The paper discusses the late endorsement by J. Schumpeter of the corporatist theory. The corporatist view was definitely enunciated by him during a well known conference held in Montreal on November 19th 1945, but this was probably the end of more antique process, the consequence of a cultural network, to which Schumpeter attended since the beginning of his American experience. The aim of the paper is first of all to draw the characteristics of this group of scholars - from Montreal, St Louis (Mo) and The Loyola University - based on Jesuit fathers, scholars of medieval economic history and economists - as Bernard W. Dempsey, Emile Bouvier, Leo Cyril Brown, Raymond de Roover, Joseph Solterer etc. Issues and questions typical of the scholastic tradition which interested very much Schumpeter during his life, but which especially during the 30s and the 40s became a serious effort to give economics a strong moral basis, involving several and different economists, from Pesch to Knight and many others. In a certain view, the aim of the paper is also to demonstrate that, while Schumpeter apparently was firstly engaged in technical issues related with business cycle, really he was always much more interested in irrational and moral view of economics, which he ultimately showed with the endorsement of the corporatist theory.
本文论述了熊彼特对社团主义理论的后期认可。1945年11月19日在蒙特利尔举行的一次著名会议上，他明确阐述了社团主义观点，但这可能是更古老的过程的结束，是文化网络的结果，熊彼特从他的美国经历开始就参加了这个网络。本文的目的首先是根据耶稣会神父、中世纪经济史学者和经济学家Bernard W. Dempsey、Emile Bouvier、Leo Cyril Brown、Raymond de Roover、Joseph Solterer等学者的特点，从蒙特利尔、圣路易斯(Mo)和洛约拉大学(The Loyola University)得出这群学者的特点。这是典型的学术传统问题熊彼特生前对此非常感兴趣，尤其是在30年代和40年代，这成为了一种严肃的努力，为经济学提供了一个强大的道德基础，涉及到几个不同的经济学家，从佩施到奈特等等。在某种程度上，本文的目的也是为了证明，虽然熊彼特最初显然是从事与商业周期相关的技术问题，但实际上他总是对经济学的非理性和道德观更感兴趣，他最终以社团主义理论的认可来表现这一点。
{"title":"Beyond the Business Cycle and Socialism: The Late Schumpeter's Corporatist View","authors":"Sergio Noto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1261910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1261910","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the late endorsement by J. Schumpeter of the corporatist theory. The corporatist view was definitely enunciated by him during a well known conference held in Montreal on November 19th 1945, but this was probably the end of more antique process, the consequence of a cultural network, to which Schumpeter attended since the beginning of his American experience. The aim of the paper is first of all to draw the characteristics of this group of scholars - from Montreal, St Louis (Mo) and The Loyola University - based on Jesuit fathers, scholars of medieval economic history and economists - as Bernard W. Dempsey, Emile Bouvier, Leo Cyril Brown, Raymond de Roover, Joseph Solterer etc. Issues and questions typical of the scholastic tradition which interested very much Schumpeter during his life, but which especially during the 30s and the 40s became a serious effort to give economics a strong moral basis, involving several and different economists, from Pesch to Knight and many others. In a certain view, the aim of the paper is also to demonstrate that, while Schumpeter apparently was firstly engaged in technical issues related with business cycle, really he was always much more interested in irrational and moral view of economics, which he ultimately showed with the endorsement of the corporatist theory.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116906571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Kahneman and Tversky (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that reported by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises from two to three. These findings cast serious doubts about the importance and robustness of such violations for the understanding of real-life economic decisions.
{"title":"On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence","authors":"G. Charness, E. Karni, Dan Levin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1155219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1155219","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Kahneman and Tversky (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that reported by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises from two to three. These findings cast serious doubts about the importance and robustness of such violations for the understanding of real-life economic decisions.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128998526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historians often make Christian belief and evolutionary science adversaries (as perhaps best exemplified by accounts of the 1925 Scopes trial), but Progressive Era American political economy allied Christian belief and evolutionary science. Leading progressive economists, notably the evangelicals attached to the Social Gospel movement, readily assimilated Darwinism to their religiously motivated project of economic reform. This essay argues that the progressive economists' merger of evolutionary science and Christian belief was made possible by the fact that the Social Gospel was itself already (in part) an accommodation to the implications of Darwinism, and that Progressive Era evolutionary science was protean, fragmented and plural, enabling intellectuals to enlist evolutionary science in support of diverse, even opposed positions in political economy.
{"title":"Evolutionary Science and Christian Belief in Progressive Era Political Economy: Adversaries or Allies?","authors":"Thomas C. (Tim) Leonard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1166622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1166622","url":null,"abstract":"Historians often make Christian belief and evolutionary science adversaries (as perhaps best exemplified by accounts of the 1925 Scopes trial), but Progressive Era American political economy allied Christian belief and evolutionary science. Leading progressive economists, notably the evangelicals attached to the Social Gospel movement, readily assimilated Darwinism to their religiously motivated project of economic reform. This essay argues that the progressive economists' merger of evolutionary science and Christian belief was made possible by the fact that the Social Gospel was itself already (in part) an accommodation to the implications of Darwinism, and that Progressive Era evolutionary science was protean, fragmented and plural, enabling intellectuals to enlist evolutionary science in support of diverse, even opposed positions in political economy.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114764775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.
{"title":"How General Do Theories of Explanation Need to Be?","authors":"B. Nickel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1091966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091966","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125819121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The appeal to ideas as causal variables and/or constitutive features of political processes increasingly characterizes political analysis. Yet, perhaps because of the pace of this ideational intrusion, too often ideas have simply been grafted onto pre-existing explanatory theories at precisely the point at which they seem to get into difficulties, with little or no consideration either of the status of such ideational variables or of the character or consistency of the resulting theoretical hybrid. This is particularly problematic for ideas are far from innocent variables - and can rarely, if ever, be incorporated seamlessly within existing explanatory and/or constitutive theories without ontological and epistemological consequence. We contend that this tendency along with the limitations of the prevailing human conception of causality, and associated epistemological polemic between causal and constitutive logics, continue to plague almost all of the literature that strives to accord an explanatory role to ideas. In trying to move beyond the current vogue for epistemological polemic, we argue that the incommensurability thesis between causal and constitutive logics is only credible in the context of a narrow, human, conception of causation. If we reject this in favor of a more inclusive (and ontologically realist) understanding then it is perfectly possible to chart the causal significance of constitutive processes and reconstrue the explanatory role of ideas as causally constitutive.
{"title":"The Ideas Debate in International and European Studies: Towards a Cartography and Critical Assessment","authors":"Andreas Gofas, C. Hay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1086060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086060","url":null,"abstract":"The appeal to ideas as causal variables and/or constitutive features of political processes increasingly characterizes political analysis. Yet, perhaps because of the pace of this ideational intrusion, too often ideas have simply been grafted onto pre-existing explanatory theories at precisely the point at which they seem to get into difficulties, with little or no consideration either of the status of such ideational variables or of the character or consistency of the resulting theoretical hybrid. This is particularly problematic for ideas are far from innocent variables - and can rarely, if ever, be incorporated seamlessly within existing explanatory and/or constitutive theories without ontological and epistemological consequence. We contend that this tendency along with the limitations of the prevailing human conception of causality, and associated epistemological polemic between causal and constitutive logics, continue to plague almost all of the literature that strives to accord an explanatory role to ideas. In trying to move beyond the current vogue for epistemological polemic, we argue that the incommensurability thesis between causal and constitutive logics is only credible in the context of a narrow, human, conception of causation. If we reject this in favor of a more inclusive (and ontologically realist) understanding then it is perfectly possible to chart the causal significance of constitutive processes and reconstrue the explanatory role of ideas as causally constitutive.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133576774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I use a general argument about the evidential role of data in ongoing inquiry to show that it is fruitful for economic historians and historians of economics to collaborate more frequently. The shared aim of this collaboration should be to learn from past economic experience in order to improve the cutting edge of economic theory. Along the way, I attack a too rigorous distinction between the history of economics and economic history. By drawing on the history of physics, I argue that the history of a discipline can be a source of important evidence in ongoing inquiry. My argument relies on the claim that it is a constitutive element of science that evidence is never discarded forever and is thus historical in nature. In the final section, I offer a case study by explaining a research proposal that turns on a long-running data-set Babylonian whole-sale prices of six commodities noted in pre-Hellenistic and Hellenistic times. To motivate my reading of this data-set, I critically discuss Aristotle's successful attempt to distinguish between astrology and political economy.
{"title":"Prophecy, Eclipses and Whole-Sale Markets: A Case Study on Why Data Driven Economic History Requires History of Economics, a Philosopher's Reflection","authors":"E. Schliesser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1142825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1142825","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I use a general argument about the evidential role of data in ongoing inquiry to show that it is fruitful for economic historians and historians of economics to collaborate more frequently. The shared aim of this collaboration should be to learn from past economic experience in order to improve the cutting edge of economic theory. Along the way, I attack a too rigorous distinction between the history of economics and economic history. By drawing on the history of physics, I argue that the history of a discipline can be a source of important evidence in ongoing inquiry. My argument relies on the claim that it is a constitutive element of science that evidence is never discarded forever and is thus historical in nature. In the final section, I offer a case study by explaining a research proposal that turns on a long-running data-set Babylonian whole-sale prices of six commodities noted in pre-Hellenistic and Hellenistic times. To motivate my reading of this data-set, I critically discuss Aristotle's successful attempt to distinguish between astrology and political economy.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131376886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I investigate two denials in Milton Friedman's Nobel Lecture (1976). The first is [i] the denial that 'Economics and its fellow social sciences' ought to be 'regarded more nearly as branches of philosophy.' The second is [ii] the denial that economics is 'enmeshed with values at the outset because they deal with human behaviour'. I show that Friedman's appeal to his methodology in the Nobel lecture fails on conceptual grounds internal to Friedman's methodology. Moreover, I show that the failure is related to a broader systematic problem: when properly understood, Friedman's methodology shows that positive economics is (in a non-trivial sense) enmeshed in values. In order to account for Friedman's overreaching, I turn to the charged social context regarding Friedman's purported involvement with the Chicago Boys, who were then serving Chilean Dictator Pinochet. I conclude by explaining why I re-open the old chestnut of values in positive science. The episode allows me to raise a question of fundamental import about the relationship between expertise and society.
{"title":"Friedman, Positive Economics, and the Chicago Boys","authors":"E. Schliesser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1142741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1142741","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I investigate two denials in Milton Friedman's Nobel Lecture (1976). The first is [i] the denial that 'Economics and its fellow social sciences' ought to be 'regarded more nearly as branches of philosophy.' The second is [ii] the denial that economics is 'enmeshed with values at the outset because they deal with human behaviour'. I show that Friedman's appeal to his methodology in the Nobel lecture fails on conceptual grounds internal to Friedman's methodology. Moreover, I show that the failure is related to a broader systematic problem: when properly understood, Friedman's methodology shows that positive economics is (in a non-trivial sense) enmeshed in values. In order to account for Friedman's overreaching, I turn to the charged social context regarding Friedman's purported involvement with the Chicago Boys, who were then serving Chilean Dictator Pinochet. I conclude by explaining why I re-open the old chestnut of values in positive science. The episode allows me to raise a question of fundamental import about the relationship between expertise and society.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"29 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122859178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool has been previously ignored by philosophers. I'd like to introduce philosophers to interactive epistemology. After doing so, I'll go on to describe the way I've used this powerful formal tool in my own research, by giving some arguments about Bounded Epistemology, which is an analogue of Bounded Rationality, and, if I'm right, is explainable according to many, but not all, of the same models. Doing so, however, requires first setting out and explaining many of these concepts more fully.
{"title":"Bounded Epistemology","authors":"R. C. Robinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1000697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000697","url":null,"abstract":"Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool has been previously ignored by philosophers. I'd like to introduce philosophers to interactive epistemology. After doing so, I'll go on to describe the way I've used this powerful formal tool in my own research, by giving some arguments about Bounded Epistemology, which is an analogue of Bounded Rationality, and, if I'm right, is explainable according to many, but not all, of the same models. Doing so, however, requires first setting out and explaining many of these concepts more fully.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133780104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the influence of performance related pay on several dimensions of job satisfaction. In cross-sectional estimates, performance related pay is associated with increased overall satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with hours. It appears to be negatively associated with satisfaction with the work itself. Yet, after accounting for worker fixed-effects, the positive associations remain and the negative association vanishes. These results appear robust to a variety of alternative specifications and support the notion that performance pay allows increased opportunities for worker optimization and do not generally demotivate workers or crowd out intrinsic motivation.
{"title":"Performance Pay, Sorting and the Dimensions of Job Satisfaction","authors":"Colin Green, J. Heywood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.983910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.983910","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the influence of performance related pay on several dimensions of job satisfaction. In cross-sectional estimates, performance related pay is associated with increased overall satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with hours. It appears to be negatively associated with satisfaction with the work itself. Yet, after accounting for worker fixed-effects, the positive associations remain and the negative association vanishes. These results appear robust to a variety of alternative specifications and support the notion that performance pay allows increased opportunities for worker optimization and do not generally demotivate workers or crowd out intrinsic motivation.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134354047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El autor de este articula comenta y critica la idea de « ciencia social islamica ». Primero, estudia la cuestion de una « Ciencia Social Isamica » en el contexto de la llamada en favor de la « indigenizacion » de las ciencias sociales en los medios academicos del Tercer Mundo. En la segunda y la tercera seccion, el autor evalua la « Ciencia Social Islamica » con los casos particulares de la « Ciencia Economica Islamica » y el « Proyecto de Islamizacion del Conocimiento ». Demuestra que el discurso economico islamico queda estructurado por un discurso modernista. Mas adelante, el « Proyecto de Islamizacion del Conocimiento » queda poco claro cientificamente, y se le puede acusar de « nativismo ». En la cuarta seccion, se plantea la cuestion entre los valores y las Ciencias Sociales en el Islam. En la quinta seccion, se considera a Ibn Khaldun como un ejemplo para la ciencias sociales en el Islam contemporaneo. El ensayo concluye con la affirmacion que la economia islâmica y la ciencia sociale islamizada no son las alternativas que pretenden al discurso modernisto.
{"title":"The Sacralization of the Social Sciences: A Critique of an Emerging Theme in Academic Discourse","authors":"S. F. Alatas","doi":"10.3406/ASSR.1995.996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3406/ASSR.1995.996","url":null,"abstract":"El autor de este articula comenta y critica la idea de « ciencia social islamica ». Primero, estudia la cuestion de una « Ciencia Social Isamica » en el contexto de la llamada en favor de la « indigenizacion » de las ciencias sociales en los medios academicos del Tercer Mundo. En la segunda y la tercera seccion, el autor evalua la « Ciencia Social Islamica » con los casos particulares de la « Ciencia Economica Islamica » y el « Proyecto de Islamizacion del Conocimiento ». Demuestra que el discurso economico islamico queda estructurado por un discurso modernista. Mas adelante, el « Proyecto de Islamizacion del Conocimiento » queda poco claro cientificamente, y se le puede acusar de « nativismo ». En la cuarta seccion, se plantea la cuestion entre los valores y las Ciencias Sociales en el Islam. En la quinta seccion, se considera a Ibn Khaldun como un ejemplo para la ciencias sociales en el Islam contemporaneo. El ensayo concluye con la affirmacion que la economia islâmica y la ciencia sociale islamizada no son las alternativas que pretenden al discurso modernisto.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122044672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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