{"title":"Securitisation, Ring-Fencing, and Housing Bubbles: Financial Stability Implications of UK and EU Bank Reforms","authors":"Jay Cullen","doi":"10.1093/jfr/fjx010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjx010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2018-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138538045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Always Crashing in the Same Car—Clearinghouse Rescue in the United States under Dodd–Frank","authors":"S. Lubben","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48045920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The International Campaign to Create Ethical Bankers","authors":"David T. Zaring","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48995595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Profit-sharing Investment Account Holders Provide Market Discipline in an Islamic Banking System?","authors":"O. Alaeddin, Simon Archer, R. Karim, Mohd Rasid","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48655140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revisiting the Taper Tantrum: A Case for International Monetary Policy Coordination","authors":"K. Bagchi","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44092130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Designing Virtual Currency Regulation in Japan: Lessons from the Mt Gox Case","authors":"Mai Ishikawa","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW015","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44485109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from trading in bank business models. Prominent reform proposals are the Volcker Rule in the U.S., the Vickers Report in the UK, and, based on the Liikanen proposal, the Barnier proposal in the EU. A major element of these reforms is to separate "classical" commercial banking activities from securities trading activities, notably from proprietary trading. While the reforms are at different stages of implementation, there is a strong ongoing discussion on what possible economic consequences are to be expected. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative approaches of these reform proposals and to assess their likely consequences for bank business models, risk-taking and financial stability. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of only proprietary trading, as envisaged in the current EU proposal, is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it likely crowds out desired trading activities, thereby negatively affecting financial stability. Second, there is potentially a better solution to limit excessive trading risk at banks in terms of potential welfare consequences: Trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations. This kind of separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
{"title":"Structural reforms in banking: The role of trading","authors":"J. Krahnen, Felix Noth, U. Schüwer","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW018","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from trading in bank business models. Prominent reform proposals are the Volcker Rule in the U.S., the Vickers Report in the UK, and, based on the Liikanen proposal, the Barnier proposal in the EU. A major element of these reforms is to separate \"classical\" commercial banking activities from securities trading activities, notably from proprietary trading. While the reforms are at different stages of implementation, there is a strong ongoing discussion on what possible economic consequences are to be expected. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative approaches of these reform proposals and to assess their likely consequences for bank business models, risk-taking and financial stability. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of only proprietary trading, as envisaged in the current EU proposal, is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it likely crowds out desired trading activities, thereby negatively affecting financial stability. Second, there is potentially a better solution to limit excessive trading risk at banks in terms of potential welfare consequences: Trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations. This kind of separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48159955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Limits of Globalizing Basel Banking Standards","authors":"Emily Jones, A. Zeitz","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJX001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJX001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJX001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47191608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article traces, and presents a brief analysis of, the recent landmark developments in India’s monetary policy framework, including the shift of primary focus to price stability (through flexible inflation targeting) and the creation of a Monetary Policy Committee with independent experts to set the binding policy rate upon the Reserve Bank of India.
{"title":"Current Developments in India’s Monetary Policy Framework","authors":"Vishrut Kansal","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW010","url":null,"abstract":"The article traces, and presents a brief analysis of, the recent landmark developments in India’s monetary policy framework, including the shift of primary focus to price stability (through flexible inflation targeting) and the creation of a Monetary Policy Committee with independent experts to set the binding policy rate upon the Reserve Bank of India.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61719111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article responds to the Bank of England’s (BoE) consultation paper of January 2016 on the systemic risk buffer for UK ring-fenced banks. It argues that, contrary to its proposed policy, the BoE should apply the highest permitted buffer rate—3 per cent of risk-weighted assets of common equity—to all large ring-fenced banks. The BoE’s reasons for lowering its estimate of optimal equity capital requirements are assessed critically.
{"title":"The Systemic Risk Buffer for UK Banks: A Response to the Bank of England’s Consultation Paper","authors":"J. Vickers","doi":"10.1093/JFR/FJW011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JFR/FJW011","url":null,"abstract":"The article responds to the Bank of England’s (BoE) consultation paper of January 2016 on the systemic risk buffer for UK ring-fenced banks. It argues that, contrary to its proposed policy, the BoE should apply the highest permitted buffer rate—3 per cent of risk-weighted assets of common equity—to all large ring-fenced banks. The BoE’s reasons for lowering its estimate of optimal equity capital requirements are assessed critically.","PeriodicalId":42830,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JFR/FJW011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61718686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：