Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: Eleonora Orlando argues that one must understand some descriptivist theories of names that I criticize in my book Roads to Reference as ceteris paribus generalizations, and that on this understanding they survive my criticisms; she also introduces some doubts about my views on the knowledge speakers have of the reference-fixing conventions I postulate for proper names. In this note I argue against Orlando’s suggestion about ceteris paribus provisos and explain my view of the epistemology of reference-fixing conventions. Spanish acknowledged.
{"title":"CETERIS PARIBUS PROVISOS, KNOWLEDGE OF REFERENCE-FIXING CONVENTIONS, AND PROPER NAMES. REPLY TO ORLANDO","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo","url":null,"abstract":": Eleonora Orlando argues that one must understand some descriptivist theories of names that I criticize in my book Roads to Reference as ceteris paribus generalizations, and that on this understanding they survive my criticisms; she also introduces some doubts about my views on the knowledge speakers have of the reference-fixing conventions I postulate for proper names. In this note I argue against Orlando’s suggestion about ceteris paribus provisos and explain my view of the epistemology of reference-fixing conventions. Spanish acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45618108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ab
Axel Barceló Aspeitia
: The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez-Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to evaluative language. In particular, I want to defend the thesis that at least some aesthetic predicates can have non-evaluative reference. As an example, I will work with the predicate “tasty” (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that it some times refers to a non-subjective non-evaluative property, flavour, which is more fundamental that the relational property of being tasty to someone. In other words, some times, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us or whether we like it, but just how it tastes period. The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to aesthetic
{"title":"TASTY ROADS TO FLAVOUR","authors":"Axel Barceló Aspeitia","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ab","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ab","url":null,"abstract":": The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez-Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to evaluative language. In particular, I want to defend the thesis that at least some aesthetic predicates can have non-evaluative reference. As an example, I will work with the predicate “tasty” (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that it some times refers to a non-subjective non-evaluative property, flavour, which is more fundamental that the relational property of being tasty to someone. In other words, some times, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us or whether we like it, but just how it tastes period. The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to aesthetic","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43262475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.
{"title":"DO CONFLICTING INTENTIONS GIVE RISE TO MULTIPLE DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE? REPLY TO MENA","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn","url":null,"abstract":": According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49424848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.
{"title":"ORDINARY KINDS AND ONTOLOGICAL ANGST. REPLY TO DEMARTINI","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt","url":null,"abstract":": Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48446187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm
Luis Fernández Moreno
: Mario Gómez-Torrente (2019) is a fundamental contribution to the issue of reference and especially of reference fixing. In this article I will focus on some questions addressed in it, especially on the relationships between some components of Kripke’s, Putnam’s and Gómez-Torrente’s theories of reference fixing as well as on the relevance of descriptions for those theories; I will then make some observations about Gómez-Torrente’s view of the reference-fixing conventions.
: Mario Gómez-Torrente(2019)是对参考问题，特别是参考固定问题的根本性贡献。在本文中，我将重点讨论其中的一些问题，特别是克里普克，普特南和Gómez-Torrente的参考固定理论的一些组成部分之间的关系以及对这些理论的描述的相关性;然后，我将对Gómez-Torrente对引用修复约定的看法进行一些观察。
{"title":"REFERENCE THEORIES AND THE RELEVANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS","authors":"Luis Fernández Moreno","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm","url":null,"abstract":": Mario Gómez-Torrente (2019) is a fundamental contribution to the issue of reference and especially of reference fixing. In this article I will focus on some questions addressed in it, especially on the relationships between some components of Kripke’s, Putnam’s and Gómez-Torrente’s theories of reference fixing as well as on the relevance of descriptions for those theories; I will then make some observations about Gómez-Torrente’s view of the reference-fixing conventions.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41256454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm
Filipe Martone
: In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
{"title":"IS THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTENTIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM? SOME REMARKS ON GÓMEZ-TORRENTE´S “ROADS TO REFERENCE”","authors":"Filipe Martone","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm","url":null,"abstract":": In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44534367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx
Martín Abreu Zavaleta
: According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there 1 For Demartini, Eleonora Orlando, for
{"title":"GÓMEZ-TORRENTE ON REFERENCE TO ORDINARY SUBSTANCES","authors":"Martín Abreu Zavaleta","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx","url":null,"abstract":": According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there 1 For Demartini, Eleonora Orlando, for","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47470197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm
R. Mena
: Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions .
{"title":"A BUMP IN THE ROAD","authors":"R. Mena","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm","url":null,"abstract":": Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions .","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47231902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.td
Thainá Coltro Demartini
This is a comment on Gómez-Torrente’s approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms. Here I will focus on his concerns related to the arbitrariness argument and his attempt to formulate a reply to it that maintains most (if not all) of the “Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy” when it comes to the reference-fixing of such terms. Gómez-Torrente concludes that ordinary kind terms have distinct referents from scientific terms. I will challenge one of the premises that he employs in reaching this conclusion: namely, that the difference in determinacy profiles between ordinary natural kinds and scientific kinds is enough to assume that the terms referring to them do not share their referents. I also suggest that some kind of contextual interpretation of natural kind terms might provide a nice explanation of those determinacy
{"title":"NATURAL KINDS AND OUR SEMANTIC INTUITIONS ALONG THE ROAD","authors":"Thainá Coltro Demartini","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.td","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.td","url":null,"abstract":"This is a comment on Gómez-Torrente’s approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms. Here I will focus on his concerns related to the arbitrariness argument and his attempt to formulate a reply to it that maintains most (if not all) of the “Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy” when it comes to the reference-fixing of such terms. Gómez-Torrente concludes that ordinary kind terms have distinct referents from scientific terms. I will challenge one of the premises that he employs in reaching this conclusion: namely, that the difference in determinacy profiles between ordinary natural kinds and scientific kinds is enough to assume that the terms referring to them do not share their referents. I also suggest that some kind of contextual interpretation of natural kind terms might provide a nice explanation of those determinacy","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43971238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mb
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: Axel Barceló has extended the objectivist apparatus for handling color terms that I develop in my book Roads to Reference, so that the extension covers also some aesthetic predicates. In this note I argue that Barceló’s extension probably attempts to go too far. account fixing and temperature
Axel Barceló扩展了我在《参考之路》一书中开发的用于处理颜色术语的客观主义工具，因此扩展也涵盖了一些美学谓词。在本文中，我认为Barceló的扩展可能试图走得太远。固定账目和温度
{"title":"CONTEXT-SENSITIVE REFERENCE FIXING AND OBJECTIVITY. REPLY TO BARCELÓ","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mb","url":null,"abstract":": Axel Barceló has extended the objectivist apparatus for handling color terms that I develop in my book Roads to Reference, so that the extension covers also some aesthetic predicates. In this note I argue that Barceló’s extension probably attempts to go too far. account fixing and temperature","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44598382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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