Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742696
M. Cordes
In his book Meinungsverschiedenheiten (engl.: Disagreement) Marc Andree Weber defends a probability based conception of epistemic peerhood. Starting from this conception he proves the equal weight thesis, which prescribes that one should allocate the same weight to the beliefs of epistemic peers as to one's own beliefs. – In the present article I provide a much shorter proof. For that purpose I first formalize Weber's definition and thesis and I close the argumentative gap between the two of them by making relatively few additions. Toward the end, I will document the differences between Weber's proof and my proof and indicate the relevance of a second proof. No judgmental assessment will be sought.
Marc Andree Weber在其著作《美浓》（英语：Meinungsverschiedenheiten）中为基于概率的认识贵族概念辩护。从这个概念开始，他证明了同等权重理论，该理论规定，一个人应该为认识论同行的信仰分配与自己信仰相同的权重在本文中，我提供了一个简短得多的证明。为此，我首先将韦伯的定义和论点形式化，并通过相对较少的补充来缩小两者之间的争论差距。最后，我将记录韦伯的证明和我的证明之间的差异，并指出第二个证明的相关性。不会寻求评判性评估。
{"title":"Beweis der Gleichgewichtungsthese aus der Wahrscheinlichkeitskonzeption epistemischer Ebenbürtigkeit","authors":"M. Cordes","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742696","url":null,"abstract":"In his book Meinungsverschiedenheiten (engl.: Disagreement) Marc Andree Weber defends a probability based conception of epistemic peerhood. Starting from this conception he proves the equal weight thesis, which prescribes that one should allocate the same weight\u0000 to the beliefs of epistemic peers as to one's own beliefs. – In the present article I provide a much shorter proof. For that purpose I first formalize Weber's definition and thesis and I close the argumentative gap between the two of them by making relatively few additions. Toward the\u0000 end, I will document the differences between Weber's proof and my proof and indicate the relevance of a second proof. No judgmental assessment will be sought.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46566512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742669
{"title":"Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung Herausgegeben von Gerhard Ernst und Christof Rapp","authors":"","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742669","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43667061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.3196/004433023836742678
Lennert Busse
In this paper, I will investigate the problem of transparent white, as is it formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Remarks on Colour. I will do so by gathering transparency requirements from RC paragraphs to develop a clear definition of transparency. The impossibility of a transparent white will be explained by pointing to the fact that white conflicts with such a definition. Furthermore, based on Paul Gilbert's and Jonathan Westphal's discussion of the problem of transparent white, I will investigate the problem of transparent black. Although neither transparent white nor transparent black is possible, the impossibility of each is grounded on conflicts with different elements of the definition of transparency.
{"title":"Das Problem des transparenten Schwarz im Kontext von Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Farben","authors":"Lennert Busse","doi":"10.3196/004433023836742678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433023836742678","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I will investigate the problem of transparent white, as is it formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Remarks on Colour. I will do so by gathering transparency requirements from RC paragraphs to develop a clear definition of transparency. The impossibility\u0000 of a transparent white will be explained by pointing to the fact that white conflicts with such a definition. Furthermore, based on Paul Gilbert's and Jonathan Westphal's discussion of the problem of transparent white, I will investigate the problem of transparent black. Although\u0000 neither transparent white nor transparent black is possible, the impossibility of each is grounded on conflicts with different elements of the definition of transparency.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43968759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836164950
C. Halbig
{"title":"Individualität und Selbstbewertung: Kommentar zu Martin Hoffmanns Menschliche Individualität","authors":"C. Halbig","doi":"10.3196/004433022836164950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164950","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45477168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836164969
A. Hüttemann
In some German-language contributions to the debate on free will, it is assumed or claimed that determinism is not an empirically verifiable thesis. Peter Bieri, for example, thinks that one must presuppose determinism in order to understand the world as a conceivable world. Determinism would then not be an empirical thesis, but rather a condition without which the conceivability of the world cannot be thought (Bieri 2001, 15/16). Geert Keil writes that determinism "can neither be verified nor falsified experimentally and therefore determinism [is] a metaphysical thesis, not a scientific one" (Keil 2018, 58). In contrast to these two claims, I will argue that determinism is most usefully conceived as an empirical thesis whose verification faces many difficulties. These difficulties, however, are not fundamentally different from those faced by other empirical theses.
{"title":"Determinismus – eine empirische These","authors":"A. Hüttemann","doi":"10.3196/004433022836164969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164969","url":null,"abstract":"In some German-language contributions to the debate on free will, it is assumed or claimed that determinism is not an empirically verifiable thesis. Peter Bieri, for example, thinks that one must presuppose determinism in order to understand the world as a conceivable world. Determinism\u0000 would then not be an empirical thesis, but rather a condition without which the conceivability of the world cannot be thought (Bieri 2001, 15/16). Geert Keil writes that determinism \"can neither be verified nor falsified experimentally and therefore determinism [is] a metaphysical thesis,\u0000 not a scientific one\" (Keil 2018, 58). In contrast to these two claims, I will argue that determinism is most usefully conceived as an empirical thesis whose verification faces many difficulties. These difficulties, however, are not fundamentally different from those faced by other empirical\u0000 theses.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45529602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836164996
Ufuk Özbe
The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's attack. Rather, constitutivism is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism.
{"title":"Logical Aliens? Eine Verallgemeinerung und Verteidigung der Psychologismus-Kritik Freges gegen Wittgensteins Naturalismus","authors":"Ufuk Özbe","doi":"10.3196/004433022836164996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164996","url":null,"abstract":"The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's\u0000 arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's attack. Rather, constitutivism\u0000 is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments\u0000 to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43499870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836164932
Jochen Briesen, Rico Gutschmidt
In this essay, Heidegger's theses on art, as he develops them in the text "On the Origin of the Work of Art," are reconstructed, interpreted, and critically evalua- ted. In doing so, we pursue a threefold goal. First, his theses on art are put in relation to the main theme of his philosophy: the question of being. Second, the different ways in which Heidegger takes art to be epistemically valuable are dif- ferentiated and reconstructed in detail. Third, Heidegger's theses are related to the contemporary debate on the epistemic value of art and critically discussed.
{"title":"Sein und Kunst: Zum epistemischen Wert der Kunst bei Heidegger","authors":"Jochen Briesen, Rico Gutschmidt","doi":"10.3196/004433022836164932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164932","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, Heidegger's theses on art, as he develops them in the text \"On the Origin of the Work of Art,\" are reconstructed, interpreted, and critically evalua- ted. In doing so, we pursue a threefold goal. First, his theses on art are put in relation to the main theme of his philosophy:\u0000 the question of being. Second, the different ways in which Heidegger takes art to be epistemically valuable are dif- ferentiated and reconstructed in detail. Third, Heidegger's theses are related to the contemporary debate on the epistemic value of art and critically discussed.","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43723160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836165003
M. Hoffmann
{"title":"Replik auf Halbig und Reichold","authors":"M. Hoffmann","doi":"10.3196/004433022836165003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836165003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45586401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-15DOI: 10.3196/004433022836164987
M. Hoffmann
{"title":"Précis zu: Menschliche Individualität. Eine Studie zu den epistemologischen Grundlagen des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses","authors":"M. Hoffmann","doi":"10.3196/004433022836164987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164987","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43672,"journal":{"name":"ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47276023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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