The paper argues that, counter to Walter Sinnott-Armostrong and Ewen Kingston’s view, we are morally required to refrain from joyguzzling, i.e., driving a fuel-inefficient car for no other purpose than having a good time. It is undisputed that joyguzzling is an example of a situation where the uncoordinated actions of a large group of individuals lead to an undesirable outcome. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that any one individual’s actions will have a significant impact on that outcome. But there are morally relevant differences between cases that share these characteristics. The paper clarifies the debate by introducing and discussing three different types of cases: drop-in-the-ocean cases, overkill cases and emergence cases. We argue that we may have moral obligations in drop-in-the-ocean cases, and that emissions of GHGs are not examples of overkill cases. Then we demonstrate through counterexamples that there are moral obligations in a subgroup of emergence cases we call joyguzzling-like cases. After criticizing the soundness of Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments, we critically address their relevance. We argue that Sinnott-Armstrong and Kingston fail to distinguish between two concepts of moral obligation — namely, autonomous and heteronomous moral obligation; that their most important arguments do not have any relevance to heteronomous obligations; and, finally, that heteronomous moral obligations are essential for social change. Keywords: joyguzzling, individual responsibility, climate ethics, harm principle, autonomous vs. heteronomous moral obligations
{"title":"Don’t Join the Joyride:","authors":"K. Skjerve, Trygve Lavik","doi":"10.5324/eip.v13i2.2982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v13i2.2982","url":null,"abstract":"The paper argues that, counter to Walter Sinnott-Armostrong and Ewen Kingston’s view, we are morally required to refrain from joyguzzling, i.e., driving a fuel-inefficient car for no other purpose than having a good time. It is undisputed that joyguzzling is an example of a situation where the uncoordinated actions of a large group of individuals lead to an undesirable outcome. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that any one individual’s actions will have a significant impact on that outcome. But there are morally relevant differences between cases that share these characteristics. The paper clarifies the debate by introducing and discussing three different types of cases: drop-in-the-ocean cases, overkill cases and emergence cases. We argue that we may have moral obligations in drop-in-the-ocean cases, and that emissions of GHGs are not examples of overkill cases. Then we demonstrate through counterexamples that there are moral obligations in a subgroup of emergence cases we call joyguzzling-like cases. After criticizing the soundness of Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments, we critically address their relevance. We argue that Sinnott-Armstrong and Kingston fail to distinguish between two concepts of moral obligation — namely, autonomous and heteronomous moral obligation; that their most important arguments do not have any relevance to heteronomous obligations; and, finally, that heteronomous moral obligations are essential for social change. \u0000Keywords: joyguzzling, individual responsibility, climate ethics, harm principle, autonomous vs. heteronomous moral obligations","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83108227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vi står overfor en planetær miljø- og klimakrise, med alvorlige, gjennomgripende, langvarige og irreversible konsekvenser for både menneske og natur. Det skyldes særlig at politiske, rettslige og økonomiske systemer som har vokst frem i løpet av de siste 250 år – slik som det liberale demokratiet og den globale kapitalismen – behandler naturen antroposentrisk, materialistisk og instrumentelt. For bedre å håndtere dagens miljø- og klimakrise, bør disse utdaterte systemene reformeres ut fra tanken om et økologisk demokrati, herunder en grønn konstitusjonalisme og naturens moralske trumf. Norges første klimasøksmål illustrerer viktigheten av en slik systemisk grønning. Rettsaken fant sted i 2017 og kom opp igjen for rettsapparatet i 2019, hvor staten hevdes å bryte miljøparagrafen (§ 112) i sin egen grunnlov. Søksmålets grønning innebærer en positiv rettsliggjøring, hvis natursynet i Grunnlovens miljøparagraf forstås økosentrisk (klodesentrert) fremfor antroposentrisk (menneskesentrert). Da styrker klimasøksmålet økologiske medborgeres konstitusjonelle rettssikkerhet og demokratiske deltagelseslikhet. Viktigst er imidlertid at planetens eksistensielle tålegrense og naturens moralske trumf anerkjennes. Nøkkelord: Miljøkrise, klimasøksmål, økologisk demokrati, økologisk medborgerskap, grønn konstitusjonalisme, naturens moralske trumf, positiv rettsliggjøring English Summary: Ecological democracy and the inherent value of nature: Climate litigation in the age of the environmental crisis We are facing a planetary environmental and climate crisis, with severe, pervasive, long-lasting, and irreversible impacts for both humans and nature. This is due to political, legal, and economic systems having emerged during the last 250 years – especially liberal democracy and global capitalism – treat nature anthropocentrically, materialistically, and instrumentally. To better handle today’s environmental and climate crisis, these outdated systems should be reformed in light of the idea of ecological democracy, hereunder green constitutionalism and nature’s moral trump. Norway’s first climate lawsuit illustrates the importance of such a systemic greening. This trial took place in 2017 and reappeared for the court in 2019, in which the state is accused for having broken the environmental paragraph (§ 112) in its own constitution. This lawsuit’s greening implies a positive juridification, if the perception of nature in the Constitution’s environmental paragraph is ecocentric (earth-centered) rather than anthropocentric (human-centered). Then, the climate lawsuit strengthens ecological co-citizens’ constitutionally rule of law and democratic participation equality. Most importantly, it recognizes the planet’s existential limits and nature’s moral trump. Keywords: Environmental crisis, climate lawsuit, ecological democracy, ecological citizenship, green constitutionalism, nature’s moral trump, positive legalization
{"title":"Økologisk demokrati og naturens iboende verdi","authors":"Odin Lysaker","doi":"10.5324/eip.v13i2.3302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v13i2.3302","url":null,"abstract":"Vi står overfor en planetær miljø- og klimakrise, med alvorlige, gjennomgripende, langvarige og irreversible konsekvenser for både menneske og natur. Det skyldes særlig at politiske, rettslige og økonomiske systemer som har vokst frem i løpet av de siste 250 år – slik som det liberale demokratiet og den globale kapitalismen – behandler naturen antroposentrisk, materialistisk og instrumentelt. For bedre å håndtere dagens miljø- og klimakrise, bør disse utdaterte systemene reformeres ut fra tanken om et økologisk demokrati, herunder en grønn konstitusjonalisme og naturens moralske trumf. Norges første klimasøksmål illustrerer viktigheten av en slik systemisk grønning. Rettsaken fant sted i 2017 og kom opp igjen for rettsapparatet i 2019, hvor staten hevdes å bryte miljøparagrafen (§ 112) i sin egen grunnlov. Søksmålets grønning innebærer en positiv rettsliggjøring, hvis natursynet i Grunnlovens miljøparagraf forstås økosentrisk (klodesentrert) fremfor antroposentrisk (menneskesentrert). Da styrker klimasøksmålet økologiske medborgeres konstitusjonelle rettssikkerhet og demokratiske deltagelseslikhet. Viktigst er imidlertid at planetens eksistensielle tålegrense og naturens moralske trumf anerkjennes. \u0000Nøkkelord: Miljøkrise, klimasøksmål, økologisk demokrati, økologisk medborgerskap, grønn konstitusjonalisme, naturens moralske trumf, positiv rettsliggjøring \u0000 \u0000English Summary: Ecological democracy and the inherent value of nature: Climate litigation in the age of the environmental crisis \u0000We are facing a planetary environmental and climate crisis, with severe, pervasive, long-lasting, and irreversible impacts for both humans and nature. This is due to political, legal, and economic systems having emerged during the last 250 years – especially liberal democracy and global capitalism – treat nature anthropocentrically, materialistically, and instrumentally. To better handle today’s environmental and climate crisis, these outdated systems should be reformed in light of the idea of ecological democracy, hereunder green constitutionalism and nature’s moral trump. Norway’s first climate lawsuit illustrates the importance of such a systemic greening. This trial took place in 2017 and reappeared for the court in 2019, in which the state is accused for having broken the environmental paragraph (§ 112) in its own constitution. This lawsuit’s greening implies a positive juridification, if the perception of nature in the Constitution’s environmental paragraph is ecocentric (earth-centered) rather than anthropocentric (human-centered). Then, the climate lawsuit strengthens ecological co-citizens’ constitutionally rule of law and democratic participation equality. Most importantly, it recognizes the planet’s existential limits and nature’s moral trump. \u0000Keywords: Environmental crisis, climate lawsuit, ecological democracy, ecological citizenship, green constitutionalism, nature’s moral trump, positive legalization","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83422814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
GPs serve in a double role of treatment provider and expert in certain social insurance systems, such as the Norwegian one. Some physicians assert that the ethical obligations of the two roles conflict with each other. The objective of this article is to show that social insurance medical ethics (SIME), which are based on recognised principles of medical ethics, unite the physicians’ obligations associated with these roles. The method applied is a medical ethics conceptual analysis. The material consists of literature on normative SIME. The study shows that SIME expands the role of the treatment provider to a wider societal context. Here, physicians should attempt to balance the perspectives of sympathy with empathy, as treatment providers, with the impartiality in their role as experts. Five principles of medical ethics are fundamental. Respect for human dignity is the overarching principle of medical ethics. The four others are nonmaleficence, beneficence (including soft paternalism), autonomy, and social justice. The article discusses two areas where it is asserted that the roles of treatment provider and expert conflict with each other: the application of beneficence and justice, and the duty of confidentiality versus the duty to provide information to the National Insurance service. The study concludes that there are no basic ethical conflicts between the two roles. The ethical problems that may arise when exercising this duality should be viewed in the same way as other ethical problems in medicine. Actual application and balancing of the principles may necessitate negotiations between patients and physicians. Keywords: dual roles, professionalism, deliberation, impartiality, medical principle ethics, values of welfare state
{"title":"Physicians in the double role of treatment provider and expert in light of principle-based social insurance medical ethics","authors":"H. M. Solli, António Barbosa da Silva","doi":"10.5324/eip.v13i2.2911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v13i2.2911","url":null,"abstract":"GPs serve in a double role of treatment provider and expert in certain social insurance systems, such as the Norwegian one. Some physicians assert that the ethical obligations of the two roles conflict with each other. The objective of this article is to show that social insurance medical ethics (SIME), which are based on recognised principles of medical ethics, unite the physicians’ obligations associated with these roles. The method applied is a medical ethics conceptual analysis. The material consists of literature on normative SIME. The study shows that SIME expands the role of the treatment provider to a wider societal context. Here, physicians should attempt to balance the perspectives of sympathy with empathy, as treatment providers, with the impartiality in their role as experts. Five principles of medical ethics are fundamental. Respect for human dignity is the overarching principle of medical ethics. The four others are nonmaleficence, beneficence (including soft paternalism), autonomy, and social justice. The article discusses two areas where it is asserted that the roles of treatment provider and expert conflict with each other: the application of beneficence and justice, and the duty of confidentiality versus the duty to provide information to the National Insurance service. The study concludes that there are no basic ethical conflicts between the two roles. The ethical problems that may arise when exercising this duality should be viewed in the same way as other ethical problems in medicine. Actual application and balancing of the principles may necessitate negotiations between patients and physicians. \u0000Keywords: dual roles, professionalism, deliberation, impartiality, medical principle ethics, values of welfare state","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86479423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This issue provides readers the opportunity to broaden understanding of methods used in applied ethics. We hope you will be inspired to decide on which method, or a combination of different ones, to use towards achieving reflective balance that can enhance understanding of all considerations relevant to deciding what should be done. Like tools, methods are used because they are well suited to the task we seek to accomplish.
{"title":"Finding balance in normative toolkits","authors":"A. Alvarez, M. Thorseth, S. G. Carson","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.3060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.3060","url":null,"abstract":"This issue provides readers the opportunity to broaden understanding of methods used in applied ethics. We hope you will be inspired to decide on which method, or a combination of different ones, to use towards achieving reflective balance that can enhance understanding of all considerations relevant to deciding what should be done. Like tools, methods are used because they are well suited to the task we seek to accomplish. ","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77592249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Professional work is currently based on explicit knowledge and evidence to a greater degree than in the past. Standardising professional services in this way requires repetitive (or at least similar) scenarios and might be seen as a challenge to professional autonomy. In the context of policing, officers perform a range of familiar tasks, but they may also encounter novel challenges at any moment. Moreover, police tasks are not well-defined. Therefore, many missions require police officers to rely on common sense, tacit knowledge or gut feeling. In this article, I argue that a values-based methodology may serve as a tool to help evaluate decisions in unfamiliar situations, to learn from experience, as well as be a quality control for established routines. Keywords: ethics, policing, decision-making, values, experiential learningroutines.
{"title":"A Values-based Methodology in Policing","authors":"J. Paulsen","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2547","url":null,"abstract":"Professional work is currently based on explicit knowledge and evidence to a greater degree than in the past. Standardising professional services in this way requires repetitive (or at least similar) scenarios and might be seen as a challenge to professional autonomy. In the context of policing, officers perform a range of familiar tasks, but they may also encounter novel challenges at any moment. Moreover, police tasks are not well-defined. Therefore, many missions require police officers to rely on common sense, tacit knowledge or gut feeling. In this article, I argue that a values-based methodology may serve as a tool to help evaluate decisions in unfamiliar situations, to learn from experience, as well as be a quality control for established routines. \u0000Keywords: ethics, policing, decision-making, values, experiential learningroutines.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88411967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content. Keywords: cultural appropriation, conventionalism, moderate conventionalism, convention difference
{"title":"Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation","authors":"J. Räikkä, Mikko Puumala","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2876","url":null,"abstract":"Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content. \u0000Keywords: cultural appropriation, conventionalism, moderate conventionalism, convention difference","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"328 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75117335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The approach to innovations known as Responsible research and innovation (RRI) aims to move the innovation system towards creating products that strive to realize social values along with economic benefits. This paper discusses the systematic assessment of assistive technologies in order for them to meet the aims expressed in RRI. A central issue in the discussion is how to facilitate an integration of insights from the discourse on RRI with more established assessment approaches such as Health Technology Assessment (HTA). Based on the literature on existing socio-ethical assessment tools, I investigate how these tools can be combined with HTA and how they can add perspectives from RRI that might increase the socio-ethical value of assistive technologies. Through a discussion on how to understand RRI, HTA, assessment and integration, I suggest a list of four possible approaches that have the potential to be applied as assessment approaches that integrate insights from RRI and HTA. These are then evaluated on their ability to address issues that have emerged from a literature review on RRI and assistive technologies, on empirical studies in this technology field and on their product focus. In conclusion, I argue that the Ethical Impact Assessment, the Socratic approach, the Ethical Matrix, and the HTA Core Model seem to be the most promising methodologies, but that these need adjustments to cover substantive themes from RRI. Keywords: energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach
{"title":"Responsibility for Assisted Living Technologies","authors":"E. Thorstensen","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2525","url":null,"abstract":"The approach to innovations known as Responsible research and innovation (RRI) aims to move the innovation system towards creating products that strive to realize social values along with economic benefits. This paper discusses the systematic assessment of assistive technologies in order for them to meet the aims expressed in RRI. A central issue in the discussion is how to facilitate an integration of insights from the discourse on RRI with more established assessment approaches such as Health Technology Assessment (HTA). Based on the literature on existing socio-ethical assessment tools, I investigate how these tools can be combined with HTA and how they can add perspectives from RRI that might increase the socio-ethical value of assistive technologies. Through a discussion on how to understand RRI, HTA, assessment and integration, I suggest a list of four possible approaches that have the potential to be applied as assessment approaches that integrate insights from RRI and HTA. These are then evaluated on their ability to address issues that have emerged from a literature review on RRI and assistive technologies, on empirical studies in this technology field and on their product focus. In conclusion, I argue that the Ethical Impact Assessment, the Socratic approach, the Ethical Matrix, and the HTA Core Model seem to be the most promising methodologies, but that these need adjustments to cover substantive themes from RRI. \u0000Keywords: energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83019000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Energy production and consumption give rise to issues of justice for future humans. By analysing a specific case – Swedish energy politics – this article contributes to the discussion of how consideration for future humans should affect energy policy making. It outlines three different energy scenarios for the period 2035-2065 – the nuclear-renewables, the renewables-low and the renewables-high scenarios – and assesses them from the point of view of justice for future individuals by using the capabilities approach as a normative framework. We cannot make a definitive assessment of the different scenarios due to the great uncertainties involved in determining the impacts on individuals living between 2035 and 2065 and individuals born thereafter, but we still conclude that we have certain reasons to prefer the renewables-low scenario since it avoids certain risks connected with the other scenarios. The economic growth in this scenario is lower than in the others, but we question whether this is a disadvantage from the point of view of the capabilities approach. Keywords: energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach
{"title":"Energy Scenarios and Justice Towards Future Humans","authors":"Anders Melin, David Kronlid","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2749","url":null,"abstract":"Energy production and consumption give rise to issues of justice for future humans. By analysing a specific case – Swedish energy politics – this article contributes to the discussion of how consideration for future humans should affect energy policy making. It outlines three different energy scenarios for the period 2035-2065 – the nuclear-renewables, the renewables-low and the renewables-high scenarios – and assesses them from the point of view of justice for future individuals by using the capabilities approach as a normative framework. We cannot make a definitive assessment of the different scenarios due to the great uncertainties involved in determining the impacts on individuals living between 2035 and 2065 and individuals born thereafter, but we still conclude that we have certain reasons to prefer the renewables-low scenario since it avoids certain risks connected with the other scenarios. The economic growth in this scenario is lower than in the others, but we question whether this is a disadvantage from the point of view of the capabilities approach. \u0000Keywords: energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"464 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83006641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
De siste årene har fosterreduksjon i økende grad vært gjenstand for debatt i Norge, og intensiteten nådde et foreløpig maksimum da Lovavdelingen leverte tolknings-uttalelsen § 2 - Tolkning av abortloven i 2016 som svar på at Helse- og omsorgs-departementet (i 2014) ba Lovavdelingen om å vurdere hvorvidt Lov om svangers-kapsavbrudd åpner for fosterreduksjon av friske fostre ved flerlings-vangerskap. Lovavdelingen konkluderte med at abortloven åpner for fosterreduksjon ved flerlingsvangerskap innenfor de rammene som loven ellers oppstiller. Debatten har ikke stilnet, og utover høsten 2018 ble den ytterligere tilspisset i forbindelse med KrFs veivalg og signaler fra Høyre om å vurdere å fjerne § 2.3c, samt å forby fosterreduksjon. Mange av argumentene i fosterreduksjonsdebatten fremstår tilsynelatende like de argumentene som verserer i abortdebatten, og det mangler en analyse av hva som stiller seg annerledes ved fosterreduksjon. Målet med denne artikkelen er følgelig å undersøke hvorvidt det finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Vi tar for oss typiske argumenter fra den norske debatten, og belyser dem med fagartikler fra forskningslitteraturen. De mest sentrale argumentene mot fosterreduksjon har vi identifisert som skadeargumentet, skråplansargumentet, intensjonsargumentet, sorgargumentet, psykologiske langtids-effekter for kvinnen og sorteringsargumentet. Vi kommer frem til at motargumentene ikke holder mål hva gjelder å påvise en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Konklusjonen vår er derfor at det – på tross av hva flere debattanter synes å mene - ikke finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom de to. Når vi derfor tillater abort, så bør vi også tillate fosterreduksjon. Nøkkelord: Abort, etikk, fosterreduksjon, medisinsk etikk, selektiv fosterreduksjon English summary: Abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction: An ethical comparison During recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been subject to debate in Norway, and this debate reached an apex when the Legislation Department delivered the interpretation statement § 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health and Care Services, who had (in 2014) requested the Legislation Department to assess whether the Abortion Act allowed for multifetal pregnancy reductions of healthy fetuses. The Legislation Department concluded that the Abortion Act does regulate and permit multifetal pregnancy reductions within the framework that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and in the autumn of 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party´s (KrF) "crossroads choice" and the signals from the Norwegian Conservative Party that they would consider reverting the Abortion Act’s section 2.3c [regulating second trimester abortions due to fetal anomalies], as well as a ban on multifetal pregnan
{"title":"Abort og fosterreduksjon: En etisk sammenligning","authors":"Silje Langseth Dahl, Rebekka Hylland Vaksdal, Mathias Barra, Espen Gamlund, Carl Tollef Solberg","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.3002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.3002","url":null,"abstract":"De siste årene har fosterreduksjon i økende grad vært gjenstand for debatt i Norge, og intensiteten nådde et foreløpig maksimum da Lovavdelingen leverte tolknings-uttalelsen § 2 - Tolkning av abortloven i 2016 som svar på at Helse- og omsorgs-departementet (i 2014) ba Lovavdelingen om å vurdere hvorvidt Lov om svangers-kapsavbrudd åpner for fosterreduksjon av friske fostre ved flerlings-vangerskap. Lovavdelingen konkluderte med at abortloven åpner for fosterreduksjon ved flerlingsvangerskap innenfor de rammene som loven ellers oppstiller. Debatten har ikke stilnet, og utover høsten 2018 ble den ytterligere tilspisset i forbindelse med KrFs veivalg og signaler fra Høyre om å vurdere å fjerne § 2.3c, samt å forby fosterreduksjon. \u0000Mange av argumentene i fosterreduksjonsdebatten fremstår tilsynelatende like de argumentene som verserer i abortdebatten, og det mangler en analyse av hva som stiller seg annerledes ved fosterreduksjon. Målet med denne artikkelen er følgelig å undersøke hvorvidt det finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Vi tar for oss typiske argumenter fra den norske debatten, og belyser dem med fagartikler fra forskningslitteraturen. De mest sentrale argumentene mot fosterreduksjon har vi identifisert som skadeargumentet, skråplansargumentet, intensjonsargumentet, sorgargumentet, psykologiske langtids-effekter for kvinnen og sorteringsargumentet. Vi kommer frem til at motargumentene ikke holder mål hva gjelder å påvise en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Konklusjonen vår er derfor at det – på tross av hva flere debattanter synes å mene - ikke finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom de to. Når vi derfor tillater abort, så bør vi også tillate fosterreduksjon. \u0000Nøkkelord: Abort, etikk, fosterreduksjon, medisinsk etikk, selektiv fosterreduksjon \u0000 \u0000English summary: Abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction: An ethical comparison \u0000During recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been subject to debate in Norway, and this debate reached an apex when the Legislation Department delivered the interpretation statement § 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health and Care Services, who had (in 2014) requested the Legislation Department to assess whether the Abortion Act allowed for multifetal pregnancy reductions of healthy fetuses. The Legislation Department concluded that the Abortion Act does regulate and permit multifetal pregnancy reductions within the framework that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and in the autumn of 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party´s (KrF) \"crossroads choice\" and the signals from the Norwegian Conservative Party that they would consider reverting the Abortion Act’s section 2.3c [regulating second trimester abortions due to fetal anomalies], as well as a ban on multifetal pregnan","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83085053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The contributors to this issue offer applied critical and normative perspectives on central, yet overlooked, ethical aspects of migration management with a certain cosmopolitan lance in some capacity. However, cosmopolitanism might mean different things for transnational migration. It can refer to “political cosmopolitanism” that provides the reasons for why there should be certain global institutions governing migration. It can also refer to “moral cosmopolitanism” that simply represents a moral concern for individual rights and interests first and foremost (Caney 2005). Cosmopolitanism can also work as a lens that is based on a scepticism towards using the nation-state as the ultimate unit or locus of analysis. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and the contributions in this special issue accommodate a form of cosmopolitan outlook or stance to some extent in their discussion on migration management practices.
{"title":"Special Issue on Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Migration: Ethics of Inclusion and Exclusion","authors":"Yusuf Yuksekdag, Elin Palm","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2867","url":null,"abstract":"The contributors to this issue offer applied critical and normative perspectives on central, yet overlooked, ethical aspects of migration management with a certain cosmopolitan lance in some capacity. However, cosmopolitanism might mean different things for transnational migration. It can refer to “political cosmopolitanism” that provides the reasons for why there should be certain global institutions governing migration. It can also refer to “moral cosmopolitanism” that simply represents a moral concern for individual rights and interests first and foremost (Caney 2005). Cosmopolitanism can also work as a lens that is based on a scepticism towards using the nation-state as the ultimate unit or locus of analysis. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and the contributions in this special issue accommodate a form of cosmopolitan outlook or stance to some extent in their discussion on migration management practices.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84110914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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