{"title":"Who's Responsible? (It's Complicated.) Assigning Blame in the Wake of the Financial Crisis","authors":"Kendy M. Hess","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12087","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44381912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"James Dempsey, Tom Sorell","doi":"10.1111/misp.12080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12080","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45908127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global financial crisis began in 2007, and we are still feeling its effects. It has involved the collapse or near- collapse of large commercial banks, hugely expensive interventions by governments to guarantee deposits and buy bank assets, a steep decline in bank lending to individuals and businesses, significant falls in consumer activity, both domestic and international, with a resulting reduction in trade. Government indebtedness due to the crisis has resulted in diminished welfare states in Western Europe and a worsening of the position of the worst off in developed countries. In the United States, repossessions of properties rose very markedly after 2006, and members of both low and middle income groups have at times been very badly affected.
{"title":"Responsibility in the Financial Crisis","authors":"T. Sorell","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12081","url":null,"abstract":"The global financial crisis began in 2007, and we are still feeling its effects. It has involved the collapse or near- collapse of large commercial banks, hugely expensive interventions by governments to guarantee deposits and buy bank assets, a steep decline in bank lending to individuals and businesses, significant falls in consumer activity, both domestic and international, with a resulting reduction in trade. Government indebtedness due to the crisis has resulted in diminished welfare states in Western Europe and a worsening of the position of the worst off in developed countries. In the United States, repossessions of properties rose very markedly after 2006, and members of both low and middle income groups have at times been very badly affected.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12081","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46500704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collective Responsibility and the Purposes of Banks","authors":"Steven Scalet","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12083","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12083","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44749612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some Tranching of Moral Responsibility Ascriptions to Individuals in Shadow Banking during the Financial Crisis","authors":"P. French","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12082","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12082","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43411732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Moral Accountability of the Financial Industry for the Global Financial Crisis","authors":"David Silver","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12085","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12085","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43216465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Banking Culture and Moral Responsibility for the Financial Crisis","authors":"James Dempsey","doi":"10.1111/misp.12084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12084","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12084","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42018228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Culture and the Financial Crisis in Light of the Icelandic Experience","authors":"V. Árnason, S. Nordal","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12086","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12086","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49406949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000). This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.
{"title":"Not in the Mood for Intentionalism","authors":"D. Bordini","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12066","url":null,"abstract":"According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience (e.g., Dretske, 1995, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000). This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12066","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47076665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin Heidegger’s perspective stands out among the many proposals for understanding affect in the phenomenological tradition. One reason for this is that Heidegger is the most thorough antiCartesian among the phenomenologists. He rigorously disbands affectivity from notions of psychological interiority, inner states, or other individualist allegiances, construing affect instead as a form of being open to the world in a radical sense. Another reason is that Heidegger places affect in the thick of everyday social and interpersonal commerce—within the warp and weft of all our days. With this orientation, he manages to combine a sense for ordinary comportment and experience—a phenomenological and cultural analysis of the everyday—with a profound sense for the ontological depths of human existence. Rarely have the mundane and the metaphysical been so thoroughly coarticulated; and yet Heidegger works from an acute sense of the massive discordance between these two distinct but interwoven layers of existence. Despite this promising outlook, there is much one should take issue with in Heidegger’s work, above all and most strikingly his dubious politics. My way of dealing with this problematic is not the usual one of trying to identify fascistic or protofascistic tendencies in Heidegger’s philosophy (I made a start at that elsewhere, see Slaby forthcoming). Rather, in the final section of this article, I will indicate how the perspective on affect and historicity developed here might help us turn Heidegger’s insights against his own putative political orientation. I will mainly focus on two aspects of Heidegger’s view, as these might help orient critical work on affect in philosophy and the humanities today.
{"title":"More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical Situatedness","authors":"J. Slaby","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12076","url":null,"abstract":"Martin Heidegger’s perspective stands out among the many proposals for understanding affect in the phenomenological tradition. One reason for this is that Heidegger is the most thorough antiCartesian among the phenomenologists. He rigorously disbands affectivity from notions of psychological interiority, inner states, or other individualist allegiances, construing affect instead as a form of being open to the world in a radical sense. Another reason is that Heidegger places affect in the thick of everyday social and interpersonal commerce—within the warp and weft of all our days. With this orientation, he manages to combine a sense for ordinary comportment and experience—a phenomenological and cultural analysis of the everyday—with a profound sense for the ontological depths of human existence. Rarely have the mundane and the metaphysical been so thoroughly coarticulated; and yet Heidegger works from an acute sense of the massive discordance between these two distinct but interwoven layers of existence. Despite this promising outlook, there is much one should take issue with in Heidegger’s work, above all and most strikingly his dubious politics. My way of dealing with this problematic is not the usual one of trying to identify fascistic or protofascistic tendencies in Heidegger’s philosophy (I made a start at that elsewhere, see Slaby forthcoming). Rather, in the final section of this article, I will indicate how the perspective on affect and historicity developed here might help us turn Heidegger’s insights against his own putative political orientation. I will mainly focus on two aspects of Heidegger’s view, as these might help orient critical work on affect in philosophy and the humanities today.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12076","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47212043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：