Pub Date : 2009-03-10DOI: 10.1163/187197409X12525781476088
J. Gathii
This article discusses the role war has played in shaping the rules of international investment law from the late nineteenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the move towards institutions, such as arbitration forums, and rules as an alternative to the use of force gave new impetus to the growth of international commercial law and related institutions. These rules and institutions represented the hope that the use of force would be eclipsed as States moved forward towards more cooperative, consensual and non-coercive mechanisms of dispute settlement. Capital-importing states in Latin America however became acutely aware that these institutions and rules did not completely erase the coercive and uneven relations they had with capital-exporting states. In era after era of reformism from the Calvo era, to the NIEO and to the era in opposition to neo-liberal economic governance, capital-importing States have continued to resist and sometimes adapt to the coercive realities of the rules of international investment law. The article begins by tracing the origin of the Drago doctrine as a response to the practice of European states that engaged in aggression and conquest against militarily and economically weaker Latin American states as a means of collecting debts owed to their citizens. It then shows that while the denouement of forcible measures to resolve contract debt was overstated by early twentieth century international lawyers, international law nevertheless provided avenues for dispute settlement outside the use of force in international commercial relations. Thus while protecting commerce from the scourge of war was a primary inspiration for the post-Second World War international economic order, the author shows how war has nevertheless continued to be an animating factor for former colonies particularly with regard to their State responsibility for war damage in the context of foreign investment.
{"title":"War's Legacy in International Investment Law","authors":"J. Gathii","doi":"10.1163/187197409X12525781476088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/187197409X12525781476088","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the role war has played in shaping the rules of international investment law from the late nineteenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the move towards institutions, such as arbitration forums, and rules as an alternative to the use of force gave new impetus to the growth of international commercial law and related institutions. These rules and institutions represented the hope that the use of force would be eclipsed as States moved forward towards more cooperative, consensual and non-coercive mechanisms of dispute settlement. Capital-importing states in Latin America however became acutely aware that these institutions and rules did not completely erase the coercive and uneven relations they had with capital-exporting states. In era after era of reformism from the Calvo era, to the NIEO and to the era in opposition to neo-liberal economic governance, capital-importing States have continued to resist and sometimes adapt to the coercive realities of the rules of international investment law. The article begins by tracing the origin of the Drago doctrine as a response to the practice of European states that engaged in aggression and conquest against militarily and economically weaker Latin American states as a means of collecting debts owed to their citizens. It then shows that while the denouement of forcible measures to resolve contract debt was overstated by early twentieth century international lawyers, international law nevertheless provided avenues for dispute settlement outside the use of force in international commercial relations. Thus while protecting commerce from the scourge of war was a primary inspiration for the post-Second World War international economic order, the author shows how war has nevertheless continued to be an animating factor for former colonies particularly with regard to their State responsibility for war damage in the context of foreign investment.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128317697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unrestricted flows of information usually improve efficiency. The recent growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools have paved the road for the collection and analysis of a vast amount of data about consumers. Firms who possess such information can target individual consumers (or certain groups of consumers) more effectively. We investigate whether consumers can claim some of the value of their own private information, while at the same time efficient flows of information are guaranteed. We address this question in a principal-agent adverse selection model. Prior to the contracting stage, the agent (consumer) chooses how much (precision) of his private information to sell to the principal. This gives rise to a signaling game that precedes the adverse selection stage. We show that there exists a pooling efficient equilibrium, where both agent types sell all their information to the principal.
{"title":"Efficiency, Welfare and Ownership of Private Information","authors":"Qihong Liu, Konstantinos Serfes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.963155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.963155","url":null,"abstract":"Unrestricted flows of information usually improve efficiency. The recent growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools have paved the road for the collection and analysis of a vast amount of data about consumers. Firms who possess such information can target individual consumers (or certain groups of consumers) more effectively. We investigate whether consumers can claim some of the value of their own private information, while at the same time efficient flows of information are guaranteed. We address this question in a principal-agent adverse selection model. Prior to the contracting stage, the agent (consumer) chooses how much (precision) of his private information to sell to the principal. This gives rise to a signaling game that precedes the adverse selection stage. We show that there exists a pooling efficient equilibrium, where both agent types sell all their information to the principal.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123939004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
'Who' is accountable to 'whom' becomes a crucial issue in new modes of governance. The thrust of a substantial literature on regulatory governance at the global or national level is towards a search for substitute mechanisms of accountability and monitoring, operating outside formal governmental institutions. And here, what I term 'accountability communities' perform a crucial function. Accountability communities are complex and composed of public and/or private organisations and they: a) perform legislative, monitoring and compliance activities in specific functionally based regulatory regimes within and beyond, national boundaries; b) operate through institutional forms such as deliberative forums, markets, or use of network mechanisms; and c) possess particular understandings of accountability that binds various actors together.
{"title":"Retailing Governance? The Rise of Accountability Communities","authors":"Kanishka Jayasuriya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1352770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352770","url":null,"abstract":"'Who' is accountable to 'whom' becomes a crucial issue in new modes of governance. The thrust of a substantial literature on regulatory governance at the global or national level is towards a search for substitute mechanisms of accountability and monitoring, operating outside formal governmental institutions. And here, what I term 'accountability communities' perform a crucial function. Accountability communities are complex and composed of public and/or private organisations and they: a) perform legislative, monitoring and compliance activities in specific functionally based regulatory regimes within and beyond, national boundaries; b) operate through institutional forms such as deliberative forums, markets, or use of network mechanisms; and c) possess particular understandings of accountability that binds various actors together.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114835327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-02-11DOI: 10.1163/157237408X412907
Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann
The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is probably the most prominent signpost for the internationalization of educational policy. The PISA reports on the performance of secondary school students have become an important factor for educational policy-making in the developed world. In some states PISA has spurred more educational reforms than anything before it during the last decades. What is more, PISA succeeded in shifting approach and focus in a most sensitive area of domestic policy touching on social justice and the self-understanding of the citizenry: Because of PISA, policy-making in the field of school education changed from normative, input-oriented reasoning to comparative, empirical, output-oriented analysis. The international plane succeeded in establishing itself as indispensable in a field thus far essentially conceived as domestic.PISA owes its impact on educational policy to a mode of governance which we call "governance by information". It describes mechanisms which impact on a given policy field by shaping the cognitive framework of policy-making through the collection, processing and dissemination of information. International and supranational institutions more and more often take recourse to governance by information. This article explores the repercussions of governance by information for international law in an approach that stresses the publicness of public international law and the role of international institutional law in legally framing global governance. Thus far, these questions have been hardly explored, in spite of the enormous impact of PISA on national policy. We hypothesize that this is because the knowledge and experience of international lawyers relate mostly to international treaties and other binding legal instruments. Governance by information, by contrast, determines society indirectly through instruments which establish or contribute to the cognitive setting within which policy-makers operate. But since no legal obligations are imposed upon states or individuals, it escapes the established perspective of international lawyers, just as many other instruments, actors and processes of global governance do.In the article, we first provide an overview of PISA and its legal framework (II). Thereafter, we explain why PISA should be considered an exercise of public authority and why it therefore needs a solid public law framework. This part develops a concept of international public authority that focuses on the social relevance of official acts and their impact on individual freedom (III). Third, we explore on a theoretical level how a legal framework could be established for new forms of public authority. In the tradition of German and Italian public law scholarship we suggest the doctrinal construction of "standard instruments" (Handlungsformen). This doctrinal construction does not rest on the belief that legal concepts automatically evoke legitimacy. Rather, it stresses the communicat
{"title":"The Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessment: The OECD's PISA Policy as a Paradigm for a New International Standard Instrument","authors":"Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann","doi":"10.1163/157237408X412907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/157237408X412907","url":null,"abstract":"The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is probably the most prominent signpost for the internationalization of educational policy. The PISA reports on the performance of secondary school students have become an important factor for educational policy-making in the developed world. In some states PISA has spurred more educational reforms than anything before it during the last decades. What is more, PISA succeeded in shifting approach and focus in a most sensitive area of domestic policy touching on social justice and the self-understanding of the citizenry: Because of PISA, policy-making in the field of school education changed from normative, input-oriented reasoning to comparative, empirical, output-oriented analysis. The international plane succeeded in establishing itself as indispensable in a field thus far essentially conceived as domestic.PISA owes its impact on educational policy to a mode of governance which we call \"governance by information\". It describes mechanisms which impact on a given policy field by shaping the cognitive framework of policy-making through the collection, processing and dissemination of information. International and supranational institutions more and more often take recourse to governance by information. This article explores the repercussions of governance by information for international law in an approach that stresses the publicness of public international law and the role of international institutional law in legally framing global governance. Thus far, these questions have been hardly explored, in spite of the enormous impact of PISA on national policy. We hypothesize that this is because the knowledge and experience of international lawyers relate mostly to international treaties and other binding legal instruments. Governance by information, by contrast, determines society indirectly through instruments which establish or contribute to the cognitive setting within which policy-makers operate. But since no legal obligations are imposed upon states or individuals, it escapes the established perspective of international lawyers, just as many other instruments, actors and processes of global governance do.In the article, we first provide an overview of PISA and its legal framework (II). Thereafter, we explain why PISA should be considered an exercise of public authority and why it therefore needs a solid public law framework. This part develops a concept of international public authority that focuses on the social relevance of official acts and their impact on individual freedom (III). Third, we explore on a theoretical level how a legal framework could be established for new forms of public authority. In the tradition of German and Italian public law scholarship we suggest the doctrinal construction of \"standard instruments\" (Handlungsformen). This doctrinal construction does not rest on the belief that legal concepts automatically evoke legitimacy. Rather, it stresses the communicat","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"29 15","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120957296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-02-02DOI: 10.1163/187197308x356912
Michael Fakhri
Th is paper sketches out some preliminary thoughts on political economy that stem from problematics that emerge from Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). The TWAIL story of international law is one of frustration and disappointment because of the constant exploitation of the Third World despite all the historic changes in international legal ideas and institutions, but it also a story of hope in the moments of resistance. In order to better debate how particular international institutions should be changed or whether particular international institutions should be renounced, I suggest that we need to explicate the theories of political economy embedded within these institutions. Drawing from Karl Polanyi's Th e Great Transformation, bringing alongside the work of Michel Foucault, I sketch out one way of conducting a study of international political economy by suggesting that we can think of law as the interplay of ideas, institutions, and interests.
{"title":"Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, and Interests: Using Polyani (and Foucault) to Ask TWAIL Questions","authors":"Michael Fakhri","doi":"10.1163/187197308x356912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/187197308x356912","url":null,"abstract":"Th is paper sketches out some preliminary thoughts on political economy that stem from problematics that emerge from Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). The TWAIL story of international law is one of frustration and disappointment because of the constant exploitation of the Third World despite all the historic changes in international legal ideas and institutions, but it also a story of hope in the moments of resistance. In order to better debate how particular international institutions should be changed or whether particular international institutions should be renounced, I suggest that we need to explicate the theories of political economy embedded within these institutions. Drawing from Karl Polanyi's Th e Great Transformation, bringing alongside the work of Michel Foucault, I sketch out one way of conducting a study of international political economy by suggesting that we can think of law as the interplay of ideas, institutions, and interests.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123294790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Four interrelated arguments are presented to form a theory about the relation between the logic of markets, social efficiency and the quality of government. The first is that competitive markets with a certain set of characteristics are the most efficient organizational form for creating a utilitarian based economic efficiency for the production of most goods and services. The second argument is that in order to reach this utilitarian based social efficiency, markets need large and complicated set of institutions, formal as well as informal. Since such institutions will in the long run make all market agents better off, they are labelled efficient institutions. The third argument is that it is unlikely that such institutions will be created endogenously by market agents. Moreover, if such institutions have been created, we should expect market agents to try to destroy them. Based on insights from various approaches (institutional economics and research on neo-corporatism, clientilism, and corruption) there is no reason to expect that efficient institutions will evolve by any selection mechanism that is generated from the sum of agency that exists in markets. The conclusion reached is that if left to themselves, markets are inherently selfdestructive. The fourth argument is that markets can only reach social efficiency if the agents that reproduce the necessary efficient type of institutions act according to a logic that is different from the logic that market agents use when operating in the market. This operational logic is the ethical dimensions of what should count as quality of government.
{"title":"Preventing Markets from Self-Destruction: The Quality of Government Factor","authors":"Bo Rothstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1328819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328819","url":null,"abstract":"Four interrelated arguments are presented to form a theory about the relation between the logic of markets, social efficiency and the quality of government. The first is that competitive markets with a certain set of characteristics are the most efficient organizational form for creating a utilitarian based economic efficiency for the production of most goods and services. The second argument is that in order to reach this utilitarian based social efficiency, markets need large and complicated set of institutions, formal as well as informal. Since such institutions will in the long run make all market agents better off, they are labelled efficient institutions. The third argument is that it is unlikely that such institutions will be created endogenously by market agents. Moreover, if such institutions have been created, we should expect market agents to try to destroy them. Based on insights from various approaches (institutional economics and research on neo-corporatism, clientilism, and corruption) there is no reason to expect that efficient institutions will evolve by any selection mechanism that is generated from the sum of agency that exists in markets. The conclusion reached is that if left to themselves, markets are inherently selfdestructive. The fourth argument is that markets can only reach social efficiency if the agents that reproduce the necessary efficient type of institutions act according to a logic that is different from the logic that market agents use when operating in the market. This operational logic is the ethical dimensions of what should count as quality of government.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133286238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At the beginning of the present century, a debate over the compatibility of constitutionalism and pragmatism erupted in the pages of the journal Administration and Society. Several scholars (especially James Stever, Kevin Snider and Patricia Shields) expressed concern that Deweyan pragmatism, or the classic pragmatism of John Dewey that some contemporary philosophers subscribe to, might be incompatible with the commitment to constitutional order found at the heart of the administrative state tradition. In this paper, the issue that arose in Administration and Society is framed more generally: Can pragmatists, and particularly Deweyan pragmatists, be constitutionalists? By way of answering this question, I define Dewey’s experimentalism in terms of his theory of inquiry and action, before proceeding to the administrative state debate, where the claim emerges that constitutional limits offend the experimentalist drive of Dewey’s pragmatism. Next, three typical (though by no means exhaustive) conceptions of constitutionalism are presented: (i) traditionalism (or that a constitution expresses the traditions or mores of its drafters’ society), (ii) organicism (or that a constitution is a living document, the meaning of which evolves with the changing values and norms of each new generation) and (iii) functionalism (or that a constitution functions as an ordering device, both creating and perpetuating legitimate legal-political frameworks). Then, I consider whether a founding document modeled after each conception can preserve political stability amidst a tolerable level of political change without offending Dewey’s experimentalism. In light of Dewey’s essay “Presenting Thomas Jefferson,” a related issue arises: Does Jefferson’s notion of generational sovereignty have any bearing on the matter of pragmatism and constitutionalism’s compatibility? The paper concludes with a final evaluation of the degree to which Deweyan experimentalism can accommodate a commitment to constitutionalism in its various forms.
本世纪初，《行政与社会》(administrative and Society)杂志上爆发了一场关于宪政与实用主义是否相容的辩论。一些学者(尤其是James Stever, Kevin Snider和Patricia Shields)表达了对杜威实用主义的担忧，或者一些当代哲学家赞同的约翰·杜威的经典实用主义，可能与行政国家传统核心的宪法秩序的承诺不相容。在本文中，《行政与社会》中出现的问题被更广泛地提出:实用主义者，特别是杜威实用主义者，能成为宪政主义者吗?为了回答这个问题，我将杜威的实验主义定义为他的调查和行动理论，然后再进行行政国家辩论，在辩论中出现了宪法限制冒犯了杜威实用主义的实验主义驱动的主张。接下来，提出了三个典型的(尽管并非详尽无遗的)宪政概念:(i)传统主义(或宪法表达了其起草者社会的传统或习俗)，(ii)组织论(或宪法是一份活的文件，其意义随着每一代人不断变化的价值观和规范而演变)和(iii)功能主义(或宪法作为一种秩序工具，既创造又延续合法的法律政治框架)。然后，我考虑一个以每个概念为模型的建国文件是否可以在一个可容忍的政治变革水平中保持政治稳定，而不冒犯杜威的实验主义。根据杜威的文章“介绍托马斯·杰斐逊”，一个相关的问题出现了:杰斐逊的代际主权概念是否与实用主义和宪政主义的兼容性有关?本文最后对杜威的实验主义能在多大程度上容纳对各种形式的宪政的承诺作了最后的评价。
{"title":"Can Pragmatists be Constitutionalists? Dewey, Jefferson and the Experimental Constitution","authors":"S. Ralston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1322818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1322818","url":null,"abstract":"At the beginning of the present century, a debate over the compatibility of constitutionalism and pragmatism erupted in the pages of the journal Administration and Society. Several scholars (especially James Stever, Kevin Snider and Patricia Shields) expressed concern that Deweyan pragmatism, or the classic pragmatism of John Dewey that some contemporary philosophers subscribe to, might be incompatible with the commitment to constitutional order found at the heart of the administrative state tradition. In this paper, the issue that arose in Administration and Society is framed more generally: Can pragmatists, and particularly Deweyan pragmatists, be constitutionalists? By way of answering this question, I define Dewey’s experimentalism in terms of his theory of inquiry and action, before proceeding to the administrative state debate, where the claim emerges that constitutional limits offend the experimentalist drive of Dewey’s pragmatism. Next, three typical (though by no means exhaustive) conceptions of constitutionalism are presented: (i) traditionalism (or that a constitution expresses the traditions or mores of its drafters’ society), (ii) organicism (or that a constitution is a living document, the meaning of which evolves with the changing values and norms of each new generation) and (iii) functionalism (or that a constitution functions as an ordering device, both creating and perpetuating legitimate legal-political frameworks). Then, I consider whether a founding document modeled after each conception can preserve political stability amidst a tolerable level of political change without offending Dewey’s experimentalism. In light of Dewey’s essay “Presenting Thomas Jefferson,” a related issue arises: Does Jefferson’s notion of generational sovereignty have any bearing on the matter of pragmatism and constitutionalism’s compatibility? The paper concludes with a final evaluation of the degree to which Deweyan experimentalism can accommodate a commitment to constitutionalism in its various forms.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130165221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-01-01DOI: 10.1108/1525383X200900021
P. Hwang, Ajai S. Gaur
We argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) not only strive to minimize transaction costs but also attempt to maximize transaction values when interacting with local firms in foreign markets. We put forth our thesis regarding MNE governance structure, that it is contingent on the institutional environment of the host country and the characteristics of the transaction. Specifically, we suggest that MNEs’ choice of market, hierarchy or hybrid (joint ventures) form of governance, depends on the interplay between the costs and benefits of a transaction relationship. For high knowledge content products/services, MNEs choose hierarchy when the institutional environment is not well developed. As the institutional environment develops, hybrid replaces hierarchy. However, in a very strong institutional environment, hierarchy again turns out to be optimal for MNEs. For low or no knowledge content products/services, the presence of market is possible in a very advanced institutional environment.
{"title":"Organizational Efficiency, Firm Capabilities, and Economic Organization of MNEs","authors":"P. Hwang, Ajai S. Gaur","doi":"10.1108/1525383X200900021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/1525383X200900021","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) not only strive to minimize transaction costs but also attempt to maximize transaction values when interacting with local firms in foreign markets. We put forth our thesis regarding MNE governance structure, that it is contingent on the institutional environment of the host country and the characteristics of the transaction. Specifically, we suggest that MNEs’ choice of market, hierarchy or hybrid (joint ventures) form of governance, depends on the interplay between the costs and benefits of a transaction relationship. For high knowledge content products/services, MNEs choose hierarchy when the institutional environment is not well developed. As the institutional environment develops, hybrid replaces hierarchy. However, in a very strong institutional environment, hierarchy again turns out to be optimal for MNEs. For low or no knowledge content products/services, the presence of market is possible in a very advanced institutional environment.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123325102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A comment on the theoretical consequences of the credit crunch on neoliberalism as a development doctrine.
评论信贷紧缩对新自由主义作为一种发展主义的理论影响。
{"title":"The Credit Crunch and the End of Neoliberalism","authors":"Ioannis Glinavos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1312722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1312722","url":null,"abstract":"A comment on the theoretical consequences of the credit crunch on neoliberalism as a development doctrine.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126017528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-12-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2008.00423.x
Wenli Cheng, DingSheng Zhang
This paper presents a simple model to investigate the effectiveness of foreign aid. It shows that foreign aid is most effective if it is given to a market economy with relatively high transaction efficiency. If transaction efficiency in a market economy is low due to, for instance, bad institutions or policies, then foreign aid will either be largely dissipated as transaction costs or can even lead to retrogression of market activities. In either case, it will be more effective to give foreign aid to poor primitive economies with no developed markets. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
{"title":"Who Should be Given More Foreign Aid?","authors":"Wenli Cheng, DingSheng Zhang","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0106.2008.00423.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2008.00423.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a simple model to investigate the effectiveness of foreign aid. It shows that foreign aid is most effective if it is given to a market economy with relatively high transaction efficiency. If transaction efficiency in a market economy is low due to, for instance, bad institutions or policies, then foreign aid will either be largely dissipated as transaction costs or can even lead to retrogression of market activities. In either case, it will be more effective to give foreign aid to poor primitive economies with no developed markets. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"369 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133652303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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