Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pl
Patrick Duffley
{"title":"REPLY TO “PREDICTIVE PROCESSING AND THE SEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE: COMMENTARY TO DUFFLEY”","authors":"Patrick Duffley","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pl","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pl","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43964139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.ns
Nancy Stern
{"title":"REFLEXIVITY, ROLE CONFLICTS, AND THE MEANING OF ENGLISH SELF PRONOUNS","authors":"Nancy Stern","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.ns","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.ns","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42248268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pe
Patrick Duffley
{"title":"REACTION TO ‘LINGUISTIC MEANING MEETS LINGUISTIC FORM IN ACTION’","authors":"Patrick Duffley","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pe","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n1.pe","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":"50 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41247075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rs
R. Silvestre
: In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God.
{"title":"A FORMAL-LOGICAL APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF GOD","authors":"R. Silvestre","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rs","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rs","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43197388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rb
R. BENEVIDES B. G.
{"title":"WILLIAM JAMES AND THE ROLE OF MYSTICISM IN RELIGION","authors":"R. BENEVIDES B. G.","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.rb","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43808935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ns
Nicola Salvatore
: According to The Evidentialist problem of Evil, the existence of disproportionate, prima facie gratuitous evil and suffering in the world is enough evidence against the existence of the Omnipotent, Perfectly Loving, Omniscient God of Classical Theism. A contemporary way of dealing with this argument is Skeptical Theism , for which the very fact that there is an huge amount of evil that looks gratuitous to us does not mean that we can reasonably believe whether this evil is indeed gratuitous or not . In this paper, I present and discuss a number of influential criticisms against this view according to which a proponent of Skeptical Theism will be forced to accept a number of unpalatable skeptical conclusions. I argue that this is not the case.
{"title":"A DEFENCE OF SKEPTICAL THEISM","authors":"Nicola Salvatore","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ns","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ns","url":null,"abstract":": According to The Evidentialist problem of Evil, the existence of disproportionate, prima facie gratuitous evil and suffering in the world is enough evidence against the existence of the Omnipotent, Perfectly Loving, Omniscient God of Classical Theism. A contemporary way of dealing with this argument is Skeptical Theism , for which the very fact that there is an huge amount of evil that looks gratuitous to us does not mean that we can reasonably believe whether this evil is indeed gratuitous or not . In this paper, I present and discuss a number of influential criticisms against this view according to which a proponent of Skeptical Theism will be forced to accept a number of unpalatable skeptical conclusions. I argue that this is not the case.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44501143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gc
G. Cardoso, Sérgio Ricardo Neves DE Miranda
: In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).
{"title":"Should God believe the Liar? A non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s Omniscience","authors":"G. Cardoso, Sérgio Ricardo Neves DE Miranda","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gc","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gc","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47519295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.lg
Luis Estrada-González
: Beall has given more or less convincing arguments to the effect that neither classical logic, nor K 3 , nor LP , nor S3 can play the role he expects from logic: to be the basement theory for all true theories, including true theology. However, he has not considered all the pertinent competitors, and he has not given any reassurance that he has not gone too low in the hierarchy of logics to find his desired “universal closure of all true theories”. In this paper, I put forward those additional arguments to show the superiority of FDE with respect to logics that include a detachable conditional but that are very much like FDE otherwise. I also discuss the problem that theological consequence might not contrapose even if theological consequence is supposed to extend FDE consequence and the latter does contrapose.
{"title":"The logical bases of contradictory Christology: comments on The Contradictory Christ, Ch. 2","authors":"Luis Estrada-González","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.lg","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.lg","url":null,"abstract":": Beall has given more or less convincing arguments to the effect that neither classical logic, nor K 3 , nor LP , nor S3 can play the role he expects from logic: to be the basement theory for all true theories, including true theology. However, he has not considered all the pertinent competitors, and he has not given any reassurance that he has not gone too low in the hierarchy of logics to find his desired “universal closure of all true theories”. In this paper, I put forward those additional arguments to show the superiority of FDE with respect to logics that include a detachable conditional but that are very much like FDE otherwise. I also discuss the problem that theological consequence might not contrapose even if theological consequence is supposed to extend FDE consequence and the latter does contrapose.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48841030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.jd
José Eduardo Porcher, Daniel DE LUCA-NORONHA
: In this paper, we present an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God’s creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main naturalistic frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty, Wilson's biophilia hypothesis, and Keltner and Haidt's prototype approach to awe. We show shortcomings of both accounts in explaining the relevant experiences and argue that the reliance of these accounts on an adaptationist reading of our aesthetic appreciation of nature entails a commitment to questionable hidden premises: that affordances themselves can figure in the subject's perceptual experience, and that experiences of awe have adaptive value. We maintain that the argument's “ empirical ” premise is tenable and conclude with directions for future research regarding the argument's “ theological ” premise.
{"title":"AWE AT NATURAL BEAUTY AS DEFEASIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD,","authors":"José Eduardo Porcher, Daniel DE LUCA-NORONHA","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.jd","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.jd","url":null,"abstract":": In this paper, we present an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God’s creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main naturalistic frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty, Wilson's biophilia hypothesis, and Keltner and Haidt's prototype approach to awe. We show shortcomings of both accounts in explaining the relevant experiences and argue that the reliance of these accounts on an adaptationist reading of our aesthetic appreciation of nature entails a commitment to questionable hidden premises: that affordances themselves can figure in the subject's perceptual experience, and that experiences of awe have adaptive value. We maintain that the argument's “ empirical ” premise is tenable and conclude with directions for future research regarding the argument's “ theological ” premise.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45933906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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