Monash Bioethics Review最新文献

There have been growing calls within Australia and beyond to defer medical interventions for children born with variations in their sex characteristics. These calls are increasingly grounded in the claim that such interventions when performed on infants and young children are a violation of their human rights. This paper examines the basis for this claim. It also examines the differences between the principles-based approach to medical ethics which has tended to dominant decisions regarding the treatment of children born with variations in their sex characteristics, relative to the adoption of a rights-based approach. It identifies the points of complementarity between these two discourses but suggests that a rights-based approach offers some unique and differing insights into several issues concerning children born with variations in their sex characteristics.

Medical practice has always involved at least three roles, three complimentary identities. Practitioners have been at once clinicians dedicated to a patient's care, members of a professional organization promoting medicine, and informed citizens engaged in public debates on health issues. Beginning in the 1970s, a series of social and technological changes affected, and in many cases restricted, the practitioner's ability to function equally in these three identities. While others have discussed the changing realities of medical practice in recent decades, none have commented on their effect on their effect on rights of practitioners as citizens. Here several cases begin an analysis of the manner in which those changes have limited the physician's right to act conscientiously and speak publicly in the face of organizational agendas and political priorities.

Given the lack of effective curative treatment options and in light of a significant reconceptualization of Alzheimer's disease, the focus of dementia research has shifted towards prevention, risk prediction, and detection in very early disease stages. In the context of these shifts, the edited volume Preventing Dementia?: Critical Perspectives on a New Paradigm of Preparing for Old Age (edited by Annette Leibing and Silke Schicktanz) collects critical and insightful positions on the new paradigm of dementia prevention from an interdisciplinary and international perspective. The editors introduce the overarching topic of prevention by reflecting on the optimistic framing of modifiable risk factors and their novelty in the dementia context. Leibing and Schicktanz call for a cautious reception of the findings in the Lancet report(s) and draw attention to epistemic, ethical, and socio-political issues of what the editors term the contested "new dementia" and to the effect that this might have on rethinking individual and societal perceptions of aging. The contributions of the anthology depict the social and cultural dimensions of dementia discourses and consider the ethical implications of the changing conceptions of Alzheimer's disease as well as the shift towards early disease stages and prevention. With this, the anthology initiates a debate about the often implicit unresolved social, ethical, and political implications and preconditions of the medical understanding and handling of cognitive disorders.

This commentary continues an exchange on eugenics in Monash Bioethics Review between (Anomaly in Defending Eugenics: From Cryptic Choice to Conscious Selection 35:24-35, 2018), (Wilson in Eugenics Undefended 37:68-75, 2019), and (Veit in Can 'Eugenics' be Defended? 39:60-67, 2021). The eponymous question, "Can 'Eugenics' be Defended?", is multiply ambiguous and does not receive a clear answer from Veit et al.. Despite their stated desire to move beyond mere semantics to matters of substance, Veit et al. concentrate on several uses of the term "eugenics" that pull in opposite directions. I argue, first, that (Veit in Can 'Eugenics' be Defended? 39:60-67, 2021) makes much the same error as does (Anomaly in Defending Eugenics: From Cryptic Choice to Conscious Selection 35:24-35, 2018) in characterizing eugenics; second, that the paper misunderstands the relationship between eugenics and enhancement; and third, that it distorts the views expressed in my "Eugenics Undefended".

Healthcare professionals often need to make clinical decisions that carry profound ethical implications. As such, they require a tool that will make decision-making intuitive. While the discussion about the principles that should guide clinical ethics has been going on for over two thousand years, it does not seem that making such decisions is becoming any more straight forward. With an abundance of competing ethical systems and frameworks for their application in real life, the clinician is still often not sure how to proceed in the face of ethical dilemmas, either due to a lack of background ethical knowledge or experience in applying it. This paper will discuss whether considering what one would expect one's friend to do if one was the patient, or what would one think they would do for a friend if they were the patient, can be a helpful, more intuitive, tool for clinical decision-making that can produce outcomes that are congruent with major ethical systems.

The practice of biobank networking-where biobanks are linked together, and researchers share human tissue samples-is an increasingly common practice both domestically and internationally. The benefits from networking in this way are well established. However, there is a need for ethical oversight in the sharing of human tissue. Ethics committees will increasingly be called upon to approve the sharing of tissue and data with other researchers, often via biobanks, and little guidance currently exists for such committees. In this paper, we provide a structured approach to the ethical review of on-sharing of data and tissue for research purposes.

Conversion therapy refers to a range of unscientific, discredited and harmful heterosexist practices that attempt to re-align an individual's sexual orientation, usually from non-heterosexual to heterosexual. In Australia, the state of Victoria recently joined Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory in criminalising conversion therapy. Although many other jurisdictions have also introduced legislation banning conversion therapy, it persists in over 60 countries. Children are particularly vulnerable to the harmful effects of conversion therapy, which can include coercion, rejection, isolation and blame. However, if new biotechnologies create safe and effective conversion therapies, the question posed here is whether it would ever be morally permissible to use them. In addressing this question, we need to closely examine the individual's circumstances and the prevailing social context in which conversion therapy is employed. I argue that, even in a sexually unjust world, conversion therapy may be morally permissible if it were the only safe and effective means of relieving intense anguish and dysphoria for the individual. The person providing the conversion therapy must be qualified, sufficiently independent from any religious organisation and must provide conversion therapy in a way that is positively affirming of the individual and their existing sexuality.

Travel for reproductive health care has become a widespread global phenomenon. Within the field, the decision to travel to seek third parties to assist with reproduction is widely assumed to be autonomous. However there has been scant research exploring the application of the principle of autonomy to the experience of the cross-border traveller. Seeking to contribute to the growing, but still small, body of sociological bioethics research, this paper maps the application of the ethical principle of autonomy to the lived experience of infertile individuals who cross borders for reproductive care. It examines their choices as patient, consumer and traveller. It suggests that their experience evidences a contradictory autonomy, which offers them both choice and no choice in their final decision to travel. The paper argues that this lack of meaningful autonomy is enabled by a medicalised framework of infertility which prioritises technology as the cure to infertility. This both shapes expectations of infertile individuals and limits their options of family creation. Ultimately, the paper suggests that sociological bioethics research shows that the liberatory credentials of technology should be questioned, and identifies that this field demands greater scholarly attention.