Mexican Law Review最新文献

This work gives a synopsis of the evolution of public administration control mechanisms in Mexico. It highlights the instrumental nature of oversight, as well as regulatory and assessment aspects, and discusses issues like the historical design of the control instruments used in Mexican public administration. Certain social and political aspects from a legal perspective of administrative anti-corruption regulations are then underscored. The article concludes by drawing attention to the fact that neither the newly designed political-administrative anti-corruption structure in Mexico (the National Anti-Corruption Commission) nor the new mechanism to emerge from draft legislation (the National Anti-Corruption and Oversight Institute) will not eliminate corruption in the country because they replicate the same model established for reforming legal institutions. This article aims to show how the Mexican model has repeatedly designed administrative rules and structures that are unable to rise above the political and social spheres in which the complex phenomenon of corruption is deeply entrenched and creates a schism between legislative development and Mexico's social-political experiences in its fight against corruption. These observations can serve to help other countries design anti-corruption instruments. China is cited in this article because this article was presented as a speech regarding the Mexican experience in that country. It should be noted that the intention of this study was not to make a comparison of corruption or of the legal structures in these countries, but to analyze the case of Mexico.

The recent surge in illegal firearms trafficking from the U.S. into Mexico has helped empower Mexican criminal groups to adopt highly confrontational strategies, contributing to a surge of violence throughout the country. This article addresses the regulatory asymmetries between Mexico and the U.S. with respect to the production, import, export, sales and possession of firearms. It reviews several important gun laws and explores why this asymmetry limits bilateral cooperation and encourages gray market activity. It also examines the autonomy of U.S. states to regulate firearms, as this creates a diverse regulatory map that complicates any effort to stem smuggling. The results are flourishing gray markets on one side of the border and violent criminal activity on the other.

The international responsibility of States is based on two legal precepts: first, a State must be subject to international obligations; and second, a State must be responsible for noncompliance with such obligations. Specific and concrete damages are not required for the allocation of international responsibility to a State. Given these elements, the Inter-American Human Rights System, through the Inter-American Court, will not hear disputes involving a State’s international responsibility without the existence of a specific and concrete human rights violation. While this seems appropriate, rulings by the Inter-American Court have subsequently opened the door to States’ objective in ternational responsibility; i.e., responsibility under the American Convention on Human Rights that require no showing of a specific violation. In the author’s view, the international responsibility of States, similar to Public International Law, should be based on noncompliance without the need for a victim –especially in human rights cases. For this reason, the Inter-American Court is correct in holding States responsible for domestic laws that contravene its own human rights commitments under international treaties– regardless of whether or not these norms have been enforced.

The main function of administrative courts in Mexico is to resolve disputes between administrative agencies and citizens. Mexico is a federal system with 31 states and a Federal District. Twenty-nine states and the Federal District have administrative courts of this type. Most of these courts follow the French model of reviewing administrative actions in bodies that do not form part of the regular justice system. However, almost half of the states have deviated from this model and ascribed these administrative courts to the judicial branch. How does this change in the institutional framework influence the way administrative court judges review administrative action disputes? In order to answer this question we analyzed the rulings of judges from the different types of courts empirically. The Mexican federal court structure made this experiment possible because there are both administrative courts incorporated into the judiciary and autonomous courts. We used a database of more than 4,000 cases from over twenty local administrative courts. We analyzed the influence of the branch to which the court belongs, the procedures of appointment for judges, the length of a judge’s term in office, and the protection of judges’ salaries over their actual decisions. We classified decisions into two broad categories: pro-government decisions and case dismissals. The results point toward evidence that the branch to which the court belongs, the length of a judge’s term in office and governor intervention in the appointment of judges affect judges’ decisions.

From a doctrinal perspective and based on a case study, this article analyzes the way in which the best interests of the minor has become an important principle of interpretation in Mexico’s legal life. This is observed in the evaluation of different situations in which the federal Judicial Branch has resolved conflicts dealing with fundamental rights, taking into account family law-related issues. Moreover, there are important cases that neither the state nor local courts have resolved as they specifically deal with the protection of minors in the printed media. Therefore, as of the constitutionalization of Civil Law, the traditional form of this particular branch of law has been revised, considering the rescue of the person and in compliance with the international treaties that Mexico has signed, as a form of legal argument.

Drawing on T.H. Marshall’s classic analysis of how civil, political and social rights evolved in Great Britain, this article follows authors, like Rose and Shin, who used a “social pyramid” to illustrate how the inverted development of such citizenship rights in other nations may weaken liberal democracy. In contrast, I argue that this sequence varies depending on a society’s own unique history, and that no one single path can define the development of liberal democracy. In Mexico, the development of citizenship rights (mainly social, political and civil, following T.H. Marshall’s categorization) was catalyzed by a series of economic and security-related crises that impacted a broad cross-section of Mexican society. The result of these pressures —both from above (organized elites) and below (organized popular groups)— has been greater enforcement of already existing political rights. This major change eventually led to competitive ballot elections (since the late 1990s) which in turn has forced politicians to focus on reshaping social rights (e.g., making their application universal rather than selective). Since President Felipe Calderon’s (2006-2012) “war on drugs,” there has also been notable legislation —backed by widespread public support— to strengthen civil rights (e.g., 2008 criminal justice reform; 2011 reforms to the amparo and human rights).

This article offers (a) a basic exposition of what some members of a certain generation of legal scholars said with regards to legal education; and (b) an effort to link those ideas with a specific issue of legal education in general, and Mexican legal education in particular. With regards to these points, the idea is to go beyond the traditional approach to theory and practice, i.e., that theory is independent or even irrelevant in some cases with regards to matters of practical knowledge. Contrary to this approach, it is assumed that there is a strong relationship between theory and practice, and that they both complement each other. The purpose is to show: (a) that the ideas of the legal realists regarding training for practice during legal education is useful for general legal education; (b) that the implementation of some of these ideas in Mexican legal education would invariably help to graduate more conscious and prepared legal professionals; and (c) that the implementation of these ideas does not require much effort, only the willingness of universities and faculty to go beyond traditional, localist approaches to legal education, towards a more realistic view.

This note explains the new legal initiatives in the regulation of private corporate bribery in Brazil. Corruption is an endemic problem in many States, including ones with an emerging economy such as Brazil. The development and implementation of anticorruption policies necessarily goes through Klitgaard’s “Principal-Agent-Client” model. According to this theory, it is important to create a system of punishment and incentive that focuses also on the “client,” the private sector, a subject often forgotten in the drafting of anti-corruption laws. This note argues that previous Brazilian corruption laws did not foresee a consistent legal framework capable of preventing and punishing companies’ use of bribery. In this scenario, one can observe that Brazil began a process of institutional change over the course of recent years, which consisted of developing new anti-corruption mechanisms. The creation of The Office of Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União), a federal government organ specialized in corruption control, is a landmark. The implementation of Law No. 12.846, which will enter into force in 2014, shows great promise. The new law predicts harsher punishments to companies involved in bribery. One interesting aspect is the creation of incentive mechanisms directed at cooperation with government inspection, leniency agreements and a provision to decrease punishment when compliance programs are implemented. Although in order for it to be put into practice, the latter demands a more precise definition. The authors are optimistic about this new initiative and await further developments.

Biobanking presents significant governance challenges. This is especially evident in Mexico, where the legal framework has not kept up with significant industry expansion. Twenty years ago, Europe was in a similar position. More recently, Europe has developed a comprehensive framework for addressing biobank expansion within ever-growing scientific and biomedical research communities. Based on this experience, we can draw many lessons, including those involving the implementation of laws, procedures and stakeholders’ consensus to ethically maximize the potential of samples. Mexican biobanking raises many issues, requiring solutions that are sensitive to its own particular needs. This article analyses the flaws of current biobanking regulations in Mexico by drawing comparisons with Europe. It pays special attention to informed consent; sample/data sharing systems; ethical tissue treatment and classification; governance models; best practices and the role of ethics committees. It argues that several European provisions regarding data protection and sharing can serve as guidelines for international research collaboration currently taking place between Mexico and Europe.

BRICS is an exogenous invention that was institutionalized as a convenient geopolitical market strategy, which favored each of the five BRICS countries to a greater or a lesser degree. As such, it is now a political group without deep roots and its future will be conditioned by any dividends it might yield over the coming years as a result of political, economic and social correlations and divergences.