I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.
我认为Émilie Du chtelet在充分理性原则的范围和认识论内容上与Christian Wolff决裂，尽管他对她的基本本体论有影响，并且他们一致认为充分理性原则具有基础性的重要性。这些差异对杜夏·特雷特和沃尔夫理解科学的方式产生了决定性的影响。
{"title":"Science and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Du Châtelet contra Wolff","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.1086/723961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/723961","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 1","pages":"24 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75023787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to Newton and Clarke, Leibniz’s relationalism cannot make sense of distance quantities. Although the core of Newton and Clarke’s “argument from quantity” is clear enough, its details remain unclear because we do not know what its key term “quantity” means. This key term is still unsettled because, unlike Leibniz, who loudly voices his view of quantity in both his correspondence with Clarke and in his philosophical essays on quantity, Newton and Clarke are frustratingly terse when it comes to defining quantity. Nevertheless, I think that it would be hasty to conclude that there is no way to expand our understanding of the term “quantity” as it appears in their argument. Although Newton and Clarke do not pursue a theory of quantity, their colleagues do, and the theory of quantity developed by their peers promises to deliver a historically rich perspective on Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity. In this article, I aim to provide some historical context for Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity by examining two criteria for quantity that were popular among their peers—what I call the “divisibility” and “precise increase and diminution” conditions.
{"title":"Contextualizing Newton and Clarke’s “Argument from Quantity”","authors":"Jenn P. Nguyen","doi":"10.1086/723959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/723959","url":null,"abstract":"According to Newton and Clarke, Leibniz’s relationalism cannot make sense of distance quantities. Although the core of Newton and Clarke’s “argument from quantity” is clear enough, its details remain unclear because we do not know what its key term “quantity” means. This key term is still unsettled because, unlike Leibniz, who loudly voices his view of quantity in both his correspondence with Clarke and in his philosophical essays on quantity, Newton and Clarke are frustratingly terse when it comes to defining quantity. Nevertheless, I think that it would be hasty to conclude that there is no way to expand our understanding of the term “quantity” as it appears in their argument. Although Newton and Clarke do not pursue a theory of quantity, their colleagues do, and the theory of quantity developed by their peers promises to deliver a historically rich perspective on Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity. In this article, I aim to provide some historical context for Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity by examining two criteria for quantity that were popular among their peers—what I call the “divisibility” and “precise increase and diminution” conditions.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"191 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85126552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although Peano’s negative attitude toward infinitesimals—particularly, geometric infinitesimals—is widely documented, his conception of a single infinite cardinality and, more generally, his views on the infinite are less known. In this article, we reconstruct the evolution of Peano’s ideas on these questions and formulate several hypotheses about their underlying motivations.
{"title":"Peano’s Conception of a Single Infinite Cardinality","authors":"Claudio Ternullo, Isabella Fascitiello","doi":"10.1086/726078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/726078","url":null,"abstract":"Although Peano’s negative attitude toward infinitesimals—particularly, geometric infinitesimals—is widely documented, his conception of a single infinite cardinality and, more generally, his views on the infinite are less known. In this article, we reconstruct the evolution of Peano’s ideas on these questions and formulate several hypotheses about their underlying motivations.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"197 1","pages":"241 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74414741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Descartes’s most extensive discussion of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens is contained in Rule 8 of Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Few reconstructions of Descartes’s discovery of the law of refraction take Rule 8 as their basis. In Rule 8, Descartes denies that the law of refraction can be discovered by purely mathematical means, and he requires that the law of refraction be deduced from physical principles about natural power or force, the nature of the action of light, and the behavior of light rays in a variety of transparent media. For over a century, however, there has been broad agreement that Descartes discovered the law of refraction by purely mathematical means, and that he only later provided the relevant physical rationale (via comparisons or analogies) in Dioptrics II. I execute each step in Descartes’s proposed deduction of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens in Rule 8 and concretely show how Descartes could have discovered the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic by its means. Rule 8, I argue, reflects Descartes’s actual path to the discovery of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens.
{"title":"Descartes’s Deduction of the Law of Refraction and the Shape of the Anaclastic Lens in Rule 8","authors":"Tarek R. Dika","doi":"10.1086/721282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721282","url":null,"abstract":"Descartes’s most extensive discussion of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens is contained in Rule 8 of Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Few reconstructions of Descartes’s discovery of the law of refraction take Rule 8 as their basis. In Rule 8, Descartes denies that the law of refraction can be discovered by purely mathematical means, and he requires that the law of refraction be deduced from physical principles about natural power or force, the nature of the action of light, and the behavior of light rays in a variety of transparent media. For over a century, however, there has been broad agreement that Descartes discovered the law of refraction by purely mathematical means, and that he only later provided the relevant physical rationale (via comparisons or analogies) in Dioptrics II. I execute each step in Descartes’s proposed deduction of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens in Rule 8 and concretely show how Descartes could have discovered the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic by its means. Rule 8, I argue, reflects Descartes’s actual path to the discovery of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"395 - 446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79935645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Newton’s Third Rule and the Experimental Argument for Universal Gravity, by Mary Domski","authors":"O. Belkind","doi":"10.1086/721138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721138","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79415687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The theory of quantum mechanics has often been thought to show an affinity with logical empiricism: in both, observation plays a central role, and questions about what is unobservable are dismissed. However, there were also strong tensions between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and implications drawn from quantum physics. In the 1920s and 1930s, many physicists thought that quantum mechanics revealed a limit to what could be known scientifically, and this opened the door to a wide range of speculations, in which quantum mechanics was connected with free will, organic life, psychology, and religion—speculations in which many leading quantum physicists were engaged. Members of the Vienna Circle, such as Frank and Schlick, looked at quantum mechanics for a confirmation of their empiricist views, but they were at the same time critical about these wider implications drawn from quantum mechanics, which in their eyes were connected with broader mystical and irrational trends in society. They engaged in particular with the views of Bohr and Jordan, both of whom expressed a sympathy for logical empiricism while at the same time arguing for claims that proved hard to reconcile with the scientific world conception of the Vienna Circle.
{"title":"The Vienna Circle against Quantum Speculations","authors":"M. Strien","doi":"10.1086/721137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721137","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of quantum mechanics has often been thought to show an affinity with logical empiricism: in both, observation plays a central role, and questions about what is unobservable are dismissed. However, there were also strong tensions between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and implications drawn from quantum physics. In the 1920s and 1930s, many physicists thought that quantum mechanics revealed a limit to what could be known scientifically, and this opened the door to a wide range of speculations, in which quantum mechanics was connected with free will, organic life, psychology, and religion—speculations in which many leading quantum physicists were engaged. Members of the Vienna Circle, such as Frank and Schlick, looked at quantum mechanics for a confirmation of their empiricist views, but they were at the same time critical about these wider implications drawn from quantum mechanics, which in their eyes were connected with broader mystical and irrational trends in society. They engaged in particular with the views of Bohr and Jordan, both of whom expressed a sympathy for logical empiricism while at the same time arguing for claims that proved hard to reconcile with the scientific world conception of the Vienna Circle.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"8 1","pages":"359 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89216430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter’s account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that, for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental and that he accepted a powerful underdetermination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza’s form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and antiempirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza’s scientific method.
{"title":"Essence, Experiment, and Underdetermination in the Spinoza-Boyle Correspondence","authors":"Stephe Harrop","doi":"10.1086/721136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721136","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter’s account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that, for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental and that he accepted a powerful underdetermination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza’s form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and antiempirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza’s scientific method.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"61 1","pages":"447 - 484"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83655752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kant’s denial that psychology is a properly so-called natural science, owing to the lack of application of mathematics to inner sense, has garnered a great deal of attention from scholars. Although the interpretations of this claim are diverse, commentators by and large fail to ground their views on an account of Kant’s conception of applied mathematics. In this article, I develop such an account, according to which the application of mathematics to a natural science requires both a mathematical representation and a metaphysical validation for the positive use of this representation to achieve a priori knowledge about nature. The second condition—that of metaphysical validation—has been overlooked in the literature. I show that psychology’s falling short of natural scientific propriety consists not in our lacking sufficient mathematical tools for the representation of inner states, according to Kant. After all, we can represent the mere temporality of inner states with the line and their intensities with numbers. Rather, the problem is that metaphysics does not validate the further use of such mathematical entities for the achievement of a priori knowledge about inner phenomena.
{"title":"Kant on the Mathematical Deficiency of Psychology","authors":"M. McNulty","doi":"10.1086/721151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721151","url":null,"abstract":"Kant’s denial that psychology is a properly so-called natural science, owing to the lack of application of mathematics to inner sense, has garnered a great deal of attention from scholars. Although the interpretations of this claim are diverse, commentators by and large fail to ground their views on an account of Kant’s conception of applied mathematics. In this article, I develop such an account, according to which the application of mathematics to a natural science requires both a mathematical representation and a metaphysical validation for the positive use of this representation to achieve a priori knowledge about nature. The second condition—that of metaphysical validation—has been overlooked in the literature. I show that psychology’s falling short of natural scientific propriety consists not in our lacking sufficient mathematical tools for the representation of inner states, according to Kant. After all, we can represent the mere temporality of inner states with the line and their intensities with numbers. Rather, the problem is that metaphysics does not validate the further use of such mathematical entities for the achievement of a priori knowledge about inner phenomena.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":"485 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83754279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society, and issues that later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism, and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers’ use of key institutions, including journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism.
{"title":"The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science","authors":"J. Katzav, K. Vaesen","doi":"10.1086/721135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/721135","url":null,"abstract":"This article contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society, and issues that later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism, and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers’ use of key institutions, including journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"327 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89125492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Microbial Ecology special issue contains a compilation of peer-reviewed papers presented at the II International Conference on Environmental, Industrial and Applied Microbiology (BioMicroWorld2007) held in Seville (Spain) on 28 November to 1 December 2007, where over 550 researches of about 60 countries attended and presented their cutting edge research. The main goals of this meeting were to (1) identify new approaches and research opportunities in applied microbiology presenting works that linked microbiology with research areas usually related with other scientific and engineering disciplines, (2) consolidate international collaborative efforts, and (3) communicate current research priorities and progress in the field. There were many excellent presentations in the several conference sessions and plenary lectures. The conference was structured in four main sessions covering the topics: (1) Environmental, Marine, Aquatic Microbiology/Geomicrobiology; (2) Agriculture, Soil, Forest Microbiology; (3) Food Microbiology; and (4) Industrial Microbiology/ Future Bioindustries. Four additional special sessions were dedicated to: (1) Bioremediation, (2) Microbial Production of Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals/Biosurfactants/Biotechnologically Relevant Enzymes and Proteins, (3) Medical and Pharmaceutical Microbiology, and (4) Techniques and Methods/ Microbiology Education. The lectures presented by the three plenary speakers can be highlighted as good examples of modern interdisciplinary applied microbiology: Dr. J.L. Ramos Martín, from the CSICSpanish National Research Council (Granada, Spain), presented the lecture titled “The toluene paradox: to eat, to tolerate or to run away.” Dr. M.L. González-Martín, from the Biosurfaces and Interfacial Phenomena Group of the Department of Applied Physics, UEX (Badajoz, Spain), expounded on “Physico-chemistry of microbial adhesion to materials: from macroscopic surface thermodynamics to modern nano-scale technology.” Finally, Dr. Riitta Puupponen-Pimiä, from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Espoo, Finland), presented the lecture titled “Antimicrobial and antiadhesion properties of bioactive berry compounds.” This special issue is made up of the works presented in some of the above-mentioned sessions but clearly bearing in mind the scope of Microbial Ecology, that is, how microorganisms interact with their biotic and abiotic environments, with each other and with their neighbors and hosts, to carry out their diverse functions. As a result of it, an interesting issue is presented here. We hope readers will find this issue interesting and helpful to their research purposes and helps to consolidate the conference as a regular research meeting in the field. It has been a pleasure to put together this special issue in Microbial Ecology journal. We would like to thank all members of the Organizing and Scientific Advisory Committees for the work made during the conference preparation. We would also like to
{"title":"Special Section Introduction","authors":"Silvia De Bianchi, Federico Viglione","doi":"10.1086/718991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718991","url":null,"abstract":"This Microbial Ecology special issue contains a compilation of peer-reviewed papers presented at the II International Conference on Environmental, Industrial and Applied Microbiology (BioMicroWorld2007) held in Seville (Spain) on 28 November to 1 December 2007, where over 550 researches of about 60 countries attended and presented their cutting edge research. The main goals of this meeting were to (1) identify new approaches and research opportunities in applied microbiology presenting works that linked microbiology with research areas usually related with other scientific and engineering disciplines, (2) consolidate international collaborative efforts, and (3) communicate current research priorities and progress in the field. There were many excellent presentations in the several conference sessions and plenary lectures. The conference was structured in four main sessions covering the topics: (1) Environmental, Marine, Aquatic Microbiology/Geomicrobiology; (2) Agriculture, Soil, Forest Microbiology; (3) Food Microbiology; and (4) Industrial Microbiology/ Future Bioindustries. Four additional special sessions were dedicated to: (1) Bioremediation, (2) Microbial Production of Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals/Biosurfactants/Biotechnologically Relevant Enzymes and Proteins, (3) Medical and Pharmaceutical Microbiology, and (4) Techniques and Methods/ Microbiology Education. The lectures presented by the three plenary speakers can be highlighted as good examples of modern interdisciplinary applied microbiology: Dr. J.L. Ramos Martín, from the CSICSpanish National Research Council (Granada, Spain), presented the lecture titled “The toluene paradox: to eat, to tolerate or to run away.” Dr. M.L. González-Martín, from the Biosurfaces and Interfacial Phenomena Group of the Department of Applied Physics, UEX (Badajoz, Spain), expounded on “Physico-chemistry of microbial adhesion to materials: from macroscopic surface thermodynamics to modern nano-scale technology.” Finally, Dr. Riitta Puupponen-Pimiä, from the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Espoo, Finland), presented the lecture titled “Antimicrobial and antiadhesion properties of bioactive berry compounds.” This special issue is made up of the works presented in some of the above-mentioned sessions but clearly bearing in mind the scope of Microbial Ecology, that is, how microorganisms interact with their biotic and abiotic environments, with each other and with their neighbors and hosts, to carry out their diverse functions. As a result of it, an interesting issue is presented here. We hope readers will find this issue interesting and helpful to their research purposes and helps to consolidate the conference as a regular research meeting in the field. It has been a pleasure to put together this special issue in Microbial Ecology journal. We would like to thank all members of the Organizing and Scientific Advisory Committees for the work made during the conference preparation. We would also like to ","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"56 3","pages":"122 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72449296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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