Loneliness was one the most important matters during The Covid Pandemic. This paper claims that this “lonely situation” was a previous cultural condition. Loneliness belongs to a certain style of life of the Western Culture as an effect of the cultural way of living during the last decades. For this purpose, we will show the way loneliness has been researched during the last 70 years, which is mostly from a psychological and emotional point of view. On the opposite, we will show 2 reasonings to declare the “emotional loneliness” not enough in order to understand this phenomenon. Finally, we will introduce structural cultural elements – taking Sweden as an example of a very modern western socialdemocracy – to show loneliness as way of life and not only a way of feeling. That conclusion allows us to re-ask the cultural control of an isolated individual in pre-Pandemic times.
{"title":"Understanding Loneliness in Pre- and Post-Pandemic Times","authors":"Enrique Anrubia","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.009","url":null,"abstract":"Loneliness was one the most important matters during The Covid Pandemic. This paper claims that this “lonely situation” was a previous cultural condition. Loneliness belongs to a certain style of life of the Western Culture as an effect of the cultural way of living during the last decades. For this purpose, we will show the way loneliness has been researched during the last 70 years, which is mostly from a psychological and emotional point of view. On the opposite, we will show 2 reasonings to declare the “emotional loneliness” not enough in order to understand this phenomenon. Finally, we will introduce structural cultural elements – taking Sweden as an example of a very modern western socialdemocracy – to show loneliness as way of life and not only a way of feeling. That conclusion allows us to re-ask the cultural control of an isolated individual in pre-Pandemic times.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79240628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism.
{"title":"Methodological Naturalists Need Not Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism","authors":"Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.005","url":null,"abstract":"In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86101264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One scientific objection to religion is that the discovery of extraterrestrial life would show that our religions are not veridical, with Christianity being the most common target. I will first look at a parallel issue, the ancient and medieval controversy over antipodes. This raises two problematic Christian doctrines that would apply equally to extraterrestrials: the transmission of original sin and the cosmic fall. These issues raise questions about their spiritual status, but I conclude that not having such answers does not amount to an objection to Christianity’s credibility.
{"title":"Extraterrestrial Soteriology","authors":"Jim Slagle","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.006","url":null,"abstract":"One scientific objection to religion is that the discovery of extraterrestrial life would show that our religions are not veridical, with Christianity being the most common target. I will first look at a parallel issue, the ancient and medieval controversy over antipodes. This raises two problematic Christian doctrines that would apply equally to extraterrestrials: the transmission of original sin and the cosmic fall. These issues raise questions about their spiritual status, but I conclude that not having such answers does not amount to an objection to Christianity’s credibility.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72713481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theological thinking is hard. It takes various forms depending on its object of reflection, and needs to be doctrinally informed, contextually appropriate and methodologically consistent. Theological thinking about evolutionary creation meets all said conditions and restrictions on some sort of a larger-than-usual scale. I, thus, introduce a thinking tool – intuition pump, as Daniel Dennett calls it – that can help us theologically contemplate evolutionary creation. This approach aims to put together and to combine evolution and creation within the context of the structure and form of Dennett’s proposed methodology and thought experiments using at one instance Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This intuition pump has its implications and effects in other theological domains (Trinity, Christology and Sacramentology) but its natural context lies within theology of creation. I will start by presenting Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for scientific research of consciousness, stretching our theological imagination by using it. This thinking tool enables us to see this world as God’s heterophenomenological world. At the same time, it enables us to recognize and confirm intrinsic properties or essences in nature and it warrant thinking about historicity of Adam and Eve.
{"title":"Thinking tool for evolutionary creation","authors":"Bruno Petrušić","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.003","url":null,"abstract":"Theological thinking is hard. It takes various forms depending on its object of reflection, and needs to be doctrinally informed, contextually appropriate and methodologically consistent. Theological thinking about evolutionary creation meets all said conditions and restrictions on some sort of a larger-than-usual scale. I, thus, introduce a thinking tool – intuition pump, as Daniel Dennett calls it – that can help us theologically contemplate evolutionary creation. This approach aims to put together and to combine evolution and creation within the context of the structure and form of Dennett’s proposed methodology and thought experiments using at one instance Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This intuition pump has its implications and effects in other theological domains (Trinity, Christology and Sacramentology) but its natural context lies within theology of creation. I will start by presenting Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for scientific research of consciousness, stretching our theological imagination by using it. This thinking tool enables us to see this world as God’s heterophenomenological world. At the same time, it enables us to recognize and confirm intrinsic properties or essences in nature and it warrant thinking about historicity of Adam and Eve.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79447183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay is a critique of a version of progressive creation developed by Michael Chaberek, O. P. He holds that there are exceptions to evolutionary descent due to the supernatural production of “natural species,” taxa that allegedly do not have biological ancestry, are theologically identified with biblical kinds, and are metaphysically characterized by distinct substantial forms. Chaberek’s assertion that these natural species correspond “roughly” to the Linnaean taxa of biological families contradicts modern scientific conclusions regarding the continuity of evolutionary descent. To illustrate this conflict, I examine some of the extensive evidence for the evolutionary origins of families within the Feliformia sub-order. I conclude that Chaberek’s assertion of supernatural progressive creation is a God-of-the-gaps theology burdened by a defensive stance with respect to scientific progress.
这篇文章是对Michael Chaberek, O. P.提出的渐进创造论的批判。他认为，由于“自然物种”的超自然产生，进化血统也有例外，这些物种据称没有生物祖先，在神学上被认定为圣经的种类，并且在形而上学上以独特的实体形式为特征。查伯雷克断言，这些自然物种“大致”与林奈生物科分类群相对应，这与现代科学关于进化血统连续性的结论相矛盾。为了说明这种冲突，我研究了一些关于Feliformia亚目家庭进化起源的广泛证据。我的结论是，查伯雷克关于超自然的渐进创造的断言是一种“间隙之神”的神学，背负着对科学进步的防御立场。
{"title":"The Evolving Taxonomy of Progressive Creation","authors":"J. R. Hofmann","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.002","url":null,"abstract":"This essay is a critique of a version of progressive creation developed by Michael Chaberek, O. P. He holds that there are exceptions to evolutionary descent due to the supernatural production of “natural species,” taxa that allegedly do not have biological ancestry, are theologically identified with biblical kinds, and are metaphysically characterized by distinct substantial forms. Chaberek’s assertion that these natural species correspond “roughly” to the Linnaean taxa of biological families contradicts modern scientific conclusions regarding the continuity of evolutionary descent. To illustrate this conflict, I examine some of the extensive evidence for the evolutionary origins of families within the Feliformia sub-order. I conclude that Chaberek’s assertion of supernatural progressive creation is a God-of-the-gaps theology burdened by a defensive stance with respect to scientific progress.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90772476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Este trabajo aborda la contribución de Ratzinger al debate sobre la relación entre ciencia y fe. No la analizamos desde los esquemas usuales que clasifican dicha relación en modelos como el del conflicto, magisterios independientes, integración, etc. La posición de Ratzinger se encuadra mejor en un esquema que clasifica las diferentes actitudes adoptadas ante la tesis del conflicto. Proponemos una clasificación de dichas actitudes. Mostramos cómo Ratzinger reconoce la existencia de un conflicto real en la relación entre ciencia y fe. Exponemos las raíces epistémicas que, según Ratzinger, dan lugar a dicho conflicto y denominamos su actitud ante el mismo de “armonización”. La tarea de armonización propuesta por Ratzinger es posible mantenerla sólo desde la fe. Se trata de una fe entendida de manera distinta al modo en que comparece en los modelos de relación antes mencionados y que usualmente se presentan como modelos alternativos. La propuesta de Ratzinger sirve para dar unidad a dichos modelos. No aborda el conflicto desde los presupuestos ilustrados, sino desvelando las claves epistémicas que determinan su naturaleza y que se descubren en un proceso histórico del que nuestro autor dibuja un cuadro global. En Ratzinger el conflicto se entiende mejor como tensión insuperable que invita a acometer una tarea continuada de purificación. El sujeto de dicha purificación son las imágenes con las que se ha expresado la fe a lo largo de la historia y las cosmovisiones en las que dicha fe ha sido acogida, las que le han prestado esas imágenes.
{"title":"Ratzinger ante el conflicto entre ciencia y fe","authors":"S. Collado","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.013","url":null,"abstract":"Este trabajo aborda la contribución de Ratzinger al debate sobre la relación entre ciencia y fe. No la analizamos desde los esquemas usuales que clasifican dicha relación en modelos como el del conflicto, magisterios independientes, integración, etc. La posición de Ratzinger se encuadra mejor en un esquema que clasifica las diferentes actitudes adoptadas ante la tesis del conflicto. Proponemos una clasificación de dichas actitudes. \u0000Mostramos cómo Ratzinger reconoce la existencia de un conflicto real en la relación entre ciencia y fe. Exponemos las raíces epistémicas que, según Ratzinger, dan lugar a dicho conflicto y denominamos su actitud ante el mismo de “armonización”. La tarea de armonización propuesta por Ratzinger es posible mantenerla sólo desde la fe. Se trata de una fe entendida de manera distinta al modo en que comparece en los modelos de relación antes mencionados y que usualmente se presentan como modelos alternativos. La propuesta de Ratzinger sirve para dar unidad a dichos modelos. No aborda el conflicto desde los presupuestos ilustrados, sino desvelando las claves epistémicas que determinan su naturaleza y que se descubren en un proceso histórico del que nuestro autor dibuja un cuadro global. \u0000En Ratzinger el conflicto se entiende mejor como tensión insuperable que invita a acometer una tarea continuada de purificación. El sujeto de dicha purificación son las imágenes con las que se ha expresado la fe a lo largo de la historia y las cosmovisiones en las que dicha fe ha sido acogida, las que le han prestado esas imágenes.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90175363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The opening of the archives for the pontificate of Pius XII makes it possible to see the history of the drafting of the encyclical Humani generis, the first document in which the universal magisterium of the Catholic Church addressed the question of evolution. Although its acknowledgment that the question of the evolutionary origin of the human body was, provisionally, theologically open generated no controversy at the drafting commission, the definitiveness of its reservations about monophyletic polygenism generated a disagreement resolved only by Pope Pius. Three incidents from the early 1950’s reinforce these conclusions about the proper interpretation of the encyclical.
{"title":"Humani Generis & Evolution: A Report from the Archives","authors":"K. Kemp","doi":"10.12775/setf.2023.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2023.001","url":null,"abstract":"The opening of the archives for the pontificate of Pius XII makes it possible to see the history of the drafting of the encyclical Humani generis, the first document in which the universal magisterium of the Catholic Church addressed the question of evolution. Although its acknowledgment that the question of the evolutionary origin of the human body was, provisionally, theologically open generated no controversy at the drafting commission, the definitiveness of its reservations about monophyletic polygenism generated a disagreement resolved only by Pope Pius. Three incidents from the early 1950’s reinforce these conclusions about the proper interpretation of the encyclical.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82943394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In these brief remarks, I sketch Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity. The nature of humility for Aquinas emerges nicely from his account of pride, and it also illuminates Aquinas’s view of magnanimity. For Aquinas, pride is the worst of the vices, and it comes in four kinds. The opposite of all these kinds of pride in a person is his disposition to accept that the excellences he has are all gifts from a good God and are all meant to be given back by being shared with others. Aquinas believes that all the virtues come together as a set. Consequently, a person who has humility also has courage. Aquinas takes the deepest kind of courage as a gift of the Holy Spirit. On his view, taken as a gift, courage manifests itself in a disposition to act on the settled conviction that one will be united to God in heaven when one dies. It is not easy to see how magnanimity could be a virtue if humility is. The solution is to see that for Aquinas the honor for the Christian virtue of magnanimity is not honor from human beings but honor from God. A person can have the virtue of humility and still strive for the greatest honors, as Aquinas sees it. The conclusion of Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity is this: it is morally obligatory to go for glory, because glory is a matter of being honored by God as faithful.
{"title":"Humility, Courage, Magnanimity: a Thomistic Account","authors":"Eleonore Stump","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.016","url":null,"abstract":"In these brief remarks, I sketch Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity. The nature of humility for Aquinas emerges nicely from his account of pride, and it also illuminates Aquinas’s view of magnanimity. For Aquinas, pride is the worst of the vices, and it comes in four kinds. The opposite of all these kinds of pride in a person is his disposition to accept that the excellences he has are all gifts from a good God and are all meant to be given back by being shared with others. Aquinas believes that all the virtues come together as a set. Consequently, a person who has humility also has courage. Aquinas takes the deepest kind of courage as a gift of the Holy Spirit. On his view, taken as a gift, courage manifests itself in a disposition to act on the settled conviction that one will be united to God in heaven when one dies. It is not easy to see how magnanimity could be a virtue if humility is. The solution is to see that for Aquinas the honor for the Christian virtue of magnanimity is not honor from human beings but honor from God. A person can have the virtue of humility and still strive for the greatest honors, as Aquinas sees it. The conclusion of Aquinas’s account of humility, courage, and magnanimity is this: it is morally obligatory to go for glory, because glory is a matter of being honored by God as faithful.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78691933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Collaborative research is quite common in contemporary society; indeed, it may be thought that scientists cannot live without it. Yet, it seems difficult to engage in good interdisciplinary collaboration when research methods and background assumptions often differ widely. I suggest in this paper that a disposition to inquire into another person is essential to good collaborative research. I first explain what I mean by “empersonal inquisitiveness” and why it is important in interdisciplinary collaboration. Inquiring into a person serves as an important precursor to engaging in interdisciplinary collaboration, because it allows researchers to form shared frameworks and develop a shared plan for the research project. I then discuss social-cognitive mechanisms and their ability to generate knowledge of other persons. In the final section of the paper, I explain how social cognition can allow persons to engage in truly collaborative projects, in particular by way of shared mental models and shared reasoning. The result is that empersonal inquisitiveness, when employed by potential research partners, produces important empersonal knowledge that advances collaborative research.
{"title":"Empersonal Research Practices","authors":"Katherine Sweet","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.024","url":null,"abstract":"Collaborative research is quite common in contemporary society; indeed, it may be thought that scientists cannot live without it. Yet, it seems difficult to engage in good interdisciplinary collaboration when research methods and background assumptions often differ widely. I suggest in this paper that a disposition to inquire into another person is essential to good collaborative research. I first explain what I mean by “empersonal inquisitiveness” and why it is important in interdisciplinary collaboration. Inquiring into a person serves as an important precursor to engaging in interdisciplinary collaboration, because it allows researchers to form shared frameworks and develop a shared plan for the research project. I then discuss social-cognitive mechanisms and their ability to generate knowledge of other persons. In the final section of the paper, I explain how social cognition can allow persons to engage in truly collaborative projects, in particular by way of shared mental models and shared reasoning. The result is that empersonal inquisitiveness, when employed by potential research partners, produces important empersonal knowledge that advances collaborative research.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80674436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Young children routinely display a naturalistic understanding of the world. When asked for explanations, they rarely invoke supernatural or religious explanations even when confronted by puzzling or unexpected phenomena. Nevertheless, depending on the surrounding culture, children are eventually prone to accept God as a creator, to believe in the power of prayer and to expect there to be an afterlife. A plausible interpretation of this dual stance is that children adopt two different cognitive routes to understanding: one grounded in empirical observation and in trusted testimony about the observable world. Based on this route, children gradually build up a common-sense understanding of various natural domains, including the physical, the biological and the psychological. The second route is grounded in children’s early emerging ability to engage in shared pretense. As members of a religious community, children will routinely observe community members engage in activities, such as prayer, which cannot be readily understood in terms of their standard, common-sense framework. Nevertheless, children can charitably interpret prayer as special form of communication, directed at an imagined interlocutor. Cumulative exposure to such belief-based activities is likely to encourage children to transition from charitable interpreters of religious activities to participant believers.
{"title":"From Charitable Inference to Active Credence","authors":"P. Harris","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.020","url":null,"abstract":"Young children routinely display a naturalistic understanding of the world. When asked for explanations, they rarely invoke supernatural or religious explanations even when confronted by puzzling or unexpected phenomena. Nevertheless, depending on the surrounding culture, children are eventually prone to accept God as a creator, to believe in the power of prayer and to expect there to be an afterlife. A plausible interpretation of this dual stance is that children adopt two different cognitive routes to understanding: one grounded in empirical observation and in trusted testimony about the observable world. Based on this route, children gradually build up a common-sense understanding of various natural domains, including the physical, the biological and the psychological. The second route is grounded in children’s early emerging ability to engage in shared pretense. As members of a religious community, children will routinely observe community members engage in activities, such as prayer, which cannot be readily understood in terms of their standard, common-sense framework. Nevertheless, children can charitably interpret prayer as special form of communication, directed at an imagined interlocutor. Cumulative exposure to such belief-based activities is likely to encourage children to transition from charitable interpreters of religious activities to participant believers. ","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91383244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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