Monash Bioethics Review最新文献

Figuring out what pushes individuals to become organ donors has become the holy grail of social scientists interested in transplantations. In this paper I concentrate on solidarity as a determinant of organ donation and examine it through the history of organ donation in Israel. By following the history of transplantation policies since 1968 and examining them in relation to different types of solidarities, this paper leads to a nuanced understanding of the ties between solidarity and health policy. Attempts to foster an all-encompassing consensus on the definition of brain death yielded the Transplantation and the Brain-Respiratory Death Laws of 2008. It was hoped that a wide "civic solidarity" would render Israel self-sufficient in its organ economy. However, the failure of the law led to the breakdown of civic solidarity in organ donation. As a result, initiatives such as the priority policy and non-directed living organ donations, developed out of a narrower conception of solidarity. Juxtaposing these initiatives sheds light on macro level processes for policy makers and suggests solidarity as a key bioethical concept to understand organ donation policies.

Doctors routinely refuse donation offers from prospective living kidney donors with certain comorbidities such as diabetes or obesity out of concern for donor wellbeing. This refusal occurs despite the ongoing shortage of kidney transplants and the superior performance of living donor kidney transplants compared to those from deceased donors. In this paper, we argue that this paternalistic refusal by doctors is unjustified and that, within limits, there should be greater acceptance of such donations. We begin by describing possible weak and strong paternalistic justifications of current conservative donor acceptance guidelines and practices. We then justify our position by outlining the frequently under-recognised benefits and the routinely overestimated harms of such donation, before discussing the need to respect the autonomy of willing donors with certain comorbidities. Finally, we respond to a number of possible objections to our proposal for more liberal kidney donor acceptance criteria. We use the situation in Australia as our case study, but our argument is applicable to comparable situations around the world.

There are increasing pressures for bioethics to emphasise 'translation'. Against this backdrop, we defend 'speculative bioethics'. We explore speculation as an important tool and line of bioethical inquiry. Further, we examine the relationship between speculation and translational bioethics and posit that speculation can support translational work. First, speculative research might be conducted as ethical analysis of contemporary issues through a new lens, in which case it supports translational work. Second, speculation might be a first step prior to translational work on a topic. Finally, speculative bioethics might constitute different content altogether, without translational objectives. For each conception of speculative bioethics, important methodological aspects determine whether it constitutes good bioethics research. We conclude that whether speculative bioethics is compatible with translational bioethics-and to what extent-depends on whether it is being employed as tool or content. Applying standards of impact uniformly across bioethics may inappropriately limit speculative bioethics.

A contemporary serious lack of scientific knowledge by the general public and many decision-makers is now quite perceptible, both globally and in Portugal. Living in a science-driven technological world filled with scientific illiteracy is dangerous and a path toward disaster. Recent years brought a fairly strong global movement promoting the so-called "alternative therapy" that also affected Portugal. I propose an evidence-based ethics reflection and argumentation, both encompassing the global and the specific Portuguese reality. I debate the specific arguments used in favour of alternative therapies, demonstrating the inherent fallacies of thought, deliberate manipulation of words and concepts, and the dire consequences for global and local health politics by following this line of biased reasoning.

A prominent concern in the literature on the ethics of human enhancement is that unequal access to future technology will exacerbate existing societal inequalities. The philosopher Daniel Wikler has argued that a futuristic cognitively enhanced majority would be justified in restricting the civil liberties of the unenhanced minority population for their own good in the same way that, mutatis mutandis, the cognitively normal majority are now justified in restricting the civil liberties of those deemed to be cognitively incompetent. Contrary to this argument, the author of this manuscript presents and defends The Liberal Argument to Protect Cognitive 'Normals'. According to this argument, while classical liberalism authorizes the cognitively competent to paternalistically restrict the civil liberties of the cognitively incompetent, classical liberalism does not authorize the cognitively enhanced to paternalistically restrict the civil liberties of the cognitively normal. Two additional arguments are developed in support of The Liberal Argument to Protect Cognitive 'Normals'. The author of this manuscript concludes by suggesting that classical liberalism could be valuable for protecting the civil liberties of disenfranchised groups in a future in which enhancement technology could exacerbate existing societal inequalities.

One prominent argument against the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to select a deaf embryo with the aim of creating a deaf child is that it violates the child's right to an open future. This paper challenges the open future argument against deaf embryo selection, criticizing its major premise that deafness limits a child's opportunity range in ways that compromise their future autonomy. I argue that this premise is not justified and is supported by negative presumptions about deaf embodiments that are suspect and in need of further argumentation. First, available interpretations of the open future concept fail to justify the devaluation of deaf traits as inherently autonomy-diminishing. Second, arguing against deaf embryo selection requires demonstrating that a deaf trait generally constrains opportunity ranges independent of social context. But such analyses neglect important social and relational components of autonomy. For these reasons, merely appealing to the child's right to an open future does not sufficiently support the conclusion that deaf embryo selection is wrong.

Due to the rapid advance of the pandemic caused by COVID-19, several countries perceived that human and material resources would be insufficient to meet the demand of infected patients. The aim of this study is to analyze the knowledge of health professionals working in the pandemic about the application of ethical criteria in decision-making in situations of resource scarcity. This is a cross-sectional, descriptive, and quantitative survey study, conducted from June to December 2020, with health professionals working in the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil. We applied a questionnaire to assess the professionals' knowledge about ethical criteria in decision-making in the allocation of scarce resources during the pandemic, containing 14 questions and possible score from 0 to 70, which was developed by researchers from documents and protocols validated by organizations from various countries, available in the first months of the pandemic, a sociodemographic characterization questionnaire and a self-assessment questionnaire regarding knowledge about bioethics. A total of 197 health professionals participated in the study, 37.6% of whom were nurses and 22.8% of whom were physicians, working in the Family Health Unit (28.4%) with a degree at the level of specialization (46.2%). Moreover, (9.5%) of nurses, (18.2%) of dental surgeons and (24.4%) of physicians reported that they have no prior knowledge about bioethics. Physicians and hospital workers scored higher on the knowledge assessment questionnaire. The mean score of the participants was 45.4 (SD = 7.2). Investments in training and professional education in the field of health focused on Bioethics are necessary, considering models and ethical theories that help professionals, managers and society to better position themselves in the face of pandemic contexts.

There has been considerable debate over regulated organ markets. Especially current markets, where people sell one of their kidneys while still alive, have received increased attention. Futures markets remain an interesting and under-discussed alternative specification of a market-based solution to the organ shortage. Futures markets pertain to the sale of the right to procure people's organs after they die. There is a wide range of possible specifications of the futures market. There are, however, some major unaddressed efficiency concerns. This article presents this class of concerns and discusses the implication for organ futures markets. It identifies a number of inefficiency sources pertaining to crowding out, bad organs, costs and missed opportunities, family refusals, moral hazard and strength of the provided incentive. However, a complete assessment of futures market requires better knowledge regarding the potential reaction from donors, families and health professionals.

We examine the bioethical issues that arise from long-duration space missions, asking what there is that is distinctive about such issues. We pay particular attention to the possibility that such space missions, certainly if they lead to self-sustaining space settlements, may require human enhancement, and examine the significance of reproduction in space for bioethics. We conclude that while space bioethics raises important issues to do with human survival and reproduction in very hazardous environments, it raises no issues that are distinct from those in terrestrial bioethics. Rather, space bioethics raises extreme versions of bioethical issues that are already found in the military, when working in extreme environments (such as Antarctica), or when living in circumstances (such as in prison) where one's autonomy is severely curtailed.