In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel's book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is completely irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis (which they also seem to endorse) that people do have a right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one's labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property.
在这篇短文中，我认为墨菲和内格尔的书《所有权的神话》(the Myth of Ownership)的主要观点——人们对税前收入没有权利——并不支持他们关于私有财产权不是一种自然权利的主张。我认为，私有财产权的非自然性，与他们的道德论证完全无关。他们的道德结论的合理性源于这样一个论点(他们似乎也赞同这个论点)，即人们确实有权获得自己的劳动成果，然而，他们坚持认为，从道德上讲，一个人的劳动成果是什么，不可能独立于构成公平交易、定价等条款的法律和社会规范体系。人们只能有权获得对其劳动附加值的公平评估，而后者不可能独立于相关社会中盛行的整个规范体系而有任何意义。我认为这一结论不受私有财产权性质的影响。
{"title":"On the Right to Private Property and Entitlement to One's Income","authors":"Andrei Marmor","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.567784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.567784","url":null,"abstract":"In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel's book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is completely irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis (which they also seem to endorse) that people do have a right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one's labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116621917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we defend the traditional rule that legislative entrenchment, the practice by which a legislature insulates ordinary statutes from repeal by a subsequent legislature, is both unconstitutional and normatively undesirable. A recent essay by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule disputes this rule against legislative entrenchment and provides the occasion for our review of the issue. First, we argue that legislative entrenchment is unconstitutional, offering the first comprehensive defense of the proposition that the original meaning of the Constitution prohibits legislative entrenchments. We show that a combination of textual, historical, and structural arguments make a very compelling case against the constitutionality of legislative entrenchment. In particular, the Framers incorporated into the Constitution the traditional Anglo-American practice against legislative entrenchment, as evidenced by early comments by James Madison - comments that have not been previously discussed in this context. Moreover, legislative entrenchment essentially would allow Congress to use majority rule to pass constitutional amendments. On the normative issue, we offer a new theory of the appropriate scope of entrenchment: the theory of symmetric entrenchment. Under our theory, there is a strong presumption that only symmetric entrenchments - entrenchments that are enacted under the same supermajority rule that is needed to repeal them - are desirable. The presumption helps to distinguish desirable entrenchments that would improve upon government decisions from undesirable ones that simply involve legislatures protecting their existing preferences against future repeal. To be desirable entrenchments must generally be symmetric, because the supermajority rule that is applied to the enactment of entrenched measures would improve the quality of these measures and therefore compensate for the additional dangers that entrenchments pose. This theory steers a middle path between a strict majoritarian position, which would prohibit all legislative entrenchments, and a position that would allow legislative majorities to entrench measures.
{"title":"Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory","authors":"Michael B. Rappaport, John O. McGinnis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.417263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.417263","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we defend the traditional rule that legislative entrenchment, the practice by which a legislature insulates ordinary statutes from repeal by a subsequent legislature, is both unconstitutional and normatively undesirable. A recent essay by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule disputes this rule against legislative entrenchment and provides the occasion for our review of the issue. First, we argue that legislative entrenchment is unconstitutional, offering the first comprehensive defense of the proposition that the original meaning of the Constitution prohibits legislative entrenchments. We show that a combination of textual, historical, and structural arguments make a very compelling case against the constitutionality of legislative entrenchment. In particular, the Framers incorporated into the Constitution the traditional Anglo-American practice against legislative entrenchment, as evidenced by early comments by James Madison - comments that have not been previously discussed in this context. Moreover, legislative entrenchment essentially would allow Congress to use majority rule to pass constitutional amendments. On the normative issue, we offer a new theory of the appropriate scope of entrenchment: the theory of symmetric entrenchment. Under our theory, there is a strong presumption that only symmetric entrenchments - entrenchments that are enacted under the same supermajority rule that is needed to repeal them - are desirable. The presumption helps to distinguish desirable entrenchments that would improve upon government decisions from undesirable ones that simply involve legislatures protecting their existing preferences against future repeal. To be desirable entrenchments must generally be symmetric, because the supermajority rule that is applied to the enactment of entrenched measures would improve the quality of these measures and therefore compensate for the additional dangers that entrenchments pose. This theory steers a middle path between a strict majoritarian position, which would prohibit all legislative entrenchments, and a position that would allow legislative majorities to entrench measures.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128880148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of "dual processing"; the place of heuristics and biases outside of the laboratory; and the implications of heuristics and biases for policy and law. This review-essay focuses on certain aspects of "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment", edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. An understanding of heuristics and biases casts light on many issues in law, involving jury awards, risk regulation, and political economy in general. Some attention is given to the possibility of "moral heuristics" - rules of thumb, for purposes of morality, that generally work well but that also systematically misfire.
{"title":"Hazardous Heuristics","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.344620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.344620","url":null,"abstract":"New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of \"dual processing\"; the place of heuristics and biases outside of the laboratory; and the implications of heuristics and biases for policy and law. This review-essay focuses on certain aspects of \"Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment\", edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. An understanding of heuristics and biases casts light on many issues in law, involving jury awards, risk regulation, and political economy in general. Some attention is given to the possibility of \"moral heuristics\" - rules of thumb, for purposes of morality, that generally work well but that also systematically misfire.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121745361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under Pennhurst, a court may conclude that Congress has imposed a condition on the grant of federal funds to a state recipient only if Congress unambiguously expressed its intent to do so; under Chevron, the existence of statutory ambiguity with respect to a particular issue requires the reviewing court to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language. What, then, should a court do when the terms of a federal-state grant program's condition are not fully elaborated in the statute and when the agency charged with enforcing the statute has issued regulations that purport to define the terms of the condition? Such controversies arise at the crossroads of administrative law and federalism principles. They raise the question whether Chevron deference, which is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, ever is warranted when the statutory provision at issue attaches a condition to a state's receipt of funds - a provision that must, in order to be effective under Pennhurst, attach the condition unambiguously. This Essay considers whether the usual principles of Chevron deference govern the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions in federal-state grant programs. Resolution of this question depends principally on how one characterizes Pennhurst's clear-statement rule. The first approach, which I call the "accountability model," treats Pennhurst's rule as a structural mechanism to ensure congressional accountability when Congress imposes burdens on the states. Under this framework, Congress (which, at least theoretically, represents the interests of the states), in contradistinction to administrative agencies (which do not), must unambiguously decide whether to impose a particular burden on the states. The second approach, which I call the "state choice model," views Pennhurst's rule as a means to ensure notice - and thus fairness - to the states when a federal grant program imposes a burden on the state recipients. Under this account, the question of which federal actor (that is, Congress or the agency) has imposed a condition on the state is not determinative; the inquiry focuses instead on whether, in light of the information available when the state accepted federal funds, the state can fairly be said to have understood the nature of the bargain, and thus had the opportunity "freely" to "choose" whether to accept the funds. This Essay argues that the accountability model upsets the delicate balance that Pennhurst achieved between federal and state interests and undermines the important values advanced by the Court's decision in Chevron. By requiring an unrealistic standard of congressional precision, the accountability model effectively converts Pennhurst's rule from an interpretive tool to a substantive limitation on Congress's power to regulate through the spending power. The state choice model, on the other hand, accommodates the values advanced by Chevron and limits Pennhurst's application to those cas
{"title":"Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power","authors":"Peter J. Smith","doi":"10.2307/797527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/797527","url":null,"abstract":"Under Pennhurst, a court may conclude that Congress has imposed a condition on the grant of federal funds to a state recipient only if Congress unambiguously expressed its intent to do so; under Chevron, the existence of statutory ambiguity with respect to a particular issue requires the reviewing court to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language. What, then, should a court do when the terms of a federal-state grant program's condition are not fully elaborated in the statute and when the agency charged with enforcing the statute has issued regulations that purport to define the terms of the condition? Such controversies arise at the crossroads of administrative law and federalism principles. They raise the question whether Chevron deference, which is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, ever is warranted when the statutory provision at issue attaches a condition to a state's receipt of funds - a provision that must, in order to be effective under Pennhurst, attach the condition unambiguously. This Essay considers whether the usual principles of Chevron deference govern the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions in federal-state grant programs. Resolution of this question depends principally on how one characterizes Pennhurst's clear-statement rule. The first approach, which I call the \"accountability model,\" treats Pennhurst's rule as a structural mechanism to ensure congressional accountability when Congress imposes burdens on the states. Under this framework, Congress (which, at least theoretically, represents the interests of the states), in contradistinction to administrative agencies (which do not), must unambiguously decide whether to impose a particular burden on the states. The second approach, which I call the \"state choice model,\" views Pennhurst's rule as a means to ensure notice - and thus fairness - to the states when a federal grant program imposes a burden on the state recipients. Under this account, the question of which federal actor (that is, Congress or the agency) has imposed a condition on the state is not determinative; the inquiry focuses instead on whether, in light of the information available when the state accepted federal funds, the state can fairly be said to have understood the nature of the bargain, and thus had the opportunity \"freely\" to \"choose\" whether to accept the funds. This Essay argues that the accountability model upsets the delicate balance that Pennhurst achieved between federal and state interests and undermines the important values advanced by the Court's decision in Chevron. By requiring an unrealistic standard of congressional precision, the accountability model effectively converts Pennhurst's rule from an interpretive tool to a substantive limitation on Congress's power to regulate through the spending power. The state choice model, on the other hand, accommodates the values advanced by Chevron and limits Pennhurst's application to those cas","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127861111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2001-01-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852940.003.0008
John Gardner
Who is the ‘reasonable person’, that ‘excellent but odious character’1 who seems to inhabit every nook and cranny of the common law? Until I read Arthur Ripstein’s book Equality, Responsibility and the Law, I thought I knew the answer. I generally understood the word ‘reasonable’, in legal contexts, to mean no more and no less than ‘justified’. A reasonable action is a justified action, a reasonable belief is a justified belief, a reasonable fear is a justified fear, a reasonable measure of care is a justified measure of care, etc. By the same token, the common law’s reasonable person (I fondly thought) is none other than a justified person, i.e. a person who is justified in all those aspects of her life that properly call for justification. She is justified in her actions, her beliefs, her fears, the measure of care she takes, and so on. Thus, to say that one’s actions or beliefs or emotions or attitudes etc. were those of the reasonable person is merely to say, in a typically roundabout lawyer’s way, that one’s actions or beliefs or emotions or attitudes etc. were justified ones. It may be thought that at least some of the law’s uses of its reasonableness standard plainly defy this interpretation, so that it should not have taken a philosophical virtuoso like Ripstein to alert me to its deficiencies. What about the familiar cases, mentioned in even the most pedestrian of criminal-law
{"title":"The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person","authors":"John Gardner","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198852940.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852940.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Who is the ‘reasonable person’, that ‘excellent but odious character’1 who seems to inhabit every nook and cranny of the common law? Until I read Arthur Ripstein’s book Equality, Responsibility and the Law, I thought I knew the answer. I generally understood the word ‘reasonable’, in legal contexts, to mean no more and no less than ‘justified’. A reasonable action is a justified action, a reasonable belief is a justified belief, a reasonable fear is a justified fear, a reasonable measure of care is a justified measure of care, etc. By the same token, the common law’s reasonable person (I fondly thought) is none other than a justified person, i.e. a person who is justified in all those aspects of her life that properly call for justification. She is justified in her actions, her beliefs, her fears, the measure of care she takes, and so on. Thus, to say that one’s actions or beliefs or emotions or attitudes etc. were those of the reasonable person is merely to say, in a typically roundabout lawyer’s way, that one’s actions or beliefs or emotions or attitudes etc. were justified ones. It may be thought that at least some of the law’s uses of its reasonableness standard plainly defy this interpretation, so that it should not have taken a philosophical virtuoso like Ripstein to alert me to its deficiencies. What about the familiar cases, mentioned in even the most pedestrian of criminal-law","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134254286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law","authors":"John Gardner","doi":"10.1093/CLP/53.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CLP/53.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract of this article to come.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116210728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2000-01-01DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695553.003.0001
John Gardner
This paper simultaneously pursues two comparisons: (1) a comparison between the religious believer's presupposition of God's existence and the lawyer's presupposition of the bindingness of the first constitution; and (2) a comparison between Soren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion and Hans Kelsen's philosophy of law. Altough both exercises throw up some important disanalogies, there are also many valuable lessons, especially concerning the intellectual fate of the tradition known as 'legal positivism'.
{"title":"Law as a Leap of Faith","authors":"John Gardner","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695553.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695553.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper simultaneously pursues two comparisons: (1) a comparison between the religious believer's presupposition of God's existence and the lawyer's presupposition of the bindingness of the first constitution; and (2) a comparison between Soren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion and Hans Kelsen's philosophy of law. Altough both exercises throw up some important disanalogies, there are also many valuable lessons, especially concerning the intellectual fate of the tradition known as 'legal positivism'.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114839672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article suggests a reading of various works by Jacques Derrida as an attempt to present some of his philosophical views on the nature of law and justice.
本文建议阅读雅克·德里达的各种著作，试图呈现他对法律和正义本质的一些哲学观点。
{"title":"The Economy of Violence: Derrida on Law and Justice","authors":"Roberto Buonamano","doi":"10.1111/1467-9337.00083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9337.00083","url":null,"abstract":"The article suggests a reading of various works by Jacques Derrida as an attempt to present some of his philosophical views on the nature of law and justice.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114384255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I begin, in Parts I-III, by presenting the details of the Baker and Hacker/community consensus debate over the nature of rule-following in the later Wittgenstein. In Part IV this philosophical debate is related to the law through the argument that there is both an internal and an external element to rule-following in law. I here assert one of the principal claims of my position: viz., that legal argument is directed at constructing the point of law. Part V introduces the distinction between the formal and the material elements of a concept. As I shall show in detail, form is a heuristic for illuminating conceptual understanding. In Part VI, I move on to provide several examples in support of the form/matter distinction. Part VI also provides arguments in support of the proposition that understanding is internal to a practice and thus not necessarily coextensive with regularity in behavior. Parts VII-IX examine relevant claims made by Wittgenstein and their application to law. Finally, Parts X-XI sketch and illustrate my ultimate claim, a narrative approach to law.
{"title":"Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative","authors":"Dennis Patterson","doi":"10.2307/1073154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1073154","url":null,"abstract":"I begin, in Parts I-III, by presenting the details of the Baker and Hacker/community consensus debate over the nature of rule-following in the later Wittgenstein. In Part IV this philosophical debate is related to the law through the argument that there is both an internal and an external element to rule-following in law. I here assert one of the principal claims of my position: viz., that legal argument is directed at constructing the point of law. Part V introduces the distinction between the formal and the material elements of a concept. As I shall show in detail, form is a heuristic for illuminating conceptual understanding. In Part VI, I move on to provide several examples in support of the form/matter distinction. Part VI also provides arguments in support of the proposition that understanding is internal to a practice and thus not necessarily coextensive with regularity in behavior. Parts VII-IX examine relevant claims made by Wittgenstein and their application to law. Finally, Parts X-XI sketch and illustrate my ultimate claim, a narrative approach to law.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122376258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511575488.012
W. Edmundson
Pluralism is an appealing and now orthodox view of the sources of value. But pluralism has led to well-known difficulties for social-choice theory. Moreover, as Susan Hurley has argued, the difficulties of pluralism go even deeper. In 1954, Kenneth May suggested an intrapersonal analogue to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. In brief, May showed that an individual's response to a plurality of values will, given certain additional assumptions, lead to intransitive preference orderings. (Daniel Kahneman and others have shown that intransitivity is an empirical feature of preferences.) Hurley challenged May's additional assumptions as implausibly strong; but her work did not exclude the possibility that values may disobey the canon of rationality that insists on transitivity. John Broome has recently extended these canons to the "betterness" relation. This chapter argues that there is no good reason to be confident that values, understood as real features of the world, behave consistently with those canons.
{"title":"Pluralism, Intransitivity, Incoherence","authors":"W. Edmundson","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511575488.012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575488.012","url":null,"abstract":"Pluralism is an appealing and now orthodox view of the sources of value. But pluralism has led to well-known difficulties for social-choice theory. Moreover, as Susan Hurley has argued, the difficulties of pluralism go even deeper. In 1954, Kenneth May suggested an intrapersonal analogue to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. In brief, May showed that an individual's response to a plurality of values will, given certain additional assumptions, lead to intransitive preference orderings. (Daniel Kahneman and others have shown that intransitivity is an empirical feature of preferences.) Hurley challenged May's additional assumptions as implausibly strong; but her work did not exclude the possibility that values may disobey the canon of rationality that insists on transitivity. John Broome has recently extended these canons to the \"betterness\" relation. This chapter argues that there is no good reason to be confident that values, understood as real features of the world, behave consistently with those canons.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129347301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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