1 Abstract: This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for unlucky outcomes, but less-than fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty Traveler.
{"title":"Moral Luck and Deviant Causation","authors":"S. Bernstein","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12110","url":null,"abstract":"1 Abstract: This paper discusses a puzzling tension in attributions of moral responsibility in cases of resultant moral luck: we seem to hold agents fully morally responsible for unlucky outcomes, but less-than fully-responsible for unlucky outcomes brought about differently than intended. This tension cannot be easily discharged or explained, but it does shed light on a famous puzzle about causation and responsibility, the Thirsty Traveler.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12110","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45922452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The very idea of moral luck poses a puzzle. In fact, Bernard Williams, who introduced the phrase “moral luck,” writes that he “expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993: 251). As I will understand it here, moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control (Nagel 1979). Williams (1981) had suggested that the idea of luck—or being outside of our control—is simply inconsistent with the idea of moral assessment. The more specific claim that will be the focus here is that the idea of luck is inconsistent with a particular form of moral assessment, namely, moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And in fact, I will focus on a specific kind of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, namely, that associated with moral responsibility understood as accountability. In this sense of responsibility, we are responsible agents insofar as we are subjects of legitimate moral demands and apt candidates for being held to account when it comes to meeting those demands.1
{"title":"Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck","authors":"D. Nelkin","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12101","url":null,"abstract":"The very idea of moral luck poses a puzzle. In fact, Bernard Williams, who introduced the phrase “moral luck,” writes that he “expected to suggest an oxymoron” (Williams 1993: 251). As I will understand it here, moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for depends on factors beyond his control (Nagel 1979). Williams (1981) had suggested that the idea of luck—or being outside of our control—is simply inconsistent with the idea of moral assessment. The more specific claim that will be the focus here is that the idea of luck is inconsistent with a particular form of moral assessment, namely, moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And in fact, I will focus on a specific kind of moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, namely, that associated with moral responsibility understood as accountability. In this sense of responsibility, we are responsible agents insofar as we are subjects of legitimate moral demands and apt candidates for being held to account when it comes to meeting those demands.1","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12101","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47715803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debunking, Vindication, and Moral Luck","authors":"D. Statman","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12113","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12113","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48236677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The view that moral responsibility requires making a difference faces challenges from both cases of causal overdetermination and cases of causal preemption (such as Frankfurt-style Cases). In some such cases it seems that an agent is responsible for something that they could not have avoided. To deal with these cases, I enlist help from a plausible approach to moral luck. Following John Martin Fischer (1986) and Michael Zimmerman (2002), I defend the view that one’s degree of responsibility is immune to moral luck but the scope of events for which one is responsible is subject to moral luck. I then argue that this view leads to a plausible error theory for our responsibility intuitions concerning cases of causal overdetermination and preemption. This error theory allows us to avoid counterexamples to the claim that responsibility requires making a difference.
道德责任要求有所作为的观点面临着因果过度决定案例和因果优先案例(如法兰克福案例)的挑战。在某些情况下，代理人似乎对他们无法避免的事情负有责任。为了处理这些情况，我从一种貌似合理的道德运气方法中寻求帮助。继John Martin Fischer(1986)和Michael Zimmerman(2002)之后，我为自己的观点辩护，即一个人的责任程度不受道德运气的影响，但一个人负责的事件范围受道德运气的影响。然后，我认为这种观点导致了一种貌似合理的错误理论，可以解释我们关于因果过度决定和先发制人的责任直觉。这个错误理论使我们能够避免反例来反驳责任要求有所作为的说法。
{"title":"Luckily, We Are Only Responsible for What We Could Have Avoided","authors":"Philip Swenson","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12107","url":null,"abstract":"The view that moral responsibility requires making a difference faces challenges from both cases of causal overdetermination and cases of causal preemption (such as Frankfurt-style Cases). In some such cases it seems that an agent is responsible for something that they could not have avoided. To deal with these cases, I enlist help from a plausible approach to moral luck. Following John Martin Fischer (1986) and Michael Zimmerman (2002), I defend the view that one’s degree of responsibility is immune to moral luck but the scope of events for which one is responsible is subject to moral luck. I then argue that this view leads to a plausible error theory for our responsibility intuitions concerning cases of causal overdetermination and preemption. This error theory allows us to avoid counterexamples to the claim that responsibility requires making a difference.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12107","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43712082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: It is almost unanimously accepted that Kant denies resultant moral luck— that is, he denies that the lucky consequence of a person’s action can affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Philosophers often point to the famous good will passage at the beginning of the Groundwork to justify this claim. I argue, however, that this passage does not support Kant’s denial of resultant moral luck. Subsequently, I argue that Kant allows agents to be morally responsible for certain kinds of lucky consequences. Even so, I argue that it is unclear whether Kant ultimately endorses resultant moral luck. The reason is that Kant does not write enough on moral responsibility for consequences to determine definitively whether he thinks that the lucky consequence for which an agent is morally responsible can add to her degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. The clear upshot, however, is that Kant does not deny resultant moral luck.
{"title":"Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck","authors":"R. J. Hartman","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12109","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: It is almost unanimously accepted that Kant denies resultant moral luck— that is, he denies that the lucky consequence of a person’s action can affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Philosophers often point to the famous good will passage at the beginning of the Groundwork to justify this claim. I argue, however, that this passage does not support Kant’s denial of resultant moral luck. Subsequently, I argue that Kant allows agents to be morally responsible for certain kinds of lucky consequences. Even so, I argue that it is unclear whether Kant ultimately endorses resultant moral luck. The reason is that Kant does not write enough on moral responsibility for consequences to determine definitively whether he thinks that the lucky consequence for which an agent is morally responsible can add to her degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. The clear upshot, however, is that Kant does not deny resultant moral luck.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44548157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Image Consciousness, Movement Consciousness","authors":"Jonathan Owen Clark","doi":"10.1111/misp.12119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12119","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12119","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44082272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dance as Art, Theatre, and Practice: Somaesthetic Perspectives","authors":"R. Shusterman","doi":"10.1111/misp.12125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12125","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44864593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Post‐Performance Amnesia","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1111/misp.12118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12118","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46292553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1976-2019","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/msp20194335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/msp20194335","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70921010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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