I investigate the accounting rules for loan loss recognition in banks. In June 2016 the FASB issued a new rule, effective in December 2019, that will replace current GAAP with a model that allows banks to use broader information to estimate loan loss allowances. To empirically examine current GAAP and the new model, I exploit differences in the information sets allowed under the old and the new rules. Using a methodology that combines micro data and machine learning techniques, I provide evidence that it is possible to construct a loan loss recognition model that outperforms the current GAAP without expanding the information set beyond that permitted under the current rule. I find that expanding this model’s information set does not significantly improve its performance. My model’s predicted allowances would have been materially larger at the outset of the financial crisis than actual reported bank estimates. The differences are due to that my model consistently assigns larger weights to certain input variables relative to current GAAP. I also find that weakly capitalized banks under-provision relative to well capitalized banks. My results provide a novel method to examine aspects of the new accounting rule before it comes into effect. The findings suggest that the way information is used, rather than the use of broader information set improves the estimates of loan loss allowance.
{"title":"Recognizing Loan Losses in Banks: An Examination of Alternative Approaches","authors":"R. Vijayaraghavan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3398690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3398690","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the accounting rules for loan loss recognition in banks. In June 2016 the FASB issued a new rule, effective in December 2019, that will replace current GAAP with a model that allows banks to use broader information to estimate loan loss allowances. To empirically examine current GAAP and the new model, I exploit differences in the information sets allowed under the old and the new rules. Using a methodology that combines micro data and machine learning techniques, I provide evidence that it is possible to construct a loan loss recognition model that outperforms the current GAAP without expanding the information set beyond that permitted under the current rule. I find that expanding this model’s information set does not significantly improve its performance. My model’s predicted allowances would have been materially larger at the outset of the financial crisis than actual reported bank estimates. The differences are due to that my model consistently assigns larger weights to certain input variables relative to current GAAP. I also find that weakly capitalized banks under-provision relative to well capitalized banks. My results provide a novel method to examine aspects of the new accounting rule before it comes into effect. The findings suggest that the way information is used, rather than the use of broader information set improves the estimates of loan loss allowance.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"259 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132754199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows that banks’ cost of deposits increase following exposure to the Fintech sector. We exploit the exogenous, staggered removal of restrictions on investing through peer-to-peer lending platforms by US states. The entry of Lending Club and Prosper cause the cost of deposits to increase by approximately 11% as banks face more intense competition for deposit funds. Banks’ liability structure also shifts towards greater reliance on non-deposit funding. The findings provide regulatory insights into the unintended consequences, and potentially destabilizing effects, of the nascent Fintech sector on the banking industry.
{"title":"Peer Pressure: How do Peer-to-Peer Lenders affect Banks' Cost of Deposits and Liability Structure?","authors":"H. Farag, Santosh Koirala, Danny McGowan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3398843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3398843","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that banks’ cost of deposits increase following exposure to the Fintech sector. We exploit the exogenous, staggered removal of restrictions on investing through peer-to-peer lending platforms by US states. The entry of Lending Club and Prosper cause the cost of deposits to increase by approximately 11% as banks face more intense competition for deposit funds. Banks’ liability structure also shifts towards greater reliance on non-deposit funding. The findings provide regulatory insights into the unintended consequences, and potentially destabilizing effects, of the nascent Fintech sector on the banking industry.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"41 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134259614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Sondermann, Agostino Consolo, Vanessa Gunnella, G. Koester, K. Lambrias, Paloma López-García, C. Nerlich, Filippos Petroulakis, L. Saiz, Roberta Serafini
Well-functioning economic structures are key for resilient and prospering euro area economies. The global financial and sovereign debt crises exposed the limited resilience of the euro area’s economic structures. Economic growth was masking underlying weaknesses in several euro area countries. With the inception of the crises, significant efforts have been undertaken by Member States individually and collectively to strengthen resilience of economic structures and the smooth functioning of the euro area. National fiscal policies were consolidated to keep the increase in government debt contained and structural reform momentum increased notably in the second decade, particularly in those countries most hit by the crisis. The strengthened national economic structures were supported by a reformed EU crisis and economic governance framework. However, overall economic structures in euro area countries are still not fully commensurate with the requirements of a monetary union. Moreover, remaining challenges, such as population ageing, low productivity and the implications of digitalisation, will need to be addressed to increase economic resilience and long-term growth. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E60, E62, F10, J11, O43
{"title":"Economic Structures 20 Years into the Euro","authors":"David Sondermann, Agostino Consolo, Vanessa Gunnella, G. Koester, K. Lambrias, Paloma López-García, C. Nerlich, Filippos Petroulakis, L. Saiz, Roberta Serafini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3957692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3957692","url":null,"abstract":"Well-functioning economic structures are key for resilient and prospering euro area economies. The global financial and sovereign debt crises exposed the limited resilience of the euro area’s economic structures. Economic growth was masking underlying weaknesses in several euro area countries. With the inception of the crises, significant efforts have been undertaken by Member States individually and collectively to strengthen resilience of economic structures and the smooth functioning of the euro area. National fiscal policies were consolidated to keep the increase in government debt contained and structural reform momentum increased notably in the second decade, particularly in those countries most hit by the crisis. The strengthened national economic structures were supported by a reformed EU crisis and economic governance framework. However, overall economic structures in euro area countries are still not fully commensurate with the requirements of a monetary union. Moreover, remaining challenges, such as population ageing, low productivity and the implications of digitalisation, will need to be addressed to increase economic resilience and long-term growth. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E60, E62, F10, J11, O43","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116447489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research purposes to study social capital of Klong Arang Community, and the factors that help strengthening Ban Klong Arang, Moo 16, Ban Gang Sub-district, Muang Sakeaw District, Sakeaw Province. It was conducted by using the qualitative research method which involves the collection of observation, in-depth interview from 15 informants who are related to Klong Arang Community, analyzing of the contents, and finally, synthesizing them to fulfill the objectives of the research. The result shows that Kong Arang Community comprise of the following kinds of social capital: 1) human capital, namely the headman of Ban Klong Arang, and the community committee, who are the important driving force in developing the community, 2) natural resources capital, namely natural forest and the community’s forest, 3) knowledge and cultural capital, namely knowledge on herbal medication, and important traditions and 4) institutional capital, namely the groups that are important to the community. The factors that cause the community to have strength are: (1) the community leaders being strong and knowledgeable, (2) the people in the community having the kinship-like relationship, respecting and caring for one another, (3) people in the community participating with the community, (4) management of the community in a compromising way, and giving opportunities to the people in the community to participate with the community, and (5) imposing rules for co-living within the community. These factors are important in making social capital valuable to the community, as well as able to strengthen Klong Arang Community.
{"title":"Social Capital and Strengthening of Klong Arang Community, Sakeaw Province, Thailand","authors":"Sirikhwan Boontham","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3546296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546296","url":null,"abstract":"This research purposes to study social capital of Klong Arang Community, and the factors that help strengthening Ban Klong Arang, Moo 16, Ban Gang Sub-district, Muang Sakeaw District, Sakeaw Province. It was conducted by using the qualitative research method which involves the collection of observation, in-depth interview from 15 informants who are related to Klong Arang Community, analyzing of the contents, and finally, synthesizing them to fulfill the objectives of the research. The result shows that Kong Arang Community comprise of the following kinds of social capital: 1) human capital, namely the headman of Ban Klong Arang, and the community committee, who are the important driving force in developing the community, 2) natural resources capital, namely natural forest and the community’s forest, 3) knowledge and cultural capital, namely knowledge on herbal medication, and important traditions and 4) institutional capital, namely the groups that are important to the community. The factors that cause the community to have strength are: (1) the community leaders being strong and knowledgeable, (2) the people in the community having the kinship-like relationship, respecting and caring for one another, (3) people in the community participating with the community, (4) management of the community in a compromising way, and giving opportunities to the people in the community to participate with the community, and (5) imposing rules for co-living within the community. These factors are important in making social capital valuable to the community, as well as able to strengthen Klong Arang Community.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121947994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present work studies an bank actives in the loans with repayment through payroll deductions a employees of the state government. Those employees have legal job stability, so is very difficult that an employee is fired. Given both, job stability and the sure payment, the default probability is very low, but Argentine banking regulator requires that under certain circumstances a bank must provisioning (charge a loss) to debtor paying in a timely manner the debt contracted but delay pays of debt with other bank. This become very expensive for the bank, so, the bank want avoid give a loan to whose can fall in this situation.
The bank requiered us to design a model that predict if a debtor will be reclassified during the next year. The bank also requires build a score system and pick a cutoff that reach a reclassified rate lesser than 0.045, but allowing high approval rate.
{"title":"Credit Scoring Applied to Special Case","authors":"Mario R. Melchiori","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456130","url":null,"abstract":"The present work studies an bank actives in the loans with repayment through payroll deductions a employees of the state government. Those employees have legal job stability, so is very difficult that an employee is fired. Given both, job stability and the sure payment, the default probability is very low, but Argentine banking regulator requires that under certain circumstances a bank must provisioning (charge a loss) to debtor paying in a timely manner the debt contracted but delay pays of debt with other bank. This become very expensive for the bank, so, the bank want avoid give a loan to whose can fall in this situation.<br><br>The bank requiered us to design a model that predict if a debtor will be reclassified during the next year. The bank also requires build a score system and pick a cutoff that reach a reclassified rate lesser than 0.045, but allowing high approval rate.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122489982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, Jeremy Majerovitz, M. Vieyra
This paper presents five facts on the behavior of U.S. banks between 2007 and 2015 that impose useful restrictions on the formulation of a bank problem. (1) Market to book leverage ratio diverged significantly during the crisis. (2) Book values appear to be backward looking. There is more information content about future bank profitability and loan losses in market values than in book values. (3) Neither market nor regulatory constraints are strictly binding for most banks. (4) Banks operate with a target market leverage ratio. (5) The adjustment behavior back to the target changed fundamentally after the crisis. We present a heterogeneous-bank model that rationalizes these facts and can serve as a building block for future work.
{"title":"Banks Adjust Slowly: Evidence and Lessons for Modeling","authors":"Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, Jeremy Majerovitz, M. Vieyra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3394601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394601","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents five facts on the behavior of U.S. banks between 2007 and 2015 that impose useful restrictions on the formulation of a bank problem. (1) Market to book leverage ratio diverged significantly during the crisis. (2) Book values appear to be backward looking. There is more information content about future bank profitability and loan losses in market values than in book values. (3) Neither market nor regulatory constraints are strictly binding for most banks. (4) Banks operate with a target market leverage ratio. (5) The adjustment behavior back to the target changed fundamentally after the crisis. We present a heterogeneous-bank model that rationalizes these facts and can serve as a building block for future work.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"22 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114128344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two dysfunctions can affect the credit market: credit rationing and firm's discouragement. While the former has been studied in detail for more than 40 years, the latter has only been in the spotlight since 2003. In this work, we contribute to the understanding of this “demand-side failure” by investigating the role played by corruption. In particular, using data coming from Enterprise Surveys conducted by World Bank, we highlight, on the one hand, a significant negative effect of the corruption on “discouraged borrowers” in developing countries, and on the other, that this effect differs according to the level of economic development: in higher (resp. lower) development countries, higher level of corruption will discourage (resp. encourage) firms from applying for loans. We also find burden of government regulation is a channel to explain for this effect. To get over burdens in regulation, firms find corruption as one way to reach their targets at lower costs.
{"title":"Does Corruption Impact the Demand of Bank Credit? A Study of Discouraged Borrowers in Asian Developing Countries","authors":"Jean-Christophe Statnik, Vu Thi Huong Giang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3369672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3369672","url":null,"abstract":"Two dysfunctions can affect the credit market: credit rationing and firm's discouragement. While the former has been studied in detail for more than 40 years, the latter has only been in the spotlight since 2003. In this work, we contribute to the understanding of this “demand-side failure” by investigating the role played by corruption. In particular, using data coming from Enterprise Surveys conducted by World Bank, we highlight, on the one hand, a significant negative effect of the corruption on “discouraged borrowers” in developing countries, and on the other, that this effect differs according to the level of economic development: in higher (resp. lower) development countries, higher level of corruption will discourage (resp. encourage) firms from applying for loans. We also find burden of government regulation is a channel to explain for this effect. To get over burdens in regulation, firms find corruption as one way to reach their targets at lower costs.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124307980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the growth of Indian economy, the volume of transactions of commercial banks has grown manifold. The study attempts to investigate the total factor productivity change of four leading Indian commercial banks using non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and distance function based Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) over FY2007 to FY2016. The operating approach (or income-based approach) is adopted for input-output selection, viewing the banks as decision-making units (DMU) transforming a bundle of inputs (costs) to produce a set of outputs (revenues). A DMU is considered efficient which maximizes the revenues without increasing the costs. The results indicate that the annual TFP growth registered by these four banks is 3.3%. While two banks recorded productivity growth, the productivity of two other banks declined during the period. Highest productivity growth was recorded during FY2015 and FY2016. TFP growth is further decomposed to Efficiency change (EFFCH) and Technical change (TECHCH) components to study the catchup by less efficient DMUs.
{"title":"Productivity Change of Indian Commercial Banks: A Non-Parametric Study","authors":"S. Behera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3368797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3368797","url":null,"abstract":"With the growth of Indian economy, the volume of transactions of commercial banks has grown manifold. The study attempts to investigate the total factor productivity change of four leading Indian commercial banks using non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and distance function based Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) over FY2007 to FY2016. The operating approach (or income-based approach) is adopted for input-output selection, viewing the banks as decision-making units (DMU) transforming a bundle of inputs (costs) to produce a set of outputs (revenues). A DMU is considered efficient which maximizes the revenues without increasing the costs. The results indicate that the annual TFP growth registered by these four banks is 3.3%. While two banks recorded productivity growth, the productivity of two other banks declined during the period. Highest productivity growth was recorded during FY2015 and FY2016. TFP growth is further decomposed to Efficiency change (EFFCH) and Technical change (TECHCH) components to study the catchup by less efficient DMUs.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126246964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conceptually, the ‘resolution’ of financial intermediaries does not merely refer to instruments and procedures for the management of insolvencies in the financial sector generally. Rather, ‘resolution’ is conceived as a functional alternative to, and substitute for, traditional means of insolvency management (in particular, liquidation procedures), to be applied specifically in cases where such traditional means cannot be activated in view of potentially disastrous implications for professional counter-parties, depositors, market infrastructures – in short, for systemic stability. While the scope of these legal instruments is not expressly restricted to systemically relevant institutions, care has been taken to restrict the use of the innovative toolbox to cases where the public interest in the prevention of contagious effects, in light of the size of the institution in question, its market share, complexity and/or connectedness with other parties, outweighs the disadvantages (e.g., the detrimental effects on creditors, as well as potentially higher costs of resolution compared with traditional insolvency liquidation). Although it is now widely agreed that systemic relevance is not a phenomenon confined to any particular type of financial institution but depends on factors such as size, market share, and interconnection with other market participants, the emergence of resolution regimes has thus far been characterised by the traditional boundaries between banks, investment firms, insurance companies, and financial market infrastructures. Against the backdrop of a growing body of international standards and European legislation on resolution frameworks, most of which have been sectoral in scope and content so far, the present Chapter analyses the rationale of, and perspectives for, a move towards cross-sectoral regulation in the area of financial institutions’ insolvency management.
{"title":"Resolution Regimes in the Financial Sector: In Need of Cross-Sectoral Regulation?","authors":"Jens-Hinrich Binder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3346455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3346455","url":null,"abstract":"Conceptually, the ‘resolution’ of financial intermediaries does not merely refer to instruments and procedures for the management of insolvencies in the financial sector generally. Rather, ‘resolution’ is conceived as a functional alternative to, and substitute for, traditional means of insolvency management (in particular, liquidation procedures), to be applied specifically in cases where such traditional means cannot be activated in view of potentially disastrous implications for professional counter-parties, depositors, market infrastructures – in short, for systemic stability. While the scope of these legal instruments is not expressly restricted to systemically relevant institutions, care has been taken to restrict the use of the innovative toolbox to cases where the public interest in the prevention of contagious effects, in light of the size of the institution in question, its market share, complexity and/or connectedness with other parties, outweighs the disadvantages (e.g., the detrimental effects on creditors, as well as potentially higher costs of resolution compared with traditional insolvency liquidation). Although it is now widely agreed that systemic relevance is not a phenomenon confined to any particular type of financial institution but depends on factors such as size, market share, and interconnection with other market participants, the emergence of resolution regimes has thus far been characterised by the traditional boundaries between banks, investment firms, insurance companies, and financial market infrastructures. Against the backdrop of a growing body of international standards and European legislation on resolution frameworks, most of which have been sectoral in scope and content so far, the present Chapter analyses the rationale of, and perspectives for, a move towards cross-sectoral regulation in the area of financial institutions’ insolvency management.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127479381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We extend the analysis we sketched in Castagna [5] and we provide an application of the framework we introduced to incrementally evaluate financial contracts within a financial institution’s balance sheet.
{"title":"Advances in Incremental Valuation of Financial Contracts and Definition of the Economic Meaning of the Capital Value Adjustment (KVA)","authors":"A. Castagna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3337618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3337618","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the analysis we sketched in Castagna [5] and we provide an application of the framework we introduced to incrementally evaluate financial contracts within a financial institution’s balance sheet.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"24 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132270722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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