This review essay offers an assessment of the 'harmonised' (elsewhere called 'revised') Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (1)) Informally known as SIPO II, it succeeds the original Strategic Indicative Plan, adopted in 2004 for a five-year period. Following a lengthy review process, SIPO II was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. It was finally publicly launched in November 2012, but as of mid-2103, implementation appears to be lagging. Although Southern Africa has had many years' experience of fighting colonialism and apartheid, formal inter-state cooperation in the area of peace and security is a relatively new phenomenon. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980, turned into SADC in 1994. In 1996, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). In 2001, Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which provided an institutional framework for cooperation by member states in these areas. In 2002, the SADC Summit mandated the OPDSC to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation over the next five years. The achievements under the SIPO include the establishment of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, launch of the SADC Standby Force (SSF), integration of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) into the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), establishment of the Regional Early Warning Centre as well as the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a mediation unit (SADC 2010). However, SIPO I was also poorly implemented in numerous respects. In particular, the production of a business plan for addressing its 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ. Critically, the relationship between the SADC Secretariat and the member states is key to SADC's effective functioning, and needs to be driven by visionary leadership. The SSF, although technically committed to the AU's grand strategy of having standby forces ready for deployment (by 2015--a new deadline), remains resource-poor and depends on political guidance at Summit level. It is unclear whether there is any real political will to use this instrument in a robust fashion beyond fact-finding and mediation by retired presidents. Despite prescriptions to this effect in the Protocol, SADC's security architecture does not necessarily harmonise with that of the AU, giving rise to a range of tensions, not least of which the question of agenda-setting (who determines action, when, and how?) and deployment
{"title":"SIPO II: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE?","authors":"A. V. Nieuwkerk","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.129","url":null,"abstract":"This review essay offers an assessment of the 'harmonised' (elsewhere called 'revised') Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (1)) Informally known as SIPO II, it succeeds the original Strategic Indicative Plan, adopted in 2004 for a five-year period. Following a lengthy review process, SIPO II was approved by the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. It was finally publicly launched in November 2012, but as of mid-2103, implementation appears to be lagging. Although Southern Africa has had many years' experience of fighting colonialism and apartheid, formal inter-state cooperation in the area of peace and security is a relatively new phenomenon. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980, turned into SADC in 1994. In 1996, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). In 2001, Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which provided an institutional framework for cooperation by member states in these areas. In 2002, the SADC Summit mandated the OPDSC to prepare a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which would provide guidelines for implementing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation over the next five years. The achievements under the SIPO include the establishment of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, launch of the SADC Standby Force (SSF), integration of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) into the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), establishment of the Regional Early Warning Centre as well as the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) and a mediation unit (SADC 2010). However, SIPO I was also poorly implemented in numerous respects. In particular, the production of a business plan for addressing its 130-plus objectives never materialised, and no serious effort was made to develop strategies for operationalising the Organ. Critically, the relationship between the SADC Secretariat and the member states is key to SADC's effective functioning, and needs to be driven by visionary leadership. The SSF, although technically committed to the AU's grand strategy of having standby forces ready for deployment (by 2015--a new deadline), remains resource-poor and depends on political guidance at Summit level. It is unclear whether there is any real political will to use this instrument in a robust fashion beyond fact-finding and mediation by retired presidents. Despite prescriptions to this effect in the Protocol, SADC's security architecture does not necessarily harmonise with that of the AU, giving rise to a range of tensions, not least of which the question of agenda-setting (who determines action, when, and how?) and deployment","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44663131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article is a critical analysis of the biographical-political documentary entitled Nelson Mandela: The Living Legend (1918-2013), published by the British Broadcasting Corporation as part of its multi-dimensional global media projects. The two-part series narratively outlines an illustrious, albeit significant historic, political and transformative period spanning about 67 years embodied in Mandela's persona as a symbol of the dialectic of resistance and transformation in South Africa. The article employs qualitative content analysis to highlight the producers' use of specific filmic excerpts that frame Mandela as the symbolic figure and transformative leader who reconfigured South Africa's political stalemate to democracy. This is augmented by an ideological analysis of the socio-economic and political milieu premised within the institutional context represented in the documentary. Despite the functional agenda setting role that the film packaging process espouses, the producers' application of Western constructive ideological framing as the epicentre upon which the legendary qualities of Mandela are pivoted is evident. This eventually yields into the focalisation of Mandela's transformative model to highlight as well as demonstrate the benefits of reconciliatory-inclusive politics in facilitating change as opposed to the antics of violence and confrontational conquest often associated with individualist paradigms and politics of patronage. Thus, beyond purveying the protagonist as a symbol of both political influence and moral integrity, particularly during the transition period, the documentary is a vivid mise-en scene that showcases Mandela's charismatic leadership as the prototype befitting the qualities of iconic international statesmanship.
{"title":"The Role of Film Genre in Transformative Ideological Documentary Analysis of Politics: An Ideological Documentary Analysis of Nelson Mandela: The Living Legend (1918-2013)","authors":"T Muswede, D. Masvopo","doi":"10.35293/srsa.v40i2.157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v40i2.157","url":null,"abstract":"This article is a critical analysis of the biographical-political documentary entitled Nelson Mandela: The Living Legend (1918-2013), published by the British Broadcasting Corporation as part of its multi-dimensional global media projects. The two-part series narratively outlines an illustrious, albeit significant historic, political and transformative period spanning about 67 years embodied in Mandela's persona as a symbol of the dialectic of resistance and transformation in South Africa. The article employs qualitative content analysis to highlight the producers' use of specific filmic excerpts that frame Mandela as the symbolic figure and transformative leader who reconfigured South Africa's political stalemate to democracy. This is augmented by an ideological analysis of the socio-economic and political milieu premised within the institutional context represented in the documentary. Despite the functional agenda setting role that the film packaging process espouses, the producers' application of Western constructive ideological framing as the epicentre upon which the legendary qualities of Mandela are pivoted is evident. This eventually yields into the focalisation of Mandela's transformative model to highlight as well as demonstrate the benefits of reconciliatory-inclusive politics in facilitating change as opposed to the antics of violence and confrontational conquest often associated with individualist paradigms and politics of patronage. Thus, beyond purveying the protagonist as a symbol of both political influence and moral integrity, particularly during the transition period, the documentary is a vivid mise-en scene that showcases Mandela's charismatic leadership as the prototype befitting the qualities of iconic international statesmanship.","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48837208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalists (Chris Alden and Sérgio Chichava, eds)","authors":"Z. Matsimbe","doi":"10.35293/srsa.v37i2.255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v37i2.255","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49316072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
South Sudanese have borne the brunt of the civil wars that have engulfed the country since 1955 to the present. People are perishing at the hands of government soldiers, militias and rebel forces. Using document analysis, this article evaluates the centrality of the conflict transformation model in reducing political violence in South Sudan. Political struggles and political violence in South Sudan have significantly led to the deterioration of human security and human rights. Conflict transformation helps South Sudan in realising that there is more to their future as a country rather than power struggles largely driven by ethnic politics. The North-South divide has since diminished. This implies that tolerance should now prevail. The DinkaNuer dichotomy should be a cause for celebration rather than animosity. It is significant for the country’s political leaders to realise that ethnic differences are going to forever be part of their lives, and should therefore be a source of strength as they seek to rebuild their country. The transformation of relationships is thus essential in eliminating the so-called ‘politics of isolation’ in the country and ensuring that violence is not viewed as the solution to the problems affecting the country.
{"title":"The Centrality of Conflict Transformation in Solving Political Struggles and Political Violence in South Sudan","authors":"Darlington Mutanda","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V41I1.236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V41I1.236","url":null,"abstract":"South Sudanese have borne the brunt of the civil wars that have engulfed the country since 1955 to the present. People are perishing at the hands of government soldiers, militias and rebel forces. Using document analysis, this article evaluates the centrality of the conflict transformation model in reducing political violence in South Sudan. Political struggles and political violence in South Sudan have significantly led to the deterioration of human security and human rights. Conflict transformation helps South Sudan in realising that there is more to their future as a country rather than power struggles largely driven by ethnic politics. The North-South divide has since diminished. This implies that tolerance should now prevail. The DinkaNuer dichotomy should be a cause for celebration rather than animosity. It is significant for the country’s political leaders to realise that ethnic differences are going to forever be part of their lives, and should therefore be a source of strength as they seek to rebuild their country. The transformation of relationships is thus essential in eliminating the so-called ‘politics of isolation’ in the country and ensuring that violence is not viewed as the solution to the problems affecting the country.","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47746566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This volume is based on NRF-funded research cooperation between the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, dealing with the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. It discusses the transition to multi-party democracy, the consequent changes in the security environment and the current role and defensive posture of these countries in their respective regions. All contributions are abstracted separately in the introductory chapter (pp 1-11). The specific chapters discuss the joint experiences and challenges in facing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1. Liebenberg, I: "Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy": 13-36; 2. Sasz, P V: "Transition to Democracy in Romania": 37-57; 4. Mangayani, C: "The Role of Youth in South Africa's Transition": 87-121), the reform of the armies (3. Ionesco, M: "Transition, Alliances and Military Reform in Romania in the post-Cold War Period": 59-86; 5. Ferreira, R: "South Africa: From Apartheid Army to a Post-Apartheid Defence Force": 123-135; 7. Mangayani, C: "Structures for Political Oversight of the Military": 171-204; 8. Otu, P: "Military Reform in Romania": 205-231) as well as the repositioning of Romania's security strategy (6. Cioculescu, S: "Romania's National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Period": 137-170). South Africa's change in strategy concerning its interests in the Indian Ocean is the main focus of T Potgieter in chapter 10 (pp 267-305)and Romania's status within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has been dealt with by Carmen Rijnoveanu in chapter 11 (pp307-340). Worthy of special attention is chapter 9 (Liebenberg, I: "The Arms Industry, Reform and Civil-Military Relations in South Africa": 233-266), bridging the purchase of arms and ammunition during the inter-war years (1919-1939) to the period of World War II (1939-1945) and even further to the establishment of South Africa's own defence industry under apartheid rule (1948-1989), emphasising the enormous cost of maintaining a military superiority in southern Africa paving the way for South Africa's economic decline by the end of the 1980s and leading to the political demise of apartheid in the 1994 elections. In chapter 12 ("Waves of Change, Military-Political Reorientation, Economic Alliances and Uncertain Futures": 341-357), the editors make a comparison Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 38, No 2 Book Reviews 181 of the different starting positions of both countries and the national security strategies that emerged from it.
{"title":"Manganyi, Calvin/Liebenberg, Ian/Potgieter, Thean (eds), South Africa and Romania: transition to democracy and changing security paradigms. Durban: Just Done Productions 2013, 376 pp.","authors":"Michael Eckardt","doi":"10.35293/srsa.v38i2.261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v38i2.261","url":null,"abstract":"This volume is based on NRF-funded research cooperation between the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, dealing with the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. It discusses the transition to multi-party democracy, the consequent changes in the security environment and the current role and defensive posture of these countries in their respective regions. All contributions are abstracted separately in the introductory chapter (pp 1-11). The specific chapters discuss the joint experiences and challenges in facing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy (1. Liebenberg, I: \"Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy\": 13-36; 2. Sasz, P V: \"Transition to Democracy in Romania\": 37-57; 4. Mangayani, C: \"The Role of Youth in South Africa's Transition\": 87-121), the reform of the armies (3. Ionesco, M: \"Transition, Alliances and Military Reform in Romania in the post-Cold War Period\": 59-86; 5. Ferreira, R: \"South Africa: From Apartheid Army to a Post-Apartheid Defence Force\": 123-135; 7. Mangayani, C: \"Structures for Political Oversight of the Military\": 171-204; 8. Otu, P: \"Military Reform in Romania\": 205-231) as well as the repositioning of Romania's security strategy (6. Cioculescu, S: \"Romania's National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Period\": 137-170). South Africa's change in strategy concerning its interests in the Indian Ocean is the main focus of T Potgieter in chapter 10 (pp 267-305)and Romania's status within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has been dealt with by Carmen Rijnoveanu in chapter 11 (pp307-340). Worthy of special attention is chapter 9 (Liebenberg, I: \"The Arms Industry, Reform and Civil-Military Relations in South Africa\": 233-266), bridging the purchase of arms and ammunition during the inter-war years (1919-1939) to the period of World War II (1939-1945) and even further to the establishment of South Africa's own defence industry under apartheid rule (1948-1989), emphasising the enormous cost of maintaining a military superiority in southern Africa paving the way for South Africa's economic decline by the end of the 1980s and leading to the political demise of apartheid in the 1994 elections. In chapter 12 (\"Waves of Change, Military-Political Reorientation, Economic Alliances and Uncertain Futures\": 341-357), the editors make a comparison Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 38, No 2 Book Reviews 181 of the different starting positions of both countries and the national security strategies that emerged from it.","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47289804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?" "The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes." (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the d
{"title":"ZIMBABWE BETWEEN THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELECTIONS","authors":"S. Kibble","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.131","url":null,"abstract":"\"Has any Zimbabwean election ever solved anything?\" \"The problem is not the constitution but who counts the votes.\" (Local voices) (1)) 1. Introduction The recent overwhelming 'Yes' vote in the constitutional referendum on 16 March has led to two seemingly contradictory developments. The way has opened up for elections later in the year (the date has to be announced by 29 June), but it is unlikely that these will occur in a free and fair environment as demanded by the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and by international donors who may provide the funding. By law Zimbabwe has to have set an election date by the end of June 2013 and before such elections the regional body SADC insisted that there be a referendum on a new constitution as agreed in inter-party negotiations after 2008. This took place peacefully, although amid a wider climate of intimidation and arrests, (2)) and the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour. (3)) The negotiations over the latter in the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) have dragged on since 2009. Finally a draft constitution was agreed in mid-January 2013 with all parties making concessions at the last minute. The sticking points were choosing presidential running mates (a big problem for both Mugabe and Tsvangirai given faction fighting), devolution, a Constitutional Court, a National Prosecuting Authority separate from the partisan Attorney General, and reducing the powers of the executive. Many see the draft as very flawed but with little choice but to accept it. As things stand, if elections are not called in the first half of 2013 the government becomes ultra vires. (4)) There has always been a tendency in ZANU-PF to maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods. There has been no significant progress towards security reforms/governance to prevent the violence of the 2008 elections being repeated or other reforms to ensure a free(ish) and fair(ish) election such as a truly autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. Legislation to establish a Human Rights Commission passed through Parliament but its provisions on impunity for abuses until recently attracted much civil society criticism. Western donors seem very keen to re-engage Harare despite the volatile human rights situation. In February 2013 we had four years of the 'Inclusive (or Unified) Government' (IG/GNU) following the signing in September 2008 of the 'Global Political Agreement' (GPA) between the former sole ruling party ZANU-PF and its challengers, the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Many activists see that ZANU-PF has used the space of the GPA better to consolidate its previously shaky rule, even if its support base is low. Its control of the major organisations of state with the exception of the Ministry of Finance remains firm especially with the additional, largely undeclared revenues from the d","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47417712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is an important book that weaves together diverse strands of South African and Russian history, focusing on the ideological era in which Russia became a pivotal and global political player. The vast historical account begins in the pre-colonial era and cuts through some of the big themes in history, including among others the AngloBoer War, the revolutionary triumph of the Bolsheviks, the two world wars and the fall of apartheid
{"title":"The hidden thread: Russia and South Africa in the Soviet era (Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson)","authors":"Mzukisi Qobo","doi":"10.35293/srsa.v36i1.160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v36i1.160","url":null,"abstract":"This is an important book that weaves together diverse strands of South African and Russian history, focusing on the ideological era in which Russia became a pivotal and global political player. The vast historical account begins in the pre-colonial era and cuts through some of the big themes in history, including among others the AngloBoer War, the revolutionary triumph of the Bolsheviks, the two world wars and the fall of apartheid","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41435864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the early 1990s African regional and continental organisations have been playing an active role in maintaining military security and promoting democracy, good governance and respect for human rights in Africa. However, their efforts have often proved ineffective. This article contributes to the analysis of the causes of the difficulties African multilateral organisations have been facing in promoting democracy and human rights on the continent through a case-study of SADC's policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. The article shows that SADC efforts aimed at restoring democracy and putting an end to human rights abuses in Zimbabwe were critically hampered by the history of political antagonism among the Southern African governments, and by SADC's inability to draw a clear distinction between respect for human rights and the promotion of a neoliberal strategy of regional development. In the end, SADC diplomatic efforts were caught between the demagogic rhetoric of the ZANU-PF regime as represented by President Mugabe, and the international consensus on development. SADC ultimately proved unable to both help redress the deep economic and social inequalities in Zimbabwe and uphold human rights in the country
{"title":"HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN AFRICA: SADC AND THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE","authors":"A. Pallotti","doi":"10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.97","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/SRSA.V35I1.97","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early 1990s African regional and continental organisations have been playing an active role in maintaining military security and promoting democracy, good governance and respect for human rights in Africa. However, their efforts have often proved ineffective. This article contributes to the analysis of the causes of the difficulties African multilateral organisations have been facing in promoting democracy and human rights on the continent through a case-study of SADC's policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. The article shows that SADC efforts aimed at restoring democracy and putting an end to human rights abuses in Zimbabwe were critically hampered by the history of political antagonism among the Southern African governments, and by SADC's inability to draw a clear distinction between respect for human rights and the promotion of a neoliberal strategy of regional development. In the end, SADC diplomatic efforts were caught between the demagogic rhetoric of the ZANU-PF regime as represented by President Mugabe, and the international consensus on development. SADC ultimately proved unable to both help redress the deep economic and social inequalities in Zimbabwe and uphold human rights in the country","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47716298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"South Africa — The Present as History. From Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana (John S Saul and Patrick Bond)","authors":"K. Harris","doi":"10.35293/srsa.v37i1.229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v37i1.229","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41892,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Review for Southern Africa","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47802268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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