This paper describes an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege’s writings—how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions. It also reviews two interpretations that try to resolve this puzzle: the “explicative interpretation” and the “analysis interpretation.” This paper defends the explicative interpretation and critiques the careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation given by Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege’s texts either are inconsistent with the analysis interpretation or do not support it. I also defend the explicative interpretation from the recent charge that it cannot make sense of Frege’s logicism. While I do not provide the explicative interpretation’s full solution to the puzzle, I show that its main competitor is seriously problematic.
{"title":"Arithmetic, Logicism, and Frege’s Definitions","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.5840/IPQ202124162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ202124162","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege’s writings—how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions. It also reviews two interpretations that try to resolve this puzzle: the “explicative interpretation” and the “analysis interpretation.” This paper defends the explicative interpretation and critiques the careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation given by Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege’s texts either are inconsistent with the analysis interpretation or do not support it. I also defend the explicative interpretation from the recent charge that it cannot make sense of Frege’s logicism. While I do not provide the explicative interpretation’s full solution to the puzzle, I show that its main competitor is seriously problematic.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48882960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyzes the “Interlude” in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. In particular, it examines Johannes Climacus’s response to Hegel’s view that a past actuality is necessary. I provide an in-depth analysis of Hegel’s view of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity) and of what he means when he says that a past actuality is necessary. In contrast to the standard scholarly interpretation, I argue that Climacus need not reject Hegel’s view because Hegel’s view of the necessity of the past is not so controversial or difficult to accept. Finally, I show that Climacus’s main critique is that we cannot know the past as necessary in any meaningful way. He worries that we might get so preoccupied with the futile task of trying to know the Hegelian necessity of the past that we forget to personally appropriate the past in a way that can help us live in the present.
{"title":"Kierkegaard’s Response to the Hegelian Necessity of the Past","authors":"Claudine Davidshofer","doi":"10.5840/IPQ2021421172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ2021421172","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the “Interlude” in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. In particular, it examines Johannes Climacus’s response to Hegel’s view that a past actuality is necessary. I provide an in-depth analysis of Hegel’s view of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity) and of what he means when he says that a past actuality is necessary. In contrast to the standard scholarly interpretation, I argue that Climacus need not reject Hegel’s view because Hegel’s view of the necessity of the past is not so controversial or difficult to accept. Finally, I show that Climacus’s main critique is that we cannot know the past as necessary in any meaningful way. He worries that we might get so preoccupied with the futile task of trying to know the Hegelian necessity of the past that we forget to personally appropriate the past in a way that can help us live in the present.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pamphilus’s introductory letter opens up contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by his claim to be a “mere auditor” to the dialogues that were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading has gone several ways, including to the conclusions that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature” that inflict pain and suffering on all bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate (if not malign) creator. Pamphilus’s preface also opens a more philosophical reading by his consideration of the ancient literary form of dialogue. This second interpretive path suggests that there is more design in its writing, and more revealed in it, than simple empiricist readings allow. Dialogically elucidating the Dialogues confronts us with the limits of empiricism in moral and religious philosophy. Hume’s last work, if read philosophically, exhibits the vacancy of empiricism.
{"title":"Empiricism or Its Dialectical Destruction?","authors":"Gene Fendt","doi":"10.5840/IPQ2021419170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ2021419170","url":null,"abstract":"Pamphilus’s introductory letter opens up contradictory ways of reading Hume’s Dialogues. The first, suggested by his claim to be a “mere auditor” to the dialogues that were “deeply imprinted in [his] memory,” is the empiricist reading. This traditional reading has gone several ways, including to the conclusions that the design of the mosquito and other “curious artifices of nature” that inflict pain and suffering on all bespeaks an utterly careless and insensate (if not malign) creator. Pamphilus’s preface also opens a more philosophical reading by his consideration of the ancient literary form of dialogue. This second interpretive path suggests that there is more design in its writing, and more revealed in it, than simple empiricist readings allow. Dialogically elucidating the Dialogues confronts us with the limits of empiricism in moral and religious philosophy. Hume’s last work, if read philosophically, exhibits the vacancy of empiricism.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will then refer to William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition. There is a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in. Leonard Cohen, Anthem.1 I CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY, skepticism is usually construed as a paradox that needs to be resolved at the theoretical level. In its deepest and historically most influential forms, however, skepticism is best understood as a philosophical practice that leads to a transformation of the self. Based on his interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell emphasizes this existential dimension of skepticism. In addition, he relates it to central religious notions, such as God, sin, and conversion, and recent work on Cavell highlights structural analogies between Cavell’s philosophy and pivotal Christian doctrines. Against this background, I aim in what follows to show that both philosophical skepticism and central aspects of religiosity attempt to grapple with the finitude of the human condition. Skepticism addresses our finitude when it refers to an absolute standpoint and claims that we cannot attain it, while many religious traditions posit some sort of “absolute” that is beyond human reach. In both cases, the opposition of the human and the absolute standpoints paints us as finite beings who do not and cannot attain a full grasp or control of their own existence. In this paper I will argue that both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experience that is transformative in that it engenders an attitude of acknowledgment regarding our finitude. It is in this sense that I speak of a religious dimension of skepticism. 1Leonard Cohen, Poems and Songs (New York NY: Random House, 2011), p. 188. Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1bbibro1qxr9r4 Erschienen in: International Philosophical Quarterly ; 61 (2021), 1. S. 77-99 https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202134167
{"title":"The Religious Dimension of Skepticism","authors":"Rico Gutschmidt","doi":"10.5840/IPQ202134167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ202134167","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will then refer to William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition. There is a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in. Leonard Cohen, Anthem.1 I CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY, skepticism is usually construed as a paradox that needs to be resolved at the theoretical level. In its deepest and historically most influential forms, however, skepticism is best understood as a philosophical practice that leads to a transformation of the self. Based on his interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell emphasizes this existential dimension of skepticism. In addition, he relates it to central religious notions, such as God, sin, and conversion, and recent work on Cavell highlights structural analogies between Cavell’s philosophy and pivotal Christian doctrines. Against this background, I aim in what follows to show that both philosophical skepticism and central aspects of religiosity attempt to grapple with the finitude of the human condition. Skepticism addresses our finitude when it refers to an absolute standpoint and claims that we cannot attain it, while many religious traditions posit some sort of “absolute” that is beyond human reach. In both cases, the opposition of the human and the absolute standpoints paints us as finite beings who do not and cannot attain a full grasp or control of their own existence. In this paper I will argue that both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experience that is transformative in that it engenders an attitude of acknowledgment regarding our finitude. It is in this sense that I speak of a religious dimension of skepticism. 1Leonard Cohen, Poems and Songs (New York NY: Random House, 2011), p. 188. Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1bbibro1qxr9r4 Erschienen in: International Philosophical Quarterly ; 61 (2021), 1. S. 77-99 https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202134167","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What does it mean to say that a person has dignity, and what explains her dignity? Linda Zagzebski argues that personal dignity entails both infinite and irreplaceable value. Initially she grounds the former claim in the power of rationality and the latter in the uniqueness of one’s subjective lived experience. Later she grounds both in the power of rationality, understood in terms of reflective consciousness. I argue that the latter account is an improvement upon the former but that needless problems arise from both accounts because (1) she conflates properties considered in the abstract with properties instantiated in concrete persons and (2) she fails to recognize an ambiguity in the notion of incommunicability or uniqueness. I also argue that the more fundamental account of rationality should be given not in terms of reflective consciousness but in terms of the ability to understand particulars in light of universals.
{"title":"On the Grounds of a Person’s Dignity","authors":"P. Kucharski","doi":"10.5840/IPQ202124163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ202124163","url":null,"abstract":"What does it mean to say that a person has dignity, and what explains her dignity? Linda Zagzebski argues that personal dignity entails both infinite and irreplaceable value. Initially she grounds the former claim in the power of rationality and the latter in the uniqueness of one’s subjective lived experience. Later she grounds both in the power of rationality, understood in terms of reflective consciousness. I argue that the latter account is an improvement upon the former but that needless problems arise from both accounts because (1) she conflates properties considered in the abstract with properties instantiated in concrete persons and (2) she fails to recognize an ambiguity in the notion of incommunicability or uniqueness. I also argue that the more fundamental account of rationality should be given not in terms of reflective consciousness but in terms of the ability to understand particulars in light of universals.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay offers a critical examination of Neil Ormerod’s treatment of the debate between Lonergan and Gilson on the question of being. Although this debate concerns a highly technical issue of metaphysics and epistemology, it remains germane and relevant, especially within the field of Christian thought. In Ormerod’s careful and for the most part generous examination of this debate, he argues that being for Gilson is perceived through the senses, whereas for Lonergan being is intended in the questions that arise from the relevant sense data. Where Gilson’s philosophy gives priority to the metaphysics of being, Lonergan gives priority to epistemology and cognitional theory. In arguing for the superiority of Lonergan’s approach to the question of being, Ormerod relies on a fundamental misunderstanding of Gilson’s metaphysics. By appeal to the more recent work of Kenneth Schmitz, this essay proposes a proper understanding of Gilson’s metaphysics as a basis for a more conciliatory relationship between these two giants in modern Christian philosophy who too often are pitted against one another.
{"title":"Lonergan and Gilson: A Critical Review of Neil Ormerod’s Faith and Reason","authors":"H. Williams","doi":"10.5840/IPQ2021416168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ2021416168","url":null,"abstract":"This essay offers a critical examination of Neil Ormerod’s treatment of the debate between Lonergan and Gilson on the question of being. Although this debate concerns a highly technical issue of metaphysics and epistemology, it remains germane and relevant, especially within the field of Christian thought. In Ormerod’s careful and for the most part generous examination of this debate, he argues that being for Gilson is perceived through the senses, whereas for Lonergan being is intended in the questions that arise from the relevant sense data. Where Gilson’s philosophy gives priority to the metaphysics of being, Lonergan gives priority to epistemology and cognitional theory. In arguing for the superiority of Lonergan’s approach to the question of being, Ormerod relies on a fundamental misunderstanding of Gilson’s metaphysics. By appeal to the more recent work of Kenneth Schmitz, this essay proposes a proper understanding of Gilson’s metaphysics as a basis for a more conciliatory relationship between these two giants in modern Christian philosophy who too often are pitted against one another.","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethics under Capital: MacIntyre, Communication, and the Culture Wars.","authors":"John Macias","doi":"10.5840/IPQ2021612176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/IPQ2021612176","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"American Pragmatism: An Introduction","authors":"John D. Gilroy","doi":"10.5840/ipq2021613186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq2021613186","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":43988,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71261998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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