Pub Date : 2016-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.RGAN
R. Gandhi, Christopher R. Knittel, P. Pedro, A. Wolfram
Researchers and professional evaluators are increasingly turning to randomized field experiments to evaluate energy efficiency programs and policies. This article provides a brief overview of several experimental methods and discusses their application to energy efficiency programs. We highlight experimental designs, such as randomized encouragement and recruit-and-deny, that are particularly well suited for situations where participation cannot be enforced. The article then discusses several implementation issues that can arise and characterizes applications that are a good fit for a randomized experiment. We also address the most common objections to field experiments, and share the best practices to consider when designing and implementing a field experiment in this space.
{"title":"Running Randomized Field Experiments for Energy Efficiency Programs: A Practitioners Guide","authors":"R. Gandhi, Christopher R. Knittel, P. Pedro, A. Wolfram","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.RGAN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.RGAN","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers and professional evaluators are increasingly turning to randomized field experiments to evaluate energy efficiency programs and policies. This article provides a brief overview of several experimental methods and discusses their application to energy efficiency programs. We highlight experimental designs, such as randomized encouragement and recruit-and-deny, that are particularly well suited for situations where participation cannot be enforced. The article then discusses several implementation issues that can arise and characterizes applications that are a good fit for a randomized experiment. We also address the most common objections to field experiments, and share the best practices to consider when designing and implementing a field experiment in this space.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121634313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.LBUI
Linda T Bui
I investigate whether households face reduced access to energy efficient goods in low income and minority neighborhoods. Using data from 27,000 zip codes, I uncover empirical regularities in access to three categories of ENERGYSTAR@ goods: light bulbs, electronics, and appliances. I find that (1) lower income neighborhoods experience reduced access to ENERGYSTAR@ goods; and that (2) for light bulbs and household appliances, more diverse neighborhoods have greater access to energy efficient goods than more homogeneous neighborhoods, regardless of race. The opposite holds true for household electronics. This is the first study of this issue.
{"title":"Is the Grass Greener on the Other Side","authors":"Linda T Bui","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.LBUI","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.5.2.LBUI","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate whether households face reduced access to energy efficient goods in low income and minority neighborhoods. Using data from 27,000 zip codes, I uncover empirical regularities in access to three categories of ENERGYSTAR@ goods: light bulbs, electronics, and appliances. I find that (1) lower income neighborhoods experience reduced access to ENERGYSTAR@ goods; and that (2) for light bulbs and household appliances, more diverse neighborhoods have greater access to energy efficient goods than more homogeneous neighborhoods, regardless of race. The opposite holds true for household electronics. This is the first study of this issue.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117202942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.5.1.KOFU
Kenta Tatsumi
This study provides an overview of the current status of the wholesale and retail electricity markets in Japan, with a focus on the results of market revitalization policies, such as the thermal power bidding system, regular backup, and partial supply system. This study also offers a perspective on the future of the Electricity System Reform policy currently under way. Throughout the history of Japan's electricity market reform, the implementation of full-scale retail deregulation and the unbundling of electricity generation from the transmission and distribution (T&D) sectors have been significant issues. The outcomes and issues generated by market revitalization efforts indicate that reforms have entered the crucial stage that determines whether consumers will actually benefit from them.
{"title":"Wholesale and retail electricity markets in Japan: Results of market revitalization measures and prospects for the current reform","authors":"Kenta Tatsumi","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.5.1.KOFU","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.5.1.KOFU","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides an overview of the current status of the wholesale and retail electricity markets in Japan, with a focus on the results of market revitalization policies, such as the thermal power bidding system, regular backup, and partial supply system. This study also offers a perspective on the future of the Electricity System Reform policy currently under way. Throughout the history of Japan's electricity market reform, the implementation of full-scale retail deregulation and the unbundling of electricity generation from the transmission and distribution (T&D) sectors have been significant issues. The outcomes and issues generated by market revitalization efforts indicate that reforms have entered the crucial stage that determines whether consumers will actually benefit from them.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133156231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.AKRU
A. Krupnick, N. Richardson, M. Gottlieb
{"title":"Heterogeneity of State Shale Gas Regulations","authors":"A. Krupnick, N. Richardson, M. Gottlieb","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.AKRU","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.AKRU","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"260 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121148411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.CGOL
C. Gollier, J. Tirole
In environmental matters, the free riding generated by the lack of collective action is aggravated by concerns about leakages and by the desire to receive compensation in future negotiations. The dominant "pledge and review" approach to mitigation will deliver appealing promises and renewed victory statements, only to prolong the waiting game. The climate change global commons problem will be solved only through coherent carbon pricing. We discuss the roadmap for the negotiation process. Negotiators must return to the fundamentals: the need for uniform carbon pricing across countries, for verification, and for a governance process to which countries would commit. Each country would enjoy subsidiarity in its allocation of efforts within the country. We suggest an enforcement scheme based on financial and trade penalties to induce all countries to participate and comply with the agreement. Finally, the choice among economic approaches, whether a carbon price commitment or a cap-and-trade, is subject to trade-offs, on which alternative reasonable views may co-exist. We discuss monitoring reasons for why we personally favor an international cap-and-trade agreement.
{"title":"Negotiating effective institutions against climate change","authors":"C. Gollier, J. Tirole","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.CGOL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.CGOL","url":null,"abstract":"In environmental matters, the free riding generated by the lack of collective action is aggravated by concerns about leakages and by the desire to receive compensation in future negotiations. The dominant \"pledge and review\" approach to mitigation will deliver appealing promises and renewed victory statements, only to prolong the waiting game. The climate change global commons problem will be solved only through coherent carbon pricing. We discuss the roadmap for the negotiation process. Negotiators must return to the fundamentals: the need for uniform carbon pricing across countries, for verification, and for a governance process to which countries would commit. Each country would enjoy subsidiarity in its allocation of efforts within the country. We suggest an enforcement scheme based on financial and trade penalties to induce all countries to participate and comply with the agreement. Finally, the choice among economic approaches, whether a carbon price commitment or a cap-and-trade, is subject to trade-offs, on which alternative reasonable views may co-exist. We discuss monitoring reasons for why we personally favor an international cap-and-trade agreement.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114200920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.SSTR
Sebastian Strunz, E. Gawel, P. Lehmann
It is often argued that energy policy is too fragmented across EU Member States and should be "Europeanized" to pave the way towards an efficiently organized European power system, which rests on the internal market for energy and a pan-European super-grid. However, this view neglects i) the heterogeneity of European energy policies in terms of harmonization and centralization, ii) economic arguments in favor of decentralization and iii) legal as well as political-economic obstacles against centralization of decision making. In this vein, we point out that a plea for a stronger role of the EU needs to be made with care and differentiation.
{"title":"Towards a general “Europeanization” of EU Member States’ energy policies?","authors":"Sebastian Strunz, E. Gawel, P. Lehmann","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.SSTR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.SSTR","url":null,"abstract":"It is often argued that energy policy is too fragmented across EU Member States and should be \"Europeanized\" to pave the way towards an efficiently organized European power system, which rests on the internal market for energy and a pan-European super-grid. However, this view neglects i) the heterogeneity of European energy policies in terms of harmonization and centralization, ii) economic arguments in favor of decentralization and iii) legal as well as political-economic obstacles against centralization of decision making. In this vein, we point out that a plea for a stronger role of the EU needs to be made with care and differentiation.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114526197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.SIKO
Svetlana Ikonnikova, John R. Browning, G. Gülen, K. Smye, Scott W. Tinker
{"title":"Factors influencing shale gas production forecasting: Empirical studies of Barnett, Fayetteville, Haynesville, and Marcellus Shale plays","authors":"Svetlana Ikonnikova, John R. Browning, G. Gülen, K. Smye, Scott W. Tinker","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.SIKO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.SIKO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128669470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.MMAK
M. Makkonen, M. Nilsson, S. Viljainen
Infrastructure plays an obvious and crucial role in electricity markets. Physical infrastructure must exist for the supply to meet demand in real time. In addition, it accommodates the efficient exchange of cost-efficient production across borders, and can bean important part ofsharingresourcesforreliabilitypurposes.However, in the historically successful Nordic electricity market, the cross-border transmission grid investments are lagging behind the original schedule agreed between the Nordic TSOs. Moreover, in early 2013, the Norwegian and Swedish Transmission System Operators (TSOs) cancelled the planned, by many considered critical, Hasle (Westlink) transmission capacity increase. This paper addresses several issues concerning the cross-border transmission planning and its role for successful integration of the electricity markets. We aim at evaluating the impact of different institutional requirements for key entities as well as the changing governance structure to highlight how the infrastructure development paths are dependent on these. The evaluation of the governance structure presented in this paper is based on the historical experiences of the Nordic electricity market. Our findings suggest that the national goals in transmission development contradict the Nordic capacity development targets.
{"title":"All quiet on the western front? Transmission capacity development in the Nordic electricity market","authors":"M. Makkonen, M. Nilsson, S. Viljainen","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.MMAK","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.MMAK","url":null,"abstract":"Infrastructure plays an obvious and crucial role in electricity markets. Physical infrastructure must exist for the supply to meet demand in real time. In addition, it accommodates the efficient exchange of cost-efficient production across borders, and can bean important part ofsharingresourcesforreliabilitypurposes.However, in the historically successful Nordic electricity market, the cross-border transmission grid investments are lagging behind the original schedule agreed between the Nordic TSOs. Moreover, in early 2013, the Norwegian and Swedish Transmission System Operators (TSOs) cancelled the planned, by many considered critical, Hasle (Westlink) transmission capacity increase. This paper addresses several issues concerning the cross-border transmission planning and its role for successful integration of the electricity markets. We aim at evaluating the impact of different institutional requirements for key entities as well as the changing governance structure to highlight how the infrastructure development paths are dependent on these. The evaluation of the governance structure presented in this paper is based on the historical experiences of the Nordic electricity market. Our findings suggest that the national goals in transmission development contradict the Nordic capacity development targets.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121530170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.LGIR
L. Giraudet, D. Finon
White certificate obligations impose energy savings targets on energy companies and allow them to trade energy savings certificates. They can be seen as a means of internalizing energy-use externalities and addressing energy efficiency market failures. This paper reviews existing evaluations of experiences with white certificate obligations in Great Britain, Italy and France. Ex ante microeconomic analysis find that the obligation is best modelled as a hybrid subsidy-tax instrument, whereby energy companies subsidize energy efficiency and pass-through the subsidy cost onto energy prices. Ex post static efficiency assessments find largely positive benefit-cost balances, with national differences reflecting heterogeneity in technical potentials. Compliance involved little trading between obligated parties. Whether the cost borne by obligated parties was recovered through increased energy revenue could not be ascertained. Ex post dynamic efficiency assessments find that in addition to addressing liquidity constraints through subsidies, white certificate obligations seem to have addressed informational and organisational market failures. Confidence in these conclusions is limited by the fact that no econometric analysis was performed. Yet the lack of publicly available data, a counterpart to the rationale of the instrument of harnessing private financing, makes any empirical evaluation of white certificate obligations challenging.
{"title":"European experiences with white certificate obligations: A critical review of existing evaluations","authors":"L. Giraudet, D. Finon","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.LGIR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.1.LGIR","url":null,"abstract":"White certificate obligations impose energy savings targets on energy companies and allow them to trade energy savings certificates. They can be seen as a means of internalizing energy-use externalities and addressing energy efficiency market failures. This paper reviews existing evaluations of experiences with white certificate obligations in Great Britain, Italy and France. Ex ante microeconomic analysis find that the obligation is best modelled as a hybrid subsidy-tax instrument, whereby energy companies subsidize energy efficiency and pass-through the subsidy cost onto energy prices. Ex post static efficiency assessments find largely positive benefit-cost balances, with national differences reflecting heterogeneity in technical potentials. Compliance involved little trading between obligated parties. Whether the cost borne by obligated parties was recovered through increased energy revenue could not be ascertained. Ex post dynamic efficiency assessments find that in addition to addressing liquidity constraints through subsidies, white certificate obligations seem to have addressed informational and organisational market failures. Confidence in these conclusions is limited by the fact that no econometric analysis was performed. Yet the lack of publicly available data, a counterpart to the rationale of the instrument of harnessing private financing, makes any empirical evaluation of white certificate obligations challenging.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123566421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-06-01DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.AOCK
P. Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, S. Stoft
To promote cooperation in international climate negotiations, negotiators should focus on a common commitment. Such commitments have the advantage of facilitating reciprocal "I will if you will" agreements in a group. Reciprocity is the basis for cooperation in repeated public goods games, and a uniform price would provide a natural focal point for a common international commitment. Such a price is also essential for efficient abatement. Countries would retain flexibility in how to implement the price - with cap-and-trade, a carbon tax, or a hybrid approach. Country risk is reduced relative to risk under international cap-and-trade since carbon revenues stay within the country. Price commitments also tend to equalize effort intensity and can facilitate enforcement. To encourage participation by less-developed countries, a green fund is needed to transfer money from richer to poorer countries. Transfers are smaller and more predictable with a uniform price commitment than with international cap and trade.
{"title":"An international carbon-price commitment promotes cooperation","authors":"P. Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, S. Stoft","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.AOCK","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.AOCK","url":null,"abstract":"To promote cooperation in international climate negotiations, negotiators should focus on a common commitment. Such commitments have the advantage of facilitating reciprocal \"I will if you will\" agreements in a group. Reciprocity is the basis for cooperation in repeated public goods games, and a uniform price would provide a natural focal point for a common international commitment. Such a price is also essential for efficient abatement. Countries would retain flexibility in how to implement the price - with cap-and-trade, a carbon tax, or a hybrid approach. Country risk is reduced relative to risk under international cap-and-trade since carbon revenues stay within the country. Price commitments also tend to equalize effort intensity and can facilitate enforcement. To encourage participation by less-developed countries, a green fund is needed to transfer money from richer to poorer countries. Transfers are smaller and more predictable with a uniform price commitment than with international cap and trade.","PeriodicalId":385400,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124522338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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