According to one prominent account of intellectual humility, it consists primarily of a disposition to “own” one’s intellectual limitations. This account has been criticized for neglecting the interpersonal dimensions of intellectual humility. We expect intellectually humble persons to be respectful and generous with their interlocutors and to avoid being haughty or domineering. I defend the limitations-owning account against this objection. I do so in two ways: first, by arguing that some of the interpersonal qualities associated with intellectual humility are qualities expressive of virtues other than intellectual humility; and second, by arguing that, when properly described, the kind of limitations-owning characteristic of intellectual humility in fact is robustly interpersonal. The result is a considerably broader and richer notion of the limitations the owning of which is characteristic of intellectual humility.
{"title":"Limitations-Owning and the Interpersonal Dimensions of Intellectual Humility","authors":"J. Baehr","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.019","url":null,"abstract":"According to one prominent account of intellectual humility, it consists primarily of a disposition to “own” one’s intellectual limitations. This account has been criticized for neglecting the interpersonal dimensions of intellectual humility. We expect intellectually humble persons to be respectful and generous with their interlocutors and to avoid being haughty or domineering. I defend the limitations-owning account against this objection. I do so in two ways: first, by arguing that some of the interpersonal qualities associated with intellectual humility are qualities expressive of virtues other than intellectual humility; and second, by arguing that, when properly described, the kind of limitations-owning characteristic of intellectual humility in fact is robustly interpersonal. The result is a considerably broader and richer notion of the limitations the owning of which is characteristic of intellectual humility. ","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89305937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Juan Pablo Martínez, J. Peiró, D. I. Rosales, A. Vargas
El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que todo conocimiento, incluido el conocimiento científico, está vinculado con la existencia personal que lo realiza. Para ello se ofrece un mapa de las diversas escuelas de interdisciplinariedad atendiendo a un criterio antropológico donde se detecta en general la persistencia de un enfoque parcial y reductivo del conocimiento humano en diversas modalidades. La consecuencia de esta manera de entender el conocimiento es primeramente la fragmentación de la realidad, pero también de la vida social y sobre todo de la existencia humana. Se descubre así la necesidad de una teoría de la interdisciplina que no sólo trascienda el enfoque epistemológico, sino también el de la acción humana y su dimensión ontológica. Proponemos que esta ampliación se alcanza a través de una una interdisciplina radical anclada en la existencia personal.
{"title":"Conocimiento y existencia personal","authors":"Juan Pablo Martínez, J. Peiró, D. I. Rosales, A. Vargas","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.023","url":null,"abstract":"El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que todo conocimiento, incluido el conocimiento científico, está vinculado con la existencia personal que lo realiza. Para ello se ofrece un mapa de las diversas escuelas de interdisciplinariedad atendiendo a un criterio antropológico donde se detecta en general la persistencia de un enfoque parcial y reductivo del conocimiento humano en diversas modalidades. La consecuencia de esta manera de entender el conocimiento es primeramente la fragmentación de la realidad, pero también de la vida social y sobre todo de la existencia humana. Se descubre así la necesidad de una teoría de la interdisciplina que no sólo trascienda el enfoque epistemológico, sino también el de la acción humana y su dimensión ontológica. Proponemos que esta ampliación se alcanza a través de una una interdisciplina radical anclada en la existencia personal.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"3393 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86626373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As virtues of intellectual character are commonly discussed, they aim at propositional intellectual goods. But some creative works—especially those in music and the visual arts—are not primarily intended to gain, keep, or share propositional goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding. They aim at something else. Thus, to conceive of intellectual creativity in a way that accords with standard discussions of intellectual virtue is to exclude paradigmatic works of the creative intellect. There is a kind of puzzle here: it appears that we cannot maintain both the commonly-discussed notion of intellectual virtue and the claim that, say, Beethoven’s Ninth, or Monet’s Water Lilies, are central cases of intellectually virtuous creativity. We provide a two-part solution to the puzzle. First, we suggest that some works of music and visual art can convey propositional goods. Second, we appeal to the notion of acquaintance as an epistemic good that is conveyed through creative artistic and musical to an extent not conveyed in standard prose works. In this respect, intellectual creativity is the virtue that breaks the propositional mold of much contemporary virtue epistemology.
{"title":"Intellectual Creativity, the Arts, and the University","authors":"Rebecca Strauch, Nathan L. King","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.022","url":null,"abstract":"As virtues of intellectual character are commonly discussed, they aim at propositional intellectual goods. But some creative works—especially those in music and the visual arts—are not primarily intended to gain, keep, or share propositional goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding. They aim at something else. Thus, to conceive of intellectual creativity in a way that accords with standard discussions of intellectual virtue is to exclude paradigmatic works of the creative intellect. There is a kind of puzzle here: it appears that we cannot maintain both the commonly-discussed notion of intellectual virtue and the claim that, say, Beethoven’s Ninth, or Monet’s Water Lilies, are central cases of intellectually virtuous creativity. We provide a two-part solution to the puzzle. First, we suggest that some works of music and visual art can convey propositional goods. Second, we appeal to the notion of acquaintance as an epistemic good that is conveyed through creative artistic and musical to an extent not conveyed in standard prose works. In this respect, intellectual creativity is the virtue that breaks the propositional mold of much contemporary virtue epistemology.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75816265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Due to the hyperspecialization so prevalent nowadays, interdisciplinary research is a demanding kind of epistemic activity. The concept of intellectual virtue as presented by responsibilist approaches of virtue epistemology could offer an effective counterweight to this challenge but raises the question of what epistemic virtues are necessary for interdisciplinarity. Based on a qualitative study, we identify and heuristically conceptualize a relevant subset of epistemic virtues required by interdisciplinarity that we call interpersonal intellectual virtues. These virtues are personal character traits that facilitate the reciprocal acquisition and distribution of knowledge with and through other people. By their very nature, they are only exercised in an interpersonal relationship that seeks an epistemic good, so in some sense, they are at the intersection of social virtues and intellectual virtues. We use Jason Baehr’s four-dimensional proposal for the essential components of intellectual virtues (motivational, affective, skill, and judgment) to show that these interpersonal traits are indeed epistemic virtues. Some examples of interpersonal intellectual virtues are intellectual empathy, intellectual respect, and intellectual trust, among others. Intellectual empathy is a paradigmatic case that we analyze in more detail. Finally, we suggest that interpersonal intellectual virtues are the key character traits of people involved in any successful collective epistemic endeavor, interdisciplinary research being a privileged context in which we can clearly see their manifestation.
{"title":"Interpersonal Intellectual Virtues","authors":"C. Vanney, J. I. Aguinalde Sáenz","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.025","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the hyperspecialization so prevalent nowadays, interdisciplinary research is a demanding kind of epistemic activity. The concept of intellectual virtue as presented by responsibilist approaches of virtue epistemology could offer an effective counterweight to this challenge but raises the question of what epistemic virtues are necessary for interdisciplinarity. \u0000Based on a qualitative study, we identify and heuristically conceptualize a relevant subset of epistemic virtues required by interdisciplinarity that we call interpersonal intellectual virtues. These virtues are personal character traits that facilitate the reciprocal acquisition and distribution of knowledge with and through other people. By their very nature, they are only exercised in an interpersonal relationship that seeks an epistemic good, so in some sense, they are at the intersection of social virtues and intellectual virtues. \u0000We use Jason Baehr’s four-dimensional proposal for the essential components of intellectual virtues (motivational, affective, skill, and judgment) to show that these interpersonal traits are indeed epistemic virtues. Some examples of interpersonal intellectual virtues are intellectual empathy, intellectual respect, and intellectual trust, among others. Intellectual empathy is a paradigmatic case that we analyze in more detail. \u0000Finally, we suggest that interpersonal intellectual virtues are the key character traits of people involved in any successful collective epistemic endeavor, interdisciplinary research being a privileged context in which we can clearly see their manifestation.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81436165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Academic research is increasingly centering on interdisciplinary work. Strong interdisciplinary research (SIR), involving researchers from very different fields, such as scientists and humanists, is often encouraged, if not required, by funding agencies. I argue that two intellectual virtues, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, are crucial for overcoming obstacles to SIR and achieving success. In part I, I provide a primer on intellectual virtue and the two virtues in question. In part II, I distinguish SIR from weak interdisciplinary research (WIR), which involves research teams from neighboring fields, such as physics and chemistry, and from disciplinary research (DR), which involves researchers from the same discipline. I also outline what counts as success in SIR, and explain why it’s more challenging to attain than in WIR and DR. In part III, I explain how both intellectual virtues are essential for achieving success in SIR and for overcoming obstacles that can arise in its pursuit.
{"title":"The Value of Open-Mindedness and Intellectual Humility for Interdisciplinary Research","authors":"Nancy Snow","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.018","url":null,"abstract":"Academic research is increasingly centering on interdisciplinary work. Strong interdisciplinary research (SIR), involving researchers from very different fields, such as scientists and humanists, is often encouraged, if not required, by funding agencies. I argue that two intellectual virtues, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, are crucial for overcoming obstacles to SIR and achieving success. In part I, I provide a primer on intellectual virtue and the two virtues in question. In part II, I distinguish SIR from weak interdisciplinary research (WIR), which involves research teams from neighboring fields, such as physics and chemistry, and from disciplinary research (DR), which involves researchers from the same discipline. I also outline what counts as success in SIR, and explain why it’s more challenging to attain than in WIR and DR. In part III, I explain how both intellectual virtues are essential for achieving success in SIR and for overcoming obstacles that can arise in its pursuit.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90050740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I focus on the role of curiosity as a key motivating factor in successful collaboration for interdisciplinary research. I argue that curiosity is an important, perhaps essential component of successful collaboration for interdisciplinary teams. I begin by defining curiosity and highlighting the significance of the characteristic motivation of the virtue for successful collaboration. I argue that curiosity initiates, maintains, and coordinates successful collaborative interdisciplinary research. Moreover, if curiosity is a foundational intellectual virtue, then it is not only important but essential for successful collaboration. I then draw attention to a specific type of curiosity, namely inquisitiveness, and argue that the defining feature of inquisitiveness – good questioning – renders it a particularly valuable form of curiosity for collaborative projects, including (although not limited to) interdisciplinary research. I conclude by deriving some practical recommendations for successful collaboration in interdisciplinary research.
{"title":"The Role of Curiosity in Successful Collaboration","authors":"Lani Watson","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.017","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I focus on the role of curiosity as a key motivating factor in successful collaboration for interdisciplinary research. I argue that curiosity is an important, perhaps essential component of successful collaboration for interdisciplinary teams. I begin by defining curiosity and highlighting the significance of the characteristic motivation of the virtue for successful collaboration. I argue that curiosity initiates, maintains, and coordinates successful collaborative interdisciplinary research. Moreover, if curiosity is a foundational intellectual virtue, then it is not only important but essential for successful collaboration. I then draw attention to a specific type of curiosity, namely inquisitiveness, and argue that the defining feature of inquisitiveness – good questioning – renders it a particularly valuable form of curiosity for collaborative projects, including (although not limited to) interdisciplinary research. I conclude by deriving some practical recommendations for successful collaboration in interdisciplinary research.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80418017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A common misperception, both within academia and without, is that the premodern, Judeo-Christian picture of the universe was of a small, cramped one. This allowed people to believe that the Earth and its inhabitants were the most important thing in it. But this misfires in several ways: First, the premodern cosmos is only small in comparison to what contemporary science has discovered, not absolutely. Second, the premoderns felt just as insignificant as we do in light of the universe’s size, but we cannot translate this into a scientific or philosophical argument. Third, it assumes that the Judeo-Christian view is that humanity is the most important thing (rather than God) and that God created the universe for us (rather than himself). Fourth, whatever value human beings have in the Judeo-Christian tradition is derivative, based on being created in God’s image, and the size of the universe has no bearing on it.
{"title":"Cosmic Proportions and Human Significance","authors":"Jim Slagle","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.013","url":null,"abstract":"A common misperception, both within academia and without, is that the premodern, Judeo-Christian picture of the universe was of a small, cramped one. This allowed people to believe that the Earth and its inhabitants were the most important thing in it. But this misfires in several ways: First, the premodern cosmos is only small in comparison to what contemporary science has discovered, not absolutely. Second, the premoderns felt just as insignificant as we do in light of the universe’s size, but we cannot translate this into a scientific or philosophical argument. Third, it assumes that the Judeo-Christian view is that humanity is the most important thing (rather than God) and that God created the universe for us (rather than himself). Fourth, whatever value human beings have in the Judeo-Christian tradition is derivative, based on being created in God’s image, and the size of the universe has no bearing on it.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85983117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Este artículo analiza la evolución desde una perspectiva filosófica, contraponiendo los problemas que suscita tanto el neodarwinismo como la teoría del diseño inteligente. En primer lugar, trato algunos problemas que presenta la teoría sintética desde el punto de vista científico, así como los problemas filosóficos implicados en el neodarwinismo de Dawkins, Dennett, Monod y Ruse. Defiendo que el neodarwinismo, aunque se presente como un relato científico, en realidad es fundamentalmente filosófico, y presenta problemas de fondo que lo hacen difícilmente creíble. Por otro lado, discuto el alcance del diseño inteligente como postura filosófica acerca de la evolución de los seres vivos, mostrando sus problemas. Finalmente, propongo un relato filosófico verosímil acerca de la evolución que pretende ir más allá de la lectura científica de los datos de experiencia.
{"title":"Evolución y relato: más allá del neodarwinismo y el diseño inteligente","authors":"M. C. Ortiz de Landázuri","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.002","url":null,"abstract":"Este artículo analiza la evolución desde una perspectiva filosófica, contraponiendo los problemas que suscita tanto el neodarwinismo como la teoría del diseño inteligente. En primer lugar, trato algunos problemas que presenta la teoría sintética desde el punto de vista científico, así como los problemas filosóficos implicados en el neodarwinismo de Dawkins, Dennett, Monod y Ruse. Defiendo que el neodarwinismo, aunque se presente como un relato científico, en realidad es fundamentalmente filosófico, y presenta problemas de fondo que lo hacen difícilmente creíble. Por otro lado, discuto el alcance del diseño inteligente como postura filosófica acerca de la evolución de los seres vivos, mostrando sus problemas. Finalmente, propongo un relato filosófico verosímil acerca de la evolución que pretende ir más allá de la lectura científica de los datos de experiencia.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79330771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper deals with the problem of human conscience as an attentional mode of being that effectuates an original capacity for discernment. Such an undertaking, after the necessary terminological and phenomenological clarifications, requires one to cope with its specific background, especially the critique of the moral worldview and the postmetaphysical setting of contemporary thinking. Taking into consideration the Heideggerian view of the matter, I reflect on the doubts Ricoeur addressed to the former, and take advantage of Ricoeur’s early philosophy to reinterpret and develop his own stance as expounded in Oneself as Another. His later work on ideology and utopia may contribute to helping to establish some criteria for the functioning of the conscience.
{"title":"The human conscience between witnessing and discernment: Heidegger, Ricoeur and beyond","authors":"R. Grzywacz","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.006","url":null,"abstract":"The paper deals with the problem of human conscience as an attentional mode of being that effectuates an original capacity for discernment. Such an undertaking, after the necessary terminological and phenomenological clarifications, requires one to cope with its specific background, especially the critique of the moral worldview and the postmetaphysical setting of contemporary thinking. Taking into consideration the Heideggerian view of the matter, I reflect on the doubts Ricoeur addressed to the former, and take advantage of Ricoeur’s early philosophy to reinterpret and develop his own stance as expounded in Oneself as Another. His later work on ideology and utopia may contribute to helping to establish some criteria for the functioning of the conscience.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75313703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fundamental Theology (FT) has undergone a slow evolution, as many other theological disciplines, since its inception in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. The lapsed time invites us to reflect about the current situation in this field and to what extent that theological section is pursuing its main objectives, especially for its teaching at different levels. After examining several issues that could have influenced that development, some suggestions for advancing the field and its teaching will also be given. Indeed, both the internal and external contexts have changed quite a lot in the last 60 years, and this probably will influence a treaty that should be more contextually sensitive and very bound to developments in religious education.
{"title":"Fundamental Theology at the Crossroads: Challenges and Alternatives After a Long Maturation","authors":"L. Oviedo","doi":"10.12775/setf.2022.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.003","url":null,"abstract":"Fundamental Theology (FT) has undergone a slow evolution, as many other theological disciplines, since its inception in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council. The lapsed time invites us to reflect about the current situation in this field and to what extent that theological section is pursuing its main objectives, especially for its teaching at different levels. After examining several issues that could have influenced that development, some suggestions for advancing the field and its teaching will also be given. Indeed, both the internal and external contexts have changed quite a lot in the last 60 years, and this probably will influence a treaty that should be more contextually sensitive and very bound to developments in religious education.","PeriodicalId":41706,"journal":{"name":"Scientia et Fides","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91395388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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