Abstract Commercial databases now make available to paying clients information about the legal terms in sovereign loan contracts. This information is important to academic researchers, to policy institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, and to investors and other market actors. For a random sample of 10 countries, the authors compare this data to a hand-coded sample of bond terms. They find significant error rates in the commercial databases, which vary significantly by country and by the legal term at issue. In some cases, they document error rates well over 75 per cent. They also describe important limitations in the data, especially the use of binary coding schemes that obscure important differences in the rights conferred by different sovereign loan contracts.
{"title":"Sovereign Bond Contracts: Flaws in the Public Data?","authors":"Andrea E Kropp,W Mark C Weidemaier,Mitu Gulati","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjy010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjy010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Commercial databases now make available to paying clients information about the legal terms in sovereign loan contracts. This information is important to academic researchers, to policy institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, and to investors and other market actors. For a random sample of 10 countries, the authors compare this data to a hand-coded sample of bond terms. They find significant error rates in the commercial databases, which vary significantly by country and by the legal term at issue. In some cases, they document error rates well over 75 per cent. They also describe important limitations in the data, especially the use of binary coding schemes that obscure important differences in the rights conferred by different sovereign loan contracts.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"1 1","pages":"190-208"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Effective are the Order-to-Trade Ratio and Resting Time Regulations?","authors":"Viktoria Dalko, Michael H. Wang","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJY007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJY007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJY007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43950631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building a Stable European Deposit Insurance Scheme","authors":"Dirk Schoenmaker","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjy004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjy004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors provide a novel angle to the ongoing discussions by the G20 on sovereign contingent debt and argue that contingent debt could provide market-based insurance to protect the euro area from future debt crises. Risk-sharing with the markets is a practical way forward in the context of the Franco-German debate on risk-sharing among EU member states vs system-wide risk reduction. The financial innovation of contingent debt is a feasible euro area reform that would not introduce risk-sharing between states or require institutional reforms or Treaty changes. However, coordination would be needed. The authors’ suggestion fills a gap in the proposals on the completion of the banking union and the possible establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF). These proposals offer institutions-based solutions to crises, with the banking union providing safety regulations that will make banking institutions more resilient, while the EMF will be a ‘fire brigade’ to be called on in emergencies. What has not been tapped are the markets, whose tolerant behaviour to sovereign demands encouraged the build up of debt, while their finicky response exacerbated the crisis.
{"title":"State Contingent Debt as Insurance for Euro Area Sovereigns","authors":"M. Demertzis, S. Zenios","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJZ003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJZ003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The authors provide a novel angle to the ongoing discussions by the G20 on sovereign contingent debt and argue that contingent debt could provide market-based insurance to protect the euro area from future debt crises. Risk-sharing with the markets is a practical way forward in the context of the Franco-German debate on risk-sharing among EU member states vs system-wide risk reduction. The financial innovation of contingent debt is a feasible euro area reform that would not introduce risk-sharing between states or require institutional reforms or Treaty changes. However, coordination would be needed. The authors’ suggestion fills a gap in the proposals on the completion of the banking union and the possible establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF). These proposals offer institutions-based solutions to crises, with the banking union providing safety regulations that will make banking institutions more resilient, while the EMF will be a ‘fire brigade’ to be called on in emergencies. What has not been tapped are the markets, whose tolerant behaviour to sovereign demands encouraged the build up of debt, while their finicky response exacerbated the crisis.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJZ003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44938262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Scope for Financial Stability Considerations in the Fulfilment of the Mandate of the ECB/Eurosystem","authors":"G. Psaroudakis","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJY001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJY001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"4 1","pages":"119-156"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJY001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41334411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Operational risk capital requirements represent a relative backwater of the Basel capital framework for banks. We examine both the existing Basel II framework and the latest Basel Committee proposals for reform and conclude that neither are effective in creating the incentives and loss absorbency to minimize negative externalities from operational risk events. We suggest an alternative approach that we believe would be much more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives. We do not offer a view on the amount of capital required, focusing instead on the methodology and structure of the capital requirement.
{"title":"Rethinking Operational Risk Capital Requirements","authors":"Peter Sands, Gordon Y. Liao, Yueran Ma","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX009","url":null,"abstract":"Operational risk capital requirements represent a relative backwater of the Basel capital framework for banks. We examine both the existing Basel II framework and the latest Basel Committee proposals for reform and conclude that neither are effective in creating the incentives and loss absorbency to minimize negative externalities from operational risk events. We suggest an alternative approach that we believe would be much more effective in achieving the regulatory objectives. We do not offer a view on the amount of capital required, focusing instead on the methodology and structure of the capital requirement.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"4 1","pages":"1-34"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47470687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime","authors":"Tobias H Tröger","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjy002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjy002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"1 1","pages":"35-72"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Securitisation, Ring-Fencing, and Housing Bubbles: Financial Stability Implications of UK and EU Bank Reforms","authors":"Jay Cullen","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjx010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjx010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"16 1","pages":"73-118"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Always Crashing in the Same Car—Clearinghouse Rescue in the United States under Dodd–Frank","authors":"S. Lubben","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"3 1","pages":"133-158"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48045920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The International Campaign to Create Ethical Bankers","authors":"David T. Zaring","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":"3 1","pages":"187-209"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48995595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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