This study aims to investigate the patronage behaviour of Islamic banks customers and the importance of Shariah compliance, within a total Islamic banking system, compared to other criteria in their selection decisions. The sample consists of 395 valid and complete responses of bank customers. Factor analysis is used to classify a set of 23 items submitted to participants for their opinion. Findings revealed that within a pure Islamic banking system Shariah Abidance of the Islamic bank is the most important factor in bank patronage. The study has many implications for marketers in designing and planning their marketing strategies and plans and future investments of their organizations, especially when intense competition exist in the industry. The study adds to the existing literature on consumer bank patronage behavior a pure Islamic banking system in the context of Sudan
{"title":"Patronage Behavior of Islamic Bank’s Consumers: The Importance of Shariah Compliance within Total Islamic Banking System","authors":"I. H. F. Mansour","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3389581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3389581","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to investigate the patronage behaviour of Islamic banks customers and the importance of Shariah compliance, within a total Islamic banking system, compared to other criteria in their selection decisions. The sample consists of 395 valid and complete responses of bank customers. Factor analysis is used to classify a set of 23 items submitted to participants for their opinion. Findings revealed that within a pure Islamic banking system Shariah Abidance of the Islamic bank is the most important factor in bank patronage. The study has many implications for marketers in designing and planning their marketing strategies and plans and future investments of their organizations, especially when intense competition exist in the industry. The study adds to the existing literature on consumer bank patronage behavior a pure Islamic banking system in the context of Sudan","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"426 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134063342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document a direct channel through which financial institutions contribute to the net worth of members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those sitting on the finance committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives. These individuals report greater levels of leverage and new liabilities as a proportion of their total net worth, relative to when they are not part of the finance committee or relative to other congressional members. Politicians increase new liabilities by over 30% of their net worth in the first year of their finance committee membership. We do not find similar patterns for members of non-finance powerful committees. We find no evidence that finance committee members arrange new personal liabilities ahead of their appointments to the committees. Finance committee members also report liabilities with lower interest rates and longer maturities. Finally, focusing on banks that lend to U.S. Congress members, we find that the weaker performing financial institutions lend to more finance committee members and provide more new debt to these politicians. Our findings suggest that lenders may create political connections with finance committee members in an attempt to obtain regulatory benefits.
{"title":"Political Lending","authors":"Ahmed Tahoun, Florin P. Vasvari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2817703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817703","url":null,"abstract":"We document a direct channel through which financial institutions contribute to the net worth of members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those sitting on the finance committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives. These individuals report greater levels of leverage and new liabilities as a proportion of their total net worth, relative to when they are not part of the finance committee or relative to other congressional members. Politicians increase new liabilities by over 30% of their net worth in the first year of their finance committee membership. We do not find similar patterns for members of non-finance powerful committees. We find no evidence that finance committee members arrange new personal liabilities ahead of their appointments to the committees. Finance committee members also report liabilities with lower interest rates and longer maturities. Finally, focusing on banks that lend to U.S. Congress members, we find that the weaker performing financial institutions lend to more finance committee members and provide more new debt to these politicians. Our findings suggest that lenders may create political connections with finance committee members in an attempt to obtain regulatory benefits.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132352558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the scale, causes, and timing of significant episodes of industrialization and deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent studies have argued that the turning point of manufacturing output and employment shares tends to occur prematurely in this region. The analysis is performed using panel data methods for fractional responses and data from a variety of sources for a panel of 41 African countries. The results overwhelmingly do not support the common finding that Sub-Saharan African countries have begun to deindustrialize. Moreover, the study documents meaningful heterogeneity across Sub-Saharan Africa subregions, with the Southern region being the only subregion to have witnessed deindustrialization. However, this deindustrialization of the Southern subregion does not appear to be occurring prematurely. The study also explores the potential role of the Dutch disease and resource curse hypotheses in understanding Sub-Saharan Africa's manufacturing experience in resource rich countries.
{"title":"Manufacturing in Structural Change in Africa","authors":"Pierre Nguimkeu, Albert G. Zeufack","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8992","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the scale, causes, and timing of significant episodes of industrialization and deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent studies have argued that the turning point of manufacturing output and employment shares tends to occur prematurely in this region. The analysis is performed using panel data methods for fractional responses and data from a variety of sources for a panel of 41 African countries. The results overwhelmingly do not support the common finding that Sub-Saharan African countries have begun to deindustrialize. Moreover, the study documents meaningful heterogeneity across Sub-Saharan Africa subregions, with the Southern region being the only subregion to have witnessed deindustrialization. However, this deindustrialization of the Southern subregion does not appear to be occurring prematurely. The study also explores the potential role of the Dutch disease and resource curse hypotheses in understanding Sub-Saharan Africa's manufacturing experience in resource rich countries.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128045189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does law change society? In the rational actor model, law affects behavior only by changing incentives and information -- the command and coordination function of law. Under the view that humans are social animals, law is also a guidepost for social norms that regulate behavior -- the expressive function of law. This paper proposes a third function of law—the schematizing function -- based on cognitive research that shows that individuals cannot think without categories. Law makes possible new kinds of exemplars, role models, and social interactions that give people prototypes that transform the categories they use, thereby reframing their options and influencing their behavior. This paper illustrates the schematizing power of law with examples from field and natural experiments. Like the one-two punch in a boxing match, the command and schematizing functions of law together can change society in situations where the command function alone would be ineffective or backfire.
{"title":"The Third Function of Law is to Transform Cultural Categories","authors":"K. Hoff, J. Walsh","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8954","url":null,"abstract":"How does law change society? In the rational actor model, law affects behavior only by changing incentives and information -- the command and coordination function of law. Under the view that humans are social animals, law is also a guidepost for social norms that regulate behavior -- the expressive function of law. This paper proposes a third function of law—the schematizing function -- based on cognitive research that shows that individuals cannot think without categories. Law makes possible new kinds of exemplars, role models, and social interactions that give people prototypes that transform the categories they use, thereby reframing their options and influencing their behavior. This paper illustrates the schematizing power of law with examples from field and natural experiments. Like the one-two punch in a boxing match, the command and schematizing functions of law together can change society in situations where the command function alone would be ineffective or backfire.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114891060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513509853.001
Sebastian Acevedo Mejia, Claudio Baccianti, Mićo Mrkaić, Natalija Novta, E. Pugacheva, P. Topalova
We explore the extent to which macroeconomic policies, structural policies, and institutions can mitigate the negative relationship between temperature shocks and output in countries with warm climates. Empirical evidence and simulations of a dynamic general equilibrium model reveal that good policies can help countries cope with negative weather shocks to some extent. However, none of the adaptive policies we consider can fully eliminate the large aggregate output losses that countries with hot climates experience due to rising temperatures. Only curbing greenhouse gas emissions—which would mitigate further global warming—could limit the adverse macroeconomic consequences of weather shocks in a long-lasting way.
{"title":"Weather Shocks and Output in Low-Income Countries: The Role of Policies and Adaptation","authors":"Sebastian Acevedo Mejia, Claudio Baccianti, Mićo Mrkaić, Natalija Novta, E. Pugacheva, P. Topalova","doi":"10.5089/9781513509853.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513509853.001","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the extent to which macroeconomic policies, structural policies, and institutions can mitigate the negative relationship between temperature shocks and output in countries with warm climates. Empirical evidence and simulations of a dynamic general equilibrium model reveal that good policies can help countries cope with negative weather shocks to some extent. However, none of the adaptive policies we consider can fully eliminate the large aggregate output losses that countries with hot climates experience due to rising temperatures. Only curbing greenhouse gas emissions—which would mitigate further global warming—could limit the adverse macroeconomic consequences of weather shocks in a long-lasting way.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129238111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article seeks to consider the issues of democratic self-constitution in illiberal states. To that end it focuses on the current process of constitutional revision in Cuba, a traditional Marxist-Leninist State in the process of self-transformation. For the last several years Cuba has been in the midst of a quite public national effort at reform. Those reforms to the organizing political and economic theory of the state then produced a move to restructure the 1976 national constitution (last revised in 2002) to reflect these reforms. In both cases, the PCC and the state apparatus attempted to invoke the core mechanics of popular participation even as it sought to manage that participation under the leadership of the PCC and popular representatives in national institutions. The Cuban experiment in constitutional reformation presents some unique elements. It may also point to the development of the collectivist premises on which the Cuban political order is might be used to structure democratic mechanisms that might have application in other in Party-State systems. Popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform efforts actually takes three forms. Two of them are formal and Party-State driven. These consisted of the formal system to deliver comments and reactions to the drafts of the revised constitution circulated to the general population after review and revision by PCC and State (Asamblea Nacional) organs. The third of them, and the object of this article, was both informal and popularly driven. Perhaps the most important element of popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform debate, the quite vigorous popular debates about Cuban constitutional reform occurred outside the structures of the Party and State organs. These debates took place in cyber space and among an active and politically engaged segment of the population, one with strong connections to the Cuban diaspora community. This article suggests that it may be possible to begin to understand the form, practice, character and influence of these new and emerging modalities of popular participation through a close empirical study. Part II provides a brief conceptual and historical context. That context is necessary for several reasons. Parts III and IV then move from the examination of the transforming contours of the normative structures of the Cuban system to an empirical analysis of the expression of normative change on that ground. Part III introduces the study and its methodology. We use data from government web sites, the official reports, and social media sites to examine the contours of participation, its constitution, and its limitations. We intend to develop from the analysis of four distinct data sets a clearer understanding of the nature of popular participation. Part IV then considers consequences and applications both within Cuba and beyond.
{"title":"Popular Participation in the Constitution of the Illiberal State — An Empirical Study of Popular Engagement and Constitutional Reform in Cuba and the Contours of Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0","authors":"L. Backer, F. Sapio, James Korman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383172","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to consider the issues of democratic self-constitution in illiberal states. To that end it focuses on the current process of constitutional revision in Cuba, a traditional Marxist-Leninist State in the process of self-transformation. For the last several years Cuba has been in the midst of a quite public national effort at reform. Those reforms to the organizing political and economic theory of the state then produced a move to restructure the 1976 national constitution (last revised in 2002) to reflect these reforms. In both cases, the PCC and the state apparatus attempted to invoke the core mechanics of popular participation even as it sought to manage that participation under the leadership of the PCC and popular representatives in national institutions. The Cuban experiment in constitutional reformation presents some unique elements. It may also point to the development of the collectivist premises on which the Cuban political order is might be used to structure democratic mechanisms that might have application in other in Party-State systems. Popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform efforts actually takes three forms. Two of them are formal and Party-State driven. These consisted of the formal system to deliver comments and reactions to the drafts of the revised constitution circulated to the general population after review and revision by PCC and State (Asamblea Nacional) organs. The third of them, and the object of this article, was both informal and popularly driven. Perhaps the most important element of popular participation in the 2019 Cuban constitutional reform debate, the quite vigorous popular debates about Cuban constitutional reform occurred outside the structures of the Party and State organs. These debates took place in cyber space and among an active and politically engaged segment of the population, one with strong connections to the Cuban diaspora community. This article suggests that it may be possible to begin to understand the form, practice, character and influence of these new and emerging modalities of popular participation through a close empirical study. Part II provides a brief conceptual and historical context. That context is necessary for several reasons. Parts III and IV then move from the examination of the transforming contours of the normative structures of the Cuban system to an empirical analysis of the expression of normative change on that ground. Part III introduces the study and its methodology. We use data from government web sites, the official reports, and social media sites to examine the contours of participation, its constitution, and its limitations. We intend to develop from the analysis of four distinct data sets a clearer understanding of the nature of popular participation. Part IV then considers consequences and applications both within Cuba and beyond.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"529 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123904255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Candidates often tout their private sector experience when running for public office. But do businessperson politicians actually govern differently? This paper argues that given their preferences and managerial expertise, businesspeople in office may adopt policies favorable to the business community and improve government efficiency. To test these claims, I collect data on over 33,000 Russian mayors and legislators and investigate policy outcomes using detailed municipal budgets and over a million procurement contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that businessperson politicians increase expenditures on roads and transport, while leaving health and education spending untouched. Prioritizing economic over social infrastructure brings immediate benefits to firms, while holding back long-term accumulation of human capital. Businesspeople also do not reduce budget deficits, but rather adopt less competitive methods for selecting contractors, particularly in corruption-ripe construction. In all, businessperson politicians do more to make government run for business, rather than like a business.
{"title":"Private Sector Policymaking: Business Background and Politicians’ Behavior in Office","authors":"David Szakonyi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3101095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3101095","url":null,"abstract":"Candidates often tout their private sector experience when running for public office. But do businessperson politicians actually govern differently? This paper argues that given their preferences and managerial expertise, businesspeople in office may adopt policies favorable to the business community and improve government efficiency. To test these claims, I collect data on over 33,000 Russian mayors and legislators and investigate policy outcomes using detailed municipal budgets and over a million procurement contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that businessperson politicians increase expenditures on roads and transport, while leaving health and education spending untouched. Prioritizing economic over social infrastructure brings immediate benefits to firms, while holding back long-term accumulation of human capital. Businesspeople also do not reduce budget deficits, but rather adopt less competitive methods for selecting contractors, particularly in corruption-ripe construction. In all, businessperson politicians do more to make government run for business, rather than like a business.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126035325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-12DOI: 10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(2)
Muhammad Istan, Zengji Song, Abraham Nahm, Zongyi Zhang, Abubakr Saeed, Yacine Belghitar, Yung-Chin Chiu, Ching-Wen Liang
Objective – The purpose of this research is to test the theory of capital structure by determining whether the relationship is affected by Political Patronage. The study will examine political support, capital structure and financial performance of the company. Methodology/Technique – The data in this research is in the form of financial ratios displayed in the financial report of each company listed from 2010 to 2016. The sample was selected using purposive sampling with as many as 70 companies indicated to have political support. The data was analysed using regression analysis. Findings – The results show that Political Patronage has an influence on capital structure and political Patronage has a weak effect on financial performance. Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: Political Patronage; Capital Structure; Financial Performance. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Istan, M; Kamaludin. 2019. Political Patronage on Capital Structure in Indonesia, J. Fin. Bank. Review 4 (3): 89 – 97 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(2) JEL Classification: G30, G32, G39.
{"title":"Political Patronage on Capital Structure in Indonesia","authors":"Muhammad Istan, Zengji Song, Abraham Nahm, Zongyi Zhang, Abubakr Saeed, Yacine Belghitar, Yung-Chin Chiu, Ching-Wen Liang","doi":"10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(2)","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(2)","url":null,"abstract":"Objective – The purpose of this research is to test the theory of capital structure by determining whether the relationship is affected by Political Patronage. The study will examine political support, capital structure and financial performance of the company.\u0000Methodology/Technique – The data in this research is in the form of financial ratios displayed in the financial report of each company listed from 2010 to 2016. The sample was selected using purposive sampling with as many as 70 companies indicated to have political support. The data was analysed using regression analysis.\u0000Findings – The results show that Political Patronage has an influence on capital structure and political Patronage has a weak effect on financial performance.\u0000Type of Paper: Empirical\u0000Keywords: Political Patronage; Capital Structure; Financial Performance.\u0000Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Istan, M; Kamaludin. 2019. Political Patronage on Capital Structure in Indonesia, J. Fin. Bank. Review 4 (3): 89 – 97 https://doi.org/10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.3(2)\u0000\u0000JEL Classification: G30, G32, G39.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121196081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We advance a theory of how private information and heterogeneous screening ability across market participants shapes trade in decentralized asset markets. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and show that the investors who intermediate trade the most and interact with the largest set of counterparties must have the highest screening ability. That is, the primary intermediaries are those with superior information?screening experts. We provide empirical support for the model?s predictions using transaction-level micro data and information disclosure requirements. Finally, we study the connection between screening ability and efficiency, and observe that a market where all investors are screening experts?and thus, a market with no private information?may be dominated in terms of welfare by a market with no screening experts.
{"title":"An Information-Based Theory of Financial Intermediation","authors":"Zachary Bethune, Bruno Sultanum, N. Trachter","doi":"10.21144/wp19-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21144/wp19-12","url":null,"abstract":"We advance a theory of how private information and heterogeneous screening ability across market participants shapes trade in decentralized asset markets. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and show that the investors who intermediate trade the most and interact with the largest set of counterparties must have the highest screening ability. That is, the primary intermediaries are those with superior information?screening experts. We provide empirical support for the model?s predictions using transaction-level micro data and information disclosure requirements. Finally, we study the connection between screening ability and efficiency, and observe that a market where all investors are screening experts?and thus, a market with no private information?may be dominated in terms of welfare by a market with no screening experts.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121133886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-30DOI: 10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2019.23.2.361
Gan‐Ochir Doojav, Munkhbayar Purevdorj
This paper examines the interactions between financial conditions and business cycles in Mongolia, a small open economy, heavily depending on commodity exports. We construct two financial conditions indexes based on the reduced form IS model and the vector autoregression (VAR) model as surveillance tools to quantify the degree of the financial conditions. We find that real short-term interest rate and real effective exchange rate gap get a higher weight in the FCIs. Both business and financial cycles are often more pronounced in Mongolia, and financial condition is dependent of the financial and monetary policies in place. The analysis of the predictive power of the FCIs for business cycles shows that they have predictive information for the near-term economic activities. FCIs are also helpful in signaling inflation turning points.
{"title":"The Relationship Between Financial Condition and Business Cycle in Mongolia","authors":"Gan‐Ochir Doojav, Munkhbayar Purevdorj","doi":"10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2019.23.2.361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2019.23.2.361","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the interactions between financial conditions and business cycles in Mongolia, a small open economy, heavily depending on commodity exports. We construct two financial conditions indexes based on the reduced form IS model and the vector autoregression (VAR) model as surveillance tools to quantify the degree of the financial conditions. We find that real short-term interest rate and real effective exchange rate gap get a higher weight in the FCIs. Both business and financial cycles are often more pronounced in Mongolia, and financial condition is dependent of the financial and monetary policies in place. The analysis of the predictive power of the FCIs for business cycles shows that they have predictive information for the near-term economic activities. FCIs are also helpful in signaling inflation turning points.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130511560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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