Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have both developed comprehensive yet very different theories of social cohesion. Whereas Ibn Khaldun traces the development of intense group solidarity to the ascetic lifestyles of nomadic warriors, for Gellner social cohesion is a product of different material conditions. In contrast to Ibn Khaldun?s theory, where all social ties are generated through similar social processes, in Gellner?s model the patterns of collective solidarity change through time, that is, different societies produce different forms of social cohesion. While Ibn Khaldun argues that asbiyyah is the backbone of group unity in all social orders, Gellner insists that modern societies are underpinned by very different type of collective solidarity than their premodern counterparts. In this paper I offer a critique of Ibn Khaldun?s and Gellner?s theories of social cohesion and develop an alternative explanation, which situates the social dynamics of group solidarity in the organisational and ideological legacies of warfare.
{"title":"Warfare and group solidarity: From Ibn Khaldun to Ernest Gellner and beyond","authors":"S. Malešević","doi":"10.2298/fid2103389m","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2103389m","url":null,"abstract":"Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have both developed comprehensive yet very different theories of social cohesion. Whereas Ibn Khaldun traces the development of intense group solidarity to the ascetic lifestyles of nomadic warriors, for Gellner social cohesion is a product of different material conditions. In contrast to Ibn Khaldun?s theory, where all social ties are generated through similar social processes, in Gellner?s model the patterns of collective solidarity change through time, that is, different societies produce different forms of social cohesion. While Ibn Khaldun argues that asbiyyah is the backbone of group unity in all social orders, Gellner insists that modern societies are underpinned by very different type of collective solidarity than their premodern counterparts. In this paper I offer a critique of Ibn Khaldun?s and Gellner?s theories of social cohesion and develop an alternative explanation, which situates the social dynamics of group solidarity in the organisational and ideological legacies of warfare.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81467093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article provides a critical review of the books Rijec je o slici by Jagor Bucan and Slika i rec by the Serbian Society for Aesthetics. From the titles it is already evident that they share the same topic. The paper points out the similarities between the two texts on both what is present and what is absent in them, which also seems important for understanding the theoretical problems they deal with.
本文对Jagor Bucan的《Rijec je to slici》和塞尔维亚美学学会的《Slika i》这两本书进行了批判性的评论。从标题中可以明显看出，它们的主题是相同的。本文指出了两篇文章在存在和缺失方面的相似之处，这对于理解他们所处理的理论问题也很重要。
{"title":"Pictures, titles, personifications","authors":"Miloš Ćipranić","doi":"10.2298/fid2104739c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2104739c","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides a critical review of the books Rijec je o slici by Jagor Bucan and Slika i rec by the Serbian Society for Aesthetics. From the titles it is already evident that they share the same topic. The paper points out the similarities between the two texts on both what is present and what is absent in them, which also seems important for understanding the theoretical problems they deal with.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86482303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reflects on the crisis of political reason in this heyday of populistic rhetoric, proposing to move beyond the erroneous dichotomy between ?democratic reason? and ?raging passions,? and the demo-phobia that often derives from it. We propose instead to follow Bourdieu?s footsteps in bringing our attention to the forms of impermeability that fracture our contemporary political and social life, establishing the conditions of possibility of the reasonable and the unreasonable. What marks contemporary political passions as particularly dangerous is their impermeability to the lessons of our historical past, to the moral condemnation of the political instrumentalization of difference and to the sacred character of fundamental principles. This hermeneutical gap, however, is later explained by a more fundamental analysis of the problem of contemporary impermeability, one which operates as a reversal of the dichotomy between political reason and passion. It is no longer the electorate, seduced by the sirens of populism, which is impermeable to the voice of political reason; it is, instead, this very reason, embodied by the elites who claim to recognize themselves in its values and principles, which has become impermeable to the ?conditions of non-existence? in which a considerable part of the population lives. If there is a problem of contemporary impermeability, or imperturbability, it is that of a political discourse that has lost touch with ?all the misery of the world?.
{"title":"The importance of Pierre Bourdieu today. On consent to misery","authors":"Marc Crépon","doi":"10.2298/fid2104505c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2104505c","url":null,"abstract":"This article reflects on the crisis of political reason in this heyday of populistic rhetoric, proposing to move beyond the erroneous dichotomy between ?democratic reason? and ?raging passions,? and the demo-phobia that often derives from it. We propose instead to follow Bourdieu?s footsteps in bringing our attention to the forms of impermeability that fracture our contemporary political and social life, establishing the conditions of possibility of the reasonable and the unreasonable. What marks contemporary political passions as particularly dangerous is their impermeability to the lessons of our historical past, to the moral condemnation of the political instrumentalization of difference and to the sacred character of fundamental principles. This hermeneutical gap, however, is later explained by a more fundamental analysis of the problem of contemporary impermeability, one which operates as a reversal of the dichotomy between political reason and passion. It is no longer the electorate, seduced by the sirens of populism, which is impermeable to the voice of political reason; it is, instead, this very reason, embodied by the elites who claim to recognize themselves in its values and principles, which has become impermeable to the ?conditions of non-existence? in which a considerable part of the population lives. If there is a problem of contemporary impermeability, or imperturbability, it is that of a political discourse that has lost touch with ?all the misery of the world?.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84911604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article analyzes Heidegger?s relation to National Socialism based on his private writing in the ?Black Notebooks,? published in their entirety (nine volumes) this year. Although it is indisputable that Heidegger was an enthusiastic adherent of the National Socialist program between 1930 and 1934, his private writings show his avowed philosophical delusion that the National Socialist ?revolution? in Germany was going to bring about a new beginning of philosophy beyond the metaphysical tradition. The article shows how Heidegger criticized National Socialism after 1934, and the circumstances of his resignation from the post of Rector of Freiburg University in that year.
{"title":"Now is the “We-Time.” Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’ read as self-critical reflection of Nazi involvement","authors":"Rastko Jovanov","doi":"10.2298/fid2104729j","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2104729j","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes Heidegger?s relation to National Socialism based on his private writing in the ?Black Notebooks,? published in their entirety (nine volumes) this year. Although it is indisputable that Heidegger was an enthusiastic adherent of the National Socialist program between 1930 and 1934, his private writings show his avowed philosophical delusion that the National Socialist ?revolution? in Germany was going to bring about a new beginning of philosophy beyond the metaphysical tradition. The article shows how Heidegger criticized National Socialism after 1934, and the circumstances of his resignation from the post of Rector of Freiburg University in that year.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89589831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What exactly is wrong with hating others? However deep-seated the intuition, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and confusing. In this paper, I attempt to be more precise by distinguishing two senses in which hatred is inappropriate, a moral and a non-moral one. First, I critically discuss the central current proposals defending the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators and show that they are all based on a problematic assumption, which I call the ?reality of evil agents assumption?. I then turn to the issue of non-moral emotional appropriateness and sketch a novel, focus-based account of fittingness. Next, I outline the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred, suggesting that hatred, unlike most other antagonistic emotions, has an overgeneralizing and indeterminate affective focus. Against this background, I argue that hatred cannot be fitting. Due to the indeterminacy of its focus, hatred fails to pick out those evaluative features of the intentional object that would really matter to the emoters. I close with some tentative remarks on the possibility of appropriate hatred towards corporate or group agents.
{"title":"Can it be or feel right to hate? On the appropriateness and fittingness of hatred","authors":"Thomas Szanto","doi":"10.2298/fid2103341s","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2103341s","url":null,"abstract":"What exactly is wrong with hating others? However deep-seated the intuition, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and confusing. In this paper, I attempt to be more precise by distinguishing two senses in which hatred is inappropriate, a moral and a non-moral one. First, I critically discuss the central current proposals defending the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators and show that they are all based on a problematic assumption, which I call the ?reality of evil agents assumption?. I then turn to the issue of non-moral emotional appropriateness and sketch a novel, focus-based account of fittingness. Next, I outline the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred, suggesting that hatred, unlike most other antagonistic emotions, has an overgeneralizing and indeterminate affective focus. Against this background, I argue that hatred cannot be fitting. Due to the indeterminacy of its focus, hatred fails to pick out those evaluative features of the intentional object that would really matter to the emoters. I close with some tentative remarks on the possibility of appropriate hatred towards corporate or group agents.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86861159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper looks at Thomas Szanto?s theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto?s theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred.
{"title":"A critical account of the concept of de-objectified hatred","authors":"Mark Losoncz","doi":"10.2298/fid2103369l","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2103369l","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at Thomas Szanto?s theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto?s theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84837999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article focuses on a passage from Carl Schmitt?s Ex Captivitate Salus - a book famously written in a Nurnberg prison in 1946 - in which he draws, from memory, on a story derived from Serbian epic poetry, to justify his understanding of historiography, victory, and the figure of the hero. Analyzing the entire Serbian epic poem from which Schmitt extracts the vignette in question, we show how the text of the poem presents a significantly more complicated and messy picture of the figures of victor, victory, and hero, heroism. The anonymous Serbian poet, addressing himself to his contemporary audience, with which he is intimately familiar, really subverts simplistic expectations regarding the heroism and victory of the Serbian hero, Marko Kraljevic. Finally, the article contrasts these complex and at times paradoxical figures of victory and the hero in the poem with their presentation in Carl Schmitt?s writing.
{"title":"The messiness of victory and heroism: A brief response to Carl Schmitt","authors":"P. Bojanić, Edward Djordjevic","doi":"10.2298/fid2104662b","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2104662b","url":null,"abstract":"The article focuses on a passage from Carl Schmitt?s Ex Captivitate Salus - a book famously written in a Nurnberg prison in 1946 - in which he draws, from memory, on a story derived from Serbian epic poetry, to justify his understanding of historiography, victory, and the figure of the hero. Analyzing the entire Serbian epic poem from which Schmitt extracts the vignette in question, we show how the text of the poem presents a significantly more complicated and messy picture of the figures of victor, victory, and hero, heroism. The anonymous Serbian poet, addressing himself to his contemporary audience, with which he is intimately familiar, really subverts simplistic expectations regarding the heroism and victory of the Serbian hero, Marko Kraljevic. Finally, the article contrasts these complex and at times paradoxical figures of victory and the hero in the poem with their presentation in Carl Schmitt?s writing.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84086212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper focuses on violence, claiming that it is not action, but silence and inaction that become ?murderous?, given that we are forced into a permanent and impossible process of choosing between responsibility for the other and the possibility of responding to a call for help. Still, this position is not final and the author offers certain alternative strategies, such as rebellion, goodness, critique and shame.
{"title":"On murderous silence","authors":"Marc Crépon","doi":"10.2298/FID2101067C","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2101067C","url":null,"abstract":"The paper focuses on violence, claiming that it is not action, but silence and inaction that become ?murderous?, given that we are forced into a permanent and impossible process of choosing between responsibility for the other and the possibility of responding to a call for help. Still, this position is not final and the author offers certain alternative strategies, such as rebellion, goodness, critique and shame.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72472499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic was first ascribed to persons associated with the Huanan Seafood Market. However, many scientists suggest that this pandemic is actually a consequence of human intrusion into nature. This opens up a whole new perspective for an examination of direct and indirect, individual and collective responsibility concerning this particular pandemic, but also zoonotic pandemics as such. In this context, one of the key issues are the consequences of factory-farming of animals, which contributes to circumstances in which zoonotic pandemics emerge. Moreover, it is part of a larger economic system, global capitalism, whose logic implies certain coercion toward its participants to keep it essentially unchanged and therefore to make sure that livestock health remains ?the weakest link in our global health chain? (FAO). However, even though the precise answer to the issue of moral responsibility for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks in general and the COVID-19 pandemic in particular cannot be given, it is possible to list certain indicators and make a framework helpful in ascribing moral responsibility to certain persons. The paper intends to do so by examining the notion of responsibility and by applying it to the issues mentioned. The results of this analysis show that it is misleading to place moral blame on people involved in actions that directly caused the animal-to-human transmission of a certain virus or on humanity as a whole.
{"title":"Relationship between moral responsibility for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks and industrial animal farms","authors":"Josip Guć","doi":"10.2298/fid2104695g","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/fid2104695g","url":null,"abstract":"The responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic was first ascribed to persons associated with the Huanan Seafood Market. However, many scientists suggest that this pandemic is actually a consequence of human intrusion into nature. This opens up a whole new perspective for an examination of direct and indirect, individual and collective responsibility concerning this particular pandemic, but also zoonotic pandemics as such. In this context, one of the key issues are the consequences of factory-farming of animals, which contributes to circumstances in which zoonotic pandemics emerge. Moreover, it is part of a larger economic system, global capitalism, whose logic implies certain coercion toward its participants to keep it essentially unchanged and therefore to make sure that livestock health remains ?the weakest link in our global health chain? (FAO). However, even though the precise answer to the issue of moral responsibility for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks in general and the COVID-19 pandemic in particular cannot be given, it is possible to list certain indicators and make a framework helpful in ascribing moral responsibility to certain persons. The paper intends to do so by examining the notion of responsibility and by applying it to the issues mentioned. The results of this analysis show that it is misleading to place moral blame on people involved in actions that directly caused the animal-to-human transmission of a certain virus or on humanity as a whole.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82871455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In my view, making the case for a specific interpretation of Critical Theory is problematic.1 Although the term has a prestigious origin stemming from Horkheimer?s 1937 paper, Traditional and Critical Theory,2 given during his term as Director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University and generating the enthusiasm of its members, the term and the movement associated would be defined and radically redefined not only by subsequent generations but by its very author. One of the merits of the book under discussion is that even before the first chapter an ?Interlude? is presented entitled Arguing for Classical Critical Theory signifying to the reader that Horkheimer got it right when he defined the subject and that it is possible to return to that particular definition after 83 years. This paper challenges Professor S?rensen?s claims for the restoration of classical Critical Theory on three levels: the scientific, the historical and the political level.
在我看来，对批判理论进行具体的解释是有问题的虽然这个词有一个著名的起源，起源于霍克海默?他1937年在担任法兰克福大学社会研究所所长期间发表的论文《传统与批判理论》(Traditional and Critical Theory)，激发了该所成员的热情。这一术语和相关的运动不仅被后人界定，而且被其作者本人彻底重新界定。正在讨论的这本书的优点之一是，甚至在第一章和“插曲”之前，题为《为古典批判理论辩护》，向读者表明，霍克海默对主体的定义是正确的，83年后，我们有可能回到那个特定的定义。这篇论文对S?rensen?他主张从科学、历史和政治三个层面恢复古典批判理论。
{"title":"Arguing for classical critical theory","authors":"M. Rasmussen","doi":"10.2298/FID2101005R","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2101005R","url":null,"abstract":"In my view, making the case for a specific interpretation of Critical Theory is problematic.1 Although the term has a prestigious origin stemming from Horkheimer?s 1937 paper, Traditional and Critical Theory,2 given during his term as Director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University and generating the enthusiasm of its members, the term and the movement associated would be defined and radically redefined not only by subsequent generations but by its very author. One of the merits of the book under discussion is that even before the first chapter an ?Interlude? is presented entitled Arguing for Classical Critical Theory signifying to the reader that Horkheimer got it right when he defined the subject and that it is possible to return to that particular definition after 83 years. This paper challenges Professor S?rensen?s claims for the restoration of classical Critical Theory on three levels: the scientific, the historical and the political level.","PeriodicalId":41902,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy and Society-Filozofija i Drustvo","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81588356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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