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Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers 有偏见的知识分子、有偏见的理由和有偏见的哲学家
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10078
Michael Veber

In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.

在《偏见：哲学研究》一书中，托马斯-凯利以他对偏见的解释为基础，对认识论怀疑论做出了回应。凯利认为，怀疑论的经典论证最好被理解为试图证明我们的常识信念对怀疑论者是有偏见的。凯利承认这是事实，但认为有偏见的信念仍然可以是知识。我提出两个反对意见。首先，如果我们将凯利的偏见理论应用于怀疑论，那么最好将怀疑论者的挑战视为我们的反怀疑信念是基于我们所知道的有偏见的理由。凯利并没有证明这种偏见与知识是相容的。其次，凯利解决怀疑论问题的方法是我所说的 "不雄心勃勃的认识论 "的一个例子。因此，它不是对怀疑论的令人满意的回答。
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引用次数: 0
Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt 关于安赫尔-皮尼略斯《我们为何怀疑》的评论
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10079
Branden Fitelson

In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (pbs) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.

在这些简短的评论中，我描述了作者对元认知、启发式算法（pbs）狭隘功能的贝叶斯阐释，这是他对我们为什么会产生怀疑的心理解释的核心。我提出了一些批评意见，以及另一种（在我看来）比作者更优雅的贝叶斯方法。
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引用次数: 0
Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question 不同意见、怀疑论和提出问题
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10077
Jonathan Matheson

In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemology: that some question-begging reasoning is permissible, and that there are important asymmetries between epistemological good cases and bad cases. I argue that there are several reasons to resist Kelly’s response. In brief, there are problems with each of the motivations Kelly gives for his picture. Each parallel faces significant obstacles. In addition, his response also fails to take the new evil demon intuition seriously.

在本文中，我将探讨托马斯-凯利在《偏见：哲学研究》一书中关于偏见的认识论意义的论述。凯利将来自偏见的怀疑性威胁与来自分歧的怀疑性威胁相提并论，并针对这些怀疑性威胁提出了对策。根据凯利的观点，一个没有偏见的人可以依据这一事实得出结论，认为与他持不同意见的对话者是有偏见的。凯利的这一回应与认识论的近期教训有几处相似之处：一些问题诱导推理是允许的，认识论的好案例与坏案例之间存在重要的不对称性。我认为，有几个理由抵制凯利的回应。简而言之，凯利给出的每一个动机都存在问题。每种平行都面临着重大障碍。此外，他的回应也没有认真对待新的恶鬼直觉。
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引用次数: 0
The Case for Spirit Realism: A Reply to Fales 精神现实主义的案例：答复法尔斯
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2024-02-09 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10076
Hans Van Eyghen
In this article, I respond to some criticisms raised in Evan Fales’ review of my book The Epistemology of Spirit Beliefs that was published in this journal. The points I will address are the following: (i) Fales’ complaint about unclarity in my epistemological position, (ii) his complaint about my insufficient presentation of alternative explanations, and (iii) his complaint about my use of the terms ‘naturalism’ and ‘naturalistic explanation’.
在本文中，我将对埃文-法尔斯（Evan Fales）在本刊发表的对我的《精神信仰的认识论》一书的评论中提出的一些批评意见做出回应。我将讨论以下几点：(i) Fales 抱怨我的认识论立场不明确，(ii) 他抱怨我对替代解释的介绍不够充分，(iii) 他抱怨我使用了 "自然主义 "和 "自然解释 "这两个术语。
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引用次数: 0
Non-Ideal Epistemology, written by Robin McKenna (2023) 非理想认识论》，罗宾-麦肯纳撰写（2023 年）
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10071
Angela O’Sullivan
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引用次数: 0
Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment 分歧、尊重和宗教承诺的实践
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10069
John Pittard
This paper summarizes Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. The book’s central question is whether confident (ir)religious commitment can be rationally maintained in the face of systematic religious disagreement. Part i develops an account of the epistemic significance of disagreement and considers the implications of this account for religious belief. This part argues against the commitment of “strong conciliationists” to a rigorous form of epistemic impartiality, a commitment that underlies the strongest argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. Part ii considers the implications for religious commitment if the impartiality constraint favored by strong conciliationists is correct. It is argued that the commitment to epistemic impartiality does not clearly support religious skepticism. However, such a commitment does induce a thoroughgoing normative uncertainty that arguably prevents one from rationally pursuing a religious (or explicitly irreligious) way of life.
本文总结了分歧、顺从和宗教承诺。这本书的核心问题是，面对系统性的宗教分歧，自信的宗教承诺是否能够理性地维持。第一部分阐述了分歧的认识论意义，并考虑了这种解释对宗教信仰的影响。这一部分反对“强有力的调和主义者”对一种严格形式的认知公正的承诺，这种承诺是支持分歧驱动的宗教怀疑主义的最有力论据。第二部分考虑如果强有力的和解主义者所支持的公正约束是正确的，对宗教承诺的影响。有人认为，对认识公正性的承诺并不明确地支持宗教怀疑主义。然而，这样的承诺确实会导致一种彻底的规范不确定性，这种不确定性可能会阻止人们理性地追求宗教(或明确地非宗教)的生活方式。
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引用次数: 0
Rational Insight and Partisan Justification: Responding to Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig 理性洞察与党派辩护:对Bogardus、Burton、throw和Kvanvig的回应
IF 0.2 0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-11-25 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10070
John Pittard
This paper discusses responses to Disagreement, Deference, and Rational Commitment from Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig. Each of these responses objects to the rationalist account of “partisan justification” defended in the book. After explaining partisan justification and its significance, I first take up Bogardus and Burton’s argument for a more restrictive account of partisan justification which says that partisan justification requires certainty. I argue that this account yields implausible discontinuities in the verdicts given to nearly identical cases. Next, I consider Thurow’s suggestion that perceptual evidence can provide partisan justification without supporting rational insight. I explain why insight plays a crucial role in cases where perceptual beliefs enjoy partisan justification. Finally, I address Kvanvig’s objection that my account of partisan justification applies only to highly reflective agents. I argue that a subject’s actual reflectiveness does not bear on the sense of justification principally at issue in the disagreement literature.
本文讨论了Bogardus、Burton、throw和Kvanvig对分歧、顺从和理性承诺的回应。这些回应都反对书中所捍卫的“党派辩护”的理性主义解释。在解释了党派辩护及其重要性之后，我首先讨论了Bogardus和Burton对党派辩护的一个更严格的解释，即党派辩护需要确定性。我认为，这种说法在几乎相同的案件中产生了令人难以置信的不连续性。接下来，我考虑Thurow的建议，即感性证据可以在不支持理性洞察力的情况下提供党派辩护。我解释了为什么洞察力在感性信念享受党派辩护的情况下起着至关重要的作用。最后，我要说明Kvanvig的反对意见，即我对党派辩护的描述只适用于高度反思的特工。我认为，一个主体的实际反思性并不影响在分歧文献中争论的正当性。
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引用次数: 0
Pyrrho and Vagueness: A Fregean Analysis 皮浪与模糊性:一个格伦的分析
0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10068
Refik Güremen
Abstract Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading.
伊里斯的皮洛建议我们不要相信自己的感觉和观点，而要对个别事物不抱任何看法。他建议，要达到这样一种状态，就必须对每一件单独的事物说，它“不是”某种方式，而不是某种方式。本文认为，目前对皮洛观点的形而上学解读未能解释为什么我们不应该相信我们的感觉和观点;此外，它也没有解释如何达到对个体事物“无意见”的状态。有人认为，对皮洛观点的弗雷格式分析可以为这两个问题提供令人满意的答案。然而，本文的目的是完善而不是反驳形而上学的阅读。
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引用次数: 0
Rik Peels’ Ignorance: A Philosophical Study 里克·皮尔斯的《无知:哲学研究
0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-09-27 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10064
Daniel R. DeNicola
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引用次数: 0
L’incertitude chez les Anciens et les Modernes, directed by Anastasios Brenner & Brigitte Pérez-Jean 《古代与现代的不确定性》，阿纳斯塔西奥斯·布伦纳导演林青霞Pérez-Jean
0 PHILOSOPHY
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10059
Enzo Godinot
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引用次数: 0
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