{"title":"Editor's Note","authors":"Lydia Patton","doi":"10.1086/726258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726258","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75161331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, the concept of integron as it appears in François Jacob’s book The Logic of Life is discussed. It begins by locating the concept within the overall structure of Jacob’s book. The book is conceived as a history of heredity, with the central historical chapters framed by an epistemological discussion of the notions of program in the introductory chapter and of integron in the concluding chapter. A detailed analysis of the concept of integron follows, including that of reproduction on which it relies. It is then compared with the concept of hypercycle as developed around the same time by Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster. The article concludes on a note on name-coining in the sciences with a focus on Jacob’s own practice.
{"title":"Remarks on François Jacob’s Concept of Integron","authors":"H. Rheinberger","doi":"10.1086/726253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726253","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, the concept of integron as it appears in François Jacob’s book The Logic of Life is discussed. It begins by locating the concept within the overall structure of Jacob’s book. The book is conceived as a history of heredity, with the central historical chapters framed by an epistemological discussion of the notions of program in the introductory chapter and of integron in the concluding chapter. A detailed analysis of the concept of integron follows, including that of reproduction on which it relies. It is then compared with the concept of hypercycle as developed around the same time by Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster. The article concludes on a note on name-coining in the sciences with a focus on Jacob’s own practice.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":"483 - 491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90548857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In The Logic of Life, François Jacob reconstructed the history of heredity from the seventeenth century to the present, emphasizing the role of physics in the development of biology. Quantum mechanics provided questions, methods, and techniques to molecular biologists. In the 1960s, physics also provided the organizational model. Jacob worked on the creation of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, on the model of CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research). I argue that reflection on the relation between molecular biology and physics played a part in the making of The Logic of Life. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, Jacob focused on relations between the “genealogy” of his molecular biology work and the development of physics at scientific, institutional, and historical levels. He thus brought molecular biology to the attention of a larger public, following the history of the Institut Pasteur, whose public mission had to be reaffirmed to grant its survival. With The Logic of Life, Jacob became an influential intellectual who engaged with scholars in human sciences. He promoted his view of the development of molecular biology as a model for a possible new discipline: bioanthropology.
{"title":"The Logic of Life, the Creation of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, and the Relation between Molecular Biology and Physics","authors":"D. Cozzoli","doi":"10.1086/726252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726252","url":null,"abstract":"In The Logic of Life, François Jacob reconstructed the history of heredity from the seventeenth century to the present, emphasizing the role of physics in the development of biology. Quantum mechanics provided questions, methods, and techniques to molecular biologists. In the 1960s, physics also provided the organizational model. Jacob worked on the creation of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, on the model of CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research). I argue that reflection on the relation between molecular biology and physics played a part in the making of The Logic of Life. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, Jacob focused on relations between the “genealogy” of his molecular biology work and the development of physics at scientific, institutional, and historical levels. He thus brought molecular biology to the attention of a larger public, following the history of the Institut Pasteur, whose public mission had to be reaffirmed to grant its survival. With The Logic of Life, Jacob became an influential intellectual who engaged with scholars in human sciences. He promoted his view of the development of molecular biology as a model for a possible new discipline: bioanthropology.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"463 - 482"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85159885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although it has not been much noticed, reproduction is the central theme of François Jacob’s important history of biology, La logique du vivant (The Logic of Life). In a book ostensibly devoted to heredity, this molecular biologist had reproduction integrate levels of organization from organisms to molecules and play a major role in each historical transition between them, not just in the influential argument for a shift “from generation to reproduction.” Moreover, I claim, La logique was the first general history of (research on) reproduction. Earlier histories had tackled only aspects of generation and reproduction; none historicized the latter. Jacob’s innovation came out of the rising prominence of reproduction in neo-Darwinist studies of populations and in his own field, the cellular genetics of bacteria and their viruses, and engagement with history and philosophy of science. The discovery of bacterial “sex” enabled microbial genetics but, ironically, led Jacob to a sexless concept of reproduction. This approach molded a history that reached across the living world but slighted sex and the complexities of reproduction in multicellular organisms. Readers can learn from its strength and limitations.
{"title":"A Sexless Universe: How Microbial Genetics Shaped the First History of Reproduction, François Jacob’s The Logic of Life","authors":"N. Hopwood","doi":"10.1086/726259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726259","url":null,"abstract":"Although it has not been much noticed, reproduction is the central theme of François Jacob’s important history of biology, La logique du vivant (The Logic of Life). In a book ostensibly devoted to heredity, this molecular biologist had reproduction integrate levels of organization from organisms to molecules and play a major role in each historical transition between them, not just in the influential argument for a shift “from generation to reproduction.” Moreover, I claim, La logique was the first general history of (research on) reproduction. Earlier histories had tackled only aspects of generation and reproduction; none historicized the latter. Jacob’s innovation came out of the rising prominence of reproduction in neo-Darwinist studies of populations and in his own field, the cellular genetics of bacteria and their viruses, and engagement with history and philosophy of science. The discovery of bacterial “sex” enabled microbial genetics but, ironically, led Jacob to a sexless concept of reproduction. This approach molded a history that reached across the living world but slighted sex and the complexities of reproduction in multicellular organisms. Readers can learn from its strength and limitations.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"43 1","pages":"511 - 534"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76977149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
François Jacob viewed the living world as interconnected by reproductive links, suggesting that biology should not limit itself to studying individual organisms given their ephemeral nature. He believed that reproduction was the cause and purpose of life, asserting that the genetic program played a crucial role in physiology and evolutionary biology, offering a potential unifying framework for biology. While acknowledging the importance of Jacob’s idea of reproduction as a nexus, there are criticisms regarding his reliance on genetic programs. Various approaches to understanding the causes of reproduction—including formal, material, and externally scaffolded factors—are explored and highlight some perspectives that extend beyond the concept of genetic programming. Furthermore, criticisms and objections to the organizational aspects and significance of reproduction in life are addressed. Finally, the relational nature of reproduction is presented as a crucial aspect that necessitates considering collaborative and distributed models.
{"title":"Jacob’s Understanding of Reproduction: Challenges from an Organismic Collaborative Framework","authors":"Arantza Etxeberria Agiriano","doi":"10.1086/726256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726256","url":null,"abstract":"François Jacob viewed the living world as interconnected by reproductive links, suggesting that biology should not limit itself to studying individual organisms given their ephemeral nature. He believed that reproduction was the cause and purpose of life, asserting that the genetic program played a crucial role in physiology and evolutionary biology, offering a potential unifying framework for biology. While acknowledging the importance of Jacob’s idea of reproduction as a nexus, there are criticisms regarding his reliance on genetic programs. Various approaches to understanding the causes of reproduction—including formal, material, and externally scaffolded factors—are explored and highlight some perspectives that extend beyond the concept of genetic programming. Furthermore, criticisms and objections to the organizational aspects and significance of reproduction in life are addressed. Finally, the relational nature of reproduction is presented as a crucial aspect that necessitates considering collaborative and distributed models.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":"535 - 553"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91181762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
François Jacob’s The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity has shown an enduring relevance for the history and philosophy of biology. In this article, resisting the received view that regards this book merely as an application of Foucault’s archaeological method, I reconstruct a silent debate between François Jacob and Jacques Monod. More precisely, I argue that Jacob’s history of biology offers a riposte to Monod’s claims in Chance and Necessity. First, I show that the distinction between a “history of ideas” and a “history of objects” captures two ways of looking at the history of science that characterize Monod’s and Jacob’s own approaches. Next, I present Monod’s search for a “theory of the natural selection of ideas.” Then I argue that the concept of “integron,” introduced by Jacob in his conclusion, covertly undermines Monod’s argument for the use of evolutionary models of cultural and scientific change. These contrasting perspectives shed new light on why the Nobel colaureates and former colleagues expressed little interest in each other’s books. More generally, the Monod-Jacob divide illustrates the use and rejection of biological models in writing the history of science and the importance of situating Jacob within his own milieu.
{"title":"Jacob versus Monod on the Natural Selection of Ideas","authors":"Pierre-Olivier Méthot","doi":"10.1086/726222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726222","url":null,"abstract":"François Jacob’s The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity has shown an enduring relevance for the history and philosophy of biology. In this article, resisting the received view that regards this book merely as an application of Foucault’s archaeological method, I reconstruct a silent debate between François Jacob and Jacques Monod. More precisely, I argue that Jacob’s history of biology offers a riposte to Monod’s claims in Chance and Necessity. First, I show that the distinction between a “history of ideas” and a “history of objects” captures two ways of looking at the history of science that characterize Monod’s and Jacob’s own approaches. Next, I present Monod’s search for a “theory of the natural selection of ideas.” Then I argue that the concept of “integron,” introduced by Jacob in his conclusion, covertly undermines Monod’s argument for the use of evolutionary models of cultural and scientific change. These contrasting perspectives shed new light on why the Nobel colaureates and former colleagues expressed little interest in each other’s books. More generally, the Monod-Jacob divide illustrates the use and rejection of biological models in writing the history of science and the importance of situating Jacob within his own milieu.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"48 1","pages":"492 - 510"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85392039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article unearths little-studied accounts of the status and role of hypotheses in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. German thinkers regarded hypotheses, including those about unobservable causes for visible effects, as legitimate and necessary ingredients of scientific inquiry. They debated the nature of probable hypotheses resulting from inductions, proposed heuristics for making causal hypotheses, and advanced criteria for assessing and testing them. My survey of these rich and multifaceted discussions shows that many themes and topics that we commonly associate with modern philosophy of science were discussed decades earlier by authors of educational and practice-oriented books on logic: consequential testing, underdetermination, auxiliary hypotheses, the problem of unobservable entities, fallibility, and elaborate methodologies of observation and experimentation. It also illuminates the long-term history of present-day criteria for hypothesis evaluation.
{"title":"“Dare Explanations” (Wagerklärungen): Hypothetical Thinking in Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century German Philosophy of Science","authors":"J. Schickore","doi":"10.1086/726182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726182","url":null,"abstract":"This article unearths little-studied accounts of the status and role of hypotheses in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. German thinkers regarded hypotheses, including those about unobservable causes for visible effects, as legitimate and necessary ingredients of scientific inquiry. They debated the nature of probable hypotheses resulting from inductions, proposed heuristics for making causal hypotheses, and advanced criteria for assessing and testing them. My survey of these rich and multifaceted discussions shows that many themes and topics that we commonly associate with modern philosophy of science were discussed decades earlier by authors of educational and practice-oriented books on logic: consequential testing, underdetermination, auxiliary hypotheses, the problem of unobservable entities, fallibility, and elaborate methodologies of observation and experimentation. It also illuminates the long-term history of present-day criteria for hypothesis evaluation.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":"387 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89568924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A dominant strand of philosophical thought holds that natural kinds are clusters of objects with shared properties. Cluster theories of natural kinds are often taken to be a late-twentieth-century development prompted by dissatisfaction with essentialism in philosophy of biology. I argue, however, that a cluster theory of kinds was formulated by William Whewell (1794–1866) more than a century earlier. Cluster theories of kinds can be characterized in terms of three central commitments, all of which are present in Whewell’s work on classification. Like contemporary cluster theorists, Whewell claims that kinds are united by similarity, that many kinds do not have essences, and that there are “gaps” between kinds. Moreover, Whewell advises taxonomists to look for consilience (roughly, convergence) between different classificatory schemes, a recommendation that reinforces the identification of natural classes with property clusters. Thus Whewell was not only an early cluster theorist but one with important insights into what a cluster theory of kinds means for the practice of classification.
{"title":"William Whewell, Cluster Theorist of Kinds","authors":"Zina B. Ward","doi":"10.1086/726180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726180","url":null,"abstract":"A dominant strand of philosophical thought holds that natural kinds are clusters of objects with shared properties. Cluster theories of natural kinds are often taken to be a late-twentieth-century development prompted by dissatisfaction with essentialism in philosophy of biology. I argue, however, that a cluster theory of kinds was formulated by William Whewell (1794–1866) more than a century earlier. Cluster theories of kinds can be characterized in terms of three central commitments, all of which are present in Whewell’s work on classification. Like contemporary cluster theorists, Whewell claims that kinds are united by similarity, that many kinds do not have essences, and that there are “gaps” between kinds. Moreover, Whewell advises taxonomists to look for consilience (roughly, convergence) between different classificatory schemes, a recommendation that reinforces the identification of natural classes with property clusters. Thus Whewell was not only an early cluster theorist but one with important insights into what a cluster theory of kinds means for the practice of classification.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"133 1","pages":"362 - 386"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79381284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I propose a novel way of understanding the mechanisms of academic transfers in the context of the Second World War by looking at the role of membership and referral systems in determining an applicant’s success. Using largely unexplored archival data from the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, held at the Bodleian Library, and the British Federation for University Women, held at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, this articles presents the case of Rose Rand. She was a philosopher and one of the core members of the Vienna Circle who spent her professional years in exile, first in the United Kingdom and later in the United States. Her academic journey in the United Kingdom lasted almost 16 years. In that time, Rand never managed to obtain a permanent academic post despite the fact that her philosophical work is deemed relevant today by the experts and historians of her field. By reading and combining new and previously unused biographical data and personal and professional correspondence, this article shows the crucial role that memberships and personal referrals had in determining the success of her academic transfer.
{"title":"Breaking into British Academic Life in Second World War Britain: The Story of Rose Rand","authors":"Katarina Mihaljevic","doi":"10.1086/726075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726075","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I propose a novel way of understanding the mechanisms of academic transfers in the context of the Second World War by looking at the role of membership and referral systems in determining an applicant’s success. Using largely unexplored archival data from the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, held at the Bodleian Library, and the British Federation for University Women, held at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, this articles presents the case of Rose Rand. She was a philosopher and one of the core members of the Vienna Circle who spent her professional years in exile, first in the United Kingdom and later in the United States. Her academic journey in the United Kingdom lasted almost 16 years. In that time, Rand never managed to obtain a permanent academic post despite the fact that her philosophical work is deemed relevant today by the experts and historians of her field. By reading and combining new and previously unused biographical data and personal and professional correspondence, this article shows the crucial role that memberships and personal referrals had in determining the success of her academic transfer.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"325 1","pages":"297 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82928710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Bernays-Müller debate was a dispute in the early 1920s between Paul Bernays and Aloys Müller regarding various philosophical issues related to “Hilbert’s program.” The debate is sometimes mentioned as a sidenote in discussions of Hilbert’s program, but there is little or no discussion of the debate itself in the secondary literature. This article aims to fill this gap and to provide a detailed analysis of the background of the debate, its contents, and the impact on its protagonists.
{"title":"The Bernays-Müller Debate","authors":"Günther Eder","doi":"10.1086/726077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726077","url":null,"abstract":"The Bernays-Müller debate was a dispute in the early 1920s between Paul Bernays and Aloys Müller regarding various philosophical issues related to “Hilbert’s program.” The debate is sometimes mentioned as a sidenote in discussions of Hilbert’s program, but there is little or no discussion of the debate itself in the secondary literature. This article aims to fill this gap and to provide a detailed analysis of the background of the debate, its contents, and the impact on its protagonists.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":"317 - 361"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89548276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：