Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.3196/004433023837453588
Jörg U. Noller
The phenomenon of envy has mostly been analyzed as a special form of a subject???s emotion or feeling. However, its rational structure and moral-psychological dimension have rarely been analyzed in detail. In this paper I argue that envy is not only an unpleasant complex emotion but rather a highly interesting attitude and strategy, which consists in finding reasons for denying another person the recognition she actually deserves. Envious people systematically confuse envy with justified moral resentment. This rationalizing denial of recognition is due to a form of rational self-deception by the envious person. I will analyze this strategy of envy in more detail by referring to John Rawls???s conception of justice and Immanuel Kant???s concept of rationalizing. I shall conclude by arguing that envy is characterized by a paradoxical structure, which consists in the fact that we never consciously and willingly envy, so that the speech act “I envy you” implies a performative contradiction.
{"title":"Die Logik des Neides Eine kantianische Analyse","authors":"Jörg U. Noller","doi":"10.3196/004433023837453588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023837453588","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenon of envy has mostly been analyzed as a special form of a subject???s emotion or feeling. However, its rational structure and moral-psychological dimension have rarely been analyzed in detail. In this paper I argue that envy is not only an unpleasant complex emotion but\u0000 rather a highly interesting attitude and strategy, which consists in finding reasons for denying another person the recognition she actually deserves. Envious people systematically confuse envy with justified moral resentment. This rationalizing denial of recognition is due to a form of rational\u0000 self-deception by the envious person. I will analyze this strategy of envy in more detail by referring to John Rawls???s conception of justice and Immanuel Kant???s concept of rationalizing. I shall conclude by arguing that envy is characterized by a paradoxical structure, which consists in\u0000 the fact that we never consciously and willingly envy, so that the speech act “I envy you” implies a performative contradiction.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49297843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.3196/004433023837453614
O. Müller
Diese klugen Reaktionen auf mein Buch unterscheiden sich erheblich. W??hrend Susanne Burri mit meiner Grundthese sympathisiert und mir in deren Rahmen zwei knifflige Probleme vorlegt, die sich konstruktiv bearbeiten lassen, geht Christoph Lumers Kritik ans Eingemachte: Im Rahmen des von ihm bevorzugten philosophischen Ansatzes stellt sich meine Herangehensweise als haltlos dar, weil ihr jede Rationalität abgeht.
{"title":"Repliken","authors":"O. Müller","doi":"10.3196/004433023837453614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023837453614","url":null,"abstract":"Diese klugen Reaktionen auf mein Buch unterscheiden sich erheblich. W??hrend Susanne Burri mit meiner Grundthese sympathisiert und mir in deren Rahmen zwei knifflige Probleme vorlegt, die sich konstruktiv bearbeiten lassen, geht Christoph Lumers Kritik ans Eingemachte: Im Rahmen des\u0000 von ihm bevorzugten philosophischen Ansatzes stellt sich meine Herangehensweise als haltlos dar, weil ihr jede Rationalität abgeht.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47697635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.3196/004433023837453524
O. Hallich
On 26 February 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany pronounced a judgement that the prohibition of assisted suicide services set out in § 217 of the Criminal Code is void. It thereby reestablished the legal state that had obtained before 2015. Furthermore, it defined the right to die as an autonomy-based right, thereby dissociating the right to take one???s life from states of extreme suffering caused by illness. The judgement implies that one can, in principle, resort to assistance for suicide even in the absence of illness and suffering. In this contribution, I deal with the problems that arise as a consequence of dissociating legitimate assisted suicide from states of illness. I analyze Bettina Schöne-Seifert???s suggestion to regard an understandable (,,nachvollziehbar“) wish to die as a wish that is protected by the right to autonomy. It turns out that the criterion of understandability is deficient: it either commits us to regarding every wish to die as understable or it undermines the anti-paternalistic requirement of respecting the patient???s autonomy
{"title":"Nachvollziehbarkeit als Kriterium für die Respektabilität von Sterbewünschen? Eine Kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Bettina Schöne-seiferts ,,flankiertem Bewertungssubjektivismus“","authors":"O. Hallich","doi":"10.3196/004433023837453524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023837453524","url":null,"abstract":"On 26 February 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany pronounced a judgement that the prohibition of assisted suicide services set out in § 217 of the Criminal Code is void. It thereby reestablished the legal state that had obtained before 2015. Furthermore, it defined\u0000 the right to die as an autonomy-based right, thereby dissociating the right to take one???s life from states of extreme suffering caused by illness. The judgement implies that one can, in principle, resort to assistance for suicide even in the absence of illness and suffering. In this contribution,\u0000 I deal with the problems that arise as a consequence of dissociating legitimate assisted suicide from states of illness. I analyze Bettina Schöne-Seifert???s suggestion to regard an understandable (,,nachvollziehbar“) wish to die as a wish that is protected by the right to\u0000 autonomy. It turns out that the criterion of understandability is deficient: it either commits us to regarding every wish to die as understable or it undermines the anti-paternalistic requirement of respecting the patient???s autonomy","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48459628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742614
F. Neumann
In the present paper, it is shown that Kant in his theory of fine art from the Critique of Aes thetic Judgment proves to be a proponent of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which art is, first, a source of non-trivial knowledge and, second, this knowledge also has aesthetic relevance. This issue has been raised several times in the recent research literature, but has not been substantiated, or only briefly. Central to this is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas, with which fine art symbolizes intellectual ideas of various genesis and with which his theory of art acquires a content-aesthetic dimension. Discussing recent research literature, an interpretation for the conception of aesthetic ideas and the accompanying expressive dimension of fine art is offered in a first part. Based on this, it will be shown in a second part that Kant hereby proves to be a representative of aesthetic cognitivism; this is shown by the fact that his theory of art confirms both criteria of aesthetic cognitivism.
{"title":"Warum Kant ein ästhetischer Kognitivist der schönen Kunst ist","authors":"F. Neumann","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742614","url":null,"abstract":"In the present paper, it is shown that Kant in his theory of fine art from the Critique of Aes thetic Judgment proves to be a proponent of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which art is, first, a source of non-trivial knowledge and, second, this knowledge also has aesthetic\u0000 relevance. This issue has been raised several times in the recent research literature, but has not been substantiated, or only briefly. Central to this is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas, with which fine art symbolizes intellectual ideas of various genesis and with which his theory of\u0000 art acquires a content-aesthetic dimension. Discussing recent research literature, an interpretation for the conception of aesthetic ideas and the accompanying expressive dimension of fine art is offered in a first part. Based on this, it will be shown in a second part that Kant hereby proves\u0000 to be a representative of aesthetic cognitivism; this is shown by the fact that his theory of art confirms both criteria of aesthetic cognitivism.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44215937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742641
Andy Mueller
{"title":"Précis zu: Beings of Thought and Action","authors":"Andy Mueller","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742641","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41475231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742687
{"title":"Die Autorinnen und Autoren dieses Heftes","authors":"","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742687","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47634860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742597
A. Mueller
{"title":"Repliken zu den Kommentaren","authors":"A. Mueller","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742597","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47889123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742605
Lisa Bastian
{"title":"Epistemisches Encroachment, positiv und negativ? Kommentar zu Beings of Thought and Action","authors":"Lisa Bastian","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742605","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46128996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742588
D. Wehinger
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body is often highlighted primarily for its emphasis on the conscious dimension of embodiment. What tends to be over-looked, however, is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to overcome the threat of a bifurcation of the body that this emphasis brings with it. In view of this, I show how Merleau-Ponty develops his theory of the human being as a mind-body-unity and how he aims to bridge the gap between the bodily and the conscious by way of the notion of being-in-the-world.
{"title":"Der Mensch als Leib-Seele-Einheit: Merleau-Ponty über Körperlichkeit","authors":"D. Wehinger","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742588","url":null,"abstract":"Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body is often highlighted primarily for its emphasis on the conscious dimension of embodiment. What tends to be over-looked, however, is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to overcome the threat of a bifurcation of the body that this emphasis brings with it. In\u0000 view of this, I show how Merleau-Ponty develops his theory of the human being as a mind-body-unity and how he aims to bridge the gap between the bodily and the conscious by way of the notion of being-in-the-world.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46838579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742650
Moritz Schulz
{"title":"Entscheidendes Wissen: Kommentar zu Beings of Thought and Action","authors":"Moritz Schulz","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742650","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45893938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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