Pub Date : 2007-09-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.4.408-428
Leslie Dienes
In Russia, as elsewhere, energy is used not in an abstract fashion but in concrete geographic space and, except in mobile machines, in a locationally concentrated manner. It is also consumed in a concrete world of existing equipment and specific technological applications. Energy production is similarly specific and particular, both in its various primary forms (raw fuels and hydro- and nuclear power) and in its location. However, the different primary forms in which energy is produced are not uniformly transportable nor uniformly applicable, efficient, or environmentally acceptable in the diverse technological processes. Energy demand, and the transport-delivery infrastructure to satisfy it, is, therefore, subject to pronounced inertia. The ghost of geography, which burdened the Soviet energy system in its last decade, also haunts that system in Russia today. In the 1980s, 65-70 percent of all fuels used in the European regions (the Urals included) of the USSR had to be shipped from Siberia and Central Asia; in today's Russia, also with three-fourths of the population in its European parts and the Urals, the share is significantly larger.The enormous spatial discrepancy between consumption and production that characterized the energy complex of the late Soviet era, specifically the oil and gas sector, remains. Indeed, its significance has increased because a much larger share of oil and gas output is exported today, and these exports account for a greater portion of Russia's economy than ever before. Roughly one-half of the oil and one-third of the natural gas were exported in recent years, overwhelmingly through Black Sea and Baltic ports and pipelines to Europe. The sharp rise in prices and the increased volumes, at least until the middle of the present decade, lifted the contribution of energy exports (nearly all of it oil and gas) to approximately 23 percent of Russia's GDP in the first seven months of 2006.1 To plug the huge domestic deficit in European Russia and fill export pipelines and tankers, Moscow still depends on its West Siberian province and a pipeline system largely developed in Soviet times. Russian oil companies did increase production, construct and expand tanker terminal capacity, and build a few hundred kilometers of pipeline. The anemic growth in the gas sector, however, is due entirely to independent producers who work on small fields and to oil companies, both of which extract mostly fat gas-that is, gas high in heavier hydrocarbon molecules that need to be removed before interregional pipeline transport. Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, continues to live off its Soviet inheritance.2 Although Gazprom's reserves have grown, much less has been done to access and prepare them for production and tap them with new pipelines.Geographic and structural rigidities in the consumption pattern will therefore circumscribe the scope of change, possibly for a generation. The population and settlement structure on the one hand and the
{"title":"Natural Gas in the Context of Russia's Energy System","authors":"Leslie Dienes","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.4.408-428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.4.408-428","url":null,"abstract":"In Russia, as elsewhere, energy is used not in an abstract fashion but in concrete geographic space and, except in mobile machines, in a locationally concentrated manner. It is also consumed in a concrete world of existing equipment and specific technological applications. Energy production is similarly specific and particular, both in its various primary forms (raw fuels and hydro- and nuclear power) and in its location. However, the different primary forms in which energy is produced are not uniformly transportable nor uniformly applicable, efficient, or environmentally acceptable in the diverse technological processes. Energy demand, and the transport-delivery infrastructure to satisfy it, is, therefore, subject to pronounced inertia. The ghost of geography, which burdened the Soviet energy system in its last decade, also haunts that system in Russia today. In the 1980s, 65-70 percent of all fuels used in the European regions (the Urals included) of the USSR had to be shipped from Siberia and Central Asia; in today's Russia, also with three-fourths of the population in its European parts and the Urals, the share is significantly larger.The enormous spatial discrepancy between consumption and production that characterized the energy complex of the late Soviet era, specifically the oil and gas sector, remains. Indeed, its significance has increased because a much larger share of oil and gas output is exported today, and these exports account for a greater portion of Russia's economy than ever before. Roughly one-half of the oil and one-third of the natural gas were exported in recent years, overwhelmingly through Black Sea and Baltic ports and pipelines to Europe. The sharp rise in prices and the increased volumes, at least until the middle of the present decade, lifted the contribution of energy exports (nearly all of it oil and gas) to approximately 23 percent of Russia's GDP in the first seven months of 2006.1 To plug the huge domestic deficit in European Russia and fill export pipelines and tankers, Moscow still depends on its West Siberian province and a pipeline system largely developed in Soviet times. Russian oil companies did increase production, construct and expand tanker terminal capacity, and build a few hundred kilometers of pipeline. The anemic growth in the gas sector, however, is due entirely to independent producers who work on small fields and to oil companies, both of which extract mostly fat gas-that is, gas high in heavier hydrocarbon molecules that need to be removed before interregional pipeline transport. Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, continues to live off its Soviet inheritance.2 Although Gazprom's reserves have grown, much less has been done to access and prepare them for production and tap them with new pipelines.Geographic and structural rigidities in the consumption pattern will therefore circumscribe the scope of change, possibly for a generation. The population and settlement structure on the one hand and the","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"18 1","pages":"408-428"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81061967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-09-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.4.360-370
M. Goldman
Abstract: With the revenue from Russia's oil exports, Russia has moved from its near-bankrupt status after the August 1998 financial collapse to a situation where it is now a financial powerhouse. Although revenue from natural gas exports is not as large, Russia's natural gas pipelines into Europe bring Russia immense political clout. Putin has used Russia's oil and gas skillfully so that the country is once again a superpower--emphasis on power. Keywords: Gazprom, ITERA, natural gas, petroleum, Putin, Russia ********** When asked at his January 31, 2006, press conference how he responded to calls by U.S. Senator John McCain and Congressman Tom Lantos to kick Russia out of the G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin quoted an old Arabic proverb: "The dog barks but the caravan moves on." This was Putin's way of saying, "Who cares if some American senator thinks Russia is not up to the standards of the world's richest democracies. Russia will do as it pleases and there is not much anyone can do about it. They need Russia more than we need them." This was very different from what Boris Yeltsin used to say when he was president and, for that matter, how Putin would probably have responded to the same question during his first term. More than anything, this new assertiveness is a result of oil at $70 a barrel and the fact that Russia is the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the world's second largest exporter of petroleum. Considering the context, this new hubris might seem overly presumptive. Russia's GDP is growing at 6-7 percent per year--primarily because of growth in the energy and metals sector rather than manufacturing, which is lagging. Russia's per capita income is still less than Portugal's, and its army is bogged down in misadventures in Chechnya and by public revulsion at a scandal highlighting army hazing and brutalizing of draftees. But today, with oil and natural gas prices at record highs, abundant energy reserves count for more than per capita income and, like Venezuela, Russia is learning how to leverage those resources. I Russia's transformation from impoverished supplicant in the 1990s to haughty creditor today has been breathtaking. Less than a decade ago, in August 1998, because of its weakened economy and ever-increasing deficit, Russia was forced to default on its state loans, which in turn precipitated the collapse of most of its private banks. Russia's foreign reserves all but disappeared and its RTS index of stock (the Russian equivalent of the Dow Jones index) fell to 39 from a high the year before of 571. In July 2007, fewer than ten years later, the RTS index hit a new high of 2,091, a fifty-one-fold increase. Export volume rose from $71 billion in 1998 to $275 billion in 2006, most of which was generated by oil and gas earnings. Moreover, with export earnings in 2006 almost double the spending on imports, Russia had a $130 billion trade surplus. When added to reserves accumulated from previous years, Russian gold
{"title":"The Dog Barks but the Caravan Moves On","authors":"M. Goldman","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.4.360-370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.4.360-370","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: With the revenue from Russia's oil exports, Russia has moved from its near-bankrupt status after the August 1998 financial collapse to a situation where it is now a financial powerhouse. Although revenue from natural gas exports is not as large, Russia's natural gas pipelines into Europe bring Russia immense political clout. Putin has used Russia's oil and gas skillfully so that the country is once again a superpower--emphasis on power. Keywords: Gazprom, ITERA, natural gas, petroleum, Putin, Russia ********** When asked at his January 31, 2006, press conference how he responded to calls by U.S. Senator John McCain and Congressman Tom Lantos to kick Russia out of the G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin quoted an old Arabic proverb: \"The dog barks but the caravan moves on.\" This was Putin's way of saying, \"Who cares if some American senator thinks Russia is not up to the standards of the world's richest democracies. Russia will do as it pleases and there is not much anyone can do about it. They need Russia more than we need them.\" This was very different from what Boris Yeltsin used to say when he was president and, for that matter, how Putin would probably have responded to the same question during his first term. More than anything, this new assertiveness is a result of oil at $70 a barrel and the fact that Russia is the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the world's second largest exporter of petroleum. Considering the context, this new hubris might seem overly presumptive. Russia's GDP is growing at 6-7 percent per year--primarily because of growth in the energy and metals sector rather than manufacturing, which is lagging. Russia's per capita income is still less than Portugal's, and its army is bogged down in misadventures in Chechnya and by public revulsion at a scandal highlighting army hazing and brutalizing of draftees. But today, with oil and natural gas prices at record highs, abundant energy reserves count for more than per capita income and, like Venezuela, Russia is learning how to leverage those resources. I Russia's transformation from impoverished supplicant in the 1990s to haughty creditor today has been breathtaking. Less than a decade ago, in August 1998, because of its weakened economy and ever-increasing deficit, Russia was forced to default on its state loans, which in turn precipitated the collapse of most of its private banks. Russia's foreign reserves all but disappeared and its RTS index of stock (the Russian equivalent of the Dow Jones index) fell to 39 from a high the year before of 571. In July 2007, fewer than ten years later, the RTS index hit a new high of 2,091, a fifty-one-fold increase. Export volume rose from $71 billion in 1998 to $275 billion in 2006, most of which was generated by oil and gas earnings. Moreover, with export earnings in 2006 almost double the spending on imports, Russia had a $130 billion trade surplus. When added to reserves accumulated from previous years, Russian gold","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"95 1","pages":"360-370"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91041789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-07-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.3.293-311
J. Hughes
Armed conflicts remind us that definitions and labels have political consequences and are therefore politicized. Russia's policy toward secessionist Chechnya from the early 1990s onward has consistently framed the conflict against the Chechen resistance in the idiom of a struggle against terrorism. Although Yeltsin periodically engaged in a peace process with the moderate leaders of the Chechen resistance, Putin's policy has been uncompromising. When asked by a journalist in February 2004 about the potential for negotiations in Chechnya, Putin rejected the idea outright: "Russia does not negotiate with terrorists, we destroy them."1 Given that terrorism is one of the most politicized and contested concepts in the modern era, is it analytically meaningful or useful to apply it to any conflict, let alone the conflict in Chechnya? There is no international consensus as to what actions or principles the term terrorism should cover, and the adage "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" captures succinctly the essential problem of politicized usage inherent in the term in Chechnya and elsewhere.What Is Terrorism?The founding fathers of the United States established the principle, based on the ideas of John Locke, that any group has the right to resort to armed rebellion to remove a tyrannical government, or "governments of force" as Thomas Jefferson put it. The most contentious definitional problem with the term terrorism, however, is how it should be distinguished from the legitimate use of violence in rebellion. Nonjudgmental and nonemotive terms such as insurgency, insurrection, rebellion, guerrilla, or partisan war are often employed to describe armed conflict. These terms are often associated with nationalist or nationbuilding revolts, revolutionary movements, and resistance to foreign occupation. States, especially colonial powers, have traditionally denied the political motivations and aspirations of nationalist resistance and have employed criminalizing references to denounce them, notably terms such as gangs, bandits, thugs, monsters, or terrorists. The framing of a conflict as terrorist in nature is a classic device employed by a state to denigrate legitimate resistance. States generally do not employ ordinary criminal procedure to repress such resistance but instead use special legal or security regimes. In managing counterinsurgency, states often adhere to the British colonial principle that sometimes "in order to maintain law and order . . . it is necessary for government itself to break it for a time."2 There are many historical contradictions of how states manipulate resistance and the term terrorism. As Chin Peng, the leader of the communist resistance to the British in Malaya stated: "When we worked with the British during the Japanese occupation and killed people-essentially in Britain's interests-we were neither bandits nor terrorists. Indeed, we were applauded, praised and given awards. Thus, you only became a t
{"title":"The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?","authors":"J. Hughes","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.3.293-311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.3.293-311","url":null,"abstract":"Armed conflicts remind us that definitions and labels have political consequences and are therefore politicized. Russia's policy toward secessionist Chechnya from the early 1990s onward has consistently framed the conflict against the Chechen resistance in the idiom of a struggle against terrorism. Although Yeltsin periodically engaged in a peace process with the moderate leaders of the Chechen resistance, Putin's policy has been uncompromising. When asked by a journalist in February 2004 about the potential for negotiations in Chechnya, Putin rejected the idea outright: \"Russia does not negotiate with terrorists, we destroy them.\"1 Given that terrorism is one of the most politicized and contested concepts in the modern era, is it analytically meaningful or useful to apply it to any conflict, let alone the conflict in Chechnya? There is no international consensus as to what actions or principles the term terrorism should cover, and the adage \"one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter\" captures succinctly the essential problem of politicized usage inherent in the term in Chechnya and elsewhere.What Is Terrorism?The founding fathers of the United States established the principle, based on the ideas of John Locke, that any group has the right to resort to armed rebellion to remove a tyrannical government, or \"governments of force\" as Thomas Jefferson put it. The most contentious definitional problem with the term terrorism, however, is how it should be distinguished from the legitimate use of violence in rebellion. Nonjudgmental and nonemotive terms such as insurgency, insurrection, rebellion, guerrilla, or partisan war are often employed to describe armed conflict. These terms are often associated with nationalist or nationbuilding revolts, revolutionary movements, and resistance to foreign occupation. States, especially colonial powers, have traditionally denied the political motivations and aspirations of nationalist resistance and have employed criminalizing references to denounce them, notably terms such as gangs, bandits, thugs, monsters, or terrorists. The framing of a conflict as terrorist in nature is a classic device employed by a state to denigrate legitimate resistance. States generally do not employ ordinary criminal procedure to repress such resistance but instead use special legal or security regimes. In managing counterinsurgency, states often adhere to the British colonial principle that sometimes \"in order to maintain law and order . . . it is necessary for government itself to break it for a time.\"2 There are many historical contradictions of how states manipulate resistance and the term terrorism. As Chin Peng, the leader of the communist resistance to the British in Malaya stated: \"When we worked with the British during the Japanese occupation and killed people-essentially in Britain's interests-we were neither bandits nor terrorists. Indeed, we were applauded, praised and given awards. Thus, you only became a t","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"35 1","pages":"293-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84575305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-07-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.3.335-352
S. Charap
IntroductionHow does political upheaval at home affect a state's behavior abroad? The vast domestic political change in Russia in the past twenty years has given political scientists occasion to address this question as it pertains to Moscow's foreign policy. In the 1990s, they sought answers through the lens of regime change, assessing the impact of democratization on the country's international conduct.1 The notion that democracies do not go to war with each other (democratic peace theory) was refashioned for transitional regimes. New theories-most prominently, one that held that democratizing states are likely to behave belligerently in international affairs-were built and tested.2Although the operational assumption of the early studies-that politics, and thus foreign policymaking, in post-Soviet Russia was more "democratic" than it was during the Soviet period-was relatively uncontroversial, there is disagreement about the democratic trajectory of Russian politics under Putin. There is a consensus that pluralism has declined significantly since 2000, but academic analysis is divided over the impact of Putin's first-term political reforms on the overall democratic quality of the Russian political system. Moreover, the apparent "consolidation" of a hybrid regime calls into question the utility of the term "democratization" in the Russian case.3 Focusing on the regime's democratic credentials in a study of the links between domestic politics and foreign policy under Putin could therefore obscure more than it would illuminate.This article addresses the external consequences of domestic political change in Putin's first term while avoiding assessments about the democratic quality (or lack thereof) of his regime. Given the degree of change, it seems likely that Putin's reordering of domestic politics has affected Russia's international behavior. For the most part, however, little work on this question has been conducted.4 This article fills this gap by suggesting a framework for analysis and then investigating the empirical evidence from the political change that took place in Putin's first term.Accounting for Change: A Domestic Politics FrameworkOne aspect of political change in post-Soviet Russia that seems likely to have an impact on foreign policy output is variation in the authority and capacity of the executive branch in domestic politics.5 This analytical lens, which I call executive strength-derived from the political science literature on state strength6-provides for a higher degree of analytic specificity than state-centric approaches. A focus on the executive-in the Russian case, the president, the presidential administration, the government (pravitel'stvo) and the executive ministries-avoids certain assumptions in the state strength literature that have proven problematic in the post-Soviet context.7 This concept is applicable across the post-Soviet states, where the executive has, on the one hand, played a central role in public life a
{"title":"Inside Out: Domestic Political Change and Foreign Policy in Vladimir Putin's First Term","authors":"S. Charap","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.3.335-352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.3.335-352","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionHow does political upheaval at home affect a state's behavior abroad? The vast domestic political change in Russia in the past twenty years has given political scientists occasion to address this question as it pertains to Moscow's foreign policy. In the 1990s, they sought answers through the lens of regime change, assessing the impact of democratization on the country's international conduct.1 The notion that democracies do not go to war with each other (democratic peace theory) was refashioned for transitional regimes. New theories-most prominently, one that held that democratizing states are likely to behave belligerently in international affairs-were built and tested.2Although the operational assumption of the early studies-that politics, and thus foreign policymaking, in post-Soviet Russia was more \"democratic\" than it was during the Soviet period-was relatively uncontroversial, there is disagreement about the democratic trajectory of Russian politics under Putin. There is a consensus that pluralism has declined significantly since 2000, but academic analysis is divided over the impact of Putin's first-term political reforms on the overall democratic quality of the Russian political system. Moreover, the apparent \"consolidation\" of a hybrid regime calls into question the utility of the term \"democratization\" in the Russian case.3 Focusing on the regime's democratic credentials in a study of the links between domestic politics and foreign policy under Putin could therefore obscure more than it would illuminate.This article addresses the external consequences of domestic political change in Putin's first term while avoiding assessments about the democratic quality (or lack thereof) of his regime. Given the degree of change, it seems likely that Putin's reordering of domestic politics has affected Russia's international behavior. For the most part, however, little work on this question has been conducted.4 This article fills this gap by suggesting a framework for analysis and then investigating the empirical evidence from the political change that took place in Putin's first term.Accounting for Change: A Domestic Politics FrameworkOne aspect of political change in post-Soviet Russia that seems likely to have an impact on foreign policy output is variation in the authority and capacity of the executive branch in domestic politics.5 This analytical lens, which I call executive strength-derived from the political science literature on state strength6-provides for a higher degree of analytic specificity than state-centric approaches. A focus on the executive-in the Russian case, the president, the presidential administration, the government (pravitel'stvo) and the executive ministries-avoids certain assumptions in the state strength literature that have proven problematic in the post-Soviet context.7 This concept is applicable across the post-Soviet states, where the executive has, on the one hand, played a central role in public life a","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"67 1","pages":"335-352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76831687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-07-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.3.312-334
Stephen J. Blank
IntroductionCentral Asia's importance to the United States is growing. In 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asians that "stability in the area is of paramount importance and vital national interest."1 Yet today U.S. interests in the region face attacks from three sides: Russia and China, the Taliban and their supporters, and the authoritarian misrule of Central Asian governments. Worse yet, some local governments might fail, adding to these threats. Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress in 2006,Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and widening socio-economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible, case central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.2Negroponte's successor, Vice Admiral (Ret.) J. Michael McConnell, was even more pessimistic in his 2007 testimony:There is no guarantee that elite and societal turmoil across Central Asia will stay within the confines of existing autocratic systems. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival political factions, clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to a dramatic expansion of terrroist and criminal activity along the lines of a failed state.3Neither is this merely an American perception. When Turkmenistan's dictator, Sapirmurat Niyazov, suddently died on December 21, 2006, the local media openly expressed speculation and anxiety over Turkmenistan's and Central Asia's future.4While some attacks on U.S. policy are or were unavoidable, others stem from shortcomings in policy that gave these adversaries opportunities to attack it to their own advantage. This article addresses these deficiencies and makes recommendations for extricating America from its present difficulties.U.S. interests in Central Asia are primarily strategic. They derive first from Central Asia's proximity to Russia, Iran, and China.5 Indeed,The United States and the West in general find themselves increasingly dependent on the continued stability and development of the Central Eurasian region. The United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan, and its engagement there and in Central Asian states is a long-term endeavor. The future of this region has a considerable bearing on the development of the Global War on Terrorism and in general on U.S. security interests in Eurasia; the maintenance of access to airspace and territory in the heart of Asia; the development of alternative sources of energy; and the furthering of freedom and democratic development.6Hence Russia and China view any U.S. presence in Central Asia as a standing challenge,
{"title":"U.S. Interests in Central Asia and Their Challenges","authors":"Stephen J. Blank","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.3.312-334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.3.312-334","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionCentral Asia's importance to the United States is growing. In 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asians that \"stability in the area is of paramount importance and vital national interest.\"1 Yet today U.S. interests in the region face attacks from three sides: Russia and China, the Taliban and their supporters, and the authoritarian misrule of Central Asian governments. Worse yet, some local governments might fail, adding to these threats. Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress in 2006,Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and widening socio-economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible, case central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.2Negroponte's successor, Vice Admiral (Ret.) J. Michael McConnell, was even more pessimistic in his 2007 testimony:There is no guarantee that elite and societal turmoil across Central Asia will stay within the confines of existing autocratic systems. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival political factions, clans or regions vie for power-opening the door to a dramatic expansion of terrroist and criminal activity along the lines of a failed state.3Neither is this merely an American perception. When Turkmenistan's dictator, Sapirmurat Niyazov, suddently died on December 21, 2006, the local media openly expressed speculation and anxiety over Turkmenistan's and Central Asia's future.4While some attacks on U.S. policy are or were unavoidable, others stem from shortcomings in policy that gave these adversaries opportunities to attack it to their own advantage. This article addresses these deficiencies and makes recommendations for extricating America from its present difficulties.U.S. interests in Central Asia are primarily strategic. They derive first from Central Asia's proximity to Russia, Iran, and China.5 Indeed,The United States and the West in general find themselves increasingly dependent on the continued stability and development of the Central Eurasian region. The United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan, and its engagement there and in Central Asian states is a long-term endeavor. The future of this region has a considerable bearing on the development of the Global War on Terrorism and in general on U.S. security interests in Eurasia; the maintenance of access to airspace and territory in the heart of Asia; the development of alternative sources of energy; and the furthering of freedom and democratic development.6Hence Russia and China view any U.S. presence in Central Asia as a standing challenge, ","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"37 1","pages":"312-334"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87174897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-07-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.3.277.292
B. McAllister
IntroductionConflict during the Cold War revolved around decision making in two camps, each equally dedicated to neorealist foreign policy goals. The irony behind a foreign policy doctrine centered on balance-of-power considerations and national security was that it lent a degree of predictability (and hence stability) to superpower relations. Indeed, some observers have mentioned that the key behind the post-Cold War U.S.-Russian rapprochement is the fact that Moscow and Washington think alike, in large measure because of their mutual past as great powers. Continued positive relations between the United States and Russia could to some degree be attributed to this mutual understanding. Indeed, the beauty of neorealism as a driver of foreign policy is its simplicity.1By reducing international politics to a few key variables (the state, anarchy, power, and security), it is possible, in the context of great-power competition, to delineate categories of competition, stalemate, and cooperation. The ever-present specter of confrontation keeps these categories mutually exclusive. However, is the complexity of the post-Cold War world order so great that it challenges neorealism as the dominant paradigm of international relations? Whereas the centrality of power politics and national security has not come into serious question, the calculus of power has changed how students of foreign policy formulate responses to contemporary risks. Given contemporary threats, what should the nature of U.S.-Russian relations be in the future? Furthermore, why, and on what grounds, should cooperation occur?Critics of neorealist foreign policy usually focus on the state-centric approach to politics it represents and counter that the threats of the post-September 11, 2001, post-Beslan reality contradict the utility of unilateral, hegemonic, or great-power politics. In particular, liberal critics of Cold War-era foreign policy point to the preeminence of terrorism, and specifically the threat of terrorist use of WMDs, as proof that multilateralism is the new security doctrine. As one specialist on U.S.-Russian relations put it, the fundamental conflict of the post-Cold War era is not a clash of ideological "alternative modernities" such as communism vs. fascism or liberalism vs. communism but rather the wholesale rejection of "modernity" in exchange for radical religion.2 The policy prescription then, is international cooperation in the neoliberal tradition, specifically in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and nonproliferation, all made possible through the propagation of international law and institutions. Unilateral attempts to further security through the U.S. invasion of Iraq or Russia's insistence on solving its Islamist problem itself only alienates the international community to the detriment of those very institutions' norms and laws that serve as a nation's best defense in a war on terrorism.The reaction of neorealists to this argument points out
{"title":"Framing U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation: Neorealist and Neoliberal Alternatives to Navigating the New Security Terrain","authors":"B. McAllister","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.3.277.292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.3.277.292","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionConflict during the Cold War revolved around decision making in two camps, each equally dedicated to neorealist foreign policy goals. The irony behind a foreign policy doctrine centered on balance-of-power considerations and national security was that it lent a degree of predictability (and hence stability) to superpower relations. Indeed, some observers have mentioned that the key behind the post-Cold War U.S.-Russian rapprochement is the fact that Moscow and Washington think alike, in large measure because of their mutual past as great powers. Continued positive relations between the United States and Russia could to some degree be attributed to this mutual understanding. Indeed, the beauty of neorealism as a driver of foreign policy is its simplicity.1By reducing international politics to a few key variables (the state, anarchy, power, and security), it is possible, in the context of great-power competition, to delineate categories of competition, stalemate, and cooperation. The ever-present specter of confrontation keeps these categories mutually exclusive. However, is the complexity of the post-Cold War world order so great that it challenges neorealism as the dominant paradigm of international relations? Whereas the centrality of power politics and national security has not come into serious question, the calculus of power has changed how students of foreign policy formulate responses to contemporary risks. Given contemporary threats, what should the nature of U.S.-Russian relations be in the future? Furthermore, why, and on what grounds, should cooperation occur?Critics of neorealist foreign policy usually focus on the state-centric approach to politics it represents and counter that the threats of the post-September 11, 2001, post-Beslan reality contradict the utility of unilateral, hegemonic, or great-power politics. In particular, liberal critics of Cold War-era foreign policy point to the preeminence of terrorism, and specifically the threat of terrorist use of WMDs, as proof that multilateralism is the new security doctrine. As one specialist on U.S.-Russian relations put it, the fundamental conflict of the post-Cold War era is not a clash of ideological \"alternative modernities\" such as communism vs. fascism or liberalism vs. communism but rather the wholesale rejection of \"modernity\" in exchange for radical religion.2 The policy prescription then, is international cooperation in the neoliberal tradition, specifically in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and nonproliferation, all made possible through the propagation of international law and institutions. Unilateral attempts to further security through the U.S. invasion of Iraq or Russia's insistence on solving its Islamist problem itself only alienates the international community to the detriment of those very institutions' norms and laws that serve as a nation's best defense in a war on terrorism.The reaction of neorealists to this argument points out ","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"120 1","pages":"277-292"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89331865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.2.245-260
N. Robinson
Abstract: At the time, the August 1998 financial crisis was described as a watershed in Russia's development. This article looks at the reasons the crisis had a minimal effect on Russia's economy and argues that the political effect of the crisis was more marked. The growth that has occurred in the Russian economy since 1998 may mean that a reoccurrence of crisis will not be as benign as the 1998 crisis turned out to be. Keywords: financial crisis, political economy, Russia, virtual economy Introduction It is nearly a decade since the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. At the time, the crisis marked a turning point in the development of Russia's economy. In its immediate aftermath there was some expectation that it would be the "prelude to what promises to be a long and painful period of insolvency and crisis," (1) and would lead rapidly to another, more severe, financial crisis. (2) These predictions have not come true. Indeed, Russia's financial crisis experience would seem to be an enviable one: it has not caused a loss of economic sovereignty with international agencies asserting their influence over economic policy as a condition of alleviating the problems of currency collapse and debt default, nor did it presage a period of economic depression. Instead, the power of the Russian state has grown since 1998 and Russia has experienced a near uninterrupted economic recovery since 1999 with gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 6.8 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, growth in industrial production averaging 7 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, unemployment falling from 13.2 percent in 1998 to 7.7 percent in 2005, and average wages rising from $108 to $301 a month. If the 1998 crisis had an effect on Russia, it was positive. Why was the impact of the August 1998 financial crisis so muted economically in Russia? Russia's economic success since 1998 is not because of any particular negative or positive economic effect of the crisis. The crisis of 1998 was not more devastating or influential because of the peculiarities of Russia's postcommunist economic system and the chief problem of this system, the lack of capital to reform industry and create a more competitive economy with a diversified export structure. This problem endures. This article argues that three factors shaped the influence of the August 1998 financial crisis on domestic forces and the subsequent development of Russia's political economy: the legacies of the USSR, the way that earlier reforms under President Boris Yeltsin benefited a small number of financiers and exporters, and the political fall out of 1998. Each of these was largely responsible for shaping one of the main segments of Russia's political economy: the "national" sectors of the economy--those branches of the economy that produce mainly for domestic consumption and do not receive a great level of foreign investment, the "transnationalized" sectors of the economy, and the government/state. Each of thes
{"title":"So What Changed? the 1998 Financial Crisis and Russia's Economic and Political Development","authors":"N. Robinson","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.2.245-260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.2.245-260","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: At the time, the August 1998 financial crisis was described as a watershed in Russia's development. This article looks at the reasons the crisis had a minimal effect on Russia's economy and argues that the political effect of the crisis was more marked. The growth that has occurred in the Russian economy since 1998 may mean that a reoccurrence of crisis will not be as benign as the 1998 crisis turned out to be. Keywords: financial crisis, political economy, Russia, virtual economy Introduction It is nearly a decade since the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. At the time, the crisis marked a turning point in the development of Russia's economy. In its immediate aftermath there was some expectation that it would be the \"prelude to what promises to be a long and painful period of insolvency and crisis,\" (1) and would lead rapidly to another, more severe, financial crisis. (2) These predictions have not come true. Indeed, Russia's financial crisis experience would seem to be an enviable one: it has not caused a loss of economic sovereignty with international agencies asserting their influence over economic policy as a condition of alleviating the problems of currency collapse and debt default, nor did it presage a period of economic depression. Instead, the power of the Russian state has grown since 1998 and Russia has experienced a near uninterrupted economic recovery since 1999 with gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 6.8 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, growth in industrial production averaging 7 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, unemployment falling from 13.2 percent in 1998 to 7.7 percent in 2005, and average wages rising from $108 to $301 a month. If the 1998 crisis had an effect on Russia, it was positive. Why was the impact of the August 1998 financial crisis so muted economically in Russia? Russia's economic success since 1998 is not because of any particular negative or positive economic effect of the crisis. The crisis of 1998 was not more devastating or influential because of the peculiarities of Russia's postcommunist economic system and the chief problem of this system, the lack of capital to reform industry and create a more competitive economy with a diversified export structure. This problem endures. This article argues that three factors shaped the influence of the August 1998 financial crisis on domestic forces and the subsequent development of Russia's political economy: the legacies of the USSR, the way that earlier reforms under President Boris Yeltsin benefited a small number of financiers and exporters, and the political fall out of 1998. Each of these was largely responsible for shaping one of the main segments of Russia's political economy: the \"national\" sectors of the economy--those branches of the economy that produce mainly for domestic consumption and do not receive a great level of foreign investment, the \"transnationalized\" sectors of the economy, and the government/state. Each of thes","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"23 1","pages":"245-259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77147200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.2.209-229
D. White
Imagine a football game. It requires goals, a ball, and a field. Now it is as if we have neither goals nor a field, nor a ball-only a signboard declaring the score. As soon as you enter the stadium you can see who has won, and the score. Taking part in such a procedure is impossible.1IntroductionFor scholars of political parties in postcommunist Russia, the December 2003 State Duma election was noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) suffered a massive decline in support, losing half of its electorate. Second, the pro-presidential United Russia (YeR) party gained over one-third of the vote to become the largest faction in the State Duma and was joined in parliament by the Kremlin-created Motherland (Rodina) bloc. Third, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), outwardly fond of nationalist rhetoric but nevertheless supportive of the regime, more than doubled the size of its Duma faction. For the liberal parties, the electoral outcome was catastrophic. The collapse in the liberal-reformist vote and the consequent failure of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) to pass the 5 percent threshold was seen as the end of an era in Russian party politics. The "historic mission" of the liberal parties in Russia was now over, proclaimed Putin's deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov.2Yabloko's failure in the 2003 Duma election did not reflect a sudden rejection of the party's social-liberal agenda by the Russian electorate. The party's share of the vote had been in constant decline since the first post-Soviet parliamentary election in 1993.3 Nevertheless, despite its relatively low level of support over ten years, Yabloko is a wellestablished political party. The party's leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, who worked with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and stood for the presidency in 1996 and 2000, enjoys a high profile both in Russia and the West. As an overtly democratic, liberal reformist party with a strong pro-Western orientation, the fact that Yabloko has become a marginal force in Russian politics should be of concern to those in Russia and the West who are interested both in the establishment of democratic norms and the relative strength of political forces promoting democratic and market reforms in Russia.The lack of an effective opposition in Russia after 2003 has serious implications for democratic development. In his seminal work on opposition, Dahl describes the system of managing political conflicts in a society by allowing opposition parties to compete with governing parties as "one of the greatest and most unexpected social discoveries that man has ever stumbled onto." The normative relevance of opposition parties is clear for Dahl, who sees their existence as "very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself" and their absence as "evidence, if not conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy." 4 Without effective opposition parties there can be
{"title":"Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party","authors":"D. White","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.2.209-229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.2.209-229","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine a football game. It requires goals, a ball, and a field. Now it is as if we have neither goals nor a field, nor a ball-only a signboard declaring the score. As soon as you enter the stadium you can see who has won, and the score. Taking part in such a procedure is impossible.1IntroductionFor scholars of political parties in postcommunist Russia, the December 2003 State Duma election was noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) suffered a massive decline in support, losing half of its electorate. Second, the pro-presidential United Russia (YeR) party gained over one-third of the vote to become the largest faction in the State Duma and was joined in parliament by the Kremlin-created Motherland (Rodina) bloc. Third, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), outwardly fond of nationalist rhetoric but nevertheless supportive of the regime, more than doubled the size of its Duma faction. For the liberal parties, the electoral outcome was catastrophic. The collapse in the liberal-reformist vote and the consequent failure of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) to pass the 5 percent threshold was seen as the end of an era in Russian party politics. The \"historic mission\" of the liberal parties in Russia was now over, proclaimed Putin's deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov.2Yabloko's failure in the 2003 Duma election did not reflect a sudden rejection of the party's social-liberal agenda by the Russian electorate. The party's share of the vote had been in constant decline since the first post-Soviet parliamentary election in 1993.3 Nevertheless, despite its relatively low level of support over ten years, Yabloko is a wellestablished political party. The party's leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, who worked with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and stood for the presidency in 1996 and 2000, enjoys a high profile both in Russia and the West. As an overtly democratic, liberal reformist party with a strong pro-Western orientation, the fact that Yabloko has become a marginal force in Russian politics should be of concern to those in Russia and the West who are interested both in the establishment of democratic norms and the relative strength of political forces promoting democratic and market reforms in Russia.The lack of an effective opposition in Russia after 2003 has serious implications for democratic development. In his seminal work on opposition, Dahl describes the system of managing political conflicts in a society by allowing opposition parties to compete with governing parties as \"one of the greatest and most unexpected social discoveries that man has ever stumbled onto.\" The normative relevance of opposition parties is clear for Dahl, who sees their existence as \"very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself\" and their absence as \"evidence, if not conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy.\" 4 Without effective opposition parties there can be ","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"84 1","pages":"209-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83911249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.2.261-267
A. Shakaryan
"Trust is the key for productive economy and business."-Tigran Sargsyan, Chairman of the Central Bank of Armenia1"Honesty is more important than oil. If Armenia's judiciary system is not corrupted and it takes equitable solutions then this will certainly promote [the] country's economic growth."-Steven Ekovich, American University of Paris2Why do people not trust their government? Nye and his colleagues3 raised this key question in their diagnosis of what is wrong with American political institutions. Miller4 warned of increasing political cynicism and distrust among citizens in the early 1970s. Lipset and Schneider5 analyzed historical trends of declining political trust, comparing business, labor, and government; they maintained that a "confidence gap" existed across diverse institutional sectors in America and that the gap began widening in the 1960s. According to Nye and his colleagues, only one-fourth of Americans trusted the government at the end of the 1990s, whereas in the mid-1960s, three-fourths of Americans trusted the government. Concerns about declining public confidence in both political and civil institutions begin with the assumption that support and trust are essential for functional institutions in a democratic society. Currently, the United States is not the only country concerned with declining public confidence in institutions. In their edited volume comparing public attitudes concerning democracy in the United States, European countries, and Japan, Pharr and Putnam6 reported that declining institutional confidence plagued almost all the aforementioned countries. They summarize this situation as "disaffected democracies." It is ironic that democracies face a strong internal threat in decreasing confidence among their citizens.The situation is even worse for the countries that democratized recently. South Korea provides another case of rapid decline in public confidence in political and civil institutions. 7 According to the World Value Survey results, Koreans' confidence in their Parliament declined from 70 to 15 percent between 1981 and 2001, while confidence in the courts and civil servants declined from 80 to 45 percent during the same period. Survey results show that Korean "democracy in the aftermath of democratization"8 shows symptoms of general crises.9Recent studies show that postcommunist societies suffer from a lack of public confidence in all institutions, and particularly in political institutions.10 In Poland, for example, peoples' confidence in the Parliament and the government, which had previously shown a high level of 85 and 65 percent between 1989 and 1993, respectively, fell to a low of 20 percent within five years.11This article concentrates on Armenia, a country that gained its independence only fifteen years ago. Armenia, which is in the South Caucasus, neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran. Political stability of the countries situated in this region is vital for the region and for oildependent countries.
{"title":"Civic Trust and Governance in Armenia","authors":"A. Shakaryan","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.2.261-267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.2.261-267","url":null,"abstract":"\"Trust is the key for productive economy and business.\"-Tigran Sargsyan, Chairman of the Central Bank of Armenia1\"Honesty is more important than oil. If Armenia's judiciary system is not corrupted and it takes equitable solutions then this will certainly promote [the] country's economic growth.\"-Steven Ekovich, American University of Paris2Why do people not trust their government? Nye and his colleagues3 raised this key question in their diagnosis of what is wrong with American political institutions. Miller4 warned of increasing political cynicism and distrust among citizens in the early 1970s. Lipset and Schneider5 analyzed historical trends of declining political trust, comparing business, labor, and government; they maintained that a \"confidence gap\" existed across diverse institutional sectors in America and that the gap began widening in the 1960s. According to Nye and his colleagues, only one-fourth of Americans trusted the government at the end of the 1990s, whereas in the mid-1960s, three-fourths of Americans trusted the government. Concerns about declining public confidence in both political and civil institutions begin with the assumption that support and trust are essential for functional institutions in a democratic society. Currently, the United States is not the only country concerned with declining public confidence in institutions. In their edited volume comparing public attitudes concerning democracy in the United States, European countries, and Japan, Pharr and Putnam6 reported that declining institutional confidence plagued almost all the aforementioned countries. They summarize this situation as \"disaffected democracies.\" It is ironic that democracies face a strong internal threat in decreasing confidence among their citizens.The situation is even worse for the countries that democratized recently. South Korea provides another case of rapid decline in public confidence in political and civil institutions. 7 According to the World Value Survey results, Koreans' confidence in their Parliament declined from 70 to 15 percent between 1981 and 2001, while confidence in the courts and civil servants declined from 80 to 45 percent during the same period. Survey results show that Korean \"democracy in the aftermath of democratization\"8 shows symptoms of general crises.9Recent studies show that postcommunist societies suffer from a lack of public confidence in all institutions, and particularly in political institutions.10 In Poland, for example, peoples' confidence in the Parliament and the government, which had previously shown a high level of 85 and 65 percent between 1989 and 1993, respectively, fell to a low of 20 percent within five years.11This article concentrates on Armenia, a country that gained its independence only fifteen years ago. Armenia, which is in the South Caucasus, neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran. Political stability of the countries situated in this region is vital for the region and for oildependent countries.","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"7 1","pages":"261-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82145313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-04-01DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.15.2.173-190
D. Averre
Abstract: This article examines European Union-Russia relations against broader trends in Russian foreign and security policy. It assesses the prospects for a new agreement to replace the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, analyzes the recently appeared Russian concept of "sovereign democracy," and considers the challenges Moscow's more assertive foreign policy presents to Europe. Keywords: democracy, European Union, foreign policy, Russia, security, sovereignty Introduction How are relations between the European Union and Russia, two entities whose interaction--especially in term of trade, energy markets, and security--is crucial to the future of the continent, conceptualized? On the one hand, positive developments appear to hold out the prospect of Russia's inclusion in a wider European political community. The establishment of high-level institutional arrangements--biannual summits, the Permanent Partnership Council Ministerial, and Ministerial EU Troika-Russia meetings--and the development of an increasingly dense network of contacts between officials and experts across wide areas of sectoral cooperation give Moscow a privileged and perhaps unique position among Brussels's many external partners. Russia's leaders frequently stress the importance of the country's "European choice." On the other hand there are growing strains in the relationship. The lack of a coherent European policy for engagement with Russia or a common strategic vision, particularly regarding their shared neighborhood; a relatively narrow agenda for security cooperation; disputes over trade and energy issues; Moscow's insistence on a partnership between equals and the reluctance of Russian elites to accept the imposition of European norms and models; the "values gap" and concerns among Europe's policymakers about Russia's political, social, and economic development--all of these factors have combined to silence talk of Russia's "systematic integration" into Europe, or of "Europeanizing" Russia, and create a climate of limited pragmatic cooperation. One authoritative Russian commentator, not alone in his assessment, recently characterized the relationship in terms of "economic rapprochement accompanied by complete geopolitical stagnation ... relations [with Europe] are respectable and calm but are not going anywhere in particular." (1) This article identifies the key assumptions underpinning Russia's dealings with the EU and examines them against broader trends in Russian foreign and security policy, which has recently undergone a notable--and perhaps decisive--shift. It falls into three parts. First, a brief critical analysis of the existing basis for EU-Russia relations as contained in the road maps for the four Common Spaces, (2) adopted at the May 2005 summit, and proposals for a new agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), whose initial term is due to expire at the end of November 2007, are presented and assessed. Second, we in
{"title":"\"Sovereign Democracy\" and Russia's Relations with the European Union","authors":"D. Averre","doi":"10.3200/DEMO.15.2.173-190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.2.173-190","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This article examines European Union-Russia relations against broader trends in Russian foreign and security policy. It assesses the prospects for a new agreement to replace the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, analyzes the recently appeared Russian concept of \"sovereign democracy,\" and considers the challenges Moscow's more assertive foreign policy presents to Europe. Keywords: democracy, European Union, foreign policy, Russia, security, sovereignty Introduction How are relations between the European Union and Russia, two entities whose interaction--especially in term of trade, energy markets, and security--is crucial to the future of the continent, conceptualized? On the one hand, positive developments appear to hold out the prospect of Russia's inclusion in a wider European political community. The establishment of high-level institutional arrangements--biannual summits, the Permanent Partnership Council Ministerial, and Ministerial EU Troika-Russia meetings--and the development of an increasingly dense network of contacts between officials and experts across wide areas of sectoral cooperation give Moscow a privileged and perhaps unique position among Brussels's many external partners. Russia's leaders frequently stress the importance of the country's \"European choice.\" On the other hand there are growing strains in the relationship. The lack of a coherent European policy for engagement with Russia or a common strategic vision, particularly regarding their shared neighborhood; a relatively narrow agenda for security cooperation; disputes over trade and energy issues; Moscow's insistence on a partnership between equals and the reluctance of Russian elites to accept the imposition of European norms and models; the \"values gap\" and concerns among Europe's policymakers about Russia's political, social, and economic development--all of these factors have combined to silence talk of Russia's \"systematic integration\" into Europe, or of \"Europeanizing\" Russia, and create a climate of limited pragmatic cooperation. One authoritative Russian commentator, not alone in his assessment, recently characterized the relationship in terms of \"economic rapprochement accompanied by complete geopolitical stagnation ... relations [with Europe] are respectable and calm but are not going anywhere in particular.\" (1) This article identifies the key assumptions underpinning Russia's dealings with the EU and examines them against broader trends in Russian foreign and security policy, which has recently undergone a notable--and perhaps decisive--shift. It falls into three parts. First, a brief critical analysis of the existing basis for EU-Russia relations as contained in the road maps for the four Common Spaces, (2) adopted at the May 2005 summit, and proposals for a new agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), whose initial term is due to expire at the end of November 2007, are presented and assessed. Second, we in","PeriodicalId":39667,"journal":{"name":"Demokratizatsiya","volume":"50 1","pages":"173-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88950285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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