This essay reconsiders Paul Ramsey’s “medical indications” policy and argues that his reconstruction of the case of Joseph Saikewicz demonstrates that there is more room for caretakers to decline treatments for “voiceless dependents” than his interlocutors have sometimes thought. It furthermore draws on Ramsey’s earlier work to propose ways that Ramsey might have improved his policy, and argues that the shortcomings of Ramsey’s view arise from his bracketing of age in making determinations about what form of medical care is owed. The reading of Ramsey set forth here suggests Cathleen Kaveny’s depiction of the ‘medical indications’ policy in Ethics at the Edges of Law is too rigid and inflexible, even while it affirms other aspects of her critique.
{"title":"Indexing Burdens and Benefits of Treatment to Age: Revisiting Paul Ramsey’s “Medical Indications” Policy","authors":"M. Anderson","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay reconsiders Paul Ramsey’s “medical indications” policy and argues that his reconstruction of the case of Joseph Saikewicz demonstrates that there is more room for caretakers to decline treatments for “voiceless dependents” than his interlocutors have sometimes thought. It furthermore draws on Ramsey’s earlier work to propose ways that Ramsey might have improved his policy, and argues that the shortcomings of Ramsey’s view arise from his bracketing of age in making determinations about what form of medical care is owed. The reading of Ramsey set forth here suggests Cathleen Kaveny’s depiction of the ‘medical indications’ policy in Ethics at the Edges of Law is too rigid and inflexible, even while it affirms other aspects of her critique.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114882646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Secular bioethicists do not speak from a place of distinction, but from within particular culturally, socially, and historically conditioned standpoints. As partisans of moral and ideological agendas, they bring their own biases, prejudices, and worldviews to their roles as ethical consultants, social advocates, and academics, attempting rhetorically to sway others and shift policy to a preferred point of view. Their pronouncements represent just one voice among others, even when delivered with strident rhetoric, in an educated and knowing tone, from within institutional positions of power. This essay argues that, given the hegemony of progressive secular bioethics, traditional Christians routinely face epistemic injustice within medicine. That is, Christian knowledge regarding moral reality is all too often demeaned or dismissed, unless such norms can be translated into and defended within a secular ethos. Given such systemic bias, I argue, Christians also experience significant moral distress: they are fully aware of their moral obligations and what they ought to do, but institutionalized power structures make it nearly impossible to so act. But, Christian physicians are not mere technicians, obliged to provide whatever patients request from the list of legally available treatments. That antireligious critics seek to remove the rights of Christian physicians to limit how they practice medicine, where they do not offer or refer for abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and other inappropriate forms of care, is unjustified and prejudicial, singling out Christians, and other religious groups, for singular treatment. Regardless of what the law requires or institutional policy demands, however, Christians are obliged to submit to God in all things. As a result, they may at times find themselves required to engage in acts of civil disobedience.
{"title":"Christian Bioethics and the Partisan Commitments of Secular Bioethicists: Epistemic Injustice, Moral Distress, Civil Disobedience","authors":"M. Cherry","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Secular bioethicists do not speak from a place of distinction, but from within particular culturally, socially, and historically conditioned standpoints. As partisans of moral and ideological agendas, they bring their own biases, prejudices, and worldviews to their roles as ethical consultants, social advocates, and academics, attempting rhetorically to sway others and shift policy to a preferred point of view. Their pronouncements represent just one voice among others, even when delivered with strident rhetoric, in an educated and knowing tone, from within institutional positions of power. This essay argues that, given the hegemony of progressive secular bioethics, traditional Christians routinely face epistemic injustice within medicine. That is, Christian knowledge regarding moral reality is all too often demeaned or dismissed, unless such norms can be translated into and defended within a secular ethos. Given such systemic bias, I argue, Christians also experience significant moral distress: they are fully aware of their moral obligations and what they ought to do, but institutionalized power structures make it nearly impossible to so act. But, Christian physicians are not mere technicians, obliged to provide whatever patients request from the list of legally available treatments. That antireligious critics seek to remove the rights of Christian physicians to limit how they practice medicine, where they do not offer or refer for abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and other inappropriate forms of care, is unjustified and prejudicial, singling out Christians, and other religious groups, for singular treatment. Regardless of what the law requires or institutional policy demands, however, Christians are obliged to submit to God in all things. As a result, they may at times find themselves required to engage in acts of civil disobedience.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121902127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most influential philosophical arguments in favor of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in “A Defense of Abortion.” Its appeal for prochoice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Furthermore, I argue that the parable shows that the fetus is our neighbor in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently, Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos.
支持允许堕胎的最具影响力的哲学论点之一是朱迪思·贾维斯·汤姆森(Judith Jarvis Thomson)在《为堕胎辩护》(A Defense of abortion)中提出的小提琴家类比。它对赞成堕胎的人的吸引力在于，汤姆逊承认胎儿是一个与其他人具有同等道德地位的人，但对那些接受她的推理的人来说，堕胎仍然是允许的。在她的论证中，汤姆森大量引用了好撒玛利亚人的寓言，认为在某些情况下怀孕是她所说的好撒玛利亚人的行为，并声称我们在道德上不需要成为好撒玛利亚人。在这里，我认为汤姆逊颠覆了这个寓言，为一个与其意义相反的行为辩护。我主张基督徒必须成为好撒玛利亚人，并解释说，对基督徒来说，这意味着堕胎在任何情况下都是不允许的。此外，我认为这个寓言表明，胎儿是我们的邻居，需要我们的怜悯和帮助，因此，基督徒应该积极参与帮助确保未出生的胎儿受到保护，无论他们是处于人工流产或流产危险中的胎儿，还是多余的冷冻胚胎。
{"title":"Is Pregnancy Really a Good Samaritan Act?","authors":"B. Blackshaw","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One of the most influential philosophical arguments in favor of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in “A Defense of Abortion.” Its appeal for prochoice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Furthermore, I argue that the parable shows that the fetus is our neighbor in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently, Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"167 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122975559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The respect for one’s conscience is rooted in a broader respect for the human person. The conscience represents a person’s ability to identify the values and goods that inform her moral identity. Ignoring or overriding a person’s conscience can lead to significant moral and emotional distress. Refusals to respect a person’s conscientious objection to cases of killing are a source of incisive distress, since judgments that it is impermissible to kill so-and-so are typically held very strongly and serve as central moral commitments in one’s moral identity. I think it is wrong for a college basketball coach to pay his players, but I think it is really wrong to kill people. This article argues that any and all arguments for not respecting a conscientious objection to abortion commit a deontic fallacy. Briefly, arguments for the permissibility of abortion are structurally such that abortion is at best permissible, not obligatory. Now, arguments to justify overriding or ignoring a person’s objection to performing action (α) must understand action (α) as being obligatory. Thus, arguments for ignoring conscientious objections to performing abortion are incongruent with the actual philosophical justifications for abortion. Such arguments, then, commit a deontic fallacy.
{"title":"Deontic Fallacies and the Arguments against Conscientious Objections","authors":"S. Napier","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The respect for one’s conscience is rooted in a broader respect for the human person. The conscience represents a person’s ability to identify the values and goods that inform her moral identity. Ignoring or overriding a person’s conscience can lead to significant moral and emotional distress. Refusals to respect a person’s conscientious objection to cases of killing are a source of incisive distress, since judgments that it is impermissible to kill so-and-so are typically held very strongly and serve as central moral commitments in one’s moral identity. I think it is wrong for a college basketball coach to pay his players, but I think it is really wrong to kill people. This article argues that any and all arguments for not respecting a conscientious objection to abortion commit a deontic fallacy. Briefly, arguments for the permissibility of abortion are structurally such that abortion is at best permissible, not obligatory. Now, arguments to justify overriding or ignoring a person’s objection to performing action (α) must understand action (α) as being obligatory. Thus, arguments for ignoring conscientious objections to performing abortion are incongruent with the actual philosophical justifications for abortion. Such arguments, then, commit a deontic fallacy.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127121292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent literature on the ethics of medical error disclosure acknowledges the feelings of injustice, confusion, and grief patients and their families experience as a result of medical error. Substantially less literature acknowledges the emotional and relational discomfort of the physicians responsible or suggests a meaningful way forward. To address these concerns more fully, I propose a model of medical error disclosure that mirrors the theological and sacramental technique of confession. I use Aquinas’ description of moral acts to show that all medical errors are evil, and some accidental medical errors constitute venial sins; all sin and evil should be confessed. As Aquinas urges confession for sins, here I argue that confession is necessary to restore physicians to the community and to provide a sense of absolution. Even mistakes for which physicians are not morally culpable ought to be confessed in order to heal the physician–patient relationship and to address feelings of professional distress. This paper utilizes an Episcopal theology of confession that affirms verbal admission and responsibility-taking as freeing and relationally restoring acts, arguing that a confessional stance toward medical error both leads to better outcomes in physician–patient relationships and is more compassionate toward physicians who err.
{"title":"Confessional Approach to Disclosure of Medical Error","authors":"J. Mason","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent literature on the ethics of medical error disclosure acknowledges the feelings of injustice, confusion, and grief patients and their families experience as a result of medical error. Substantially less literature acknowledges the emotional and relational discomfort of the physicians responsible or suggests a meaningful way forward. To address these concerns more fully, I propose a model of medical error disclosure that mirrors the theological and sacramental technique of confession. I use Aquinas’ description of moral acts to show that all medical errors are evil, and some accidental medical errors constitute venial sins; all sin and evil should be confessed. As Aquinas urges confession for sins, here I argue that confession is necessary to restore physicians to the community and to provide a sense of absolution. Even mistakes for which physicians are not morally culpable ought to be confessed in order to heal the physician–patient relationship and to address feelings of professional distress. This paper utilizes an Episcopal theology of confession that affirms verbal admission and responsibility-taking as freeing and relationally restoring acts, arguing that a confessional stance toward medical error both leads to better outcomes in physician–patient relationships and is more compassionate toward physicians who err.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"22 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123564555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Medicine often views hospice care as “giving up,” which results in a reduced quality of end-of-life care for many patients. By integrating a theology of the Sabbath with modern medicine, hospice becomes a sacred and valuable way to honor the dying patient in a comprehensive and holistic way. A theology of Sabbath as “Sacredness in Time” can provide the foundation for a shift in understanding hospice as a legitimate care plan, which shifts the focus from controlling and manipulating space for the body, to rest and enjoyment of time for the whole person. First, I explore vitalism and its negative effects on the institution of hospice. Second, I address the main misconceptions and biases surrounding hospice in order to establish hospice as an appropriate option for the terminally ill. Finally, I argue for a shift away from sacredness in space (as seen in vitalism) to sacredness in time.
{"title":"Opposing Vitalism and Embracing Hospice: How a Theology of the Sabbath Can Inform End-of-Life Care","authors":"Sarah K Sawicki","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Medicine often views hospice care as “giving up,” which results in a reduced quality of end-of-life care for many patients. By integrating a theology of the Sabbath with modern medicine, hospice becomes a sacred and valuable way to honor the dying patient in a comprehensive and holistic way. A theology of Sabbath as “Sacredness in Time” can provide the foundation for a shift in understanding hospice as a legitimate care plan, which shifts the focus from controlling and manipulating space for the body, to rest and enjoyment of time for the whole person. First, I explore vitalism and its negative effects on the institution of hospice. Second, I address the main misconceptions and biases surrounding hospice in order to establish hospice as an appropriate option for the terminally ill. Finally, I argue for a shift away from sacredness in space (as seen in vitalism) to sacredness in time.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123920655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay reflects on 25 years since Christian Bioethics began publication and, in somewhat autobiographical fashion, engages two core concerns. First, although “non-ecumenism” may often appear a pretext for contention and division, I suggest that a respectful non-ecumenism may provide the opportunity for dialogue and the occasion for employing certain tools from religious studies. Second, although many are skeptical about the possibilities of identifying a “common morality,” a defense of that notion provides a plausible explanation for the development of limited consensus on some issues in bioethics.
{"title":"Christian Bioethics: Reflections on a Quarter-Century with the Journal","authors":"B. Lustig","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay reflects on 25 years since Christian Bioethics began publication and, in somewhat autobiographical fashion, engages two core concerns. First, although “non-ecumenism” may often appear a pretext for contention and division, I suggest that a respectful non-ecumenism may provide the opportunity for dialogue and the occasion for employing certain tools from religious studies. Second, although many are skeptical about the possibilities of identifying a “common morality,” a defense of that notion provides a plausible explanation for the development of limited consensus on some issues in bioethics.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"276 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132972863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When two Christian prelates as internationally prominent as Desmond Tutu and George Carey call for the legalization of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, their arguments merit close consideration. This article sets out and evaluates their arguments. It concludes that the prelates rehearse the superficial case regularly advanced by euthanasia campaigners and fail adequately to engage with the arguments, both principled and practical, against legalization.
{"title":"Desmond Tutu, George Carey and the Legalization of Euthanasia: A Response","authors":"J. Keown","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAB001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAB001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When two Christian prelates as internationally prominent as Desmond Tutu and George Carey call for the legalization of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, their arguments merit close consideration. This article sets out and evaluates their arguments. It concludes that the prelates rehearse the superficial case regularly advanced by euthanasia campaigners and fail adequately to engage with the arguments, both principled and practical, against legalization.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125563269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I confront Engelhardt’s views—conceptualized as a cohesive moral perspective grounded in a combination of secular and Christian moral requirements—on two fronts. First, I critique his view of the moral demands of justice within a secular pluralistic society by showing how Thomistic natural law theory provides a content-full theory of human flourishing that is rationally articulable and defensible as a canonical vision of the good, even if it is not universally recognized as such. Second, I defend the principles of Roman Catholic social teaching (RCST) against Engelhardt’s objection that it constitutes a watered-down version of the Christian moral vision which opens the door to intolerable moral compromises. While I acknowledge that Engelhardt’s criticism of RCST is well-grounded in certain abusive compromises that have been made by some Catholic healthcare institutions, I contend that such abuses are not endemic to RCST and avoidance of them is practically feasible in contemporary secular pluralistic societies. My primary aim is to show how continued dialogue between Engelhardtian libertarians and more communitarian-inclined RCST proponents may constructively yield a vision of healthcare allocation that ensures succor for the least advantaged within an authentically Christian social ethic.
{"title":"Visions of the Common Good: Engelhardt’s Engagement with Catholic Social Teaching","authors":"J. Eberl","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAA019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAA019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, I confront Engelhardt’s views—conceptualized as a cohesive moral perspective grounded in a combination of secular and Christian moral requirements—on two fronts. First, I critique his view of the moral demands of justice within a secular pluralistic society by showing how Thomistic natural law theory provides a content-full theory of human flourishing that is rationally articulable and defensible as a canonical vision of the good, even if it is not universally recognized as such. Second, I defend the principles of Roman Catholic social teaching (RCST) against Engelhardt’s objection that it constitutes a watered-down version of the Christian moral vision which opens the door to intolerable moral compromises. While I acknowledge that Engelhardt’s criticism of RCST is well-grounded in certain abusive compromises that have been made by some Catholic healthcare institutions, I contend that such abuses are not endemic to RCST and avoidance of them is practically feasible in contemporary secular pluralistic societies. My primary aim is to show how continued dialogue between Engelhardtian libertarians and more communitarian-inclined RCST proponents may constructively yield a vision of healthcare allocation that ensures succor for the least advantaged within an authentically Christian social ethic.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"344 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113989628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The nature of the doctor–patient relationship is central to the practice of medicine and thus to bioethics. The American Medical Association (in AMA principles of medical ethics, available at: https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships, 2016) states, “The practice of medicine, and its embodiment in the clinical encounter between a patient and a physician, is fundamentally a moral activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate suffering.” In this issue of Christian Bioethics, leading scholars consider what relevance (if any) Christianity brings to the relationship between physician and patient: does Christianity make a difference? The contributors consider this question from several different perspectives: the proper model of medicine, the role that the Christian moral tradition can play in medicine in a secular pluralistic society, how a Christian understanding of virtue can inform practices such as perinatal hospice and physician-assisted suicide, and whether or not appeals to Christian values can (or should) ground a physician’s right to conscientious objection.
{"title":"The Doctor–Patient Relationship: Does Christianity Make a Difference?","authors":"J. Delaney","doi":"10.1093/CB/CBAA018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CB/CBAA018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The nature of the doctor–patient relationship is central to the practice of medicine and thus to bioethics. The American Medical Association (in AMA principles of medical ethics, available at: https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/patient-physician-relationships, 2016) states, “The practice of medicine, and its embodiment in the clinical encounter between a patient and a physician, is fundamentally a moral activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate suffering.” In this issue of Christian Bioethics, leading scholars consider what relevance (if any) Christianity brings to the relationship between physician and patient: does Christianity make a difference? The contributors consider this question from several different perspectives: the proper model of medicine, the role that the Christian moral tradition can play in medicine in a secular pluralistic society, how a Christian understanding of virtue can inform practices such as perinatal hospice and physician-assisted suicide, and whether or not appeals to Christian values can (or should) ground a physician’s right to conscientious objection.","PeriodicalId":416242,"journal":{"name":"Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality","volume":"727 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116870266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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