{"title":"Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness","authors":"E. Coffman","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12108","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48203643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I will demonstrate that either there is no such thing as moral luck or everyone is profoundly mistaken about its nature and a radical rethinking of moral luck is needed. The argument to be developed is not complicated, and relies almost entirely on premises that should seem obviously correct to anyone who follows the moral luck literature. The conclusion, however, is surprising and disturbing. The classic cases of moral luck always involve an agent who lacks control over an event whose occurrence affects her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Close examination of what it is to have control or to lack it reveals the logical space for counterexamples that do not fit the pattern constitutive of moral luck, and so unravel the whole. Here is the argument to be defended in what follows.
{"title":"Moral Luck and Control","authors":"Steven D. Hales","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12103","url":null,"abstract":"I will demonstrate that either there is no such thing as moral luck or everyone is profoundly mistaken about its nature and a radical rethinking of moral luck is needed. The argument to be developed is not complicated, and relies almost entirely on premises that should seem obviously correct to anyone who follows the moral luck literature. The conclusion, however, is surprising and disturbing. The classic cases of moral luck always involve an agent who lacks control over an event whose occurrence affects her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Close examination of what it is to have control or to lack it reveals the logical space for counterexamples that do not fit the pattern constitutive of moral luck, and so unravel the whole. Here is the argument to be defended in what follows.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48831001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-01Epub Date: 2019-07-11DOI: 10.1111/misp.12104
Neil Levy
In philosophy, the more constraints we bring to the consideration of a problem the better. This is particularly the case in normative domains, in which the invocation of intuitions may be inevitable. Since our intuitions are never entirely consistent even in a single individual, and different individuals may have somewhat different intuitions (as recent work on experimental philosophy has been at pains to demonstrate), every account of a philosophically interesting explanandum is revisionary to some extent. Every account has costs, in terms of conflict with intuitions, and the narrower the set of considerations we bring to choosing between them, the harder it will be to engage in principled choice between rivals. Broader sets of considerations are often essential to showing that one (somewhat counterintuitive) account is better than another. Debates over moral luck concern concepts that are largely (though not exclusively) normative. We ought therefore to expect that the narrower the range of considerations that we bring to bear on this debate, the harder it will be to give genuinely principled reasons for preferring one account over others. This fact gives us a strong reason for preferring an account that is sensitive to the full range of considerations that can be brought to bear. Yet the majority of philosophers who have thought about moral luck ignore—or argue for ignoring—the “luck” component of “moral luck.” They substitute for “luck” a lack of control condition, sometimes even while acknowledging that “luck” cannot be captured by such a condition.1 In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to substitute “lack of control” for “luck.” If we make that substitution, we will both fail to understand the phenomenon of moral luck, narrowly construed, and we will cut ourselves off from the many ways in which considerations
{"title":"Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck.","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1111/misp.12104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12104","url":null,"abstract":"In philosophy, the more constraints we bring to the consideration of a problem the better. This is particularly the case in normative domains, in which the invocation of intuitions may be inevitable. Since our intuitions are never entirely consistent even in a single individual, and different individuals may have somewhat different intuitions (as recent work on experimental philosophy has been at pains to demonstrate), every account of a philosophically interesting explanandum is revisionary to some extent. Every account has costs, in terms of conflict with intuitions, and the narrower the set of considerations we bring to choosing between them, the harder it will be to engage in principled choice between rivals. Broader sets of considerations are often essential to showing that one (somewhat counterintuitive) account is better than another. Debates over moral luck concern concepts that are largely (though not exclusively) normative. We ought therefore to expect that the narrower the range of considerations that we bring to bear on this debate, the harder it will be to give genuinely principled reasons for preferring one account over others. This fact gives us a strong reason for preferring an account that is sensitive to the full range of considerations that can be brought to bear. Yet the majority of philosophers who have thought about moral luck ignore—or argue for ignoring—the “luck” component of “moral luck.” They substitute for “luck” a lack of control condition, sometimes even while acknowledging that “luck” cannot be captured by such a condition.1 In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to substitute “lack of control” for “luck.” If we make that substitution, we will both fail to understand the phenomenon of moral luck, narrowly construed, and we will cut ourselves off from the many ways in which considerations","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37755958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories","authors":"A. Mele","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12105","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48519932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transformative Moral Luck","authors":"Marcela Herdova","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12111","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45824420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior to philosophical inquiry, many people have the intuition that the following moral principle—commonly known as the control principle—is unquestionably true: people cannot bear moral responsibility for things which are not their fault, that is, things which are beyond their control (cf. Nagel 1976, 138). We also generally assume that normal people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, as our everyday moral judgments and practices of blame and praise imply.1 At first blush, these commonsense positions seem compatible. However, when we carefully consider concrete cases of human action, it becomes plain that every action a person performs and the effects that one’s actions have on the world are largely—perhaps entirely—a matter of luck, that is, due to factors which are entirely beyond the actor’s control.2 As such, it seems that commonsense views about morality and moral responsibility commit us to the existence of something that is, by our own intuitive lights, impossible: the existence of moral luck, that is, cases in which a person is morally responsible for something which was not completely under that person’s control. The intuitive judgements which generate our apparent commitment to the existence of moral luck seem undeniable, but granting its existence is unacceptable; this is the paradox of moral luck.
{"title":"Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck","authors":"Kristin M. Mickelson","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12114","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to philosophical inquiry, many people have the intuition that the following moral principle—commonly known as the control principle—is unquestionably true: people cannot bear moral responsibility for things which are not their fault, that is, things which are beyond their control (cf. Nagel 1976, 138). We also generally assume that normal people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, as our everyday moral judgments and practices of blame and praise imply.1 At first blush, these commonsense positions seem compatible. However, when we carefully consider concrete cases of human action, it becomes plain that every action a person performs and the effects that one’s actions have on the world are largely—perhaps entirely—a matter of luck, that is, due to factors which are entirely beyond the actor’s control.2 As such, it seems that commonsense views about morality and moral responsibility commit us to the existence of something that is, by our own intuitive lights, impossible: the existence of moral luck, that is, cases in which a person is morally responsible for something which was not completely under that person’s control. The intuitive judgements which generate our apparent commitment to the existence of moral luck seem undeniable, but granting its existence is unacceptable; this is the paradox of moral luck.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12114","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42880732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Playing the Hand You're Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (and Probably Doesn't Exist)","authors":"D. Enoch","doi":"10.1111/misp.12115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12115","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12115","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46582354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck","authors":"Carolina Sartorio","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12106","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12106","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47481508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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