Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rm
R. Moraes
: Anthony Kenny criticized the Five Ways, by Thomas Aquinas, in a widespread and influential book. About the First Way, among other critiques, Kenny considers that Thomas Aqui-nas failed to prove that “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another”. As th is principle is central for the argument developed by Aquinas on the “first mover, put in movement by no other”, the First Way is insufficient and grounded on a mistake. In this article, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s works are analysed to expose that their arguments about movement are sound and persuasive. On the contrary, Kenny’s criticism is not consistent and is misled by bad interpretation of texts and concepts. Oderberg and Weisheipl agree with Aquinas and Aristotle, and their papers reinforce the conclusions of this article, favourable to the Medieval philosopher and against Kenny.
{"title":"ANTHONY KENNY'S CRITICISM OF AQUINAS' FIRST WAY AND THE OMNE QUOD MOVETUR AB ALIO MOVETUR PRINCIPLE","authors":"R. Moraes","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rm","url":null,"abstract":": Anthony Kenny criticized the Five Ways, by Thomas Aquinas, in a widespread and influential book. About the First Way, among other critiques, Kenny considers that Thomas Aqui-nas failed to prove that “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another”. As th is principle is central for the argument developed by Aquinas on the “first mover, put in movement by no other”, the First Way is insufficient and grounded on a mistake. In this article, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s works are analysed to expose that their arguments about movement are sound and persuasive. On the contrary, Kenny’s criticism is not consistent and is misled by bad interpretation of texts and concepts. Oderberg and Weisheipl agree with Aquinas and Aristotle, and their papers reinforce the conclusions of this article, favourable to the Medieval philosopher and against Kenny.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47393145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.fb
Fábio M. Bertato
: In this paper, I present a proposal for a Formal Natural Theology. The approach employed for this task is through a first-order theory, in which fundamental concepts such as divine, necessary, and supreme beings, are formally introduced, which
{"title":"SKETCH FOR A FORMAL NATURAL THEOLOGY: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF GOD","authors":"Fábio M. Bertato","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.fb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.fb","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, I present a proposal for a Formal Natural Theology. The approach employed for this task is through a first-order theory, in which fundamental concepts such as divine, necessary, and supreme beings, are formally introduced, which","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43314712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-08DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.js
J. Sijuwade
{"title":"FUNDAMENTALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD","authors":"J. Sijuwade","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.js","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.js","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44326012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-24DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.nr
Nara Lucia Rela
Abstract Despite the fact that the discussion on the economic man flourishes in John Stuart Mill’s work, this does not mean that this issue has not been previously discussed, at least, not in clear terms. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that even if Adam Smith never specifically characterized the person who deals with economic affairs, he pointed out some of his characteristics in his writings. We can find some clues to his thoughts on that issue in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762) and The Wealth of Nations (1776). In this article, Smith’s homo oeconomicus is approached in three aspects: rational, moral and emotional. In addition, we also argue that the philosopher had advanced some studies of psychology and behavioral economics that would be developed from the twentieth century, which is discussed when we approach the emotional side of Smith’s economic man.
{"title":"ADAM SMITH´S HOMO OECONOMICUS","authors":"Nara Lucia Rela","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.nr","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.nr","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite the fact that the discussion on the economic man flourishes in John Stuart Mill’s work, this does not mean that this issue has not been previously discussed, at least, not in clear terms. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that even if Adam Smith never specifically characterized the person who deals with economic affairs, he pointed out some of his characteristics in his writings. We can find some clues to his thoughts on that issue in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762) and The Wealth of Nations (1776). In this article, Smith’s homo oeconomicus is approached in three aspects: rational, moral and emotional. In addition, we also argue that the philosopher had advanced some studies of psychology and behavioral economics that would be developed from the twentieth century, which is discussed when we approach the emotional side of Smith’s economic man.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47954711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-24DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.dg
D. Greimann
Abstract In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior.
{"title":"QUINE’S PROXY-FUNCTION ARGUMENT FOR THE INDETERMINACY OF REFERENCE AND FREGE’S CAESAR PROBLEM","authors":"D. Greimann","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.dg","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.dg","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present paper aims to show that Frege’s Caesar problem does not really support the conclusions that Quine draws from the proxy-function argument. On the contrary, it reveals that Quine’s argument is a non sequitur: it does not establish that there are alternative interpretations of our terms that are equally correct, but only that these terms are ambiguous. The latter kind of referential indeterminacy implies that almost all sentences of our overall theory of the world are either false or neither true nor false, because they contain definite descriptions whose uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled. The proxy-function argument must therefore be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine’s behaviorist premise that the reference of terms is determined only by our linguistic behavior.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45415026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-24DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.na
N. Ayalon
: Several questions regarding Spinoza's concept of essence have been the topic of recent scholarly debate. In this paper, I show that the connection between love, desire and essence is ubiquitous in the Ethics, as well as metaphysically and psychologically coherent; moreover, it provides the key to answer unresolved questions. Analyzing the notion of essence through Spinoza's theory of love shows that essence can be expressed in different ways, and be reflected through different objects of love. These objects of love, in turn, signify the extent to which the affected mind understands itself, God and things in the world. Each object is a different expression of the same single, unique essence of the individual, and therefore of the desire which defines them. This interpretation allows to solve some puzzles about essence, and also to establish the importance of love in Spinoza's philosophy as a whole — especially his epistemology and ethics.
{"title":"LOVE AND ESSENCE IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS","authors":"N. Ayalon","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.na","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.na","url":null,"abstract":": Several questions regarding Spinoza's concept of essence have been the topic of recent scholarly debate. In this paper, I show that the connection between love, desire and essence is ubiquitous in the Ethics, as well as metaphysically and psychologically coherent; moreover, it provides the key to answer unresolved questions. Analyzing the notion of essence through Spinoza's theory of love shows that essence can be expressed in different ways, and be reflected through different objects of love. These objects of love, in turn, signify the extent to which the affected mind understands itself, God and things in the world. Each object is a different expression of the same single, unique essence of the individual, and therefore of the desire which defines them. This interpretation allows to solve some puzzles about essence, and also to establish the importance of love in Spinoza's philosophy as a whole — especially his epistemology and ethics.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44845472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-24DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.jb
Juan Bautista Bengoetxea, O. Todt
{"title":"DECISION-MAKING IN THE NUTRITION SCIENCES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR ASSESSING HEALTH CLAIMS","authors":"Juan Bautista Bengoetxea, O. Todt","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.jb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n3.jb","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49196194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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