Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10068
Refik Güremen
Abstract Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading.
{"title":"Pyrrho and Vagueness: A Fregean Analysis","authors":"Refik Güremen","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10068","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135514041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10064
Daniel R. DeNicola
{"title":"Rik Peels’ Ignorance: A Philosophical Study","authors":"Daniel R. DeNicola","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10064","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135579375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10059
Enzo Godinot
{"title":"L’incertitude chez les Anciens et les Modernes, directed by Anastasios Brenner & Brigitte Pérez-Jean","authors":"Enzo Godinot","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10059","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135720055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10067
Evan Fales
{"title":"The Epistemology of Spirit Beliefs, written by Hans Van Eyghen","authors":"Evan Fales","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10067","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136099721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-18DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10066
Joris Spigt
{"title":"Hegel and the Problem of Beginning. Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness, written by Robb Dunphy","authors":"Joris Spigt","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135208103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20231584
Scott Aikin
{"title":"Living Skepticism: Essays in Epistemology and Beyond, edited by Stephen Hetherington and David Macarthur","authors":"Scott Aikin","doi":"10.1163/22105700-20231584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20231584","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136361509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10062
Tyler Wark
{"title":"Beyond Hellenistic Epistemology: Arcesilaus and the Destruction of Stoic Metaphysics, written by Charles E. Snyder","authors":"Tyler Wark","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10062","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135097796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10061
Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht
{"title":"Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers, written by Brian Ribeiro","authors":"Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10061","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46772944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10060
M. Bergmann
These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition) that I call ‘the Paradigm-case Thesis’. In Section 4, I respond to some concerns that McCain and Lemos raise in connection with my discussion of the rationality of seemings. Lastly, Section 5 covers a few remaining objections from McCain and Lemos having to do with Chisholm’s “Problem of the Criterion,” the comparative strength of seemings, and the challenge of identifying which seemings count as epistemic intuitions.
{"title":"Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10060","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition) that I call ‘the Paradigm-case Thesis’. In Section 4, I respond to some concerns that McCain and Lemos raise in connection with my discussion of the rationality of seemings. Lastly, Section 5 covers a few remaining objections from McCain and Lemos having to do with Chisholm’s “Problem of the Criterion,” the comparative strength of seemings, and the challenge of identifying which seemings count as epistemic intuitions.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42046462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10058
M. Bergmann
In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part iii defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.
{"title":"Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10058","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part iii defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64560398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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