Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053
Andrei Buckareff
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry.
{"title":"The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry","authors":"Andrei Buckareff","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90627
Pedro Augusto De Oliveira Barbalho
No artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2 (2008), Greimann argumenta que a negação fregeana do número 2, presente no final do sexto parágrafo de Grundgesetze (1893, 1903), não envolve nenhum absurdo ainda que, segundo ele, seja uma negação do número 2 como um termo singular. Meu ponto aqui é mostrar que, na passagem em questão, Frege não necessariamente nega o número 2 como um termo singular, mas apenas exemplifica a possibilidade de se negar o emprego do número 2 como uma classificação de outro objeto numa sentença falsa.
{"title":"Nota sobre o artigo: A negação fregueana do número 2","authors":"Pedro Augusto De Oliveira Barbalho","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90627","url":null,"abstract":"No artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2 (2008), Greimann argumenta que a negação fregeana do número 2, presente no final do sexto parágrafo de Grundgesetze (1893, 1903), não envolve nenhum absurdo ainda que, segundo ele, seja uma negação do número 2 como um termo singular. Meu ponto aqui é mostrar que, na passagem em questão, Frege não necessariamente nega o número 2 como um termo singular, mas apenas exemplifica a possibilidade de se negar o emprego do número 2 como uma classificação de outro objeto numa sentença falsa. 
 
 
","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86123
Maribel Barroso
En el presente artículo se sugiere la filosofía inductiva de la ciencia del filósofo victoriano William Whewell como un enfoque apropiado para formular una noción consiliente de la representación científica. Tras un breve recorrido por los antecedentes que hacen necesaria una noción de representación en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia, se expone, en primer lugar, la descripción de lo que se ha denominado el problema de la representación científica. De seguido, se argumenta que la anterior es una caracterización poco manejable del problema que requiere ser deflacionada en favor de un perfil más acotado, para finalmente proponer que la idiosincrática noción de inducción de William Whewell puede ser considerada para desarrollar una noción de representación científica que haga consiliente las cuentas semanticistas y pragmatistas de la representación en ciencia.
{"title":"Hacia una Teoría Consiliente de la Representación Científica","authors":"Maribel Barroso","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86123","url":null,"abstract":"En el presente artículo se sugiere la filosofía inductiva de la ciencia del filósofo victoriano William Whewell como un enfoque apropiado para formular una noción consiliente de la representación científica. Tras un breve recorrido por los antecedentes que hacen necesaria una noción de representación en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia, se expone, en primer lugar, la descripción de lo que se ha denominado el problema de la representación científica. De seguido, se argumenta que la anterior es una caracterización poco manejable del problema que requiere ser deflacionada en favor de un perfil más acotado, para finalmente proponer que la idiosincrática noción de inducción de William Whewell puede ser considerada para desarrollar una noción de representación científica que haga consiliente las cuentas semanticistas y pragmatistas de la representación en ciencia.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135352472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e95358
Dirk Greimann
Na sua resenha do meu artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2, Pedro Barbalho criticou a minha tentativa de mostrar que, dada a reconstrução da sintaxe e da semântica do sistema em Grundgesetze que apresentei num artigo anterior, a suposição de Frege de que “|Ø-- 2” é uma expressão bem-formada com um sentido e uma referência pode ser satisfatoriamente explicada. Pedro Barbalho oferece uma explicação alternativa que é sugerida pela tese Fregena no § 46 de Grundlagen de que uma afirmação sobre um número contém uma afirmação sobre um conceito. Nesta resposta, o meu objetivo é mostrar que esta estratégia para fazer sentido de “|Ø-- 2” não realmente funciona.
{"title":"A negação do número 2 em Grundgesetze e § 46 de Grundlagen: Resposta a N.N.","authors":"Dirk Greimann","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e95358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e95358","url":null,"abstract":"Na sua resenha do meu artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2, Pedro Barbalho criticou a minha tentativa de mostrar que, dada a reconstrução da sintaxe e da semântica do sistema em Grundgesetze que apresentei num artigo anterior, a suposição de Frege de que “|Ø-- 2” é uma expressão bem-formada com um sentido e uma referência pode ser satisfatoriamente explicada. Pedro Barbalho oferece uma explicação alternativa que é sugerida pela tese Fregena no § 46 de Grundlagen de que uma afirmação sobre um número contém uma afirmação sobre um conceito. Nesta resposta, o meu objetivo é mostrar que esta estratégia para fazer sentido de “|Ø-- 2” não realmente funciona.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135346877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067
Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles de Menezes
Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.
{"title":"Scrutiny of the Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism","authors":"Wilson Mendonça, Julia Telles de Menezes","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e88067","url":null,"abstract":"Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135352479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90604
Santiago Ginnobili
Desmond and Moore point out that the key to understanding Darwin’s The Descent of Man is his abolitionist motivation and his advocacy that races constitute subspecies. Roberta Millstein raises some doubts about the importance of this motivation. She points out that the inclusion of the extensive section devoted to non-human animals is not justified by Darwin’s treatment of humans per se, because his explanation of the origin of races is peculiar. In this sense, she argues that Darwin’s specific explanation of the origin of races does not confirm the central importance that Desmond and Moore give to Darwin’s abolitionism. In this paper I have two different aims. On the one hand, to show that the human case actually is based on the treatment of nonhuman animals, and consequently, Darwin’s argument is not as poor as Millstein believes. My second goal, taking Millstein’s challenge seriously, is to show that Darwin’s explanation of the origin of races does confirm the Desmond and Moore thesis in a deeper sense than the one they propose themselves. For the anti-slavery motivation could not only explain the fact that Darwin sees all humans as forming the same species, but the specific explanation he gives for the origin of races.
{"title":"Sexual Selection and the Brotherhood of Humans: Does the argument of The Descent of Man confirm The sacred cause thesis?","authors":"Santiago Ginnobili","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e90604","url":null,"abstract":"Desmond and Moore point out that the key to understanding Darwin’s The Descent of Man is his abolitionist motivation and his advocacy that races constitute subspecies. Roberta Millstein raises some doubts about the importance of this motivation. She points out that the inclusion of the extensive section devoted to non-human animals is not justified by Darwin’s treatment of humans per se, because his explanation of the origin of races is peculiar. In this sense, she argues that Darwin’s specific explanation of the origin of races does not confirm the central importance that Desmond and Moore give to Darwin’s abolitionism. In this paper I have two different aims. On the one hand, to show that the human case actually is based on the treatment of nonhuman animals, and consequently, Darwin’s argument is not as poor as Millstein believes. My second goal, taking Millstein’s challenge seriously, is to show that Darwin’s explanation of the origin of races does confirm the Desmond and Moore thesis in a deeper sense than the one they propose themselves. For the anti-slavery motivation could not only explain the fact that Darwin sees all humans as forming the same species, but the specific explanation he gives for the origin of races.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86155
Eric Gilbertson
It appears that there is an inconsistency in combining epistemic contextualism with a plausible closure principle for knowledge and the view that knowledge is factive. I discuss the proposal that in order to avoid inconsistency the contextualist should reject closure and retain factivity. The proposal offers an alternative to closure and an argument that warrant fails to transmit through inference in the relevant cases. I criticize both accounts. The proposed alternative to closure is not well motivated and leaves unresolved the question of why standard closure should not hold. The argument that warrant does not transmit is based on an inaccurate model of warrant transmission. An important lesson that emerges is that known propositions themselves can serve as warrant for further propositions, which may be known provided they are competently deduced from the former. Indeed it is arguably the factivity of knowledge that accounts for the fact that known propositions themselves serve as warrant. Thus, the strategy of rejecting closure while retaining factivity is a bad one not merely because the proposed alternatives to standard closure are inadequate and transmission failure in relevant cases would not imply closure failure, but because factivity ensures that warrant transmission worries in the relevant cases are unfounded.
{"title":"Against the anti-closure response to the factivity problem for epistemic contextualism","authors":"Eric Gilbertson","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86155","url":null,"abstract":"It appears that there is an inconsistency in combining epistemic contextualism with a plausible closure principle for knowledge and the view that knowledge is factive. I discuss the proposal that in order to avoid inconsistency the contextualist should reject closure and retain factivity. The proposal offers an alternative to closure and an argument that warrant fails to transmit through inference in the relevant cases. I criticize both accounts. The proposed alternative to closure is not well motivated and leaves unresolved the question of why standard closure should not hold. The argument that warrant does not transmit is based on an inaccurate model of warrant transmission. An important lesson that emerges is that known propositions themselves can serve as warrant for further propositions, which may be known provided they are competently deduced from the former. Indeed it is arguably the factivity of knowledge that accounts for the fact that known propositions themselves serve as warrant. Thus, the strategy of rejecting closure while retaining factivity is a bad one not merely because the proposed alternatives to standard closure are inadequate and transmission failure in relevant cases would not imply closure failure, but because factivity ensures that warrant transmission worries in the relevant cases are unfounded.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135352474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85209
Alvaro David Monterroza-Rios
Algunas concepciones tradicionales de cultura suelen considerarla como un depósito de representaciones abstractas (información o conocimiento) mientras que otras la consideran un conjunto de mecanismos simbólicos de control de la conducta. Ambas concepciones suponen que los contenidos de la cultura son procesados o interiorizados por las mentes de los individuos, ya sea de una manera más o menos directa, o recurriendo a las estructuras mentales aprendidas en procesos de socialización simbólica. Las teorías corporizadas de la cognición, en especial el enactivismo, cuestionan estas ideas al no formular claridades sobre cómo se dan estos procesos de enculturación. Se defiende la idea de que la cultura debería ser considerada más allá de sus resultados (conocimientos, creencias, valores, costumbres, leyes, etc.) y comprenderla como un conjunto de prácticas significativas en los que sus procesos de enculturación se dan por el acople dinámico entre los agentes humanos y sus entornos de cultura material, a través de la búsqueda de sentido participativa. Se discute si esta idea de presentar la cultura desde un punto de vista enactivo puede llevar a un reduccionismo biologicista, así como también de qué manera podría relacionarse el enactivismo con enfoques cercanos como la psicología ecológica.
{"title":"Una Concepción Enactiva de Cultura: Enculturación como Acople Dinámico entre Seres Humanos y sus Entornos de Cultura Material","authors":"Alvaro David Monterroza-Rios","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85209","url":null,"abstract":"Algunas concepciones tradicionales de cultura suelen considerarla como un depósito de representaciones abstractas (información o conocimiento) mientras que otras la consideran un conjunto de mecanismos simbólicos de control de la conducta. Ambas concepciones suponen que los contenidos de la cultura son procesados o interiorizados por las mentes de los individuos, ya sea de una manera más o menos directa, o recurriendo a las estructuras mentales aprendidas en procesos de socialización simbólica. Las teorías corporizadas de la cognición, en especial el enactivismo, cuestionan estas ideas al no formular claridades sobre cómo se dan estos procesos de enculturación. Se defiende la idea de que la cultura debería ser considerada más allá de sus resultados (conocimientos, creencias, valores, costumbres, leyes, etc.) y comprenderla como un conjunto de prácticas significativas en los que sus procesos de enculturación se dan por el acople dinámico entre los agentes humanos y sus entornos de cultura material, a través de la búsqueda de sentido participativa. Se discute si esta idea de presentar la cultura desde un punto de vista enactivo puede llevar a un reduccionismo biologicista, así como también de qué manera podría relacionarse el enactivismo con enfoques cercanos como la psicología ecológica.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e83312
Frank Thomas Sautter
A Lógica Contemporânea dá pouca ou, mesmo, nenhuma atenção à construção de argumentos para uma conclusão dada, diferentemente do que ocorre nos Analíticos Anteriores, de Aristóteles. O procedimento de Aristóteles foi, posteriormente, compilado sob a forma de um diagrama lógico conhecido como “Ponte de Asnos” (Pons Asinorum). Neste trabalho proponho um procedimento para a construção de argumentos para uma dada conclusão, no âmbito da Lógica Proposicional Clássica, abstraído do procedimento de Aristóteles. Utilizo a noção de informação semântica como fio de Ariadne para a obtenção do procedimento.
{"title":"Pons Asinorum para a Lógica Proposicional Clássica","authors":"Frank Thomas Sautter","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e83312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e83312","url":null,"abstract":"A Lógica Contemporânea dá pouca ou, mesmo, nenhuma atenção à construção de argumentos para uma conclusão dada, diferentemente do que ocorre nos Analíticos Anteriores, de Aristóteles. O procedimento de Aristóteles foi, posteriormente, compilado sob a forma de um diagrama lógico conhecido como “Ponte de Asnos” (Pons Asinorum). Neste trabalho proponho um procedimento para a construção de argumentos para uma dada conclusão, no âmbito da Lógica Proposicional Clássica, abstraído do procedimento de Aristóteles. Utilizo a noção de informação semântica como fio de Ariadne para a obtenção do procedimento.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135346883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85523
Ailin Delvitto, Nicolás Lavagnino
Las Ciencias Ómicas se presentan con la potencialidad de realizar abordajes complejos del fenómeno que estudian como también de intervenir sobre la salud humana a partir del desarrollo de tecnologías de diagnóstico y tratamiento de enfermedades. Al respecto, mostramos un análisis epistemológico de las Ciencias Ómicas sobre la utilización y alcance de conceptualizaciones complejas de la acción génica en la relación genotipo-fenotipo. En particular, si suceden o no simplificaciones epistemológicas cuando se estudian enfermedades humanas. Nuestro análisis comparativo muestra que, en general, en las Ciencias Ómicas hay conceptualizaciones tanto simples como complejas de la acción génica en la relación genotipo-fenotipo, mientras que en las investigaciones ómicas que abordan enfermedades humanas se encuentra una exacerbación de conceptualizaciones simplificantes. Se discute si dicha simplificación epistemológica se ve favorecida en un escenario de intervención en aspectos de salud como es la generación de conocimientos para tecnologías ómicas de diagnóstico y tratamiento de enfermedades. Así, tal como sucede en otros ámbitos de las Ciencias Naturales, para los estudios ómicos de enfermedades se genera un vínculo necesario entre simplificaciones epistemológicas y la promesa de intervención.
{"title":"Limitaciones de la complejidad en las Ciencias Ómicas: simplificación epistemológica en el abordaje de enfermedades","authors":"Ailin Delvitto, Nicolás Lavagnino","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85523","url":null,"abstract":"Las Ciencias Ómicas se presentan con la potencialidad de realizar abordajes complejos del fenómeno que estudian como también de intervenir sobre la salud humana a partir del desarrollo de tecnologías de diagnóstico y tratamiento de enfermedades. Al respecto, mostramos un análisis epistemológico de las Ciencias Ómicas sobre la utilización y alcance de conceptualizaciones complejas de la acción génica en la relación genotipo-fenotipo. En particular, si suceden o no simplificaciones epistemológicas cuando se estudian enfermedades humanas. Nuestro análisis comparativo muestra que, en general, en las Ciencias Ómicas hay conceptualizaciones tanto simples como complejas de la acción génica en la relación genotipo-fenotipo, mientras que en las investigaciones ómicas que abordan enfermedades humanas se encuentra una exacerbación de conceptualizaciones simplificantes. Se discute si dicha simplificación epistemológica se ve favorecida en un escenario de intervención en aspectos de salud como es la generación de conocimientos para tecnologías ómicas de diagnóstico y tratamiento de enfermedades. Así, tal como sucede en otros ámbitos de las Ciencias Naturales, para los estudios ómicos de enfermedades se genera un vínculo necesario entre simplificaciones epistemológicas y la promesa de intervención.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135347266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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