Timothy Brennan, Places of Mind: A Life of Edward Said. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021. Pp. 464. H. Aram Veeser, Edward Said: The Charisma of Criticism. New York: Routledge, 2010. Pp. 272. Watching the famous 1986 debate between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis at the Middle East Studies Association some thirty-six years later, one is struck by the element of spectacle in the exercise, as well as the sheer superficiality of the discussion. Ostensibly a debate between two men whose bitter arguments had until then been limited to the printed page, Columbia English professor Edward Said and the (by then retired) Princeton Arabist Bernard Lewis debated “the scholars, the media, and the Middle East.” Two additional panelists, correspondent for the Nation Christopher Hitchens, at that time a Left zealot, and Leon Wieseltier, a former student of Said’s and literary editor at the New Republic, occasionally spoke as well.
蒂莫西·布伦南,《心灵之地:爱德华·赛义德的一生》。纽约:Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021。464页。H. Aram Veeser, Edward Said:批评的魅力。纽约:劳特利奇出版社,2010。272页。36年后的1986年,爱德华•萨义德(Edward Said)与伯纳德•刘易斯(Bernard Lewis)在中东研究协会(Middle East Studies Association)进行了一场著名的辩论。当我们回顾这场辩论时,我们会惊讶于这场辩论中的场面元素,以及讨论的纯粹肤浅。表面上看,哥伦比亚大学英语教授爱德华·赛义德(Edward Said)和普林斯顿大学阿拉伯学者伯纳德·刘易斯(Bernard Lewis)就“学者、媒体和中东”展开了辩论,两人的激烈争论当时还局限于纸面上。另外两名小组成员,《国家》的记者克里斯托弗·希钦斯(Christopher Hitchens),当时是左翼狂热分子,以及赛义德以前的学生、《新共和》的文学编辑莱昂·维塞尔蒂埃(Leon Wieseltier),偶尔也会发言。
{"title":"The World Said Built","authors":"M. Wagner","doi":"10.3817/0622199180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0622199180","url":null,"abstract":"Timothy Brennan, Places of Mind: A Life of Edward Said. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021. Pp. 464. H. Aram Veeser, Edward Said: The Charisma of Criticism. New York: Routledge, 2010. Pp. 272. Watching the famous 1986 debate between Edward Said and Bernard Lewis at the Middle East Studies Association some thirty-six years later, one is struck by the element of spectacle in the exercise, as well as the sheer superficiality of the discussion. Ostensibly a debate between two men whose bitter arguments had until then been limited to the printed page, Columbia English professor Edward Said and the (by then retired) Princeton Arabist Bernard Lewis debated “the scholars, the media, and the Middle East.” Two additional panelists, correspondent for the Nation Christopher Hitchens, at that time a Left zealot, and Leon Wieseltier, a former student of Said’s and literary editor at the New Republic, occasionally spoke as well.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"66 1","pages":"180 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88027088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A keynote speaker at the German Studies Association Conference in October 2013 was the renowned historian David Blackbourn, who—together with Geoff Eley—had originally made his reputation by challenging the well-entrenched Sonderweg interpretation of the course of modern German historical development. His keynote address, however, had the far less intellectually lofty, and certainly more humorous, title “Honey, I Shrunk German History.”1
{"title":"“Little History”: The Crisis in U.S. Academic History","authors":"Joseph W. Bendersky","doi":"10.3817/0922200184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0922200184","url":null,"abstract":"A keynote speaker at the German Studies Association Conference in October 2013 was the renowned historian David Blackbourn, who—together with Geoff Eley—had originally made his reputation by challenging the well-entrenched Sonderweg interpretation of the course of modern German historical development. His keynote address, however, had the far less intellectually lofty, and certainly more humorous, title “Honey, I Shrunk German History.”1","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"2 1","pages":"184 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76797343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is no doubt that world literature has close relations with Chinese literature as Goethe first conceptualized the term Weltliteratur after he had read some Chinese literary works of minor importance through English or French translation. But unfortunately, for a long period of time, Chinese literature has never occupied a prominent position on the map of world literature, largely due to a long-standing “Eurocentric” and later “Western-centric” mode of thinking. Despite this, Chinese translators and literary scholars have in the past hundred years still spent much time and energy bringing various foreign, especially Western, literary doctrines and trends of literature and culture into China. Thus there has appeared an unbalanced situation of literary translation. On the one hand, numerous foreign literary works, especially Western literary works, have come to China through translation and critical introduction; but on the other hand, few contemporary Chinese literary works have been translated for the outside world, although quite a few classical and modern Chinese literary works have been translated into major foreign languages. Mo Yan is certainly one of the very few contemporary novelists who has attracted not only the literary book market but also the authoritative institutions, including the Swedish Academy, which awarded him the prestigious Nobel Prize for Literature in 2012. He was naturally very happy about that, but at the same time he expressed his worry and hope for Chinese literature: “my next dream will be that one day, some young Western writers will say that their work is inspired and influenced by certain Chinese writers.”1 This is also the hope and dream that many other contemporary Chinese writers have, though most contemporary Chinese writers, including Mo Yan himself, started their writing career under the influence of foreign literature, especially Western literature. To them, Western literature is almost equal to world literature, and to read and study Western literary works means to read and study world literature. Similarly, to go to the West simply means to go global, as international literary circles are always dominated by Western literature. But even so, we could still find that quite a few important contemporary Chinese novelists have succeeded in being among world literature. Not only do their novels sell well in international book markets, but they are also critically discussed by international literary critical circles and scholarship. Of these writers, I will discuss here four representatives who have acquired considerable international reputations and influence with their outstanding achievements and unique characteristics. They should be recognized as world-class writers for their writings are certainly of world significance.
{"title":"Contemporary Chinese Fiction and Its Relations with World Literature","authors":"Ning Wang","doi":"10.3817/0622199083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0622199083","url":null,"abstract":"There is no doubt that world literature has close relations with Chinese literature as Goethe first conceptualized the term Weltliteratur after he had read some Chinese literary works of minor importance through English or French translation. But unfortunately, for a long period of time, Chinese literature has never occupied a prominent position on the map of world literature, largely due to a long-standing “Eurocentric” and later “Western-centric” mode of thinking. Despite this, Chinese translators and literary scholars have in the past hundred years still spent much time and energy bringing various foreign, especially Western, literary doctrines and trends of literature and culture into China. Thus there has appeared an unbalanced situation of literary translation. On the one hand, numerous foreign literary works, especially Western literary works, have come to China through translation and critical introduction; but on the other hand, few contemporary Chinese literary works have been translated for the outside world, although quite a few classical and modern Chinese literary works have been translated into major foreign languages. Mo Yan is certainly one of the very few contemporary novelists who has attracted not only the literary book market but also the authoritative institutions, including the Swedish Academy, which awarded him the prestigious Nobel Prize for Literature in 2012. He was naturally very happy about that, but at the same time he expressed his worry and hope for Chinese literature: “my next dream will be that one day, some young Western writers will say that their work is inspired and influenced by certain Chinese writers.”1 This is also the hope and dream that many other contemporary Chinese writers have, though most contemporary Chinese writers, including Mo Yan himself, started their writing career under the influence of foreign literature, especially Western literature. To them, Western literature is almost equal to world literature, and to read and study Western literary works means to read and study world literature. Similarly, to go to the West simply means to go global, as international literary circles are always dominated by Western literature. But even so, we could still find that quite a few important contemporary Chinese novelists have succeeded in being among world literature. Not only do their novels sell well in international book markets, but they are also critically discussed by international literary critical circles and scholarship. Of these writers, I will discuss here four representatives who have acquired considerable international reputations and influence with their outstanding achievements and unique characteristics. They should be recognized as world-class writers for their writings are certainly of world significance.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"51 1","pages":"83 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90656863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
America’s prestige as the bearer of a liberal democratic world order has taken a dent due to both geopolitical power shifts and the debilitating polarization of American democratic culture. Relatedly, symbolic power has been shifting away from liberal ideals and standards of legitimacy globally.1 It has become ever harder to deny that a variety of non-Western civilizational states, China chief among them, will not conform, nor even try to conform, to the West’s liberal democratic standards. Though these states imported all kinds of Western-style institutions in their earlier phases of modernization, they now seem ever more determined to break free from the West’s gravitational pull.
{"title":"The Polemics of China’s Counter Cosmopolitanism","authors":"Eric Hendriks-Kim","doi":"10.3817/1222201013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/1222201013","url":null,"abstract":"America’s prestige as the bearer of a liberal democratic world order has taken a dent due to both geopolitical power shifts and the debilitating polarization of American democratic culture. Relatedly, symbolic power has been shifting away from liberal ideals and standards of legitimacy globally.1 It has become ever harder to deny that a variety of non-Western civilizational states, China chief among them, will not conform, nor even try to conform, to the West’s liberal democratic standards. Though these states imported all kinds of Western-style institutions in their earlier phases of modernization, they now seem ever more determined to break free from the West’s gravitational pull.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"21 1","pages":"13 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83871180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Secularity is not merely to deny the existence of God or obstruct the practice of religion; it is also, and even more precisely, to confine God to the practice of religion.
世俗主义不仅仅是否认上帝的存在或阻碍宗教的实践;更确切地说,这是把上帝限制在宗教的实践中。
{"title":"Russia, the Ukraine War, and the West’s Empire of Secularization","authors":"Matthew J. Dal Santo","doi":"10.3817/1222201146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/1222201146","url":null,"abstract":"Secularity is not merely to deny the existence of God or obstruct the practice of religion; it is also, and even more precisely, to confine God to the practice of religion.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"15 38 1","pages":"146 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79623383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Kahn and Tim Luke base their claim that the United States is involved in a civil war on the implacability of the political differences between left and right that prevent any reconciliation. Arguing that the differences go beyond policy choices to questions of identity that are not subject to the compromises of party politics, they interpret recent examples of violence such as the January 6 Capitol riots as the rule rather than the exception. Yet in indicating that we are in an indefinite state of exception, they obscure the moment of decision that is part of the exception. Kahn notes that war is the opposite of the sovereign ability to decide. But a state of indecision is not in fact a state of war. It is just a lack of clear sovereignty that can last indefinitely until a sovereign emerges who is able to establish a decision. The state of war only results when two competing sovereigns emerge and both attempt to decide on a state of exception, that is to say, both are able to mobilize people to kill and die to establish their understanding of their identity.1 The United States is still very far away from this scenario. As Mark G. E. Kelly notes, the institutions of the United States are still functioning properly, and even if there is rhetoric on both sides that rejects election results, the outcomes of elections have been honored in practice and the mechanisms of government continue to function without problem. There is no immediate paralysis that would indicate a state of indecision, and there is not even the prospect of competing sovereigns who would both declare states of exception to begin a war.
保罗·卡恩(Paul Kahn)和蒂姆·卢克(Tim Luke)声称,美国卷入了一场内战,原因是左翼和右翼之间不可调和的政治分歧阻碍了任何和解。他们认为,这种差异超越了政策选择,而是身份问题,不受政党政治妥协的影响。他们将最近发生的暴力事件(如1月6日国会大厦骚乱)解释为普遍现象,而不是例外。然而,在表明我们处于一种不确定的例外状态时,它们模糊了作为例外的一部分的决定时刻。卡恩指出,战争是主权决策能力的对立面。但优柔寡断的状态实际上并不是战争状态。它只是缺乏明确的主权,这种主权可以无限期地持续下去,直到出现一个能够制定决策的主权。战争状态只有在两个相互竞争的主权国家出现时才会产生,并且都试图决定一种例外状态,也就是说,双方都能够动员人民杀戮和死亡,以建立他们对自己身份的理解美国离这种情况还很遥远。正如马克·g·e·凯利(Mark G. E. Kelly)所指出的那样,美国的制度仍在正常运转,即使双方都在口头上反对选举结果,但选举结果在实践中得到了尊重,政府机制继续正常运转。目前还没有出现表明优柔寡断的立即瘫痪状态,甚至不可能出现主权国家相互竞争,双方都宣布进入例外状态以发动战争的情况。
{"title":"The Underlying Unity of the American People","authors":"D. Pan","doi":"10.3817/0322198159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0322198159","url":null,"abstract":"Paul Kahn and Tim Luke base their claim that the United States is involved in a civil war on the implacability of the political differences between left and right that prevent any reconciliation. Arguing that the differences go beyond policy choices to questions of identity that are not subject to the compromises of party politics, they interpret recent examples of violence such as the January 6 Capitol riots as the rule rather than the exception. Yet in indicating that we are in an indefinite state of exception, they obscure the moment of decision that is part of the exception. Kahn notes that war is the opposite of the sovereign ability to decide. But a state of indecision is not in fact a state of war. It is just a lack of clear sovereignty that can last indefinitely until a sovereign emerges who is able to establish a decision. The state of war only results when two competing sovereigns emerge and both attempt to decide on a state of exception, that is to say, both are able to mobilize people to kill and die to establish their understanding of their identity.1 The United States is still very far away from this scenario. As Mark G. E. Kelly notes, the institutions of the United States are still functioning properly, and even if there is rhetoric on both sides that rejects election results, the outcomes of elections have been honored in practice and the mechanisms of government continue to function without problem. There is no immediate paralysis that would indicate a state of indecision, and there is not even the prospect of competing sovereigns who would both declare states of exception to begin a war.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"61 1","pages":"159 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80588984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the difference between left-wing anarchism and right-wing anarchism, also called libertarianism? The present article proposes to answer this question by using Peter Singer’s “effective altruism” theory as a middle ground between them. “Effective altruism,” Singer writes, “is based on a very simple idea: we should do the most good we can.”1 It follows from “the project of using evidence and reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible, and taking action on that basis.”2 Effective altruism then appears as a mix between social redistribution and moral calculation. It clearly presents itself as a branch of utilitarianism. I intend to question the political status of this project. Is effective altruism able to provide a new anarchist vision of politics through the practices of the nonreciprocal gift? Does it interrupt the logic of profit or does it, on the contrary, aggravate it?
{"title":"Effective Altruism in between Right-Wing and Left-Wing Anarchisms","authors":"C. Malabou","doi":"10.3817/0322198009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0322198009","url":null,"abstract":"What is the difference between left-wing anarchism and right-wing anarchism, also called libertarianism? The present article proposes to answer this question by using Peter Singer’s “effective altruism” theory as a middle ground between them. “Effective altruism,” Singer writes, “is based on a very simple idea: we should do the most good we can.”1 It follows from “the project of using evidence and reason to figure out how to benefit others as much as possible, and taking action on that basis.”2 Effective altruism then appears as a mix between social redistribution and moral calculation. It clearly presents itself as a branch of utilitarianism. I intend to question the political status of this project. Is effective altruism able to provide a new anarchist vision of politics through the practices of the nonreciprocal gift? Does it interrupt the logic of profit or does it, on the contrary, aggravate it?","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"469 1","pages":"9 - 22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78807906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Tired of Science?! Notes on the Relationship between University and Society,” Michael Hüther insightfully updates a preoccupation of German intellectuals running back at least to Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties, the relationship between science and society, and so between “truth” and “politics,” and the extent to which an enlightened politics is even possible—but let us not get too far ahead of ourselves.
{"title":"From the Ivory Tower to the Football Stadium: A Rueful Response to Michael Hüther","authors":"David A. Westbrook","doi":"10.3817/0922200171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0922200171","url":null,"abstract":"In “Tired of Science?! Notes on the Relationship between University and Society,” Michael Hüther insightfully updates a preoccupation of German intellectuals running back at least to Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties, the relationship between science and society, and so between “truth” and “politics,” and the extent to which an enlightened politics is even possible—but let us not get too far ahead of ourselves.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"289 1","pages":"171 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73208978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are many ways to address the issue of the comparison between China and the West, and such comparisons have been made in different disciplines, for example, literature, philosophy, music, architecture, etc. Different as these comparisons are, they share one common point: most of the discussions are based on what already exists, and this is legitimate and logical as one cannot compare things that do not even exist. The importance of history and legacy can never be overstated, not to say overlooked. Nevertheless, to make comparisons that can enlighten the relationship between China and the West in the age of this pandemic, a prism beyond the narrative around China and the West per se may shed some light as well. Moreover, to compare China and the West in the contemporary age of the Anthropocene, the future, if there still is one, that is to be shared, or suffered, by both China and the West, should also be taken into consideration.
{"title":"Toward a Community of Shared Future for Mankind: A Perspective to Compare China and the West","authors":"Min Zhou","doi":"10.3817/0622199091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/0622199091","url":null,"abstract":"There are many ways to address the issue of the comparison between China and the West, and such comparisons have been made in different disciplines, for example, literature, philosophy, music, architecture, etc. Different as these comparisons are, they share one common point: most of the discussions are based on what already exists, and this is legitimate and logical as one cannot compare things that do not even exist. The importance of history and legacy can never be overstated, not to say overlooked. Nevertheless, to make comparisons that can enlighten the relationship between China and the West in the age of this pandemic, a prism beyond the narrative around China and the West per se may shed some light as well. Moreover, to compare China and the West in the contemporary age of the Anthropocene, the future, if there still is one, that is to be shared, or suffered, by both China and the West, should also be taken into consideration.","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"21 1","pages":"91 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87414752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1. Civilization—the Pivot of Geopolitics Civilization is the new pivot of geopolitics. The West’s retreat and the resurgence of China puts civilizational divergence at the heart of international relations at a time when the populist revolt since Brexit and Trump’s victory in 2016 has redefined Western politics along cultural lines.1 From the extreme identity politics that is sweeping the West to the rejection of Western universalism in the non-Western world, civilizational norms are as important as military might and economic power. As Christopher Coker writes, we are “living in a world in which civilisation is fast becoming the currency of international politics.”2
{"title":"Renewing the West’s Unique Universalism","authors":"Adrian Pabst","doi":"10.3817/1222201165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3817/1222201165","url":null,"abstract":"1. Civilization—the Pivot of Geopolitics Civilization is the new pivot of geopolitics. The West’s retreat and the resurgence of China puts civilizational divergence at the heart of international relations at a time when the populist revolt since Brexit and Trump’s victory in 2016 has redefined Western politics along cultural lines.1 From the extreme identity politics that is sweeping the West to the rejection of Western universalism in the non-Western world, civilizational norms are as important as military might and economic power. As Christopher Coker writes, we are “living in a world in which civilisation is fast becoming the currency of international politics.”2","PeriodicalId":43573,"journal":{"name":"Telos","volume":"23 1","pages":"165 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74685919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}