In Liberalism with Excellence Kramer offers an account of liberalism that gets at something liberal philosophy often overlooks: the crucial importance for individuals of the success of their groups. 2 He argues that the idea can be made coherent with two positions that have been developed in opposition to one another. The first position is that of Rawlsian liberalism. According to this view, where constitutional essentials are concerned, the state’s action cannot be justified with reference to the fact that it may promote values, projects, activities or modes of living aimed at the pursuit and achievement of the good life. In other words, justifications for state activity that concerns constitutional essentials should be confined to the advancement and honouring of justice. According to perfectionism, by contrast, the state can deliberately promote values, projects, activities and modes of living aimed at the good life; it can promote conceptions of the good. Kramer is a perfectionist. He argues that the state should invest in the success of the groups to which its citizens belong and that it can do so by promoting excellence in human achievements. This bolsters a variety of conceptions of the good, including those that value specific forms of such excellence. But Kramer argues that this is compatible with the Rawlsian liberal project. How? Because the excellence of one’s society or the achievements of outstanding individuals in one’s society bolsters the warranted self-respect of those who belong to the society. And, as Rawls sets it out, justice requires that individuals have a warranted sense of self-respect.
{"title":"Should I Be Proud of Liberalism with Excellence? On the Collective Grounds of Self-Respect","authors":"Zofia Stemplowska","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY001","url":null,"abstract":"In Liberalism with Excellence Kramer offers an account of liberalism that gets at something liberal philosophy often overlooks: the crucial importance for individuals of the success of their groups. 2 He argues that the idea can be made coherent with two positions that have been developed in opposition to one another. The first position is that of Rawlsian liberalism. According to this view, where constitutional essentials are concerned, the state’s action cannot be justified with reference to the fact that it may promote values, projects, activities or modes of living aimed at the pursuit and achievement of the good life. In other words, justifications for state activity that concerns constitutional essentials should be confined to the advancement and honouring of justice. According to perfectionism, by contrast, the state can deliberately promote values, projects, activities and modes of living aimed at the good life; it can promote conceptions of the good. Kramer is a perfectionist. He argues that the state should invest in the success of the groups to which its citizens belong and that it can do so by promoting excellence in human achievements. This bolsters a variety of conceptions of the good, including those that value specific forms of such excellence. But Kramer argues that this is compatible with the Rawlsian liberal project. How? Because the excellence of one’s society or the achievements of outstanding individuals in one’s society bolsters the warranted self-respect of those who belong to the society. And, as Rawls sets it out, justice requires that individuals have a warranted sense of self-respect.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"81-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42609031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Symposium on Matthew Kramer’s Liberalism with Excellence","authors":"Paul Billingham, Anthony Taylor","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"1-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46483652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reasonable Disagreement and the Neutralist Dilemma: Abortion and circumcision in Matthew Kramer’s Liberalism with Excellence","authors":"Clare Chambers","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"9-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47868742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to Matthew Kramer’s aspirational perfectionism, the state is permitted to provide funding for the arts, sciences, and culture with the aim of securing the warranted self-respect of all citizens. This paper argues that although Kramer is right to think that the state has an important role to play in the economy of recognition, his conception of this role is mistaken. I argue, first, that Kramer’s exclusive focus on warrant for self-respect obscures the importance of social phenomena such as stigma, marginalization, and discrimination. Second, I argue that Kramer is mistaken in his reliance on vicarious pride to explain how the various excellences of our fellow citizens provide us with warrant for self-respect. I conclude with a brief sketch an alternative account, according to which the self-respect of citizens of democratic societies is supported by their collective creation and maintenance of just political institutions.
{"title":"The Self-Respect of Democratic People","authors":"H. Wietmarschen","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","url":null,"abstract":"According to Matthew Kramer’s aspirational perfectionism, the state is permitted to provide funding for the arts, sciences, and culture with the aim of securing the warranted self-respect of all citizens. This paper argues that although Kramer is right to think that the state has an important role to play in the economy of recognition, his conception of this role is mistaken. I argue, first, that Kramer’s exclusive focus on warrant for self-respect obscures the importance of social phenomena such as stigma, marginalization, and discrimination. Second, I argue that Kramer is mistaken in his reliance on vicarious pride to explain how the various excellences of our fellow citizens provide us with warrant for self-respect. I conclude with a brief sketch an alternative account, according to which the self-respect of citizens of democratic societies is supported by their collective creation and maintenance of just political institutions.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"93-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42471550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer argues that liberal neutrality cannot adjudicate issues such as abortion, and he intimates that this problem extends to ‘cognate problems’ such as euthanasia, animal rights and (more unexpectedly) same-sex marriage. In this Article, I examine the sense in which marriage is a cognate problem to abortion. I suggest that liberal neutrality is indeterminate, not only about the identification of rights-bearing natural persons, but also about the identification of justice-apt social practices. I argue that the resolution of many political-moral controversies depend on contested social ontologies – claims about the nature and moral status of the particular groups and relationships that individuals form – and I illustrate this claim by reference to the rights of religious association.
{"title":"Abortion, marriage and cognate problems","authors":"Cécile Laborde","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","url":null,"abstract":"In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer argues that liberal neutrality cannot adjudicate issues such as abortion, and he intimates that this problem extends to ‘cognate problems’ such as euthanasia, animal rights and (more unexpectedly) same-sex marriage. In this Article, I examine the sense in which marriage is a cognate problem to abortion. I suggest that liberal neutrality is indeterminate, not only about the identification of rights-bearing natural persons, but also about the identification of justice-apt social practices. I argue that the resolution of many political-moral controversies depend on contested social ontologies – claims about the nature and moral status of the particular groups and relationships that individuals form – and I illustrate this claim by reference to the rights of religious association.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"33-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43517343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to the Symposium Articles on Liberalism With Excellence","authors":"Matthew H Kramer","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47474463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professor Matthew Kramer offers a delimiting criterion or test for his Interest Theory of legal claim-rights. The ‘Minimum Sufficiency’ test is thought necessary because the Interest Theory is charged with being over-inclusive: it purportedly counts certain agents and entities as legal right-holders even though the law itself does not recognize them as such. This paper nonetheless argues that Kramer’s test is inadequate and unnecessary. It proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief explanation of the Interest and Will Theories of rights. Section III outlines the over-inclusiveness charge levied against the Interest Theory. Section IV explains Kramer’s test and how it aims to resolve the matter, while Section V shows why the test does not do the job. Section VI, however, provides Kramer and other rights theorists with a superior alternative.
{"title":"Kramer's Delimiting Test for Legal Rights","authors":"David Frydrych","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Matthew Kramer offers a delimiting criterion or test for his Interest Theory of legal claim-rights. The ‘Minimum Sufficiency’ test is thought necessary because the Interest Theory is charged with being over-inclusive: it purportedly counts certain agents and entities as legal right-holders even though the law itself does not recognize them as such. This paper nonetheless argues that Kramer’s test is inadequate and unnecessary. It proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief explanation of the Interest and Will Theories of rights. Section III outlines the over-inclusiveness charge levied against the Interest Theory. Section IV explains Kramer’s test and how it aims to resolve the matter, while Section V shows why the test does not do the job. Section VI, however, provides Kramer and other rights theorists with a superior alternative.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"197-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41508432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distinguishing Between What is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects","authors":"Patrick Lee","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"231-251"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44105492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequentialism, the Action/Omission Distinction, and the Principle of Double Effect: Three Rival Criteria to Solve Vital Conflicts in Cases of Necessity","authors":"Alejandro Miranda","doi":"10.1093/ajj/aux020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/aux020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"209-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/aux020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43768719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chang’s Parity: An Alternative Way to Challenge Balancing","authors":"Cristóbal Caviedes","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"165-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44063925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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