Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836165021
H. Weidemann
In the fifth chapter of book Θ of his Metaphysics Aristotle takes the view that one possesses the rational potency to do x if and only if in any situation in which all external conditions that are necessary for one's doing x are fulfilled one only needs to have the will to do x in order actually to do x in a skillful way. The modern editors of Aristotle's Metaphysics have made it unnecessarily difficult to understand this chapter, because they deleted a crucial word in a certain sen- tence rather than adding a word that appears to be missing from that sentence.
{"title":"Was heißt es, etwas zu können? Philosophische und philologische Überlegungen zu Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 5","authors":"H. Weidemann","doi":"10.3196/004433022836165021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836165021","url":null,"abstract":"In the fifth chapter of book Θ of his Metaphysics Aristotle takes the view that one possesses the rational potency to do x if and only if in any situation in which all external conditions that are necessary for one's doing x are fulfilled one only needs to\u0000 have the will to do x in order actually to do x in a skillful way. The modern editors of Aristotle's Metaphysics have made it unnecessarily difficult to understand this chapter, because they deleted a crucial word in a certain sen- tence rather than adding a word that\u0000 appears to be missing from that sentence.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42348505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836165012
{"title":"Herausgegeben von Gerhard Ernst und Christof Rapp","authors":"","doi":"10.3196/004433022836165012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836165012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42244377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885681
Daniel Minkin
The text presents the current philosophical debate on conspiracy theories and discusses the positions of this debate. The focus is on the questions "What are conspiracy theories?" and "Is it justified to believe in conspiracy theories or how can we distinguish – if at all – warranted from unwarranted conspiracy theories?" The positions discussed will be explained and evaluated in recourse to current examples, e.g.regarding the Corona crisis. Finally, an assessment of the role of philosophy within media coverage and interdisciplinary research on conspiracy theories is given.
{"title":"Philosophie der Verschwörungstheorien: Eine kommentierte Übersicht über die philosophische Debatte","authors":"Daniel Minkin","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885681","url":null,"abstract":"The text presents the current philosophical debate on conspiracy theories and discusses the positions of this debate. The focus is on the questions \"What are conspiracy theories?\" and \"Is it justified to believe in conspiracy theories or how can we distinguish – if at all –\u0000 warranted from unwarranted conspiracy theories?\" The positions discussed will be explained and evaluated in recourse to current examples, e.g.regarding the Corona crisis. Finally, an assessment of the role of philosophy within media coverage and interdisciplinary research on conspiracy theories\u0000 is given.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48257248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885582
Jörg U. Noller
Are we essentially human animals or persons? The aim of this paper is to find a middle way between animalism and constitutionalism and to develop a concept of a person's life which avoids their problems. I will argue for the following thesis: As humans we are persons, but we are persons not in the sense of certain abilities which distinguish our biological kind, but by an intersubjective form of our life. Therefore, I will strictly distinguish between the biological species form of human beings and the life form of humans as persons. This allows me to develop an account of the personal life form which unifies metaphysics and value without succumbing to the naturalistic fallacy.
{"title":"Mensch oder Person? Jenseits von Animalismus und Konstitutionalismus","authors":"Jörg U. Noller","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885582","url":null,"abstract":"Are we essentially human animals or persons? The aim of this paper is to find a middle way between animalism and constitutionalism and to develop a concept of a person's life which avoids their problems. I will argue for the following thesis: As humans we are persons, but we are persons\u0000 not in the sense of certain abilities which distinguish our biological kind, but by an intersubjective form of our life. Therefore, I will strictly distinguish between the biological species form of human beings and the life form of humans as persons. This allows me to develop an account\u0000 of the personal life form which unifies metaphysics and value without succumbing to the naturalistic fallacy.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42545166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885609
C. Beisbart
This paper discusses recent attempts to solve the problem of induction. Two broad strategies to escape Hume's fork can be distinguished. The first tries to localize the justification of specific inductions in uncontroversial empirical knowledge, e.g.mundane scientific knowledge (J. D. Norton) or perception (M. Lange). I argue that related attempts to (dis)solve the problem fail. The second strategy tries to put forward an argument in favor of induction. As a discussion of work by R. White shows, this argument can barely prove that induction is reliable or at least not unreliable. But D. Steel, F. Huber and G. Schurz could show that enumerative induction is necessary and sufficient for a certain epistemic goal or optimal in a certain sense. These proofs, however, only solve the problem of induction if the goal or a certain standard has priority over the avoidance of error. This suggests that the difficulties to justify induction do not so much derive from Hume's fork, but rather from a plurality of sensible epistemic goals that can conflict with each other.
{"title":"Lässt sich die Induktion doch rechtfertigen? Eine kritische Diskussion von neuen Ansätzen zum Induktionsproblem","authors":"C. Beisbart","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885609","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses recent attempts to solve the problem of induction. Two broad strategies to escape Hume's fork can be distinguished. The first tries to localize the justification of specific inductions in uncontroversial empirical knowledge, e.g.mundane scientific knowledge (J.\u0000 D. Norton) or perception (M. Lange). I argue that related attempts to (dis)solve the problem fail. The second strategy tries to put forward an argument in favor of induction. As a discussion of work by R. White shows, this argument can barely prove that induction is reliable or at least not\u0000 unreliable. But D. Steel, F. Huber and G. Schurz could show that enumerative induction is necessary and sufficient for a certain epistemic goal or optimal in a certain sense. These proofs, however, only solve the problem of induction if the goal or a certain standard has priority over the\u0000 avoidance of error. This suggests that the difficulties to justify induction do not so much derive from Hume's fork, but rather from a plurality of sensible epistemic goals that can conflict with each other.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47180136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885636
Jochen Briesen
{"title":"Ästhetische Kriterien in der Theorieauswahl? Kommentar zu Olaf Müllers Zu schön, um falsch zu sein","authors":"Jochen Briesen","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885636","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49597596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885645
O. Müller
{"title":"Précis zu: Zu schön, um falsch zu sein. Über die Ästhetik in der Naturwissenschaft","authors":"O. Müller","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885645","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45811462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885591
B. Gesang
A legitimate moral justification has to be given by justifying a norm to everyone. Achieving unanimity about norms is a moral correctness criterion for certain contract theories. What exactly is meant by unanimity ? Most contract theorists quickly agree that unanimity, understood as the explicit factual agreement of everyone to a norm candidate, is de facto impossible to achieve. It is stated that the following types of consent can replace de facto unanimous consent: a) majority consent; b) rational consent, c) consent based on self-interest, d) consent based on transcendental interests and e) consent based on undisputed moral principles. I want to show that unanimous consent cannot be achieved in any of these ways, and if you claim that moral norms are based on unanimity or that there are no moral norms, then you have to dismiss morality.
{"title":"Über das Einstimmigkeitspostulat im Kontraktualismus1","authors":"B. Gesang","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885591","url":null,"abstract":"A legitimate moral justification has to be given by justifying a norm to everyone. Achieving unanimity about norms is a moral correctness criterion for certain contract theories. What exactly is meant by unanimity ? Most contract theorists quickly agree that unanimity,\u0000 understood as the explicit factual agreement of everyone to a norm candidate, is de facto impossible to achieve. It is stated that the following types of consent can replace de facto unanimous consent: a) majority consent; b) rational consent, c) consent based on self-interest, d) consent\u0000 based on transcendental interests and e) consent based on undisputed moral principles. I want to show that unanimous consent cannot be achieved in any of these ways, and if you claim that moral norms are based on unanimity or that there are no moral norms, then you have to dismiss morality.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48395517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022835885690
Lisa Schmalzried
{"title":"Sechs ästhetische Fragen an Müller: Kommentar zu Olaf Müllers Zu schön, um falsch zu sein","authors":"Lisa Schmalzried","doi":"10.3196/004433022835885690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885690","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47818222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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