Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.
{"title":"ORDINARY KINDS AND ONTOLOGICAL ANGST. REPLY TO DEMARTINI","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mt","url":null,"abstract":": Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48446187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.
{"title":"DO CONFLICTING INTENTIONS GIVE RISE TO MULTIPLE DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE? REPLY TO MENA","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mn","url":null,"abstract":": According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49424848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo
Mario Gómez-Torrente
: Eleonora Orlando argues that one must understand some descriptivist theories of names that I criticize in my book Roads to Reference as ceteris paribus generalizations, and that on this understanding they survive my criticisms; she also introduces some doubts about my views on the knowledge speakers have of the reference-fixing conventions I postulate for proper names. In this note I argue against Orlando’s suggestion about ceteris paribus provisos and explain my view of the epistemology of reference-fixing conventions. Spanish acknowledged.
{"title":"CETERIS PARIBUS PROVISOS, KNOWLEDGE OF REFERENCE-FIXING CONVENTIONS, AND PROPER NAMES. REPLY TO ORLANDO","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mo","url":null,"abstract":": Eleonora Orlando argues that one must understand some descriptivist theories of names that I criticize in my book Roads to Reference as ceteris paribus generalizations, and that on this understanding they survive my criticisms; she also introduces some doubts about my views on the knowledge speakers have of the reference-fixing conventions I postulate for proper names. In this note I argue against Orlando’s suggestion about ceteris paribus provisos and explain my view of the epistemology of reference-fixing conventions. Spanish acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45618108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx
Martín Abreu Zavaleta
: According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there 1 For Demartini, Eleonora Orlando, for
{"title":"GÓMEZ-TORRENTE ON REFERENCE TO ORDINARY SUBSTANCES","authors":"Martín Abreu Zavaleta","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mx","url":null,"abstract":": According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham (2000) and Leslie (2013) cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente (2019) has argued that there is a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there 1 For Demartini, Eleonora Orlando, for","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47470197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm
Filipe Martone
: In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
{"title":"IS THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTENTIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM? SOME REMARKS ON GÓMEZ-TORRENTE´S “ROADS TO REFERENCE”","authors":"Filipe Martone","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.fm","url":null,"abstract":": In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44534367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm
Luis Fernández Moreno
: Mario Gómez-Torrente (2019) is a fundamental contribution to the issue of reference and especially of reference fixing. In this article I will focus on some questions addressed in it, especially on the relationships between some components of Kripke’s, Putnam’s and Gómez-Torrente’s theories of reference fixing as well as on the relevance of descriptions for those theories; I will then make some observations about Gómez-Torrente’s view of the reference-fixing conventions.
: Mario Gómez-Torrente(2019)是对参考问题，特别是参考固定问题的根本性贡献。在本文中，我将重点讨论其中的一些问题，特别是克里普克，普特南和Gómez-Torrente的参考固定理论的一些组成部分之间的关系以及对这些理论的描述的相关性;然后，我将对Gómez-Torrente对引用修复约定的看法进行一些观察。
{"title":"REFERENCE THEORIES AND THE RELEVANCE OF DESCRIPTIONS","authors":"Luis Fernández Moreno","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.lm","url":null,"abstract":": Mario Gómez-Torrente (2019) is a fundamental contribution to the issue of reference and especially of reference fixing. In this article I will focus on some questions addressed in it, especially on the relationships between some components of Kripke’s, Putnam’s and Gómez-Torrente’s theories of reference fixing as well as on the relevance of descriptions for those theories; I will then make some observations about Gómez-Torrente’s view of the reference-fixing conventions.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":"31 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41256454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm
R. Mena
: Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions .
{"title":"A BUMP IN THE ROAD","authors":"R. Mena","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.rm","url":null,"abstract":": Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions .","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47231902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.td
Thainá Coltro Demartini
This is a comment on Gómez-Torrente’s approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms. Here I will focus on his concerns related to the arbitrariness argument and his attempt to formulate a reply to it that maintains most (if not all) of the “Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy” when it comes to the reference-fixing of such terms. Gómez-Torrente concludes that ordinary kind terms have distinct referents from scientific terms. I will challenge one of the premises that he employs in reaching this conclusion: namely, that the difference in determinacy profiles between ordinary natural kinds and scientific kinds is enough to assume that the terms referring to them do not share their referents. I also suggest that some kind of contextual interpretation of natural kind terms might provide a nice explanation of those determinacy
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Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.me
Melissa Vivanco
Is the debate over the existence of numbers unsolvable? Mario Gómez-Torrente presents a novel proposal to unclog the old discussion between the realist and the anti-realist about numbers. In this paper, the strategy is outlined, highlighting its results and showing how they determine the desiderata for a satisfactory theory of the reference of Arabic numerals, which should lead to a satisfactory explanation about numbers. It is argued here that the theory almost achieves its goals, yet it does not capture the relevant association between how a number can be split up and the morphological property of Arabic numerals to be positional. This property seems to play a substantial role in providing a complete theory of Arabic numerals and numbers. Referencial Uses of Arabic Numerals 143 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 4, pp. 142-164, Oct.-Dec. 2020. 1. THE GAME: HOW NUMERALS COULD REFER INSTEAD OF WHETHER NUMERALS REFER There is a well–known debate about the metaphysics of natural numbers. Typically, the discussion takes place in a match whose players belong to one of two predefined teams: the Realist and the Antirealist. If you choose the Realist team, as Frege (1884), Burgess and Rosen (1997), Hale and Wright (2009), and others have done, prepare yourself to commit to the existence of natural numbers as abstract, objective, and (not necessarily but most likely) mind–independent entities. The realist player holds that arithmetical sentences are true in virtue of facts about the denotations of their singular terms and predicates. Her challenge in this game is to explain by virtue of what do we gain knowledge of arithmetic sentences (since we don’t have the same type of contact with abstract entities as we do with whatever entities that are supposed to make empirical sentences true). Naturally, you might like the Antirealist team better. The spirit of this popular team is to deny the existence of entities such as numbers (see Field (1989), Yablo (2010), Bueno (2016) Once you choose to become an antirealist, your challenge is to explain in virtue of what are arithmetical sentences true. This game has spawned a diverse variety of accounts in which each team shows off their most sophisticated tactics, even reaching extreme positions with consequences such as that the only possible result is that both teams ‘win’ (for example, defending that only radical realism and radical antirealism are tenable, as Balaguer (1998) does) or that both teams ‘lose’ (as in a case of unsolvable epistemic disagreement (see Rosen (2001)). In the fourth chapter of Roads to reference, Gómez-Torrente (2019) presents an attractive and novel account where the starting point is to put aside the traditional game— which has come to seem bogged down—and starts a new one. The opening move of this game consists of taking at face value our linguistic intuitions bearing on the question of how the
{"title":"REFERENTIAL USES OF ARABIC NUMERALS","authors":"Melissa Vivanco","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.me","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.me","url":null,"abstract":"Is the debate over the existence of numbers unsolvable? Mario Gómez-Torrente presents a novel proposal to unclog the old discussion between the realist and the anti-realist about numbers. In this paper, the strategy is outlined, highlighting its results and showing how they determine the desiderata for a satisfactory theory of the reference of Arabic numerals, which should lead to a satisfactory explanation about numbers. It is argued here that the theory almost achieves its goals, yet it does not capture the relevant association between how a number can be split up and the morphological property of Arabic numerals to be positional. This property seems to play a substantial role in providing a complete theory of Arabic numerals and numbers. Referencial Uses of Arabic Numerals 143 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 43, n. 4, pp. 142-164, Oct.-Dec. 2020. 1. THE GAME: HOW NUMERALS COULD REFER INSTEAD OF WHETHER NUMERALS REFER There is a well–known debate about the metaphysics of natural numbers. Typically, the discussion takes place in a match whose players belong to one of two predefined teams: the Realist and the Antirealist. If you choose the Realist team, as Frege (1884), Burgess and Rosen (1997), Hale and Wright (2009), and others have done, prepare yourself to commit to the existence of natural numbers as abstract, objective, and (not necessarily but most likely) mind–independent entities. The realist player holds that arithmetical sentences are true in virtue of facts about the denotations of their singular terms and predicates. Her challenge in this game is to explain by virtue of what do we gain knowledge of arithmetic sentences (since we don’t have the same type of contact with abstract entities as we do with whatever entities that are supposed to make empirical sentences true). Naturally, you might like the Antirealist team better. The spirit of this popular team is to deny the existence of entities such as numbers (see Field (1989), Yablo (2010), Bueno (2016) Once you choose to become an antirealist, your challenge is to explain in virtue of what are arithmetical sentences true. This game has spawned a diverse variety of accounts in which each team shows off their most sophisticated tactics, even reaching extreme positions with consequences such as that the only possible result is that both teams ‘win’ (for example, defending that only radical realism and radical antirealism are tenable, as Balaguer (1998) does) or that both teams ‘lose’ (as in a case of unsolvable epistemic disagreement (see Rosen (2001)). In the fourth chapter of Roads to reference, Gómez-Torrente (2019) presents an attractive and novel account where the starting point is to put aside the traditional game— which has come to seem bogged down—and starts a new one. The opening move of this game consists of taking at face value our linguistic intuitions bearing on the question of how the","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45552990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mm
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for
Filipe Martone认为，通过描述来表示意图对象的参照固定意图永远无法固定指示语的参照，而作为一个经验事实，说话者永远不会同时具有感知和非感知参照固定意图，她可以将其作为指示语参照的固定意图。在这封信中，我拒绝了Martone关于
{"title":"ARE CONFLICTING REFERENCE-FIXING INTENTIONS POSSIBLE? REPLY TO MARTONE","authors":"Mario Gómez-Torrente","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mm","url":null,"abstract":"Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47930416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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