Monash Bioethics Review最新文献

Stimulated by development of reproductive technologies, many current bioethical accounts of parenthood focus on defining parenthood at or around birth. They tend to exclude from their scope some parent-child relationships that develop later in a child's life. In reality, a parent-child relationship can emerge or dissolve over time: the parents of person A as an adolescent or adult may be different to her parents when she is a young child. To address this aspect of parenthood, we propose a new 'mutuality account' of parenthood, grounded in the concept of ontological security. We argue that in most cases a parent-child relationship exists if there is mutual ontological security between the parent and child. We suggest that this mutual ontological security is constituted and sustained by shared frameworks of reality and cohesive personal narratives. Our intention is to broaden the conceptual understanding of parenthood, to include parent-child relationships that do not fall neatly into current bioethical accounts, and to argue against the notion that objective physiological, causal, or social ties are necessary to 'make' a parent.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of biosafety in the biomedical sciences. While it is often assumed that biosafety is a purely technical matter that has little to do with philosophy or the humanities, biosafety raises important ethical issues that have not been adequately examined in the scientific or bioethics literature. This article reviews some pivotal events in the history of biosafety and biosecurity and explores three different biosafety topics that generate significant ethical concerns, i.e., risk assessment, risk management, and risk distribution. The article also discusses the role of democratic governance in the oversight of biosafety and offers some suggestions for incorporating bioethics into biosafety practice, education, and policy.

Healthcare practitioners have access to a range of ethical guidance. However, the normative role of this guidance in ethical decision-making is underexplored. This paper considers two ways that healthcare practitioners could approach ethics guidance. We first outline the idea of deference to ethics guidance, showing how an attitude of deference raises three key problems: moral value; moral understanding; and moral error. Drawing on philosophical literature, we then advocate an alternative framing of ethics guidance as a form of moral testimony by colleagues and suggest that a more promising attitude to ethics guidance is to approach it in the spirit of 'critical engagement' rather than deference.

COVID-19 presents a variety of ethical challenges in a set of arenas, arenas not always considered in past pandemics. These challenges include issues related to autonomy, distributive ethics, and the establishment of policies of equity and justice. Methods are a literature review based on regular editing of an online textbook during the COVID-19 outbreak and a literature review using key ethical terms. Patients are confronted with new issues related to autonomy. Providers need to expand their concepts of ethical issues to include decisions based on proportionality and public health ethics. The public health sector needs to assess the beneficence of alternative modes of disease control. The research community needs to redefine the concept of informed consent in emergent conditions. All elements of the medical spectrum-physicians, scientists, and the community-at-large including the pharmaceutical industry-need to consider the multifaceted methods for preventing future pandemics. This will require giving particular emphasis to public health funding and ending the documented discrimination that exists in the provision of proven therapies. The developing world is especially at risk for most of the ethical issues, especially those related to equity and justice. The ethical issues associated with the COVID-19 outbreak are not unique but provide a diverse set of issues that apply to patients, providers, social groups, and investigators. The further study of such issues can help with preventing future outbreaks.

Contact investigation is an evidence-based intervention of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) to protect public health by interrupting the chain of transmission. In pursuit of contact investigation, patients' MDR-TB status has to be disclosed to third parties (to the minimum necessary) for tracing the contacts. Nevertheless, disclosure to third parties often unintentionally leads the MDR-TB patients suffered from social discrimination and stigma. For this reason, patients are less inclined to reveal their MDR-TB status and becomes a significant issue in contact investigation. This issue certainly turns into a negative impact on the public interest. Tension between keeping MDR-TB status confidential and safeguarding public health arises in relation to this issue. Regarding MDR-TB management, patient compliance with treatment and contact investigation are equally important. Patients might fail to comply with anti-TB therapy and be reluctant to seek healthcare due to disclosure concerns. In order to have treatment adherence, MDRTB patients should not live through social discrimination and stigma arising from disclosure and TB team has a duty to support them as a mean of reciprocity. However, implementation of contact investigation as a public health policy can still be challenging even with promising reciprocal support to the patients because MDR-TB patients are living in different contexts and situations. There can be no straight forward settlement but an appropriate justification for each distinct context is needed to strike a balance between individual confidentiality and public interest.

The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation - which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill's harm principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion - i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can't adequately capture the cumulative and "looping effects" of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose "psychic costs", affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures.

Is it wrong to create a blind child, for example by in vitro fertilization, if you could create a sighted child instead? Intuitively many people believe it is wrong, but this belief is difficult to justify. When there is a possibility to create and select either 'blind' or 'sighted' embryos choosing a set of 'blind' embryos seems to harm no-one since choosing 'sighted' embryos would create a different child altogether. So when the parents choose 'blind' embryos, they give some specific individual a life that is the only option for her. Because her life is worth living (as blind peoples' lives are), the parents have not wronged the child by creating her. This is the reasoning behind the famous non-identity problem. I suggest that the non-identity problem is based on a misunderstanding. I claim that when choosing a 'blind' embryo, prospective parents harm 'their child', whoever she or he will be. Put another way: parents harm their child in the de dicto sense and that is morally wrong.