{"title":"Karim Bschir and Jamie Shaw (editors). Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays.","authors":"R. Kent","doi":"10.1086/719034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77997958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Andrew Janiak (ed.), Space: A History","authors":"G. Gorham","doi":"10.1086/719033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90714077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hermann Weyl was one of the most important figures involved in the early elaboration of the general theory of relativity and its fundamentally geometrical space-time picture of the world. Weyl’s further development of “pure infinitesimal geometry” out of relativity theory was the basis of his remarkable attempt at unifying gravitation and electromagnetism. Many interpreters have focused primarily on Weyl’s philosophical influences, especially the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as the motivation for these efforts. In this article, I argue both that these efforts are most naturally understood as an outgrowth of the distinctive mathematical-physical tradition in Göttingen and that phenomenology has little to no constructive role to play in them.
{"title":"The Constitution of Weyl’s Pure Infinitesimal World Geometry","authors":"C. McCoy","doi":"10.1086/719018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719018","url":null,"abstract":"Hermann Weyl was one of the most important figures involved in the early elaboration of the general theory of relativity and its fundamentally geometrical space-time picture of the world. Weyl’s further development of “pure infinitesimal geometry” out of relativity theory was the basis of his remarkable attempt at unifying gravitation and electromagnetism. Many interpreters have focused primarily on Weyl’s philosophical influences, especially the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as the motivation for these efforts. In this article, I argue both that these efforts are most naturally understood as an outgrowth of the distinctive mathematical-physical tradition in Göttingen and that phenomenology has little to no constructive role to play in them.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"189 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72885581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article looks at Vesto Slipher’s work on nebular spectroscopy between 1912 and 1922 as well as related research by other astronomers of the period, and it examines the dissemination of their results more widely. Slipher’s observations are viewed as marking the dividing line between speculation about the universe in traditional astronomy and the advent of modern cosmology and the theory of an expanding universe. The intent is to document the dissemination of Slipher’s results in the period leading up to the publication of studies of relativistic cosmology by Willem de Sitter in 1917 and Alexander Friedmann in 1922. Themes touched on in the article include the unprecedented character of Slipher’s findings and the interaction of observation and theory in modern cosmology. A prominent concern is the role of technology in astronomical science over the past century and a half. Here reference is made to the writings of Paul Forman on historical shifts that have taken place in our understanding of the relationship of science and technology.
{"title":"Vesto Slipher, Nebular Spectroscopy, and the Birth of Modern Cosmology, 1912–22","authors":"C. Fraser","doi":"10.1086/718804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718804","url":null,"abstract":"This article looks at Vesto Slipher’s work on nebular spectroscopy between 1912 and 1922 as well as related research by other astronomers of the period, and it examines the dissemination of their results more widely. Slipher’s observations are viewed as marking the dividing line between speculation about the universe in traditional astronomy and the advent of modern cosmology and the theory of an expanding universe. The intent is to document the dissemination of Slipher’s results in the period leading up to the publication of studies of relativistic cosmology by Willem de Sitter in 1917 and Alexander Friedmann in 1922. Themes touched on in the article include the unprecedented character of Slipher’s findings and the interaction of observation and theory in modern cosmology. A prominent concern is the role of technology in astronomical science over the past century and a half. Here reference is made to the writings of Paul Forman on historical shifts that have taken place in our understanding of the relationship of science and technology.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":"146 - 169"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79990119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1780s Kant’s critique of rational cosmology clearly identified the limits of theoretical cosmology in agreement with the doctrine of transcendental idealism of space and time. However, what seems to be less explored, and remains still a desideratum for the literature, is a thorough investigation of the implications of transcendental philosophy for Kant’s view of cosmology in the 1790s. This contribution fills this gap by investigating Kant’s view of teleology and measurement in the Critique of Judgment, exploring their implications for Kant’s late view of cosmology. Considering the historical and scientific context in which Kant developed his reflections motivates my proposal to read Kant’s late view of the universe in terms of “functional cosmology.”
{"title":"Kant’s Functional Cosmology: Teleology, Measurement, and Symbolic Representation in the Critique of Judgment","authors":"S. Bianchi","doi":"10.1086/719019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719019","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1780s Kant’s critique of rational cosmology clearly identified the limits of theoretical cosmology in agreement with the doctrine of transcendental idealism of space and time. However, what seems to be less explored, and remains still a desideratum for the literature, is a thorough investigation of the implications of transcendental philosophy for Kant’s view of cosmology in the 1790s. This contribution fills this gap by investigating Kant’s view of teleology and measurement in the Critique of Judgment, exploring their implications for Kant’s late view of cosmology. Considering the historical and scientific context in which Kant developed his reflections motivates my proposal to read Kant’s late view of the universe in terms of “functional cosmology.”","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"209 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90040943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most studies of René Descartes’s legacy have focused on the novelty of his ideas, but little has been done to uncover the conditions that allowed these ideas to spread. Seventeenth-century Europe was already a small world—it presented a high degree of connectedness with a few brokers bridging otherwise disparate regions. A communication network known as the Republic of Letters enabled scholars to trade ideas—including Descartes’s—by means of correspondence. This article offers an analysis—both qualitative and quantitative—of a corpus of letters written during Descartes’s lifetime and mentioning his name. The aim is to unveil the factors that drove the diffusion of Descartes’s ideas. The results are twofold. First, a close reading of the letters reveals that they were not used to create awareness about Descartes and his works but rather to discuss his ideas. Second, a network analysis of the letters shows that ideas do not spread like viruses, thus undermining the ‘social contagion’ model, and that weak ties are not as effective in promoting innovations as they are in circulating information.
{"title":"The Networked Origins of Cartesian Philosophy and Science","authors":"P. Rossini","doi":"10.1086/718994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718994","url":null,"abstract":"Most studies of René Descartes’s legacy have focused on the novelty of his ideas, but little has been done to uncover the conditions that allowed these ideas to spread. Seventeenth-century Europe was already a small world—it presented a high degree of connectedness with a few brokers bridging otherwise disparate regions. A communication network known as the Republic of Letters enabled scholars to trade ideas—including Descartes’s—by means of correspondence. This article offers an analysis—both qualitative and quantitative—of a corpus of letters written during Descartes’s lifetime and mentioning his name. The aim is to unveil the factors that drove the diffusion of Descartes’s ideas. The results are twofold. First, a close reading of the letters reveals that they were not used to create awareness about Descartes and his works but rather to discuss his ideas. Second, a network analysis of the letters shows that ideas do not spread like viruses, thus undermining the ‘social contagion’ model, and that weak ties are not as effective in promoting innovations as they are in circulating information.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"104 1","pages":"97 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75991930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"John Preston (ed.), Interpreting Mach. Critical Essays.","authors":"Chiara Russo Krauss","doi":"10.1086/719036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719036","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89978162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his Critique of Pure Reason, in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason, Kant not only argues that aprioristic cosmology is doomed to failure; he also implies that empirical knowledge about the universe is impossible. Today, such a negative verdict about the possibility of cosmological knowledge seems implausible because physical cosmology has made substantial progress. In particular, the spatiotemporal extension of the universe now seems a matter of empirical investigation in which models figure centrally. But I think it is worth considering the possibility that Kant got something right and that he offers insights that can help us to better understand problems in present-day cosmology. In this article, I explore a striking coincidence: according to both Kant and current wisdom, cosmology faces a serious underdetermination problem regarding the spatiotemporal extension of the world. As a closer analysis reveals, however, Kant and modern cosmology differ on the reasons why underdetermination arises. In current cosmology, underdetermination follows from laws that are knowable a posteriori, and not only from the very idea of cosmological knowledge, as Kant would have it. This suggests that the current underdetermination problem is not fully a Kantian one.
{"title":"What Is the Spatiotemporal Extension of the Universe? Underdetermination according to Kant’s First Antinomy and in Present-Day Cosmology","authors":"C. Beisbart","doi":"10.1086/719037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719037","url":null,"abstract":"In his Critique of Pure Reason, in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason, Kant not only argues that aprioristic cosmology is doomed to failure; he also implies that empirical knowledge about the universe is impossible. Today, such a negative verdict about the possibility of cosmological knowledge seems implausible because physical cosmology has made substantial progress. In particular, the spatiotemporal extension of the universe now seems a matter of empirical investigation in which models figure centrally. But I think it is worth considering the possibility that Kant got something right and that he offers insights that can help us to better understand problems in present-day cosmology. In this article, I explore a striking coincidence: according to both Kant and current wisdom, cosmology faces a serious underdetermination problem regarding the spatiotemporal extension of the world. As a closer analysis reveals, however, Kant and modern cosmology differ on the reasons why underdetermination arises. In current cosmology, underdetermination follows from laws that are knowable a posteriori, and not only from the very idea of cosmological knowledge, as Kant would have it. This suggests that the current underdetermination problem is not fully a Kantian one.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"286 - 307"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85002608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article focuses on debates on philosophical knowledge, mathematics, and the empirical sciences by analyzing the positions on cosmological and astronomical knowledge, around 1800, of three German authors: Herder, Schelling, and Hegel. I show the mutual interdependence of Schelling’s and Hegel’s Naturphilosophie and Herder’s Ideen, and I then demonstrate that the latter’s position during the last years of his life was a reaction to Schelling’s and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. While Herder seems to ignore the works of the Naturphilosophen in his journal Adrastea, in fact he participated in a very lively debate that included Schelling’s Weltseele and Hegel’s Dissertatio de Orbitis Planetarum.
{"title":"Cosmology, Astronomy, and Philosophy around 1800: Schelling, Hegel, Herder","authors":"Laura Follesa","doi":"10.1086/719002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719002","url":null,"abstract":"This article focuses on debates on philosophical knowledge, mathematics, and the empirical sciences by analyzing the positions on cosmological and astronomical knowledge, around 1800, of three German authors: Herder, Schelling, and Hegel. I show the mutual interdependence of Schelling’s and Hegel’s Naturphilosophie and Herder’s Ideen, and I then demonstrate that the latter’s position during the last years of his life was a reaction to Schelling’s and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. While Herder seems to ignore the works of the Naturphilosophen in his journal Adrastea, in fact he participated in a very lively debate that included Schelling’s Weltseele and Hegel’s Dissertatio de Orbitis Planetarum.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":"242 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85056033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"K. Brad Wray (ed.), Interpreting Kuhn: Critical Essays","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.1086/719035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719035","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"197 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72775829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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