are often adversely incorporated within development processes and policies on account of their multiple disadvantages and discrimination. The paper argues that the ability to build on or manage livelihoods is largely gendered, often exacerbated through the nuanced working of socio-economic forces as women’s experiences of poverty should be located and deconstructed within the configuration of local, political, social and economic forces. Despite notable state led development initiatives in Kerala, the multidimensionality of deprivation among different groups of poor and women within these communities is yet to be seriously considered. Only then, responsive measures can be developed, that will bear any significant difference and meaning to a historically neglected social group. Their social, economic and political participation is important to develop responsive and specific policies and institutions in lieu of those that are designed on the basis of preconceived notions of ‘modernisation’ and ‘homogeneity’ of indigenous livelihoods.
{"title":"Managing Assets and Vulnerability Contexts: Vistas of Gendered Livelihoods of Adivasi Women in South India","authors":"S. Arun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1265549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1265549","url":null,"abstract":"In general, indigenous livelihoods are often adversely incorporated within development processes and policies on account of their multiple disadvantages and discrimination. The paper argues that the ability to build on or manage livelihoods is largely gendered, often exacerbated through the nuanced working of socio-economic forces as women’s experiences of poverty should be located and deconstructed within the configuration of local, political, social and economic forces. Despite notable state led development initiatives in Kerala, the multidimensionality of deprivation among different groups of poor and women within these communities is yet to be seriously considered. Only then, responsive measures can be developed, that will bear any significant difference and meaning to a historically neglected social group. Their social, economic and political participation is important to develop responsive and specific policies and institutions in lieu of those that are designed on the basis of preconceived notions of ‘modernisation’ and ‘homogeneity’ of indigenous livelihoods.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"11 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120895893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The unregulated international trade in conventional arms, especially in small arms and light weapons, has come to be viewed as an exacerbating factor in armed conflict, violent crime and internal repression. Concern about the negative humanitarian, development and security impact of this trade has been growing over the last decade. Against this backdrop, the UN General Assembly invited states in December 2006 to consider the feasibility of an instrument establishing common international standards for conventional arms transfers-also known as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The legality of arms transfers has traditionally been treated as a question of arms control law, but in the recent debate about legal restrictions on states liberty to transfer arms, norms of international humanitarian and human rights law have frequently been invoked. This article surveys the existing international legal regulation of state-authorised conventional arms transfers, examines how humanitarian law, and in particular states duty to ensure respect for humanitarian law, affects the legality of these transfers and shows why human rights law does not make a significant contribution to the legal regulation of the international arms trade today.
{"title":"The Arms Trade and States' Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law","authors":"M. Brehm","doi":"10.1093/JCSL/KRN006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRN006","url":null,"abstract":"The unregulated international trade in conventional arms, especially in small arms and light weapons, has come to be viewed as an exacerbating factor in armed conflict, violent crime and internal repression. Concern about the negative humanitarian, development and security impact of this trade has been growing over the last decade. Against this backdrop, the UN General Assembly invited states in December 2006 to consider the feasibility of an instrument establishing common international standards for conventional arms transfers-also known as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The legality of arms transfers has traditionally been treated as a question of arms control law, but in the recent debate about legal restrictions on states liberty to transfer arms, norms of international humanitarian and human rights law have frequently been invoked. This article surveys the existing international legal regulation of state-authorised conventional arms transfers, examines how humanitarian law, and in particular states duty to ensure respect for humanitarian law, affects the legality of these transfers and shows why human rights law does not make a significant contribution to the legal regulation of the international arms trade today.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125264146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mongolia’s transition strategy is unique in Asia and has been accompanied by very high levels of poverty. For these reasons, policy choices have been the focus of substantial national and international attention. This paper examines the relationship between these policy choices and the evidence on which they were based. The salient features of Mongolia, its transition and the evolution of its policy stance are presented first. This is followed by an examination of the poverty surveys, undertaken in 1995, 1998 and 2002, and their degree of comparability. The paper then maps poverty outcomes back to policy choices using standard analytical techniques. These include a growth-inequality decomposition, the compilation of pro-poor growth statistics and the derivation of growth incidence curves. The results of these analyses demonstrate severe weaknesses in the evidential record and in the degree of transparency with which this has been presented by those agencies responsible for undertaking the poverty surveys, principally the Mongolian Statistical Office and the World Bank. Nevertheless, we conclude that there has been poverty reduction in Mongolia although this is based on a ‘trickledown’ effect and the reduction would have been greater had more attention been paid to managing inequality.
{"title":"Tracking Economic Policy and Poverty Outcomes in Mongolia","authors":"Richard Marshall, F. Nixson, B. Walters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1265540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1265540","url":null,"abstract":"Mongolia’s transition strategy is unique in Asia and has been accompanied by very high levels of poverty. For these reasons, policy choices have been the focus of substantial national and international attention. This paper examines the relationship between these policy choices and the evidence on which they were based. The salient features of Mongolia, its transition and the evolution of its policy stance are presented first. This is followed by an examination of the poverty surveys, undertaken in 1995, 1998 and 2002, and their degree of comparability. The paper then maps poverty outcomes back to policy choices using standard analytical techniques. These include a growth-inequality decomposition, the compilation of pro-poor growth statistics and the derivation of growth incidence curves. The results of these analyses demonstrate severe weaknesses in the evidential record and in the degree of transparency with which this has been presented by those agencies responsible for undertaking the poverty surveys, principally the Mongolian Statistical Office and the World Bank. Nevertheless, we conclude that there has been poverty reduction in Mongolia although this is based on a ‘trickledown’ effect and the reduction would have been greater had more attention been paid to managing inequality.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132367909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2003, as part of its ' war on terror ' , the United States has taken the position that the UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the UN Human Rights Council, as well as the system of ' special procedures ' reporting to both bodies, all lack the competence to examine abuses committed in the context of armed confl icts. The article examines the argu- ments put forward by the US in the specifi c context of the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. The authors conclude that the consistent practice of the human rights organs for almost 25 years, often supported and until 2003 never opposed by the US, runs counter to the current US position. Acceptance of the US position would not only undermine efforts to hold the US accountable but would also have a major impact on the international system of accountability as a whole.
{"title":"The Competence of the Un Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the 'War on Terror'","authors":"Philip Alston, Jason G Morgan-Foster","doi":"10.1093/EJIL/CHN006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/EJIL/CHN006","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2003, as part of its ' war on terror ' , the United States has taken the position that the UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the UN Human Rights Council, as well as the system of ' special procedures ' reporting to both bodies, all lack the competence to examine abuses committed in the context of armed confl icts. The article examines the argu- ments put forward by the US in the specifi c context of the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. The authors conclude that the consistent practice of the human rights organs for almost 25 years, often supported and until 2003 never opposed by the US, runs counter to the current US position. Acceptance of the US position would not only undermine efforts to hold the US accountable but would also have a major impact on the international system of accountability as a whole.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132658745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The globalisation of the economy goes along with numerous kinds of uncertainty and requires adequate institutional designs in order to avoid disadvantageous situations from the actors' points of view. Institutional designs usually consist of a mix of different institutions that are adapted to the particular transaction. Means of public as well as private ordering are applied when institutional designs are developed. In international transactions, institutional gaps might occur. The reason for this is not alone the higher level of uncertainty compared to national transactions. Moreover, public ordering does not work efficiently due to the fact that national states do not play the active role as a frame-setter they used to play in the national context. Supranational institutions are not able to fill this gap. Against this background, the role of the state is to be analysed in the context of how to fill this gap in order to enable international transactions. A research framework based on grounded theory is applied in order to understand the phenomenon of the institutional gap in international transactions. Moreover, evolutionary theory is considered to represent a useful theoretical approach in order to explain how the institutional gap can be filled. Having identified mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention, system dynamic modelling is used in order to structure the respective cause-and-effect mechanisms.
{"title":"Institutional Designs in International Transactions - An Evolutionary Economics Perspective","authors":"Jörg Freiling","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1093271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1093271","url":null,"abstract":"The globalisation of the economy goes along with numerous kinds of uncertainty and requires adequate institutional designs in order to avoid disadvantageous situations from the actors' points of view. Institutional designs usually consist of a mix of different institutions that are adapted to the particular transaction. Means of public as well as private ordering are applied when institutional designs are developed. In international transactions, institutional gaps might occur. The reason for this is not alone the higher level of uncertainty compared to national transactions. Moreover, public ordering does not work efficiently due to the fact that national states do not play the active role as a frame-setter they used to play in the national context. Supranational institutions are not able to fill this gap. Against this background, the role of the state is to be analysed in the context of how to fill this gap in order to enable international transactions. A research framework based on grounded theory is applied in order to understand the phenomenon of the institutional gap in international transactions. Moreover, evolutionary theory is considered to represent a useful theoretical approach in order to explain how the institutional gap can be filled. Having identified mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention, system dynamic modelling is used in order to structure the respective cause-and-effect mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121947816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A model is presented, where firms issuing equity differ in the ability of their controlling shareholders to extract private benefits: thus a lemon problem, leading to cross-subsidization across issuers, is added to the moral hazard issue. A governance institution is introduced, enabling large shareholders to commit to the general interest of shareholders. The following main results are obtained. I) Such an institution is employed either as a signalling device or as a commitment tool. The relationship between governance structure (e.g. board independence) and private benefits is non-monotonic. II) The adoption of the institution is negatively related to ownership concentration, consistently with the empirical evidence that board independence is decreasing in CEO ownership. III) It is better to let the application of such governance mechanisms emerge as a market outcome, rather than be imposed by the regulation.
{"title":"Corporate Governance Institutions as Signalling and Commitment Devices","authors":"A. Baglioni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1088368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1088368","url":null,"abstract":"A model is presented, where firms issuing equity differ in the ability of their controlling shareholders to extract private benefits: thus a lemon problem, leading to cross-subsidization across issuers, is added to the moral hazard issue. A governance institution is introduced, enabling large shareholders to commit to the general interest of shareholders. The following main results are obtained. I) Such an institution is employed either as a signalling device or as a commitment tool. The relationship between governance structure (e.g. board independence) and private benefits is non-monotonic. II) The adoption of the institution is negatively related to ownership concentration, consistently with the empirical evidence that board independence is decreasing in CEO ownership. III) It is better to let the application of such governance mechanisms emerge as a market outcome, rather than be imposed by the regulation.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"403 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123251650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.
{"title":"Interest Group Politics in a Federation","authors":"S. Guriev, Evgeny Yakovlev, E. Zhuravskaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.983883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983883","url":null,"abstract":"The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114421823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-11DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-646X.2008.01016.x
Stephen B. Salter, A. Schulz, Philip A. Lewis, J. López V.
One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share bad news (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross-cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information-sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision-makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision-makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision-makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.
{"title":"Otra Empanada En La Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia","authors":"Stephen B. Salter, A. Schulz, Philip A. Lewis, J. López V.","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-646X.2008.01016.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646X.2008.01016.x","url":null,"abstract":"One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share bad news (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross-cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information-sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision-makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision-makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision-makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124677385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
By examining several different types of open institutions including open source software, open science, open square and (open) urban planning, this paper presents a general analysis of open institutional structure that is complementary to traditional proprietary mode. We argue that open institutions, in whatever forms, are essentially about decentralized production of a collective good (or “commons”) that relies on voluntary collaboration of highly variable human-related input. In addition to providing a general definition of open institutional structure, we submit there are two necessary conditions for open institutions. The first is the integration of consumers into production. The second condition is that the efficiency gain from “production” commons is the objective and the tragedy of anticommons becomes a serious problem. In this sense, open institutions represent a positive approach toward externality and uncertainty.
{"title":"What is 'Open'? An Economic Analysis of Open Institutions","authors":"F. Deng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1138203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1138203","url":null,"abstract":"By examining several different types of open institutions including open source software, open science, open square and (open) urban planning, this paper presents a general analysis of open institutional structure that is complementary to traditional proprietary mode. We argue that open institutions, in whatever forms, are essentially about decentralized production of a collective good (or “commons”) that relies on voluntary collaboration of highly variable human-related input. In addition to providing a general definition of open institutional structure, we submit there are two necessary conditions for open institutions. The first is the integration of consumers into production. The second condition is that the efficiency gain from “production” commons is the objective and the tragedy of anticommons becomes a serious problem. In this sense, open institutions represent a positive approach toward externality and uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129475568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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