In recent decades, scientists and philosophers have developed several naturalistic theories of consciousness, in which they try to work out some theoretical foundations for a satisfactory solution to the problem of voluntary acts, in particular the genesis of voluntary bodily movements. From the author’s point of view, depending on which concept of consciousness scientists rely on in their empirical studies of voluntary movements, volition can be understood either as a generative act or as a perceptual act. The first part of the article shows that nowadays there are two competing philosophical and scientific models of volition: the generative model (dualistic and casualistic types) and the perceptual model (strong and weak types). The second part of the article deals with some experimental data from cognitive psychology and neuroscience related to the study of voluntary movements and concludes that they are in favor of the perceptive model of volition.
{"title":"Generative and Perceptive Models of Volition","authors":"D. Razeev","doi":"10.5840/EPS202158113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202158113","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, scientists and philosophers have developed several naturalistic theories of consciousness, in which they try to work out some theoretical foundations for a satisfactory solution to the problem of voluntary acts, in particular the genesis of voluntary bodily movements. From the author’s point of view, depending on which concept of consciousness scientists rely on in their empirical studies of voluntary movements, volition can be understood either as a generative act or as a perceptual act. The first part of the article shows that nowadays there are two competing philosophical and scientific models of volition: the generative model (dualistic and casualistic types) and the perceptual model (strong and weak types). The second part of the article deals with some experimental data from cognitive psychology and neuroscience related to the study of voluntary movements and concludes that they are in favor of the perceptive model of volition.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"58 1","pages":"112-124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71003764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It used to be taken as a given in epistemology that the fundamental good from a purely epistemic point of view is truth. Such veritism is a given no longer, with some commentators advocating epistemic value pluralism, whereby truth is at most one of several irreducible epistemic goods, while others are attracted to an epistemic value monism that is centred on something other than truth, such as knowledge or understanding. It is claimed that it was premature to reject veritism. In particular, it is argued that the kinds of motivations that are offered for rejecting this proposal are weak on closer inspection, as they trade on a dubious reading of veritism that is independently implausible. The attraction of this implausible way of thinking about veritism lies in the difficulty of offering any coherent alternative. A solution to this conundrum is proposed, whereby we unpack the veritist proposal in terms of the explanatorily prior notion of an intellectually virtuous inquirer.
{"title":"In Defense of Veritism","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.5840/eps202158456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202158456","url":null,"abstract":"It used to be taken as a given in epistemology that the fundamental good from a purely epistemic point of view is truth. Such veritism is a given no longer, with some commentators advocating epistemic value pluralism, whereby truth is at most one of several irreducible epistemic goods, while others are attracted to an epistemic value monism that is centred on something other than truth, such as knowledge or understanding. It is claimed that it was premature to reject veritism. In particular, it is argued that the kinds of motivations that are offered for rejecting this proposal are weak on closer inspection, as they trade on a dubious reading of veritism that is independently implausible. The attraction of this implausible way of thinking about veritism lies in the difficulty of offering any coherent alternative. A solution to this conundrum is proposed, whereby we unpack the veritist proposal in terms of the explanatorily prior notion of an intellectually virtuous inquirer.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71005573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of Veritism: Responses to My Critics","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.5840/eps202158461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202158461","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71005514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is devoted to the problem of time in modern science, where in recent years there have been major changes related to the latest discoveries in the field of the foundations of quantum theory. The author refers to works of K.-F. von Weizsacker (which works are not well-known in Russian-speaking field). Weizsacker deploys a large-scale program of building modern physics, while starting (not only as a physicist, but also a professional philosopher) with questions of philosophical interpretation of postulates of modern physics, especially quantum mechanics. His key thesis is that time in physics is fundamentally distinct, which represents the whole physics as an integral scientific discipline. Weizsacker comes from physical and philosophical reflections, that give a special value to his work. Analyzing the conclusions of theoretical physics, namely the issues of substantiation of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and, above all, quantum mechanics, Weizsacker comes to the key idea of the structure of time in the substantiation of physical theory. The author in this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of most modern physicists that time has a subjective character, and the modus of the past, present and future reflects its essential character. The allocation of the time structure requires special logic. Such a logic is temporal and quantum. Starting from temporal logic, introducing the concept of possibility and probability, he comes to the substantiation of quantum mechanics. Being modal logic, it is based on the concept of possibility and probability. Key concept for Weizsacker is a binary alternative (Uralternative), closely related to the principle of superposition in quantum mechanics. By introducing the concept of certain alternatives, essentially actualized alternatives, Weizsacker shows how one can get the theory of relativity with its space-time structure. Further, he shows that based on its structure, you can get the theory of relativity. The space-time structure in this case is secondary, relational, as understood by Leibniz, Mach, and Einstein.
{"title":"Time in the Physical Picture of the World","authors":"A. Sevalnikov","doi":"10.5840/eps202057465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057465","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the problem of time in modern science, where in recent years there have been major changes related to the latest discoveries in the field of the foundations of quantum theory. The author refers to works of K.-F. von Weizsacker (which works are not well-known in Russian-speaking field). Weizsacker deploys a large-scale program of building modern physics, while starting (not only as a physicist, but also a professional philosopher) with questions of philosophical interpretation of postulates of modern physics, especially quantum mechanics. His key thesis is that time in physics is fundamentally distinct, which represents the whole physics as an integral scientific discipline. Weizsacker comes from physical and philosophical reflections, that give a special value to his work. Analyzing the conclusions of theoretical physics, namely the issues of substantiation of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and, above all, quantum mechanics, Weizsacker comes to the key idea of the structure of time in the substantiation of physical theory. The author in this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of most modern physicists that time has a subjective character, and the modus of the past, present and future reflects its essential character. The allocation of the time structure requires special logic. Such a logic is temporal and quantum. Starting from temporal logic, introducing the concept of possibility and probability, he comes to the substantiation of quantum mechanics. Being modal logic, it is based on the concept of possibility and probability. Key concept for Weizsacker is a binary alternative (Uralternative), closely related to the principle of superposition in quantum mechanics. By introducing the concept of certain alternatives, essentially actualized alternatives, Weizsacker shows how one can get the theory of relativity with its space-time structure. Further, he shows that based on its structure, you can get the theory of relativity. The space-time structure in this case is secondary, relational, as understood by Leibniz, Mach, and Einstein.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"128-132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46384695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article provides a brief overview of the philosophical and methodological problems of modern collaborative research. Collaborations – distributed organizations with variable membership, consisting of a large number (sometimes several thousand) of participants – are common in experimental high-energy physics studying microcosm objects, elementary particles arising in collisions of beams of accelerated particles and nuclei at collider accelerators, as well as in biomedicine and climatology. The central issues are authorship, epistemic ownership and dependence in collaborations, the division of epistemic labor in interdisciplinary research, as well as related issues of scientific organization – peer review and distribution of credit in a team. Formally, the author, conceived as a list of persons appearing as authors of a collaborative scientific work, seems to be defined by the specific participants of the collaboration core, i.e., is a construct. However, the question can also be understood as “What does it mean to be the author of a scientific work?”, and then the answer becomes much less certain. Authorship of thousand-people articles is justified psychologically as the desire for regular performance of a ritual, which allows demonstrating joint belonging to a certain tradition, such as a long experiment, affiliation with the “workshop” of scientists studying phenomena of the microworld, which allows scientists, despite of their daily preoccupation with technical routines, to distinguish themselves from non-epistemic communities (engineers, technicians). However, specific rules that determine exactly who and why are worthy of being included as co-authors have been undergoing changes in recent years. In addition to theoretical significance, many of the problems discussed are related to actual practical issues of scientometry and the organization of scientific research, and therefore approaches to their solution can be directly embodied in scientific policy.
{"title":"Collaboration in Science","authors":"V. Pronskikh","doi":"10.5840/eps202057462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057462","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides a brief overview of the philosophical and methodological problems of modern collaborative research. Collaborations – distributed organizations with variable membership, consisting of a large number (sometimes several thousand) of participants – are common in experimental high-energy physics studying microcosm objects, elementary particles arising in collisions of beams of accelerated particles and nuclei at collider accelerators, as well as in biomedicine and climatology. The central issues are authorship, epistemic ownership and dependence in collaborations, the division of epistemic labor in interdisciplinary research, as well as related issues of scientific organization – peer review and distribution of credit in a team. Formally, the author, conceived as a list of persons appearing as authors of a collaborative scientific work, seems to be defined by the specific participants of the collaboration core, i.e., is a construct. However, the question can also be understood as “What does it mean to be the author of a scientific work?”, and then the answer becomes much less certain. Authorship of thousand-people articles is justified psychologically as the desire for regular performance of a ritual, which allows demonstrating joint belonging to a certain tradition, such as a long experiment, affiliation with the “workshop” of scientists studying phenomena of the microworld, which allows scientists, despite of their daily preoccupation with technical routines, to distinguish themselves from non-epistemic communities (engineers, technicians). However, specific rules that determine exactly who and why are worthy of being included as co-authors have been undergoing changes in recent years. In addition to theoretical significance, many of the problems discussed are related to actual practical issues of scientometry and the organization of scientific research, and therefore approaches to their solution can be directly embodied in scientific policy.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43038457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Instead of using the binary of public versus private science or autonomous versus state-sponsored science, this paper focuses on the ways in which Science, the Scientific Community, and the Scientific Enterprise have all been and are still public, serving the common good through the production, dissemination, andconsumption of technoscientific innovations.
{"title":"The Ubiquity of Public Science","authors":"R. Sassower","doi":"10.5840/eps202057457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057457","url":null,"abstract":"Instead of using the binary of public versus private science or autonomous versus state-sponsored science, this paper focuses on the ways in which Science, the Scientific Community, and the Scientific Enterprise have all been and are still public, serving the common good through the production, dissemination, andconsumption of technoscientific innovations.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"62-69"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45729397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article discusses the main developments in the theory of social understanding. This new interdisciplinary area of research emerged at the end of the 20th century as a synthesis of a number of directions – analytical epistemology, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience. Most philosophers and scientists believe that the core of social understanding is the ability to understand the mental states of other people. Studies of this ability have been called «theory of mind». This traditional problem of epistemology has now ceased to be the subject of “armchair philosophy” and turned into a field in which philosophy began to interact with the empirical cognitive sciences. Discussions about cognitive mechanisms that provide social understanding are dominated by two main approaches: theory-theory and simulation theory, as well as various options for their integration. The article also discusses an alternative interactive approach to social understanding research. Its supporters believe that people in real interactions with each other rarely use theorizing or mental simulation, but use direct social perception and various forms of embodied social practice.
{"title":"Social Understanding and the Problem of “Other Mind”","authors":"V. Filatov","doi":"10.5840/eps202057453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057453","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the main developments in the theory of social understanding. This new interdisciplinary area of research emerged at the end of the 20th century as a synthesis of a number of directions – analytical epistemology, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience. Most philosophers and scientists believe that the core of social understanding is the ability to understand the mental states of other people. Studies of this ability have been called «theory of mind». This traditional problem of epistemology has now ceased to be the subject of “armchair philosophy” and turned into a field in which philosophy began to interact with the empirical cognitive sciences. Discussions about cognitive mechanisms that provide social understanding are dominated by two main approaches: theory-theory and simulation theory, as well as various options for their integration. The article also discusses an alternative interactive approach to social understanding research. Its supporters believe that people in real interactions with each other rarely use theorizing or mental simulation, but use direct social perception and various forms of embodied social practice.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"6-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45875330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that if science is to be a public good, it must be made one. Neither science nor any other form of knowledge is naturally a public good. And given the history of science policy in the twentieth century, it would be reasonable to conclude that science is in fact what economists call a ‘club good’. I discuss this matter in detail in two contexts: (1) current UK efforts to create a version of the US DARPA that would focus on projects of larger, long-term societal interests – i.e. beyond the interests of the academic specialities represented in, say, the US NSF; (2) what I call the ‘organized hypocrisy’ involved in presenting science as a public good through the so-called ‘peer review’ process.
{"title":"If Science Is a Public Good, Why Do Scientists Own It?","authors":"S. Fuller","doi":"10.5840/eps202057454","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057454","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that if science is to be a public good, it must be made one. Neither science nor any other form of knowledge is naturally a public good. And given the history of science policy in the twentieth century, it would be reasonable to conclude that science is in fact what economists call a ‘club good’. I discuss this matter in detail in two contexts: (1) current UK efforts to create a version of the US DARPA that would focus on projects of larger, long-term societal interests – i.e. beyond the interests of the academic specialities represented in, say, the US NSF; (2) what I call the ‘organized hypocrisy’ involved in presenting science as a public good through the so-called ‘peer review’ process.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"23-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44169518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book “The Idea of Social Science” (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.
{"title":"Проблема следования правилу Витгенштейна и философско-правовые исследования","authors":"Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев","doi":"10.5840/202057337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/202057337","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book “The Idea of Social Science” (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":" ","pages":"34-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45526355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article contains some considerations on influence of Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following to Social Theories, especially as it is analyzed in the text of K.A. Rodin. I consider “skeptical decision” of S. Kripke, and demonstrate that in some new situation’s theory of G. Baker and P. Hacker are preferable.
{"title":"Rule-Following and Social Theory","authors":"V. Surovtsev","doi":"10.5840/eps202057340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057340","url":null,"abstract":"The article contains some considerations on influence of Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following to Social Theories, especially as it is analyzed in the text of K.A. Rodin. I consider “skeptical decision” of S. Kripke, and demonstrate that in some new situation’s theory of G. Baker and P. Hacker are preferable.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"50-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/eps202057340","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41513583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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