Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80109
E. Erickson
A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.
{"title":"On the metaphysics of (epistemological) logical anti-exceptionalism","authors":"E. Erickson","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80109","url":null,"abstract":"A recent logical anti-exceptionalist trend proposes that logical theories are revisable in the same manner as scientific theories, either on grounds of the method of theory selection or on what counts as evidence for this revision. Given this approximation of logic and science, the present essay analyzes the commitments of both these varieties and argues that, as it currently stands, this kind of anti-exceptionalism is committed to scientific realism, that is, to realism about some unobservable entities evoked in logical theories. The essay argues that anti-exceptionalism cannot be separated into metaphysical and epistemological varieties, and proposed rather to label anti-exceptionalists views either broadly in terms of theory revision, or narrowly in terms of logic’s affinity with science.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46594084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71458
C. Cardona
En el artículo se ofrece un análisis de los argumentos que condujeron a Kepler a la defensa y demostración del teorema fundamental de la óptica. Según este teorema, un haz homocéntrico de luz que se ve obligado a atravesar una esfera transparente, siempre que la amplitud del haz no sea mayor, se concentra de nuevo en un punto al otro lado de la esfera. La demostración de Kepler se compara con la ofrecida por Malebranche años más tarde. Este teorema fue determinante para la consolidación de la óptica moderna.
{"title":"Kepler y el teorema fundamental de la óptica","authors":"C. Cardona","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71458","url":null,"abstract":"En el artículo se ofrece un análisis de los argumentos que condujeron a Kepler a la defensa y demostración del teorema fundamental de la óptica. Según este teorema, un haz homocéntrico de luz que se ve obligado a atravesar una esfera transparente, siempre que la amplitud del haz no sea mayor, se concentra de nuevo en un punto al otro lado de la esfera. La demostración de Kepler se compara con la ofrecida por Malebranche años más tarde. Este teorema fue determinante para la consolidación de la óptica moderna.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49151182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80110
Sanderson Molick
The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories. The resulting picture is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels. From this perspective, one is able to articulate other kinds of divergence that considers not only the inferential aspects of a given logical theory, but also the epistemic aims and the methodological choices that drive its development.
{"title":"Logical theory revision through data underdetermination: an anti-exceptionalist exercise","authors":"Sanderson Molick","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E80110","url":null,"abstract":"The anti-exceptionalist debate brought into play the problem of what are the relevant data for logical theories and how such data affects the validities accepted by a logical theory. In the present paper, I depart from Laudan's reticulated model of science to analyze one aspect of this problem, namely of the role of logical data within the process of revision of logical theories. For this, I argue that the ubiquitous nature of logical data is responsible for the proliferation of several distinct methodologies for logical theories. The resulting picture is coherent with the Laudanean view that agreement and disagreement between scientific theories take place at different levels. From this perspective, one is able to articulate other kinds of divergence that considers not only the inferential aspects of a given logical theory, but also the epistemic aims and the methodological choices that drive its development.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49322853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71002
Paulo Pirozelli
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn resorts to concepts from several disciplines in order to describe the general patterns of scientific development. This blend of disciplines can be explained in part by Kuhn's intellectual path, from physics to history and then to philosophy of science; but it also points to a deeper methodological problem, which is the question of what is the real unity of analysis in his model of science. The primary intention of this article is, thus, to give a solution to this difficulty. The answer, I believe, rests on identifying three fundamental units present in Kuhn's theory of scientific development. They are, respectively, the individual, responsible for producing evidence, spreading information, and choosing theories; the community, a set of scientists investigating a series of phenomena; and the groups, individuals with similar behavior but with looser institutional or social ties — a usually neglected category in Kuhnian literature, but equally fundamental for the final outcome of scientific debates. After investigating these categories in detail, I propose a way of integrating them into a general model for explaining the resolution of scientific controversies. Finally, I try to resolve the apparent conflict among disciplinary vocabularies by offering an account of the function of sociological, psychological, and epistemological concepts for describing controversies, and some of the methodologies appropriate for each of these tasks.
{"title":"Individuals, Communities, and Groups in Thomas Kuhn’s Model of Scientific Development","authors":"Paulo Pirozelli","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71002","url":null,"abstract":"In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn resorts to concepts from several disciplines in order to describe the general patterns of scientific development. This blend of disciplines can be explained in part by Kuhn's intellectual path, from physics to history and then to philosophy of science; but it also points to a deeper methodological problem, which is the question of what is the real unity of analysis in his model of science. The primary intention of this article is, thus, to give a solution to this difficulty. The answer, I believe, rests on identifying three fundamental units present in Kuhn's theory of scientific development. They are, respectively, the individual, responsible for producing evidence, spreading information, and choosing theories; the community, a set of scientists investigating a series of phenomena; and the groups, individuals with similar behavior but with looser institutional or social ties — a usually neglected category in Kuhnian literature, but equally fundamental for the final outcome of scientific debates. After investigating these categories in detail, I propose a way of integrating them into a general model for explaining the resolution of scientific controversies. Finally, I try to resolve the apparent conflict among disciplinary vocabularies by offering an account of the function of sociological, psychological, and epistemological concepts for describing controversies, and some of the methodologies appropriate for each of these tasks.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43037723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71267
Malena León
En este artículo elaboramos una propuesta sobre el significado de las obras de arte que se apoya en la perspectiva de Dennett acerca de la naturaleza de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos mentales. De acuerdo a ella, la intencionalidad que estos exhiben no es original, sino derivada. Adoptar la perspectiva de la intencionalidad derivada implica que ya no será posible sostener que el significado de una obra de arte esté vinculado al acto creativo que le dio origen o que esté determinado por las intenciones que tuvo su autor al crearlas, como han sostenido las teorías intencionalistas. Ahora bien, creemos que hay un aspecto de estas que no es incompatible con la perspectiva de intencionalidad derivada. Se trata del hecho de que parte del significado de la obra de arte está dado por las interpretaciones que surgen sólo cuando se asume que la misma fue producida por un agente con el propósito de transmitir algo. Llamaremos a esta estrategia interpretativa actitud de la obra de arte y defenderemos que debe ser entendida como un subtipo de la actitud intencional. Esta estrategia interpretativa forma parte de una propuesta que intenta explicar el significado de las obras de arte como siendo parcialmente indeterminado, relativo a una historia (y no a un origen fundacional) y dependiente de la atribución interpretativa.
{"title":"Actitud de La Obra de Arte","authors":"Malena León","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E71267","url":null,"abstract":"En este artículo elaboramos una propuesta sobre el significado de las obras de arte que se apoya en la perspectiva de Dennett acerca de la naturaleza de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos mentales. De acuerdo a ella, la intencionalidad que estos exhiben no es original, sino derivada. Adoptar la perspectiva de la intencionalidad derivada implica que ya no será posible sostener que el significado de una obra de arte esté vinculado al acto creativo que le dio origen o que esté determinado por las intenciones que tuvo su autor al crearlas, como han sostenido las teorías intencionalistas. Ahora bien, creemos que hay un aspecto de estas que no es incompatible con la perspectiva de intencionalidad derivada. Se trata del hecho de que parte del significado de la obra de arte está dado por las interpretaciones que surgen sólo cuando se asume que la misma fue producida por un agente con el propósito de transmitir algo. Llamaremos a esta estrategia interpretativa actitud de la obra de arte y defenderemos que debe ser entendida como un subtipo de la actitud intencional. Esta estrategia interpretativa forma parte de una propuesta que intenta explicar el significado de las obras de arte como siendo parcialmente indeterminado, relativo a una historia (y no a un origen fundacional) y dependiente de la atribución interpretativa.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48848340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E70853
Jonathan Mai
English distinguishes between singular quantifiers like "a donkey" and plural quantifiers like "some donkeys". Pluralists hold that plural quantifiers range in an unusual, irreducibly plural, way over common objects, namely individuals from first-order domains and not over set-like objects. The favoured framework of pluralism is plural first-order logic, PFO, an interpreted first-order language that is capable of expressing plural quantification. Pluralists argue for their position by claiming that the standard formal theory based on PFO is both ontologically neutral and really logic. These properties are supposed to yield many important applications concerning second-order logic and set theory that alternative theories supposedly cannot deliver. I will show that there are serious reasons for rejecting at least the claim of ontological innocence. Doubt about innocence arises on account of the fact that, when properly spelled out, the PFO-semantics for plural quantifiers is committed to set-like objects. The correctness of my worries presupposes the principle that for every plurality there is a coextensive set. Pluralists might reply that this principle leads straight to paradox. However, as I will argue, the true culprit of the paradox is the assumption that every definite condition determines a plurality.
{"title":"Much Ado About the Many","authors":"Jonathan Mai","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E70853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E70853","url":null,"abstract":"English distinguishes between singular quantifiers like \"a donkey\" and plural quantifiers like \"some donkeys\". Pluralists hold that plural quantifiers range in an unusual, irreducibly plural, way over common objects, namely individuals from first-order domains and not over set-like objects. The favoured framework of pluralism is plural first-order logic, PFO, an interpreted first-order language that is capable of expressing plural quantification. Pluralists argue for their position by claiming that the standard formal theory based on PFO is both ontologically neutral and really logic. These properties are supposed to yield many important applications concerning second-order logic and set theory that alternative theories supposedly cannot deliver. I will show that there are serious reasons for rejecting at least the claim of ontological innocence. Doubt about innocence arises on account of the fact that, when properly spelled out, the PFO-semantics for plural quantifiers is committed to set-like objects. The correctness of my worries presupposes the principle that for every plurality there is a coextensive set. Pluralists might reply that this principle leads straight to paradox. However, as I will argue, the true culprit of the paradox is the assumption that every definite condition determines a plurality.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43879410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E82665
Revista Principia
Introduction by The Guest Editor – 4th Filomena Workshop
客座编辑介绍-第四届菲洛梅娜研讨会
{"title":"Introduction by The Guest Editor – 4th Filomena Workshop","authors":"Revista Principia","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E82665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E82665","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction by The Guest Editor – 4th Filomena Workshop","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46387887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-08DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E73843
David Suárez-Rivero
En el presente artículo evalúo el concepto de violencia, explorando casos hipotéticos que permitan establecer cuáles son las condiciones o criterios que muestran cuándo una acción puede ser calificada como violenta. Frente a esto, parto de la idea de que una acción es violenta cuando rompe reglas o normas, las cuales son establecidas por sistemas sociales que se fundan en sistema de creencias. Concluyo, así, que hay que examinar los sistemas de creencias, donde se fundan los sistemas sociales, para erradicar todo tipo de acción que pueda romper reglas o normas.
{"title":"Acciones, sistemas normativos o creencias ¿Dónde se fundamenta la violencia?","authors":"David Suárez-Rivero","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E73843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2021.E73843","url":null,"abstract":"En el presente artículo evalúo el concepto de violencia, explorando casos hipotéticos que permitan establecer cuáles son las condiciones o criterios que muestran cuándo una acción puede ser calificada como violenta. Frente a esto, parto de la idea de que una acción es violenta cuando rompe reglas o normas, las cuales son establecidas por sistemas sociales que se fundan en sistema de creencias. Concluyo, así, que hay que examinar los sistemas de creencias, donde se fundan los sistemas sociales, para erradicar todo tipo de acción que pueda romper reglas o normas. ","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44065552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-07DOI: 10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58996
L. Oliveira
Gérard Genette conceitua a narrativa como a representação de um acontecimento ou de vários acontecimentos, considerados reais ou fictícios, por meio da linguagem e, principalmente, da linguagem escrita (GENETTE, 2011, p. 265). A estrutura da narrativa, em Genette, é analisada tendo por referências três categorias, que são fundamentadas no(a): tempo, modo e voz. Assim é que o presente artigo tem por escopo tecer comentários de alguns excertos do livro de Atos dos Apóstolos pelo viés teórico de Gérard Genette.
gerard Genette将叙事概念化为通过语言，特别是书面语言，对一个事件或几个事件的再现，被认为是真实的或虚构的(Genette, 2011, p. 265)。本文从时间、模式和声音三个方面对《热内特》的叙事结构进行了分析。因此，本文的目的是通过gerard Genette的理论偏见，对使徒行传的一些摘录进行评论。
{"title":"COMENTÁRIOS DA NARRATIVA DE ATOS 13. 14-41; 14. 14-18; 17. 22-34; 22. 1-24 PELA PERSPECTIVA TEÓRICA DE GÉRARD GENETTE","authors":"L. Oliveira","doi":"10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58996","url":null,"abstract":"Gérard Genette conceitua a narrativa como a representação de um acontecimento ou de vários acontecimentos, considerados reais ou fictícios, por meio da linguagem e, principalmente, da linguagem escrita (GENETTE, 2011, p. 265). A estrutura da narrativa, em Genette, é analisada tendo por referências três categorias, que são fundamentadas no(a): tempo, modo e voz. Assim é que o presente artigo tem por escopo tecer comentários de alguns excertos do livro de Atos dos Apóstolos pelo viés teórico de Gérard Genette.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90888328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-07DOI: 10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58991
Elisa Figueira de Souza Corrêa
Este artigo examina quatro termos diferentes comumente utilizados para se referir aos grafemas de escritas não-fonéticas: pictograma, hieroglifo, logograma e ideograma. Faz-se a revisão das definições mais comuns a fim de estabelecer diferenças e semelhanças entre os termos e, na fixação de limites, defende-se a continuação da terminologia “ideograma” para os caracteres chineses em uso, mormente, na China e Japão, para marcar suas próprias peculiaridades.
{"title":"O GRAFEMA DAS ESCRITAS NÃO-FONÉTICAS: HIEROGLIFO, PICTOGRAMA, LOGOGRAMA, IDEOGRAMA?","authors":"Elisa Figueira de Souza Corrêa","doi":"10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12957/PRINCIPIA.2020.58991","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo examina quatro termos diferentes comumente utilizados para se referir aos grafemas de escritas não-fonéticas: pictograma, hieroglifo, logograma e ideograma. Faz-se a revisão das definições mais comuns a fim de estabelecer diferenças e semelhanças entre os termos e, na fixação de limites, defende-se a continuação da terminologia “ideograma” para os caracteres chineses em uso, mormente, na China e Japão, para marcar suas próprias peculiaridades.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80344532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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