{"title":"L’approche énactive et la place de l’altérité: Un dialogue entre Varela et Buber","authors":"Letícia Renault","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.920","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"28 1","pages":"143-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45939235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.
{"title":"The Body Surpassed Towards the World and Perception Surpassed Towards Action: A Comparison between Enactivism and Sartre’s Phenomenology","authors":"Federico Zilio","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.927","url":null,"abstract":"Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47710788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science. However, Uexküll’s thought itself contains different perspectives that are in tension with each other, and the concept of Umwelt is developed in representationalist terms that conflict with the commitments of both enactivism and ecological psychology. One central issue shared by all these approaches is the problem of how a living being experiences its environment. In this paper, we will look at Uexküll’s reception in French philosophy and highlight the different ways in which the concept of Umwelt functions in the work of Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. This analysis helps clarify different aspects of Uexküll’s thought and the deeper philosophical implications of importing his concepts into embodied cognitive science. This paper is part of a recent trend in which enactivism engages with continental philosophy in a way that both deepens and transcends the traditional links to phenomenology, including most recently the thought of Georg W. F. Hegel and Gilbert Simondon. However, no more than a brief outline and introduction to the potentials and challenges of this complex conceptual intersection can be given here. Our hope is that it serves to make more explicit the philosophical issues that are at stake for cognitive science in the question of experienced environments, while charting a useful course for future research.
Jakob von uexk(1864-1944)对环境世界的描述被认为是一个中介概念，以弥合生态心理学关于环境信息的现实主义与环境行动主义强调有机体在构建其居住的有意义世界中的积极作用之间的差距。如果成功的话，这一举动将构成为认知科学建立一个单一的生态-行动框架的重要一步。然而，uexk的思想本身包含了不同的观点，这些观点彼此之间存在紧张关系，而“世界”的概念是以再现主义的方式发展起来的，这与行动主义和生态心理学的承诺相冲突。所有这些方法共有的一个中心问题是生物如何体验其环境的问题。在本文中，我们将着眼于uexk在法国哲学中的接受，并强调Umwelt概念在乔治·甘圭朗、莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂和吉尔·德勒兹的作品中发挥作用的不同方式。这一分析有助于澄清uexk思想的不同方面，以及将他的概念引入具身认知科学的更深层次的哲学含义。这篇论文是最近一种趋势的一部分，在这种趋势中，行动主义以一种既深化又超越了与现象学的传统联系的方式与大陆哲学相结合，包括最近的乔治·w·f·黑格尔和吉尔伯特·西蒙顿的思想。然而，这里只能对这个复杂的概念交叉点的潜力和挑战作一个简要的概述和介绍。我们的希望是，它有助于使认知科学在经验环境问题上面临的哲学问题更加明确，同时为未来的研究绘制有用的路线。
{"title":"Worlds Apart? Reassessing von Uexküll’s Umwelt in Embodied Cognition with Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze","authors":"T. E. Feiten, Kristopher J. Holland, A. Chemero","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.929","url":null,"abstract":"Jakob von Uexküll’s (1864-1944) account of Umwelt has been proposed as a mediating concept to bridge the gap between ecological psychology’s realism about environmental information and enactivism’s emphasis on the organism’s active role in constructing the meaningful world it inhabits. If successful, this move would constitute a significant step towards establishing a single ecological-enactive framework for cognitive science. However, Uexküll’s thought itself contains different perspectives that are in tension with each other, and the concept of Umwelt is developed in representationalist terms that conflict with the commitments of both enactivism and ecological psychology. One central issue shared by all these approaches is the problem of how a living being experiences its environment. In this paper, we will look at Uexküll’s reception in French philosophy and highlight the different ways in which the concept of Umwelt functions in the work of Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. This analysis helps clarify different aspects of Uexküll’s thought and the deeper philosophical implications of importing his concepts into embodied cognitive science. This paper is part of a recent trend in which enactivism engages with continental philosophy in a way that both deepens and transcends the traditional links to phenomenology, including most recently the thought of Georg W. F. Hegel and Gilbert Simondon. However, no more than a brief outline and introduction to the potentials and challenges of this complex conceptual intersection can be given here. Our hope is that it serves to make more explicit the philosophical issues that are at stake for cognitive science in the question of experienced environments, while charting a useful course for future research.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47141115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.
{"title":"The Surplus of Signification: Merleau-Ponty and Enactivism on the Continuity of Life, Mind, and Culture","authors":"Hayden Kee","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.919","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a critical discussion of the views of Merleau-Ponty and contemporary enactivism concerning the phenomenological dimension of the continuity between life and mind. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s views are at odds with those of enactivists. Merleau-Ponty only applied phenomenological descriptions to the life-worlds of sentient animals with sensorimotor systems, contrary to those enactivists who apply them to all organisms. I argue that we should follow Merleau-Ponty on this point, as the use of phenomenological concepts to describe the “experience” of creatures with no phenomenal consciousness has generated confusion about the role of phenomenology in enactivism and prompted some enactivists to ignore or turn away from phenomenology. Further, Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the stark distinction between the vital order of animals and the human order to a greater degree than many phenomenologically inspired enactivists. I discuss his view in connection with recent research in developmental and comparative psychology. Despite the striking convergence of Merleau-Ponty’s visionary thought with the most recent findings, I argue that he somewhat overstates the difference between human experience and cognition, and that of our closest animal kin. I outline a developmental-phenomenological account of how the child enters the human order in the first years of life, thereby further mitigating the stark difference between orders. This results in a modified Merleau-Pontian version of the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity which I recommend to enactivism.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"28 1","pages":"27-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41586672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On April 22, 1922, the Societé française de Philosophie hosted Albert Einstein for a discussion of the theory of relativity. In the course of this discussion, Henri Bergson, who was at that time writing Duration and Simultaneity, which explored some of the philosophical implications of Einstein's theory, was asked to share his thoughts. The resulting remarks offer a glimpse into Bergson's analysis of the concept of simultaneity, and Einstein's brief reply reveals his insistence that time itself, not just "the physicist's time," is relative.
1922年4月22日，法国哲学学会邀请阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦讨论相对论。在讨论过程中，亨利·柏格森（Henri Bergson）被要求分享他的想法，他当时正在撰写《持续时间与同时性》（Duration and Simultanity）一书，该书探讨了爱因斯坦理论的一些哲学含义。由此产生的评论让我们得以一窥柏格森对同时性概念的分析，爱因斯坦的简短回答揭示了他坚持时间本身，而不仅仅是“物理学家的时间”，是相对的。
{"title":"Remarks on the Theory of Relativity (1922)","authors":"H. Bergson, H. Massey","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.904","url":null,"abstract":"On April 22, 1922, the Societé française de Philosophie hosted Albert Einstein for a discussion of the theory of relativity. In the course of this discussion, Henri Bergson, who was at that time writing Duration and Simultaneity, which explored some of the philosophical implications of Einstein's theory, was asked to share his thoughts. The resulting remarks offer a glimpse into Bergson's analysis of the concept of simultaneity, and Einstein's brief reply reveals his insistence that time itself, not just \"the physicist's time,\" is relative.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48245146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A central idea in autopoietic enactivism is that the living organism is an autonomous system that “enacts” or “brings forth” its environment. In this paper, I connect this thesis to the general philosophical framework developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in The Embodied Mind, which is centred on the concept of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, and I liken this notion to the kind of correlationism that is found in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. However, I argue that there is a tension in autopoietic enactivism between its search for the biological basis of cognition, which seems to be oriented towards a metaphysics of Nature, and the concept of groundlessness, which seems to imply the renunciation of metaphysics. As a consequence, the concepts of Nature and naturalism in autopoietic enactivism turn out to be problematic. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in relation to its metaphysical implications and, in particular, to the possibility of a “legitimate naturalization of consciousness”. I find a way out of this issue by combining the genetic development of phenomenology with Henry’s material phenomenology. In the light of the investigation of the temporality of experience in these views, I suggest conceiving of Nature as the qualitative process that grounds the subject-object correlation, and I conceive of the resulting view as a form of neutral monism.
{"title":"Addressing the issue of naturalism in autopoietic enactivism through genetic and material phenomenology","authors":"Andrea Gionnotta","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2020.932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2020.932","url":null,"abstract":"A central idea in autopoietic enactivism is that the living organism is an autonomous system that “enacts” or “brings forth” its environment. In this paper, I connect this thesis to the general philosophical framework developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in The Embodied Mind, which is centred on the concept of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, and I liken this notion to the kind of correlationism that is found in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. However, I argue that there is a tension in autopoietic enactivism between its search for the biological basis of cognition, which seems to be oriented towards a metaphysics of Nature, and the concept of groundlessness, which seems to imply the renunciation of metaphysics. As a consequence, the concepts of Nature and naturalism in autopoietic enactivism turn out to be problematic. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in relation to its metaphysical implications and, in particular, to the possibility of a “legitimate naturalization of consciousness”. I find a way out of this issue by combining the genetic development of phenomenology with Henry’s material phenomenology. In the light of the investigation of the temporality of experience in these views, I suggest conceiving of Nature as the qualitative process that grounds the subject-object correlation, and I conceive of the resulting view as a form of neutral monism.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46425083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The classical distinction between leisure and work is often used to define features of the emancipated life. In Aristotle leisure is defined as time devoted to purposeful activity, and distinguished from the labour time expended merely to produce life’s necessities. In critical theory, this classical distinction has been adapted to provide an image of emancipated life, as purposively driven, fulfilling and meaningful activity. Aspects of this adapted definition undermine the classical leisure/work distinction to the extent that the demand for meaningful work, i.e., a leisure-work conjunction, is now used as a critical perspective on unfulfilling, oppressive labour. Ranciere, however, is critical both of this idea of an extended franchise for leisure and of its dependence on craft and artisanal labour as the model of satisfying, skilled work. Instead of Aristotelian leisure, or ‘fulfilling’ work, Ranciere identifies in the state of reverie an alternative marker for the emancipated life. The theme is consistent across the scattered archival, historiographical, philosophical, literary and aesthetic contexts his writing treats. But since reverie is defined as disengagement from action, the position raises a number of difficulties. This article examines how Ranciere connects reverie to emancipation. It focuses on two questions: the nature of the relation between his definition of reverie and the classical, Aristotelian concept of action; and, whether, given the constitutive non-relation between reverie and action that he outlines, Ranciere’s position can address the persistent problem in critical theory of the motivation for the emancipated life. It is argued that his highlighting of the potential communicative significance of modes and scenes of emancipated life is relevant to this problem. The key argument is that rather than developing a ‘theory’, his approach to emancipation focuses on and values communicable experiences of emancipation, and that states of reverie are one such type of valued experience.
{"title":"Acting Through Inaction: The Distinction Between Leisure and Reverie in Jacques Rancière’s Conception of Emancipation","authors":"A. Ross","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2019.890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2019.890","url":null,"abstract":"The classical distinction between leisure and work is often used to define features of the emancipated life. In Aristotle leisure is defined as time devoted to purposeful activity, and distinguished from the labour time expended merely to produce life’s necessities. In critical theory, this classical distinction has been adapted to provide an image of emancipated life, as purposively driven, fulfilling and meaningful activity. Aspects of this adapted definition undermine the classical leisure/work distinction to the extent that the demand for meaningful work, i.e., a leisure-work conjunction, is now used as a critical perspective on unfulfilling, oppressive labour. Ranciere, however, is critical both of this idea of an extended franchise for leisure and of its dependence on craft and artisanal labour as the model of satisfying, skilled work. Instead of Aristotelian leisure, or ‘fulfilling’ work, Ranciere identifies in the state of reverie an alternative marker for the emancipated life. The theme is consistent across the scattered archival, historiographical, philosophical, literary and aesthetic contexts his writing treats. But since reverie is defined as disengagement from action, the position raises a number of difficulties. This article examines how Ranciere connects reverie to emancipation. It focuses on two questions: the nature of the relation between his definition of reverie and the classical, Aristotelian concept of action; and, whether, given the constitutive non-relation between reverie and action that he outlines, Ranciere’s position can address the persistent problem in critical theory of the motivation for the emancipated life. It is argued that his highlighting of the potential communicative significance of modes and scenes of emancipated life is relevant to this problem. The key argument is that rather than developing a ‘theory’, his approach to emancipation focuses on and values communicable experiences of emancipation, and that states of reverie are one such type of valued experience.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"76-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44786290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the relation between perception, invizibilization and recognizability in the work of Ranciere, Honneth and Butler. Recognizability is the term employed here to indicate the perceptual process that necessarily occurs prior to a normative or ethical act of recognition and that provides the conditions that make recognition possible. The notion of recognizability points to the fact that perception is not merely a disinterested surveying of the perceptual field but indicates that it is already evaluative in the sense that others are immediately distinguishable from other objects. When a failure of recognizability occurs, it is not due to the fact that the other has not been seen in a literal sense but instead that she has been intentionally ignored or invisibilized. The suggestion made here is that despite their different approaches, a comparison and dialogue between these three thinkers highlights the importance of this constellation of issues for critical theory.
{"title":"Recognizability, Perception and the Distribution of the Sensible: Rancière, Honneth and Butler","authors":"D. Petherbridge","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2019.894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2019.894","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relation between perception, invizibilization and recognizability in the work of Ranciere, Honneth and Butler. Recognizability is the term employed here to indicate the perceptual process that necessarily occurs prior to a normative or ethical act of recognition and that provides the conditions that make recognition possible. The notion of recognizability points to the fact that perception is not merely a disinterested surveying of the perceptual field but indicates that it is already evaluative in the sense that others are immediately distinguishable from other objects. When a failure of recognizability occurs, it is not due to the fact that the other has not been seen in a literal sense but instead that she has been intentionally ignored or invisibilized. The suggestion made here is that despite their different approaches, a comparison and dialogue between these three thinkers highlights the importance of this constellation of issues for critical theory.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"54-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49618855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While Jacques Ranciere has never been affiliated in any way with the Institute for Social Research, this article examines the extent to which his work could be considered “Critical Theory” in the sense most closely associated with the Frankfurt School tradition. I argue that Ranciere’s work is not critical theory in this narrow sense; I further lay out a kind of “Rancierean” criticism of the very project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This in turn allows me to sketch out a version of Critical Theory that might survive a Rancierean critique. Even by this renewed conception, however, I argue that Ranciere’s own work still cannot be considered a project of Critical Theory; but I finish the essay by laying out what a possible “Rancierean” Critical Theory might look like, and why I think such a project would be valuable.
{"title":"Towards a Rancièrean Critical Theory","authors":"M. Lampert","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2019.891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2019.891","url":null,"abstract":"While Jacques Ranciere has never been affiliated in any way with the Institute for Social Research, this article examines the extent to which his work could be considered “Critical Theory” in the sense most closely associated with the Frankfurt School tradition. I argue that Ranciere’s work is not critical theory in this narrow sense; I further lay out a kind of “Rancierean” criticism of the very project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This in turn allows me to sketch out a version of Critical Theory that might survive a Rancierean critique. Even by this renewed conception, however, I argue that Ranciere’s own work still cannot be considered a project of Critical Theory; but I finish the essay by laying out what a possible “Rancierean” Critical Theory might look like, and why I think such a project would be valuable.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"95-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45510543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Oneself as Another , Paul Ricoeur proposes a new ethical theory that integrates Aristotle’s eudaemonist virtue ethical outlook with Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. The goal is ambitious, and recent discussions in anglophone philosophy have made its undertaking look to be founded on a confusion. The new argument goes that the ethical justification at work in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions is of opposed kinds. Attempts to integrate them, as a result, are either incoherent, or, in the best case, simply minor variations on one or another predominant ethical outlook. The essay grants the opposed kinds thesis and argues that despite its apparent impossibility, Ricoeur nevertheless does succeed in integrating two ethical approaches, including their different sources of justification, to produce a novel and thus ethically interesting theory. The essay closes, finally, with a reflection on how this method might be developed one step further to include an insight by Emmanuel Levinas on the look of the Other, and so make for an ethics of recognition.
Paul Ricoeur在《作为他人的自我》一书中提出了一种新的伦理理论，将亚里士多德的道德伦理观与康德的道德伦理相结合。这个目标是雄心勃勃的，最近英语哲学的讨论使它的事业看起来是建立在混乱的基础上的。新的论点认为，亚里士多德和康德传统中的伦理论证是对立的。因此，整合它们的尝试要么是不连贯的，要么在最好的情况下，只是对一种或另一种主流道德观的微小变化。这篇文章支持了相反类型的论点，并认为尽管这显然是不可能的，但Ricoeur确实成功地将两种伦理方法，包括它们不同的理由来源，结合在一起，产生了一种新颖的、因此在伦理上有趣的理论。最后，这篇文章以反思如何进一步发展这种方法，以纳入埃马纽埃尔·莱维纳斯对他者外观的见解，从而形成一种认可的伦理。
{"title":"An Ethics of Recognition: Redressing the Good and the Right","authors":"Sebastian Purcell","doi":"10.5195/jffp.2019.881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2019.881","url":null,"abstract":"In Oneself as Another , Paul Ricoeur proposes a new ethical theory that integrates Aristotle’s eudaemonist virtue ethical outlook with Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. The goal is ambitious, and recent discussions in anglophone philosophy have made its undertaking look to be founded on a confusion. The new argument goes that the ethical justification at work in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions is of opposed kinds. Attempts to integrate them, as a result, are either incoherent, or, in the best case, simply minor variations on one or another predominant ethical outlook. The essay grants the opposed kinds thesis and argues that despite its apparent impossibility, Ricoeur nevertheless does succeed in integrating two ethical approaches, including their different sources of justification, to produce a novel and thus ethically interesting theory. The essay closes, finally, with a reflection on how this method might be developed one step further to include an insight by Emmanuel Levinas on the look of the Other, and so make for an ethics of recognition.","PeriodicalId":41846,"journal":{"name":"Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"142-165"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44681384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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