Four papers are included in this November 2018 special issue Open Section. First is by Bjørn Hofmann and Siri Granum Carson titled Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet: Hvordan har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? En innholdsanalyse (The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the "sorting society" in Norway in 2017). Second, Provokativ offentlig filosofi (Provocative Public Philosophy) by Aksel Braanen Sterri. Third, Steinar Bøyum’s The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself. And fourth, Jonas Jakobsen and Kjersti Fjørtoft’s In defence of moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas.
四篇论文被收录在2018年11月的特刊开放部分。首先是由Bjørn Hofmann和Siri Granum Carson合著的题为《filosoffiens rolle i det offentology and skiftet》的文章:Hvordan在2017年的一篇文章中讨论了关于分类的问题。哲学在公共辩论中的作用——对2017年挪威“分类社会”辩论的内容分析。第二，Aksel Braanen Sterri的《挑衅性公共哲学》。第三，施泰纳·伯尤姆的《自我教育的民主义务》。第四，Jonas Jakobsen和Kjersti Fjørtoft的《为温和包容主义辩护:重新审视罗尔斯和哈贝马斯》。
{"title":"Obligations in public philosophical discourse","authors":"A. Alvarez, M. Thorseth, Siri Granum Carson","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2868","url":null,"abstract":"Four papers are included in this November 2018 special issue Open Section. First is by Bjørn Hofmann and Siri Granum Carson titled Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet: Hvordan har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? En innholdsanalyse (The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the \"sorting society\" in Norway in 2017). Second, Provokativ offentlig filosofi (Provocative Public Philosophy) by Aksel Braanen Sterri. Third, Steinar Bøyum’s The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself. And fourth, Jonas Jakobsen and Kjersti Fjørtoft’s In defence of moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas. ","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87454286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ (Rawls) or ‘formal public sphere’ (Habermas). In particular, moderate inclusivism implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative. Keywords: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls
{"title":"In Defense of Moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere","authors":"Jonas Jakobsen, K. Fjørtoft","doi":"10.5324/eip.v12i2.2267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v12i2.2267","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ (Rawls) or ‘formal public sphere’ (Habermas). In particular, moderate inclusivism implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative. \u0000Keywords: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78931040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a recent interest in the ethics of high-skilled worker emigration through which the limitations of the right to exit are discussed. Insightful arguments have been made in favour of (or against) the emigration restrictions on skilled workers in order to tackle the deprivations in developing countries. However, there is still a need for clarification on how we can understand, discuss and implement limitations of a right from a normative perspective. Significantly, how we understand the limitation of a right might determine how we approach such limitations – both in terms of the process of assessing the limitations and in terms of their implications. In this paper, I identify two distinct ways to understand limitations of the right to exit with respect to losses associated with health worker emigration, while also pointing to their implications for restrictive policies: (i) as a matter of scope, and (ii) as a matter of weight or emergency, which requires a compensatory scheme for the individual right holders. While the emergency restrictions seem to be a point of convergence in the literature, what defines an emergency and the nature of the compensation still warrant exploration. To that end, I also discuss from a normative perspective what might constitute a public emergency that would give states a prima facie prerogative to regulate temporary limitations on the exercise of the right to exit. In addition, I briefly introduce the implications of emergency restrictions, with a particular focus on compensatory schemes for individual right holders.
{"title":"How to Understand Limitations of the Right to Exit with Respect to Losses Associated with Health Worker Emigration: A Clarification","authors":"Yusuf Yuksekdag","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2433","url":null,"abstract":"There is a recent interest in the ethics of high-skilled worker emigration through which the limitations of the right to exit are discussed. Insightful arguments have been made in favour of (or against) the emigration restrictions on skilled workers in order to tackle the deprivations in developing countries. However, there is still a need for clarification on how we can understand, discuss and implement limitations of a right from a normative perspective. Significantly, how we understand the limitation of a right might determine how we approach such limitations – both in terms of the process of assessing the limitations and in terms of their implications. In this paper, I identify two distinct ways to understand limitations of the right to exit with respect to losses associated with health worker emigration, while also pointing to their implications for restrictive policies: (i) as a matter of scope, and (ii) as a matter of weight or emergency, which requires a compensatory scheme for the individual right holders. While the emergency restrictions seem to be a point of convergence in the literature, what defines an emergency and the nature of the compensation still warrant exploration. To that end, I also discuss from a normative perspective what might constitute a public emergency that would give states a prima facie prerogative to regulate temporary limitations on the exercise of the right to exit. In addition, I briefly introduce the implications of emergency restrictions, with a particular focus on compensatory schemes for individual right holders.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90067919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines Swedish, Danish and Norwegian governments’ participation in the European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) project and its failed attempts to deport unaccompanied minors (UAMs) to Afghanistan. It argues that ERPUM is an interesting and urgent case of a “deportation corridor”, and suggests that this framework can benefit from analysis through normative and applied ethics and in particular discussions of feasibility constraints. It therefore identifies and critically assesses two nationalistic arguments for deportation common in Nordic politics, based on appeals credibility and humanitarianism. Considering the growth of nationalistic immigration policies in Nordic states, the article turns the usual discussions of feasibility on its head by showing that not only cosmopolitan, but also nationalistic ethics must face up to charges of lacking realism. More specifically, it argues that the case of ERPUM illustrates how nationalistic deportation ethics can rely on inconsistent normative and erroneous empirical assumptions, which can be criticized for their arbitrariness, ideological grounding and lacking feasibility.
{"title":"The \"imaginary world\" of nationalistic ethics: Feasibility constraints on Nordic deportation corridors targeting unaccompanied Afghan minors","authors":"Martin Lemberg-Pedersen","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2425","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Swedish, Danish and Norwegian governments’ participation in the European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) project and its failed attempts to deport unaccompanied minors (UAMs) to Afghanistan. It argues that ERPUM is an interesting and urgent case of a “deportation corridor”, and suggests that this framework can benefit from analysis through normative and applied ethics and in particular discussions of feasibility constraints. It therefore identifies and critically assesses two nationalistic arguments for deportation common in Nordic politics, based on appeals credibility and humanitarianism. Considering the growth of nationalistic immigration policies in Nordic states, the article turns the usual discussions of feasibility on its head by showing that not only cosmopolitan, but also nationalistic ethics must face up to charges of lacking realism. More specifically, it argues that the case of ERPUM illustrates how nationalistic deportation ethics can rely on inconsistent normative and erroneous empirical assumptions, which can be criticized for their arbitrariness, ideological grounding and lacking feasibility.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87767071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I establish a case for the moral importance of individual competence for voting, but also maintain that the substantial content of the required competence must remain open. I do this by way of an assessment of Jason Brennan's provocative defense of epistocracy. I try to show that there is no notion of political competence that can meet with reasonable agreement among citizens and that voter qualification exams are therefore illegitimate. Second, I maintain that the basic premise of Brennan's argument, the right to a competent electorate, is valid and that it corresponds to an individual duty to educate oneself politically. This duty is, in Kant's terminology, a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow democratic citizens. Yet since the content of competence must be left open, this moral duty cannot be transformed into a legal obligation.
{"title":"The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself","authors":"S. Bøyum","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2515","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I establish a case for the moral importance of individual competence for voting, but also maintain that the substantial content of the required competence must remain open. I do this by way of an assessment of Jason Brennan's provocative defense of epistocracy. I try to show that there is no notion of political competence that can meet with reasonable agreement among citizens and that voter qualification exams are therefore illegitimate. Second, I maintain that the basic premise of Brennan's argument, the right to a competent electorate, is valid and that it corresponds to an individual duty to educate oneself politically. This duty is, in Kant's terminology, a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow democratic citizens. Yet since the content of competence must be left open, this moral duty cannot be transformed into a legal obligation.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72411737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En uttalelse om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv, satte i gang en stor og opphetet debatt i den norske offentligheten i 2017. Denne ga opphav til en mer overordnet debatt om hva akademikere bør og ikke bør si i offentligheten. En viss form for offentlig filosofi, det jeg vil kalle provokativ offentlig filosofi, er blitt utpekt som synder. I denne artikkelen vil jeg, med utgangspunkt i debatten om fullverdige liv, forsvare provokativ offentlig filosofi mot både epistemiske og etiske innvendinger. Nøkkelord: Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, offentlig filosofi, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, fullverdige liv, eugenikk English summary: Provocative Public Philosophy In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light of the Down syndrome debate, defend provocative public philosophy against these allegations. Keywords: Philosophical argumentation, public debate, public philosophy, Down syndrome, eugenics
{"title":"Provokativ offentlig filosofi","authors":"Aksel Braanen Sterri","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2539","url":null,"abstract":"En uttalelse om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv, satte i gang en stor og opphetet debatt i den norske offentligheten i 2017. Denne ga opphav til en mer overordnet debatt om hva akademikere bør og ikke bør si i offentligheten. En viss form for offentlig filosofi, det jeg vil kalle provokativ offentlig filosofi, er blitt utpekt som synder. I denne artikkelen vil jeg, med utgangspunkt i debatten om fullverdige liv, forsvare provokativ offentlig filosofi mot både epistemiske og etiske innvendinger. \u0000Nøkkelord: Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, offentlig filosofi, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, fullverdige liv, eugenikk \u0000English summary: Provocative Public Philosophy \u0000In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light of the Down syndrome debate, defend provocative public philosophy against these allegations. \u0000Keywords: Philosophical argumentation, public debate, public philosophy, Down syndrome, eugenics","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"693 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72437961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article brings together two debates in bioethics more substantively than has been the case until now. One is the methodological debate over "principlism," i.e., the theoretical framework for analyzing and solving (bio)ethical problems proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (PBE). The other is the normative debate about reproductive ethics, i.e., procreative rights and obligations in a time of pervasive opportunities for making detailed choices about the properties and capacities of future people. The obvious point of bringing the debates together is to show how they can illuminate each other in fruitful ways consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium endorsed in PBE. Furthermore, discussions of reproductive ethics is almost absent in PBE, making it an interesting "test case" on how principlist theory can have an impact on and be affected by confrontations with new practices and considerations in biomedicine. Reproductive ethics is especially interesting due to the so-called non-identity considerations, which pose a challenge to common morality views on harm to and respect for persons. My focus is mainly on some methodological points about the import of concrete normative discussions for formulating basic normative principles. However, I unfold a number of substantial points in order to demonstrate this. It is my impression that most writers on principlism underestimate the effect of engaging with concrete problems. Specifically, I conclude that reflecting on procreative obligations provides strong reasons for specifying the basic principles in ways that uncover new dimensions of them and not just new applications. Key words: principlism, reproductive ethics, non-identity problem, nonmaleficence, respect for persons
这篇文章汇集了生命伦理学的两场辩论，比迄今为止的情况更为实质性。一个是关于“原则主义”的方法论争论，即比尚和柴尔德里斯在《生物医学伦理学原理》(Principles of Biomedical Ethics, PBE)中提出的分析和解决(生物)伦理问题的理论框架。另一个是关于生殖伦理的规范性辩论，即在一个对未来人的属性和能力做出详细选择的机会无处不在的时代，生育权利和义务。将这些辩论聚集在一起的明显目的是展示它们如何能够以富有成效的方式相互阐明，这种方式与PBE所认可的反思均衡方法相一致。此外，在PBE中几乎没有关于生殖伦理的讨论，这使得它成为一个有趣的“测试案例”，说明原则主义理论如何影响和受生物医学新实践和考虑的影响。由于所谓的非同一性考虑，生殖伦理特别有趣，这对关于伤害和尊重人的共同道德观提出了挑战。我的重点主要是关于具体规范讨论对于制定基本规范原则的重要性的一些方法论观点。然而，为了证明这一点，我展开了一些实质性的要点。我的印象是，大多数研究原则主义的作家都低估了研究具体问题的效果。具体地说，我的结论是，对生育义务的反思为以揭示其新维度而不仅仅是新应用的方式指定基本原则提供了强有力的理由。关键词:原则，生殖伦理，非同一性问题，非恶意，尊重人
{"title":"Lessons of Reproductive Ethics for Principlism","authors":"Morten Dige","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V13I1.2726","url":null,"abstract":"This article brings together two debates in bioethics more substantively than has been the case until now. One is the methodological debate over \"principlism,\" i.e., the theoretical framework for analyzing and solving (bio)ethical problems proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (PBE). The other is the normative debate about reproductive ethics, i.e., procreative rights and obligations in a time of pervasive opportunities for making detailed choices about the properties and capacities of future people. The obvious point of bringing the debates together is to show how they can illuminate each other in fruitful ways consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium endorsed in PBE. Furthermore, discussions of reproductive ethics is almost absent in PBE, making it an interesting \"test case\" on how principlist theory can have an impact on and be affected by confrontations with new practices and considerations in biomedicine. Reproductive ethics is especially interesting due to the so-called non-identity considerations, which pose a challenge to common morality views on harm to and respect for persons. My focus is mainly on some methodological points about the import of concrete normative discussions for formulating basic normative principles. However, I unfold a number of substantial points in order to demonstrate this. It is my impression that most writers on principlism underestimate the effect of engaging with concrete problems. Specifically, I conclude that reflecting on procreative obligations provides strong reasons for specifying the basic principles in ways that uncover new dimensions of them and not just new applications. \u0000Key words: principlism, reproductive ethics, non-identity problem, nonmaleficence, respect for persons","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81796924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Current admission criteria for migrants in Western states tend to favor the well-to-do, able-bodied, and well-qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global inequalities. In this article, I will consider how economic migration affects global inequality of opportunity, and how we might alter admission criteria in order to mitigate negative effects. I will proceed by discussing cosmopolitan and nationalist positions to open borders and economic migration. In particular, I will address David Miller’s objections to using open borders to remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I present agrees with the benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality and a state’s right to control their borders. However, I argue that Western states’ roles in perpetuating global inequality of opportunity leads to moral demands, which can in part be met by fair economic migration. Furthermore, I will consider what fairer economic migration might consist in. The model I propose would rank migrants based on their level of disadvantage, how little their emigration would affect the country they are emigrating from, and how great it might improve the opportunities in the country they are moving to.
{"title":"Towards fairer borders: Alleviating global inequality of opportunity","authors":"M. Egan","doi":"10.5324/eip.v12i2.2421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/eip.v12i2.2421","url":null,"abstract":"Current admission criteria for migrants in Western states tend to favor the well-to-do, able-bodied, and well-qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global inequalities. In this article, I will consider how economic migration affects global inequality of opportunity, and how we might alter admission criteria in order to mitigate negative effects. I will proceed by discussing cosmopolitan and nationalist positions to open borders and economic migration. In particular, I will address David Miller’s objections to using open borders to remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I present agrees with the benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality and a state’s right to control their borders. However, I argue that Western states’ roles in perpetuating global inequality of opportunity leads to moral demands, which can in part be met by fair economic migration. Furthermore, I will consider what fairer economic migration might consist in. The model I propose would rank migrants based on their level of disadvantage, how little their emigration would affect the country they are emigrating from, and how great it might improve the opportunities in the country they are moving to.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81489273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper has a twofold aim in determining who should be granted electoral rights at the state level, one negative and another positive. The negative part deconstructs the link between state-level political membership and citizenship and contests naturalization procedures. This approach argues that naturalization procedures, when coercively used as a necessary condition for accessing electoral rights at the state level, are both inconsistent with liberal democratic ideals and an inexcusable practice in liberal democratic states. The positive part of the paper seeks to establish what – if not the acquisition of citizenship –could determine state-level political membership for non-citizens. In other words, it attempts to explain how and in what conditions non-citizens may become political members of a state without naturalizing. This approach considers the most prominent arguments that base state-level political membership on residency, i.e. residency as a legal status granted by the previous members of the community and residency as physical presence within a defined jurisdiction. It argues that, in a world of increasing human mobility across borders, while the former way of understanding residency might be too restrictive, the latter might be too banal to forge membership ties that form a political community. Domicile is the proposed alternative, introduced as a type of residency that is self-given and remains stable despite numerous changes of residency. Domicile is a legal term that indicates where a person officially registers her permanent home even when residing abroad. In sum, this is an argument against naturalization as the access door for electoral rights at the state level and in favor of defining membership in the political community based on domicile.
{"title":"Who should be granted electoral rights at the state level?","authors":"Melina Duarte","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2411","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has a twofold aim in determining who should be granted electoral rights at the state level, one negative and another positive. The negative part deconstructs the link between state-level political membership and citizenship and contests naturalization procedures. This approach argues that naturalization procedures, when coercively used as a necessary condition for accessing electoral rights at the state level, are both inconsistent with liberal democratic ideals and an inexcusable practice in liberal democratic states. The positive part of the paper seeks to establish what – if not the acquisition of citizenship –could determine state-level political membership for non-citizens. In other words, it attempts to explain how and in what conditions non-citizens may\u2028become political members of a state without naturalizing. This approach considers the most prominent arguments that base state-level political membership on residency, i.e. residency as a legal status granted by the previous members of the community and residency as physical presence within a defined jurisdiction. It argues that, in a world of increasing human mobility across borders, while the former way of understanding residency might be too restrictive, the latter might be too banal to forge membership ties that form a political community. Domicile is the proposed alternative, introduced as a type of residency that is self-given and remains stable despite numerous changes of\u2028residency. Domicile is a legal term that indicates where a person officially registers her permanent home even when residing abroad. In sum, this is an argument against naturalization as the access door for electoral rights at the state level and in favor of defining membership in the political community based on domicile.","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81806876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Filosofi og etikk har fått en stadig større plass i det offentlige rom i Norge. 2017 ble et år der filosofer sørget for overskrifter i en rekke norske medier. En av sakene som fikk størst oppmerksomhet, var debatten om sorteringssamfunnet og Aksel Braanen Sterris påstand om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv. Utsagnet skapte en voldsom debatt og kraftige reaksjoner. Temaet for debatten er interessant i seg selv, men den reiser også spørsmål om hvordan slike debatter endrer filosofiens anseelse og rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet i Norge. I denne artikkelen stiller vi derfor spørsmålet: På hvilken måte har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? Som perspektiv for analysen anvender vi tradisjonelle kvalitetskriterier innen filosofi, slik som konsistens, klare premisser og evnen til å klargjøre begreper, fremstille motargumenter og begrunne grenser. Vi finner at debatten om sorteringssamfunnet utvilsomt har gitt filosofien mer oppmerksomhet i det offentlige ordskiftet, og at filosofisk argumentasjon kan bidra til å løfte frem skjulte problemstillinger og sette ord på uuttalte intuisjoner, samt å stimulere til bedre argumentasjon. Dette bør hilses velkommen. Samtidig finner vi at filosofiens tilpasning til mediediskursen fører til at akademiske forbehold tradisjonelle kvalitetskrav og nyansering forsvinner. Dersom skjulte premisser, manglende konsistens, begrepslige og vurderingsmessige uklarheter, samt ignorering av empiriske premisser, motargumenter og viktige implikasjoner blir utbredt, vil resultatet kunne bli en fattigere offentlig debatt, et dårligere samfunn og et svekket omdømme for filosofien. Løsningen må være at vi som fagpersoner er villige til å gjøre klart og grundig rede for våre påstander, perspektiver, premisser, argumenter og konklusjoner, og at vi bør revidere eller trekke dem tilbake dersom vi ikke makter å gjøre dette. Ellers står vi i fare for å gjøre filosofien til en form for «villedningskunst» – en ny form for sofisme – og et lett bytte for platonsk fordømmelse. Nøkkelord: Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, konsekvensetikk English summary: The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the "sorting society" in Norway in 2017 Philosophy and ethics has recently gained increased attention in Norway. During 2017 philosophers hit the headlines in Norwegian media. One of the issues that gained most attention was the debate on “the differentiation/sorting society” (sorteringssamfunnet). The debate was sparked by Aksel Braanen Sterri’s statement that persons with Downs’s syndrome cannot live full lives related to the issue of introducing non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT). While the debate is interesting in terms of its content, we will in this article focus on in what way the debate in 2017 has affected the relationship between philosophy and society, in particular the role and r
{"title":"Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskifte","authors":"S. G. Carson, B. Hofmann","doi":"10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5324/EIP.V12I2.2517","url":null,"abstract":"Filosofi og etikk har fått en stadig større plass i det offentlige rom i Norge. 2017 ble et år der filosofer sørget for overskrifter i en rekke norske medier. En av sakene som fikk størst oppmerksomhet, var debatten om sorteringssamfunnet og Aksel Braanen Sterris påstand om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv. Utsagnet skapte en voldsom debatt og kraftige reaksjoner. Temaet for debatten er interessant i seg selv, men den reiser også spørsmål om hvordan slike debatter endrer filosofiens anseelse og rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet i Norge. I denne artikkelen stiller vi derfor spørsmålet: På hvilken måte har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? Som perspektiv for analysen anvender vi tradisjonelle kvalitetskriterier innen filosofi, slik som konsistens, klare premisser og evnen til å klargjøre begreper, fremstille motargumenter og begrunne grenser. Vi finner at debatten om sorteringssamfunnet utvilsomt har gitt filosofien mer oppmerksomhet i det offentlige ordskiftet, og at filosofisk argumentasjon kan bidra til å løfte frem skjulte problemstillinger og sette ord på uuttalte intuisjoner, samt å stimulere til bedre argumentasjon. Dette bør hilses velkommen. Samtidig finner vi at filosofiens tilpasning til mediediskursen fører til at akademiske forbehold tradisjonelle kvalitetskrav og nyansering forsvinner. Dersom skjulte premisser, manglende konsistens, begrepslige og vurderingsmessige uklarheter, samt ignorering av empiriske premisser, motargumenter og viktige implikasjoner blir utbredt, vil resultatet kunne bli en fattigere offentlig debatt, et dårligere samfunn og et svekket omdømme for filosofien. Løsningen må være at vi som fagpersoner er villige til å gjøre klart og grundig rede for våre påstander, perspektiver, premisser, argumenter og konklusjoner, og at vi bør revidere eller trekke dem tilbake dersom vi ikke makter å gjøre dette. Ellers står vi i fare for å gjøre filosofien til en form for «villedningskunst» – en ny form for sofisme – og et lett bytte for platonsk fordømmelse. \u0000Nøkkelord: Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, konsekvensetikk \u0000English summary: The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the \"sorting society\" in Norway in 2017 \u0000Philosophy and ethics has recently gained increased attention in Norway. During 2017 philosophers hit the headlines in Norwegian media. One of the issues that gained most attention was the debate on “the differentiation/sorting society” (sorteringssamfunnet). The debate was sparked by Aksel Braanen Sterri’s statement that persons with Downs’s syndrome cannot live full lives related to the issue of introducing non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT). While the debate is interesting in terms of its content, we will in this article focus on in what way the debate in 2017 has affected the relationship between philosophy and society, in particular the role and r","PeriodicalId":42362,"journal":{"name":"Etikk I Praksis","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88197989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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