Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169400
Maya Leshkowitz, Olivia Benattasse, O. Wertheim, Ori Rottenstreich
A dominant part in blockchain networks is reaching an agreement on block transactions and their impact on the network state. We follow a common scenario where a node is selected to propose a block and its implied state updates. The proposal is then validated by other nodes that examine the block impact on the state. Typically, all validators execute the complete block and provide an indication based on comparing the results of their execution to the updated state in the proposal. With the increase in the number of participants in blockchain networks, we suggest a time-efficient block validation through splitting it into multiple disjoint tasks. This can be challenging due to possible dependencies between the block transactions. We describe the additional information the leader has to provide to enable that. Moreover, we describe a unique proof for the block partition computed by the leader such that when validated in part by the different committees guarantees the correctness of the execution by the leader. We compare the approach to traditional solutions based on real data of the Ethereum blockchain.
{"title":"Scalable Block Execution via Parallel Validation","authors":"Maya Leshkowitz, Olivia Benattasse, O. Wertheim, Ori Rottenstreich","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169400","url":null,"abstract":"A dominant part in blockchain networks is reaching an agreement on block transactions and their impact on the network state. We follow a common scenario where a node is selected to propose a block and its implied state updates. The proposal is then validated by other nodes that examine the block impact on the state. Typically, all validators execute the complete block and provide an indication based on comparing the results of their execution to the updated state in the proposal. With the increase in the number of participants in blockchain networks, we suggest a time-efficient block validation through splitting it into multiple disjoint tasks. This can be challenging due to possible dependencies between the block transactions. We describe the additional information the leader has to provide to enable that. Moreover, we describe a unique proof for the block partition computed by the leader such that when validated in part by the different committees guarantees the correctness of the execution by the leader. We compare the approach to traditional solutions based on real data of the Ethereum blockchain.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122341538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169447
Mehrdad Kiamari, B. Krishnamachari, Muhammad Naveed, Seokgu Yun
We present a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) distributed ledger protocol that is aimed at making mobile devices first-class citizens in the consensus process by having them communicate through online brokers. The protocol is provably safe and live. We show that it is capable of a throughput on the order of several thousand transactions per second per shard, and sub-second confirmation latency.
{"title":"Distributed Consensus for Mobile Devices using Online Brokers","authors":"Mehrdad Kiamari, B. Krishnamachari, Muhammad Naveed, Seokgu Yun","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169447","url":null,"abstract":"We present a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) distributed ledger protocol that is aimed at making mobile devices first-class citizens in the consensus process by having them communicate through online brokers. The protocol is provably safe and live. We show that it is capable of a throughput on the order of several thousand transactions per second per shard, and sub-second confirmation latency.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"17 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128633646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169415
Zachary Painter, Pradeep Kumar Gayam, Victor Cook, D. Dechev
Popular blockchains such as Bitcoin or Ethereum provide a transaction isolation level of READ-COMMITTED. This provides difficulties when state changes many times per block interval. Hash-Mark-Set (HMS) alleviates this problem by enabling READ-UNCOMMITTED transactions for state variables. However, the current HMS implementation relies on a sequential algorithm and is susceptible to redundant calculations. As modern processors rely more heavily on parallel algorithms to leverage multiple cores for speedup, sequential algorithms see less benefit from hardware improvements. This paper proposes a lock-free HMS to make use of thread-safe techniques and other optimizations to improve the performance of the HMS algorithm and reduce the latency of read-uncommitted state variable accesses. In our experiments, the proposed algorithm experiences an average 6.4x increase in performance up to 128 go-routines, and a maximum 11.1x increase.
{"title":"Parallel Hash-Mark-Set on the Ethereum Blockchain","authors":"Zachary Painter, Pradeep Kumar Gayam, Victor Cook, D. Dechev","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169415","url":null,"abstract":"Popular blockchains such as Bitcoin or Ethereum provide a transaction isolation level of READ-COMMITTED. This provides difficulties when state changes many times per block interval. Hash-Mark-Set (HMS) alleviates this problem by enabling READ-UNCOMMITTED transactions for state variables. However, the current HMS implementation relies on a sequential algorithm and is susceptible to redundant calculations. As modern processors rely more heavily on parallel algorithms to leverage multiple cores for speedup, sequential algorithms see less benefit from hardware improvements. This paper proposes a lock-free HMS to make use of thread-safe techniques and other optimizations to improve the performance of the HMS algorithm and reduce the latency of read-uncommitted state variable accesses. In our experiments, the proposed algorithm experiences an average 6.4x increase in performance up to 128 go-routines, and a maximum 11.1x increase.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"388 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125413230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169412
Kris Oosthoek, C. Doerr
Bitcoin is gaining traction as an alternative store of value. Its market capitalization transcends all other cryptocurrencies in the market. But its high monetary value also makes it an attractive target to cyber criminal actors. Hacking campaigns usually target the weakest points in an ecosystem. In Bitcoin, these are currently the exchange platforms. As each exchange breach potentially decreases Bitcoin’s market value by billions, it is a threat not only to direct victims, but to everyone owning Bitcoin. Based on an extensive analysis of 36 breaches of Bitcoin exchanges, we show the attack patterns used to exploit Bitcoin exchange platforms using an industry standard for reporting intelligence on cyber security breaches. Based on this we are able to provide an overview of the most common attack vectors, showing that all except three hacks were possible due to relatively lax security. We also show that while the security regimen of Bitcoin exchanges is not on par with other financial service providers, the use of stolen credentials, which does not require any hacking, is decreasing. We also show that the amount of BTC taken during a breach is decreasing, as well as the exchanges that terminate after being breached. With exchanges being targeted by nation-state hacking groups, security needs to be a first concern.
{"title":"From Hodl to Heist: Analysis of Cyber Security Threats to Bitcoin Exchanges","authors":"Kris Oosthoek, C. Doerr","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169412","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin is gaining traction as an alternative store of value. Its market capitalization transcends all other cryptocurrencies in the market. But its high monetary value also makes it an attractive target to cyber criminal actors. Hacking campaigns usually target the weakest points in an ecosystem. In Bitcoin, these are currently the exchange platforms. As each exchange breach potentially decreases Bitcoin’s market value by billions, it is a threat not only to direct victims, but to everyone owning Bitcoin. Based on an extensive analysis of 36 breaches of Bitcoin exchanges, we show the attack patterns used to exploit Bitcoin exchange platforms using an industry standard for reporting intelligence on cyber security breaches. Based on this we are able to provide an overview of the most common attack vectors, showing that all except three hacks were possible due to relatively lax security. We also show that while the security regimen of Bitcoin exchanges is not on par with other financial service providers, the use of stolen credentials, which does not require any hacking, is decreasing. We also show that the amount of BTC taken during a breach is decreasing, as well as the exchanges that terminate after being breached. With exchanges being targeted by nation-state hacking groups, security needs to be a first concern.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"24 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124469548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169408
Janick Rueegger, Guilherme Sperb Machado
Protocols based on Hash Time Lock Contracts (HTLCs) show tremendous potential to enable a truly decentralized exchange of digital currencies. In contrast to traditional financial systems and centralized crypto-exchanges, HTLC protocols provide a method to trade crypto-currencies in a peer-to-peer manner. However, considering the elimination of a third-party authority, remarkable price fluctuations and the protocol’s extensive time-to-completion, involved parties might be incentivized to deviate from the protocol and cancel a trade midway. Thus, this paper analyzes the protocol’s incentive structure based on a model of rationality to further quantify its impact on potential trades, using historical exchange rates. By analyzing different crypto-currency trading pairs, this paper highlights the probabilistic nature of a typical HTLC protocol. The results show that although the protocol does not offer a guarantee for a successful trade, it is applicable in scenarios of exchange-rates with low drift, low volatility, and an optimized time-to-completion.
{"title":"Rational Exchange: Incentives in Atomic Cross Chain Swaps","authors":"Janick Rueegger, Guilherme Sperb Machado","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169408","url":null,"abstract":"Protocols based on Hash Time Lock Contracts (HTLCs) show tremendous potential to enable a truly decentralized exchange of digital currencies. In contrast to traditional financial systems and centralized crypto-exchanges, HTLC protocols provide a method to trade crypto-currencies in a peer-to-peer manner. However, considering the elimination of a third-party authority, remarkable price fluctuations and the protocol’s extensive time-to-completion, involved parties might be incentivized to deviate from the protocol and cancel a trade midway. Thus, this paper analyzes the protocol’s incentive structure based on a model of rationality to further quantify its impact on potential trades, using historical exchange rates. By analyzing different crypto-currency trading pairs, this paper highlights the probabilistic nature of a typical HTLC protocol. The results show that although the protocol does not offer a guarantee for a successful trade, it is applicable in scenarios of exchange-rates with low drift, low volatility, and an optimized time-to-completion.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122780424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169422
Teik Guan Tan, Vishal Sharma, Jianying Zhou
Mainstream applications typically require a trusted authority where application clients will connect to obtain a service. In the blockchain decentralized environment, this trusted authority or the leader changes frequently and is selected randomly depending on the protocol. Such procedures may take an unacceptable amount of time or resources to establish the leader causing overheads, latency or processing issues if mainstream applications are to adopt the blockchain. Focusing on these issues, we present Right-of-Stake (RoS), a novel approach in a synchronous blockchain network to deterministically elect a leader or block proposer out of a group of participants, each with different stakes. This procedure is completed in a guaranteed equitable manner while removing the need for Proof-of-Work’s (PoW) aggressive-resource computations or Proof-of-Stake’s (PoS) inter-node negotiations. Besides, through the use of zero-knowledge range proofs, RoS has a distinct advantage of being able to hide the identity of future leaders until the point when the leader surfaces to propose the block. We also simulate RoS and show that it can recover from Denial-of-Service attacks which have been a point of contention in arguments against deterministic leader election protocols. We view RoS as a possible consensus replacement for blockchains that require an improved leader election process when deployed for mainstream applications.
{"title":"Right-of-Stake: Deterministic and Fair Blockchain Leader Election with Hidden Leader","authors":"Teik Guan Tan, Vishal Sharma, Jianying Zhou","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169422","url":null,"abstract":"Mainstream applications typically require a trusted authority where application clients will connect to obtain a service. In the blockchain decentralized environment, this trusted authority or the leader changes frequently and is selected randomly depending on the protocol. Such procedures may take an unacceptable amount of time or resources to establish the leader causing overheads, latency or processing issues if mainstream applications are to adopt the blockchain. Focusing on these issues, we present Right-of-Stake (RoS), a novel approach in a synchronous blockchain network to deterministically elect a leader or block proposer out of a group of participants, each with different stakes. This procedure is completed in a guaranteed equitable manner while removing the need for Proof-of-Work’s (PoW) aggressive-resource computations or Proof-of-Stake’s (PoS) inter-node negotiations. Besides, through the use of zero-knowledge range proofs, RoS has a distinct advantage of being able to hide the identity of future leaders until the point when the leader surfaces to propose the block. We also simulate RoS and show that it can recover from Denial-of-Service attacks which have been a point of contention in arguments against deterministic leader election protocols. We view RoS as a possible consensus replacement for blockchains that require an improved leader election process when deployed for mainstream applications.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124954761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169424
Wiem Badreddine, Kaiwen Zhang, C. Talhi
The number of Internet of Things devices is growing dramatically, generating a huge amount of data which is becoming a valuable asset for data analysts. This trend culminates towards the creation of an IoT data marketplace, where streams of data from heterogeneous sources are sent in real time to various data consumers and are metered for monetization purposes. Publish/subscribe systems, such as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), are a promising solution to act as a transport layer for real-time data streams in a decoupled and large scale manner. However, pub/sub systems lack two key properties for an IoT data marketplace: (1) it does not provide any monetization logic; (2) it assumes that the pub/sub brokers are trusted entities, which is not the case in a decentralized or federated marketplace setting. In this paper, we address these issues using a reliable and transparent monetization system based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and smart contracts. We propose three monetization solutions and demonstrate the trade-off between the overhead of tracking IoT data on a blockchain vs. the accuracy of the monetization for data producers and consumers. In particular, we provide a Bloom filter-based solution for efficient verification of data exchange. We implement our system using Ethereum and Solidity and evaluate with respect to contract gas cost.
{"title":"Monetization using Blockchains for IoT Data Marketplace","authors":"Wiem Badreddine, Kaiwen Zhang, C. Talhi","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169424","url":null,"abstract":"The number of Internet of Things devices is growing dramatically, generating a huge amount of data which is becoming a valuable asset for data analysts. This trend culminates towards the creation of an IoT data marketplace, where streams of data from heterogeneous sources are sent in real time to various data consumers and are metered for monetization purposes. Publish/subscribe systems, such as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), are a promising solution to act as a transport layer for real-time data streams in a decoupled and large scale manner. However, pub/sub systems lack two key properties for an IoT data marketplace: (1) it does not provide any monetization logic; (2) it assumes that the pub/sub brokers are trusted entities, which is not the case in a decentralized or federated marketplace setting. In this paper, we address these issues using a reliable and transparent monetization system based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and smart contracts. We propose three monetization solutions and demonstrate the trade-off between the overhead of tracking IoT data on a blockchain vs. the accuracy of the monetization for data producers and consumers. In particular, we provide a Bloom filter-based solution for efficient verification of data exchange. We implement our system using Ethereum and Solidity and evaluate with respect to contract gas cost.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"94 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120908540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169477
Narges Shadab, F. Houshmand, M. Lesani
The value of cryptocurrencies is highly volatile and investors require fast and reliable exchange systems. In cross-chain transactions, multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains which can be represented as a directed graph ${mathcal{G}}$ with vertexes V as parties and edges E as asset transfers. In a simple form, cross-chain transactions are cross-chain swaps where each edge e transfers an asset that the head of e already owns. However, in general, a cross-chain transaction includes a sequence of exchanges at each blockchain. Further, transactions may have off-chain steps and hence may not be strongly connected. Given a transaction, protocols are desired that guarantee the following property called uniformity. If all parties conform to the protocol, all the assets should be transferred. Further, if any party deviates from the protocol, the conforming parties should not experience any loss. Previous work introduced a uniform protocol for strongly connected cross-chain swaps and showed that no uniform protocol exists for transactions that are not strongly connected. We present a uniform protocol for general cross-chain transactions with sequenced and off-chain steps when a few certain parties are conforming. Further, we prove a new property called end-to-end that guarantees that if the source parties pay, the sink parties are paid. We present a synthesis tool called XCHAIN that given a high-level description of a cross-transaction can automatically generate smart contracts in Solidity for all the parties.
{"title":"Cross-chain Transactions","authors":"Narges Shadab, F. Houshmand, M. Lesani","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169477","url":null,"abstract":"The value of cryptocurrencies is highly volatile and investors require fast and reliable exchange systems. In cross-chain transactions, multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains which can be represented as a directed graph ${mathcal{G}}$ with vertexes V as parties and edges E as asset transfers. In a simple form, cross-chain transactions are cross-chain swaps where each edge e transfers an asset that the head of e already owns. However, in general, a cross-chain transaction includes a sequence of exchanges at each blockchain. Further, transactions may have off-chain steps and hence may not be strongly connected. Given a transaction, protocols are desired that guarantee the following property called uniformity. If all parties conform to the protocol, all the assets should be transferred. Further, if any party deviates from the protocol, the conforming parties should not experience any loss. Previous work introduced a uniform protocol for strongly connected cross-chain swaps and showed that no uniform protocol exists for transactions that are not strongly connected. We present a uniform protocol for general cross-chain transactions with sequenced and off-chain steps when a few certain parties are conforming. Further, we prove a new property called end-to-end that guarantees that if the source parties pay, the sink parties are paid. We present a synthesis tool called XCHAIN that given a high-level description of a cross-transaction can automatically generate smart contracts in Solidity for all the parties.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115004306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169464
Jing Li, Dongning Guo
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system proposed by Nakamoto in 2008. Since then, a number of protocols based on the Nakamoto consensus have been proposed to improve the blockchain throughput while maintaining a similar level of security. In addition to bitcoin, this work also studies the Prism protocol proposed by Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath in 2018. The liveness and consistency properties of the bitcoin and the Prism backbone protocols have been established by assuming either explicitly or implicitly that the blockchains have finite lifespan. While the lifespan can be arbitrarily large, it is unsatisfying for the security guarantee to be dependent on this parameter. In addition, most analyses also assume lockstep synchrony, where by the end of each round all honest miners have complete information about all blocks published until then. This paper presents a streamlined and strengthened analysis of the liveness and consistency of bitcoin and Prism protocols without the finite lifespan assumption. Also, we use the non-lockstep synchronous model which assumes the block propagation delays to be heterogeneous, arbitrary, and upper bounded by some constant. A probabilistic guarantee is also provided for a transaction to become permanent in the final ledger of all honest miners. In lieu of order optimal results, these properties take the form of explicit bounds, which provide improved design references for public transaction ledger protocols.
{"title":"Liveness and Consistency of Bitcoin and Prism Blockchains: The Non-lockstep Synchronous Case","authors":"Jing Li, Dongning Guo","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169464","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system proposed by Nakamoto in 2008. Since then, a number of protocols based on the Nakamoto consensus have been proposed to improve the blockchain throughput while maintaining a similar level of security. In addition to bitcoin, this work also studies the Prism protocol proposed by Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath in 2018. The liveness and consistency properties of the bitcoin and the Prism backbone protocols have been established by assuming either explicitly or implicitly that the blockchains have finite lifespan. While the lifespan can be arbitrarily large, it is unsatisfying for the security guarantee to be dependent on this parameter. In addition, most analyses also assume lockstep synchrony, where by the end of each round all honest miners have complete information about all blocks published until then. This paper presents a streamlined and strengthened analysis of the liveness and consistency of bitcoin and Prism protocols without the finite lifespan assumption. Also, we use the non-lockstep synchronous model which assumes the block propagation delays to be heterogeneous, arbitrary, and upper bounded by some constant. A probabilistic guarantee is also provided for a transaction to become permanent in the final ledger of all honest miners. In lieu of order optimal results, these properties take the form of explicit bounds, which provide improved design references for public transaction ledger protocols.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130013764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169393
M. Sallal, Gareth Owenson, M. Adda
The mechanism of peers randomly choosing logical neighbors without any knowledge about underlying physical topology can cause a delay overhead in information propagation which makes the system vulnerable to double spend attacks. This paper introduces a proximity-aware extensions to the current Bitcoin protocol, named Master Node Based Clustering (MNBC). The ultimate purpose of the proposed protocol is to improve the information propagation delay in the Bitcoin network.
{"title":"Evaluation of Security and Performance of Master Node Protocol in the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network","authors":"M. Sallal, Gareth Owenson, M. Adda","doi":"10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICBC48266.2020.9169393","url":null,"abstract":"The mechanism of peers randomly choosing logical neighbors without any knowledge about underlying physical topology can cause a delay overhead in information propagation which makes the system vulnerable to double spend attacks. This paper introduces a proximity-aware extensions to the current Bitcoin protocol, named Master Node Based Clustering (MNBC). The ultimate purpose of the proposed protocol is to improve the information propagation delay in the Bitcoin network.","PeriodicalId":420845,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)","volume":"11 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114045999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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