{"title":"Reasonable Disagreement and the Neutralist Dilemma: Abortion and circumcision in Matthew Kramer’s Liberalism with Excellence","authors":"Clare Chambers","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"9-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47868742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to Matthew Kramer’s aspirational perfectionism, the state is permitted to provide funding for the arts, sciences, and culture with the aim of securing the warranted self-respect of all citizens. This paper argues that although Kramer is right to think that the state has an important role to play in the economy of recognition, his conception of this role is mistaken. I argue, first, that Kramer’s exclusive focus on warrant for self-respect obscures the importance of social phenomena such as stigma, marginalization, and discrimination. Second, I argue that Kramer is mistaken in his reliance on vicarious pride to explain how the various excellences of our fellow citizens provide us with warrant for self-respect. I conclude with a brief sketch an alternative account, according to which the self-respect of citizens of democratic societies is supported by their collective creation and maintenance of just political institutions.
{"title":"The Self-Respect of Democratic People","authors":"H. Wietmarschen","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","url":null,"abstract":"According to Matthew Kramer’s aspirational perfectionism, the state is permitted to provide funding for the arts, sciences, and culture with the aim of securing the warranted self-respect of all citizens. This paper argues that although Kramer is right to think that the state has an important role to play in the economy of recognition, his conception of this role is mistaken. I argue, first, that Kramer’s exclusive focus on warrant for self-respect obscures the importance of social phenomena such as stigma, marginalization, and discrimination. Second, I argue that Kramer is mistaken in his reliance on vicarious pride to explain how the various excellences of our fellow citizens provide us with warrant for self-respect. I conclude with a brief sketch an alternative account, according to which the self-respect of citizens of democratic societies is supported by their collective creation and maintenance of just political institutions.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"93-107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42471550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer argues that liberal neutrality cannot adjudicate issues such as abortion, and he intimates that this problem extends to ‘cognate problems’ such as euthanasia, animal rights and (more unexpectedly) same-sex marriage. In this Article, I examine the sense in which marriage is a cognate problem to abortion. I suggest that liberal neutrality is indeterminate, not only about the identification of rights-bearing natural persons, but also about the identification of justice-apt social practices. I argue that the resolution of many political-moral controversies depend on contested social ontologies – claims about the nature and moral status of the particular groups and relationships that individuals form – and I illustrate this claim by reference to the rights of religious association.
{"title":"Abortion, marriage and cognate problems","authors":"Cécile Laborde","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","url":null,"abstract":"In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer argues that liberal neutrality cannot adjudicate issues such as abortion, and he intimates that this problem extends to ‘cognate problems’ such as euthanasia, animal rights and (more unexpectedly) same-sex marriage. In this Article, I examine the sense in which marriage is a cognate problem to abortion. I suggest that liberal neutrality is indeterminate, not only about the identification of rights-bearing natural persons, but also about the identification of justice-apt social practices. I argue that the resolution of many political-moral controversies depend on contested social ontologies – claims about the nature and moral status of the particular groups and relationships that individuals form – and I illustrate this claim by reference to the rights of religious association.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"63 1","pages":"33-48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43517343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to the Symposium Articles on Liberalism With Excellence","authors":"Matthew H Kramer","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUY010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47474463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professor Matthew Kramer offers a delimiting criterion or test for his Interest Theory of legal claim-rights. The ‘Minimum Sufficiency’ test is thought necessary because the Interest Theory is charged with being over-inclusive: it purportedly counts certain agents and entities as legal right-holders even though the law itself does not recognize them as such. This paper nonetheless argues that Kramer’s test is inadequate and unnecessary. It proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief explanation of the Interest and Will Theories of rights. Section III outlines the over-inclusiveness charge levied against the Interest Theory. Section IV explains Kramer’s test and how it aims to resolve the matter, while Section V shows why the test does not do the job. Section VI, however, provides Kramer and other rights theorists with a superior alternative.
{"title":"Kramer's Delimiting Test for Legal Rights","authors":"David Frydrych","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Matthew Kramer offers a delimiting criterion or test for his Interest Theory of legal claim-rights. The ‘Minimum Sufficiency’ test is thought necessary because the Interest Theory is charged with being over-inclusive: it purportedly counts certain agents and entities as legal right-holders even though the law itself does not recognize them as such. This paper nonetheless argues that Kramer’s test is inadequate and unnecessary. It proceeds as follows. Section II offers a brief explanation of the Interest and Will Theories of rights. Section III outlines the over-inclusiveness charge levied against the Interest Theory. Section IV explains Kramer’s test and how it aims to resolve the matter, while Section V shows why the test does not do the job. Section VI, however, provides Kramer and other rights theorists with a superior alternative.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"197-207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41508432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distinguishing Between What is Intended and Foreseen Side Effects","authors":"Patrick Lee","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"231-251"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44105492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consequentialism, the Action/Omission Distinction, and the Principle of Double Effect: Three Rival Criteria to Solve Vital Conflicts in Cases of Necessity","authors":"Alejandro Miranda","doi":"10.1093/ajj/aux020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/aux020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"209-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/ajj/aux020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43768719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chang’s Parity: An Alternative Way to Challenge Balancing","authors":"Cristóbal Caviedes","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"165-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44063925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is an essential contradiction in contemporary notions of subsidiarity. On the one hand, subsidiarity appeals to the ability of local bodies to engage in their own decision-making; on the other, subsidiarity employs a meta-explanation for appropriate levels of decision-making authority. In fact, therefore, the meta-explanation is assumed to provide a non-partisan basis for identifying when decision-making power should be exercised at a primary level (e.g., by representatives of the local association itself ) and when at a subsidiarity level (e.g., by the state), assuming as a premise what needs to be proved as a conclusion. By making such an assumption, the criteria for who gets to decide are taken away from primary actors themselves, limiting the fullness of their political involvement. The answer lies in recognizing that any meta-explanation for the theory of subsidiarity should be fully articulated as part of the democratic process and remain open to being questioned and challenged. The different intentions that lie behind switches to decentralization leave their mark on the nature of interference in sub-state units, proving that it is false to treat a principle of subsidiarity as politically neutral and of equivalent value wherever deployed. The meta-explanation of the criteria for aggregating or disaggregating power is something engaged with by citizens who do subsidiarity as a political practice. They take forward a view of appropriate decentralization in accordance with what they think the state should be doing and what associational groups should be doing. This at times yields priority to larger organizations for coordinated pursuit of some goods over others but does not surrender definitional discretion on the criteria for aggregating power. Defining the basis on which power is made hierarchical in society is part of the practice of doing subsidiarity, rendering subsidiarity by nature inherently political.
{"title":"The Inherently Political Nature of Subsidiarity","authors":"D. Burbidge","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUX017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUX017","url":null,"abstract":"There is an essential contradiction in contemporary notions of subsidiarity. On the one hand, subsidiarity appeals to the ability of local bodies to engage in their own decision-making; on the other, subsidiarity employs a meta-explanation for appropriate levels of decision-making authority. In fact, therefore, the meta-explanation is assumed to provide a non-partisan basis for identifying when decision-making power should be exercised at a primary level (e.g., by representatives of the local association itself ) and when at a subsidiarity level (e.g., by the state), assuming as a premise what needs to be proved as a conclusion. By making such an assumption, the criteria for who gets to decide are taken away from primary actors themselves, limiting the fullness of their political involvement. The answer lies in recognizing that any meta-explanation for the theory of subsidiarity should be fully articulated as part of the democratic process and remain open to being questioned and challenged. The different intentions that lie behind switches to decentralization leave their mark on the nature of interference in sub-state units, proving that it is false to treat a principle of subsidiarity as politically neutral and of equivalent value wherever deployed. The meta-explanation of the criteria for aggregating or disaggregating power is something engaged with by citizens who do subsidiarity as a political practice. They take forward a view of appropriate decentralization in accordance with what they think the state should be doing and what associational groups should be doing. This at times yields priority to larger organizations for coordinated pursuit of some goods over others but does not surrender definitional discretion on the criteria for aggregating power. Defining the basis on which power is made hierarchical in society is part of the practice of doing subsidiarity, rendering subsidiarity by nature inherently political.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"62 1","pages":"143-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUX017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41350919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Timothy Endicott tells the tale of the "wise electrician." Speaking as a homeowner, I should be pleased to hear about the moderately competent, reasonably affordable electrician. But that is not what Timothy has put on offer. Let us talk then about his much more interesting guy. The main activities of the Wise Electrician are two. One is that he installs legally required Grade 5 insulation in everyone's home save one. The second is that on his own ceiling light circuits he uses Grade 4 insulation. Number 4 is cheaper to acquire and, in his professional judgment, it is safe. We are not invited to infer that the Wise Electrician's abode is unique; number 4 would apparently be safe in many homes, and just as cheap for their owners. In fact, the Wise Electrician would install Grade 4 in those houses, too, but for one fact: it would be illegal. What makes our man so interesting is that it is illegal to install Grade 4 in his house too. The law says: Grade 5 for "all home wiring" and that's that. No exceptions listed.
{"title":"Response to Endicott: The Case of the Wise Electrician","authors":"G. Bradley","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/50.1.257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/50.1.257","url":null,"abstract":"Timothy Endicott tells the tale of the \"wise electrician.\" Speaking as a homeowner, I should be pleased to hear about the moderately competent, reasonably affordable electrician. But that is not what Timothy has put on offer. Let us talk then about his much more interesting guy. \u0000The main activities of the Wise Electrician are two. One is that he installs legally required Grade 5 insulation in everyone's home save one. The second is that on his own ceiling light circuits he uses Grade 4 insulation. Number 4 is cheaper to acquire and, in his professional judgment, it is safe. We are not invited to infer that the Wise Electrician's abode is unique; number 4 would apparently be safe in many homes, and just as cheap for their owners. In fact, the Wise Electrician would install Grade 4 in those houses, too, but for one fact: it would be illegal. What makes our man so interesting is that it is illegal to install Grade 4 in his house too. The law says: Grade 5 for \"all home wiring\" and that's that. No exceptions listed.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"50 1","pages":"257-262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/50.1.257","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45974238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：