Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10050
Elijah Chudnoff
According to Michael Bergmann’s “intuitionist particularism,” our position with respect to skeptical arguments is much the same as it was with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion prior to our developing sophisticated theories of the continuum. We observed ourselves move, and that closed the case in favor of the ability to move, even if we had no general theory about that ability. We observe ourselves form justified beliefs, and that closes the case in favor of the ability to form justified beliefs, even if we have no general theory about that ability. I think this is a mistake. Our position with respect to skeptical arguments is like our current position with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes. Mathematics shows where Zeno’s reasoning goes wrong and provisions explanations of the ability to move. Epistemology shows where the skeptic’s reasoning goes wrong and provisions explanations of the ability to form justified beliefs.
{"title":"Skepticism Is Wrong for General Reasons","authors":"Elijah Chudnoff","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10050","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000According to Michael Bergmann’s “intuitionist particularism,” our position with respect to skeptical arguments is much the same as it was with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion prior to our developing sophisticated theories of the continuum. We observed ourselves move, and that closed the case in favor of the ability to move, even if we had no general theory about that ability. We observe ourselves form justified beliefs, and that closes the case in favor of the ability to form justified beliefs, even if we have no general theory about that ability. I think this is a mistake. Our position with respect to skeptical arguments is like our current position with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes. Mathematics shows where Zeno’s reasoning goes wrong and provisions explanations of the ability to move. Epistemology shows where the skeptic’s reasoning goes wrong and provisions explanations of the ability to form justified beliefs.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44999490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-12DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10049
Anna Boncompagni
{"title":"Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism: Essays on the Later Philosophy","authors":"Anna Boncompagni","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43031228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10047
M. Walker
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 3. It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 4. At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.
{"title":"A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?","authors":"M. Walker","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10047","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: \u0000 \u0000 1.\u0000 It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not.\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 2.\u0000 If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 3.\u0000 It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes.\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 4.\u0000 At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.\u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46924850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10040
Jakob Ohlhorst
Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epistemology is and in what sense hinges may precede epistemic evaluation. I argue that all these non-epistemicist accounts nevertheless have to deal with a certain extent of epistemic evaluation, namely, a form of the historical problem of demarcation arises in hinge epistemology: of two incompatible hinges, one may nevertheless be epistemically preferrable over the other even though they both are pre-epistemic hinges.
{"title":"Is There a Problem of Demarcation for Hinges?","authors":"Jakob Ohlhorst","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10040","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epistemology is and in what sense hinges may precede epistemic evaluation. I argue that all these non-epistemicist accounts nevertheless have to deal with a certain extent of epistemic evaluation, namely, a form of the historical problem of demarcation arises in hinge epistemology: of two incompatible hinges, one may nevertheless be epistemically preferrable over the other even though they both are pre-epistemic hinges.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46559014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10041
Brian Ribeiro
The dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix is a point of reception in the legacy of Ciceronian skeptical fideism, and as such it deserves its place in the history of skeptical fideism. Drawing on his Ciceronian model, Minucius depicts a skeptical fideist—Caecilius—struggling to hold on to his religious traditions in the face of the challenges posed by the new religion of Christianity. But Minucius himself is a convert to the new religion and writes in its defense. And this authorial intent distorts the skeptical fideism which Minucius found in Cicero’s De natura deorum by adding credulous and/or dogmatic elements that are ill-fitted to skeptical fideism but well-suited to his authorial intention of answering all available objections to Christianity in the hopes of winning converts.
{"title":"Ciceronian Skeptical Fideism in the Octavius of Minucius Felix","authors":"Brian Ribeiro","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10041","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix is a point of reception in the legacy of Ciceronian skeptical fideism, and as such it deserves its place in the history of skeptical fideism. Drawing on his Ciceronian model, Minucius depicts a skeptical fideist—Caecilius—struggling to hold on to his religious traditions in the face of the challenges posed by the new religion of Christianity. But Minucius himself is a convert to the new religion and writes in its defense. And this authorial intent distorts the skeptical fideism which Minucius found in Cicero’s De natura deorum by adding credulous and/or dogmatic elements that are ill-fitted to skeptical fideism but well-suited to his authorial intention of answering all available objections to Christianity in the hopes of winning converts.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45603512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10037
Abraham Lim
Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them.
{"title":"Why We Are Not Living in a Computer Simulation","authors":"Abraham Lim","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10037","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47547510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-05DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10046
N. Lemos
I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings.
{"title":"Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism","authors":"N. Lemos","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10046","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49436156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-13DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10045
K. McCain
In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems.
{"title":"Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism","authors":"K. McCain","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10045","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41448190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10043
Drew Johnson
{"title":"Luca Moretti and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology","authors":"Drew Johnson","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43426087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10044
J. Kvanvig
This paper focuses on Pittard’s path to rationalism. It begins from the master argument Pittard identifies against rational disagreement among epistemic peers. It raises an issue for Pittard’s endorsement of the first premise of that argument, but focuses primarily on the third premise. It suggests a way of denying the third premise beyond the possibilities Pittard identifies, and then questions the strategy Pittard uses for ruling out competitors to his rationalism for defending the possibility of partisan justification in cases of peer disagreement.
{"title":"Pittard on Religious Disagreement","authors":"J. Kvanvig","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper focuses on Pittard’s path to rationalism. It begins from the master argument Pittard identifies against rational disagreement among epistemic peers. It raises an issue for Pittard’s endorsement of the first premise of that argument, but focuses primarily on the third premise. It suggests a way of denying the third premise beyond the possibilities Pittard identifies, and then questions the strategy Pittard uses for ruling out competitors to his rationalism for defending the possibility of partisan justification in cases of peer disagreement.","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45693694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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