Throughout this book, it has been clearly articulated that the emergence and use of schemas and standards are increasingly important to the effective functioning of research networks. However, what is also equally emphasised is the danger posed if the use of schemas and standards results in excessive and negative system constraints – a means of exerting unhelpful control over distributed research activities. However, how realistically can a balance be facilitated between the positive benefits derived in the course of centralised coordination through the use standards versus the benefits from allowing self-organisation and emergence to prevail at the edge of organisational networks?In this chapter, we set out to explore how differing approaches to such problems are actually finding expression in the world. To do this, we have engaged in a detailed comparison of three different transformation systems, including the CGML system discussed at length in the previous chapter. We caution against any premature standardisation on any system due to externalities associated with, for example, the semantic web itself.
{"title":"Interoperability and the Exchange of Humanly Usable Digital Content","authors":"Richard Vines, Joseph M. Firestone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1773168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773168","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout this book, it has been clearly articulated that the emergence and use of schemas and standards are increasingly important to the effective functioning of research networks. However, what is also equally emphasised is the danger posed if the use of schemas and standards results in excessive and negative system constraints – a means of exerting unhelpful control over distributed research activities. However, how realistically can a balance be facilitated between the positive benefits derived in the course of centralised coordination through the use standards versus the benefits from allowing self-organisation and emergence to prevail at the edge of organisational networks?In this chapter, we set out to explore how differing approaches to such problems are actually finding expression in the world. To do this, we have engaged in a detailed comparison of three different transformation systems, including the CGML system discussed at length in the previous chapter. We caution against any premature standardisation on any system due to externalities associated with, for example, the semantic web itself.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129793687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does science provide knowledge of reality? In this paper, I offer a positive response to this question. I reject the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is 'stone-age metaphysics' to be rejected as the false theory of our primitive ancestors. Against such eliminativists about common sense, I argue that science both preserves and explains commonsense experience of the world. Though science may lead to the overthrow of deeply held beliefs, common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs which are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to establish the realist approach to science.
{"title":"Science, Common Sense and Reality","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1683918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1683918","url":null,"abstract":"Does science provide knowledge of reality? In this paper, I offer a positive response to this question. I reject the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is 'stone-age metaphysics' to be rejected as the false theory of our primitive ancestors. Against such eliminativists about common sense, I argue that science both preserves and explains commonsense experience of the world. Though science may lead to the overthrow of deeply held beliefs, common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs which are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to establish the realist approach to science.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129438400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher’s account of “well-ordered science.” A central part of Kitcher’s account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific research: contextual and purpose-relative scientific significance replaces mere truth as the aim of inquiry. I raise problems for Kitcher’s account and argue for an alternative, drawing on Peirce’s and Dewey’s theories of problem-solving inquiry. I conclude by suggesting some consequences for understanding the proper conduct of science in a democracy.
{"title":"Genuine Problems and the Significance of Science","authors":"Matthew J. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1135843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1135843","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the political constraints on science through a pragmatist critique of Philip Kitcher’s account of “well-ordered science.” A central part of Kitcher’s account is his analysis of the significance of items of scientific research: contextual and purpose-relative scientific significance replaces mere truth as the aim of inquiry. I raise problems for Kitcher’s account and argue for an alternative, drawing on Peirce’s and Dewey’s theories of problem-solving inquiry. I conclude by suggesting some consequences for understanding the proper conduct of science in a democracy.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121274279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I try to show how an integrated evolutionary and mainstream economics could be developed. At this beginning stage I do not give more than tentative hints, but these in a hopefully comprehensive way. I try to be comprehensive, because I think that it is one of foremost shortcomings of economic reasoning to focus on one issue and stop in front of connections to other issues and fields. A combination of these two modes is necessary. In my view, the focus on separate issues without consideration of linked issues is one of the causes for the proliferation of conflicting economic theories. In itself these are ‘right’ or at least ‘justified’, they are less useful as explanatory frameworks for real life phenomena. They capture only a part of reality and this under specific (different) conditions, which are related to the axioms and assumptions used in model building. They say more about the authors’ ability for rigorous reasoning than about their willingness to provide workable solutions for real problems. Empirical research in economics is not free from this problem, because theory and models serve as value foundations for deciding which questions to ask and which factors to research. The results again influence theoretical exercises. When certain factors are not judged important enough to be included in research, they cannot influence theory. It has maybe by now become clear that this essay aims at sketching a framework for research and theory. My aim is consequently not so much to answer one specific question, but to show how questions can be framed usefully in economics. The idea to give a remedy for the seeming separation between economic theory and reality. This is a necessity for a coherent scientific enterprise. I begin by discussing categorization as a means to cope with information gathered in the scientific process and stress the dangers which are implied by rigid categories. Then I shortly deal with some issues in the history of economic thought. The first is the debate on economic methodology at the end of the last century between the so-called German Historical school and the mainly Anglo-Saxon economists favoring a more analytical treatment. The second episode is centered around the development of the theory of firm based on Joan Robinson’s work. The third episode is connected to the emergence of the Chicago School of economics and the marginalist debate. The critical discussion of the emergence of present mainstream concepts leads to a discussion of Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty. This distinction is related to the Popperian solution of the problem of induction - falsification as the only acceptable criterion of science. Friedman’s and Popper’s views are then evaluated in the context of more recent positions in the philosophy of science based on evolutionary views. This sets the stage for a discussion of the evolutionary nature of the scientific process. I finish by evaluating tools available to modern ec
{"title":"On Economic Methodology: History of Economic Thought and a Tentative Comparison of Mainstream and Evolutionary Positions","authors":"C. Reschke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1598769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1598769","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I try to show how an integrated evolutionary and mainstream economics could be developed. At this beginning stage I do not give more than tentative hints, but these in a hopefully comprehensive way. I try to be comprehensive, because I think that it is one of foremost shortcomings of economic reasoning to focus on one issue and stop in front of connections to other issues and fields. A combination of these two modes is necessary. In my view, the focus on separate issues without consideration of linked issues is one of the causes for the proliferation of conflicting economic theories. In itself these are ‘right’ or at least ‘justified’, they are less useful as explanatory frameworks for real life phenomena. They capture only a part of reality and this under specific (different) conditions, which are related to the axioms and assumptions used in model building. They say more about the authors’ ability for rigorous reasoning than about their willingness to provide workable solutions for real problems. Empirical research in economics is not free from this problem, because theory and models serve as value foundations for deciding which questions to ask and which factors to research. The results again influence theoretical exercises. When certain factors are not judged important enough to be included in research, they cannot influence theory. It has maybe by now become clear that this essay aims at sketching a framework for research and theory. My aim is consequently not so much to answer one specific question, but to show how questions can be framed usefully in economics. The idea to give a remedy for the seeming separation between economic theory and reality. This is a necessity for a coherent scientific enterprise. I begin by discussing categorization as a means to cope with information gathered in the scientific process and stress the dangers which are implied by rigid categories. Then I shortly deal with some issues in the history of economic thought. The first is the debate on economic methodology at the end of the last century between the so-called German Historical school and the mainly Anglo-Saxon economists favoring a more analytical treatment. The second episode is centered around the development of the theory of firm based on Joan Robinson’s work. The third episode is connected to the emergence of the Chicago School of economics and the marginalist debate. The critical discussion of the emergence of present mainstream concepts leads to a discussion of Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty. This distinction is related to the Popperian solution of the problem of induction - falsification as the only acceptable criterion of science. Friedman’s and Popper’s views are then evaluated in the context of more recent positions in the philosophy of science based on evolutionary views. This sets the stage for a discussion of the evolutionary nature of the scientific process. I finish by evaluating tools available to modern ec","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116949946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we have presented arguments for simplicity as epistemological criterion of economic research. In particular, have been important aspects that show how the tradition of the theory, to make principle simplicity to represent many empirical data of experience or information, was one of the goals set by the fathers of the discipline: Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham.
{"title":"Epistemology of the Economy: Comments from Robert Nozick","authors":"Fernando Estrada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1598011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1598011","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we have presented arguments for simplicity as epistemological criterion of economic research. In particular, have been important aspects that show how the tradition of the theory, to make principle simplicity to represent many empirical data of experience or information, was one of the goals set by the fathers of the discipline: Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129781294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-03-19DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50016-6
John B. Davis
{"title":"The Homo Economicus Conception of the Individual: An Ontological Approach","authors":"John B. Davis","doi":"10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50016-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50016-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130764486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith set out his influential theory that societies achieve prosperity by securing the freedom of individuals to pursue their own end by the means they choose within a framework of rules of justice. In his earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith developed his thesis about the origins of our moral sentiments and the emergence of rules of justice. The socalled ‘Adam Smith Problem’ concerns the perceived inconsistency between Smith’s defence of selfinterest in the Wealth of Nations and his emphasis of sympathy as the origin of moral sentiments in the earlier work. The existence of the ‘Adam Smith Problem’ has been contested by many writers. The present author provides a number of new arguments to demonstrate the illusory nature of the problem by revisiting the key elements Smith’s moral theory. The author argues that the problem dissolves when the role of justice in providing the conditions of free trade is understood. Smith’s tirade against wealth worship is explained as part of his defence of justice and not a condemnation of wealth accumulation. According to this reading, the Theory of Moral Sentiments is a powerful statement of the moral basis of capitalism.
{"title":"Dissolving the Chimera of the ‘Adam Smith Problem’","authors":"Suri Ratnapala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1598212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1598212","url":null,"abstract":"In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith set out his influential theory that societies achieve prosperity by securing the freedom of individuals to pursue their own end by the means they choose within a framework of rules of justice. In his earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith developed his thesis about the origins of our moral sentiments and the emergence of rules of justice. The socalled ‘Adam Smith Problem’ concerns the perceived inconsistency between Smith’s defence of selfinterest in the Wealth of Nations and his emphasis of sympathy as the origin of moral sentiments in the earlier work. The existence of the ‘Adam Smith Problem’ has been contested by many writers. The present author provides a number of new arguments to demonstrate the illusory nature of the problem by revisiting the key elements Smith’s moral theory. The author argues that the problem dissolves when the role of justice in providing the conditions of free trade is understood. Smith’s tirade against wealth worship is explained as part of his defence of justice and not a condemnation of wealth accumulation. According to this reading, the Theory of Moral Sentiments is a powerful statement of the moral basis of capitalism.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"211 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116154745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The results of 6 experiments indicate that emotional intensity reduces perceived psychological distance. People who described events emotionally rather than neutrally perceived those events as less psychologically distant, including embarrassing autobiographical events (Experiment 1), past and future dentist visits (Experiment 2), positive and negative events (Experiment 3), and a national tragedy (Experiment 6). People also perceived an event (dancing in front of an audience) as less psychologically distant when they were in a more emotionally arousing social role (of performer) than in a less emotionally arousing social role (of observer; Experiment 4). Two findings bolster the causal role of emotional intensity in reducing perceived psychological distance. First, reported emotional intensity was negatively correlated with perceived psychological distance and statistically mediated the effect of being in an emotionally arousing social role on perceived psychological distance (Experiment 4). Second, providing people with an alternative interpretation of their emotions (emotionally ambiguous whale songs) significantly reduced, even reversed, the negative correlation between self-reported emotional intensity and perceived psychological distance (Experiment 5). These findings about emotional intensity are consistent with the broader idea that perceived psychological distance is grounded in and influenced by the phenomenology of objective distance. Implications for theories of psychological distance, emotionality, and choice are discussed.
{"title":"Feeling Close: Emotional Intensity Reduces Perceived Psychological Distance","authors":"Leaf Van Boven, Joanne Kane, A. Mcgraw, J. Dale","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1531661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1531661","url":null,"abstract":"The results of 6 experiments indicate that emotional intensity reduces perceived psychological distance. People who described events emotionally rather than neutrally perceived those events as less psychologically distant, including embarrassing autobiographical events (Experiment 1), past and future dentist visits (Experiment 2), positive and negative events (Experiment 3), and a national tragedy (Experiment 6). People also perceived an event (dancing in front of an audience) as less psychologically distant when they were in a more emotionally arousing social role (of performer) than in a less emotionally arousing social role (of observer; Experiment 4). Two findings bolster the causal role of emotional intensity in reducing perceived psychological distance. First, reported emotional intensity was negatively correlated with perceived psychological distance and statistically mediated the effect of being in an emotionally arousing social role on perceived psychological distance (Experiment 4). Second, providing people with an alternative interpretation of their emotions (emotionally ambiguous whale songs) significantly reduced, even reversed, the negative correlation between self-reported emotional intensity and perceived psychological distance (Experiment 5). These findings about emotional intensity are consistent with the broader idea that perceived psychological distance is grounded in and influenced by the phenomenology of objective distance. Implications for theories of psychological distance, emotionality, and choice are discussed.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124087954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this short paper is to introduce the General Economic Measurement Scale, a new mathematical object.
本文的目的是介绍一种新的数学对象——一般经济计量量表。
{"title":"The General Economic Measurement Scale","authors":"Martin Burke","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1368719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1368719","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this short paper is to introduce the General Economic Measurement Scale, a new mathematical object.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129252800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tourism is becoming one of the most important economic drivers in the urban context. With this in mind, several cities have tried to adapt their economies to satisfy the demands of the influx of tourism. The main consequences of this trend are the re-shaping of urban areas, with particular regard to art cities. This phenomenon is particularly evident in Venice�s historical city centre. In order to better comprehend the changes that have taken place, we have put together a research based analysis of the commercial structure of the city. Particular attention has been given to comparing and contrasting the retail business over the last thirty years.
{"title":"Effects of Tourism on Venice: Commercial Changes Over 30 Years","authors":"Francesco Zanini, Fabio Lando, M. Bellio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1292198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292198","url":null,"abstract":"Tourism is becoming one of the most important economic drivers in the urban context. With this in mind, several cities have tried to adapt their economies to satisfy the demands of the influx of tourism. The main consequences of this trend are the re-shaping of urban areas, with particular regard to art cities. This phenomenon is particularly evident in Venice�s historical city centre. In order to better comprehend the changes that have taken place, we have put together a research based analysis of the commercial structure of the city. Particular attention has been given to comparing and contrasting the retail business over the last thirty years.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123003736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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