Abstract. The main aim of this study is to explain how institutional change, based on processes of democratization, governs the origin and diffusion of technological innovation across economies. This study suggests that institutional change, based on a progressive democratization of countries, is a driving force of inventions and adoption of usable innovations in society. Policy makers, considering the positive associations between institutional change, based on a process of democratization, and paths of technological innovation, can propose best practices directed to support a higher economic freedom in society, effective regulation, higher economic and political stability, good economic governance and higher level of education system. Overall, then, institutional change, based on democratization, is a precondition for sustaining fruitful paths of technological innovation to govern the development of economies in the presence of globalization and geographical expansion in world economic system. Keywords. Institutional change, Technological innovation, Patents, Technological change, Economic change, Social change, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Political stability, Innovative outputs, Democracy, Democratization, Economic growth, Economic performances, Rich countries, Emerging economies. JEL. B52, F55, O17, O31, O33, O35, O43, P10, P14, P48.
{"title":"How Does Institutional Change of Democratization Affect the Origin and Diffusion of Technological Innovation Across Countries?","authors":"M. Coccia","doi":"10.1453/JEST.V7I2.2017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1453/JEST.V7I2.2017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract. The main aim of this study is to explain how institutional change, based on processes of democratization, governs the origin and diffusion of technological innovation across economies. This study suggests that institutional change, based on a progressive democratization of countries, is a driving force of inventions and adoption of usable innovations in society. Policy makers, considering the positive associations between institutional change, based on a process of democratization, and paths of technological innovation, can propose best practices directed to support a higher economic freedom in society, effective regulation, higher economic and political stability, good economic governance and higher level of education system. Overall, then, institutional change, based on democratization, is a precondition for sustaining fruitful paths of technological innovation to govern the development of economies in the presence of globalization and geographical expansion in world economic system. Keywords. Institutional change, Technological innovation, Patents, Technological change, Economic change, Social change, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Political stability, Innovative outputs, Democracy, Democratization, Economic growth, Economic performances, Rich countries, Emerging economies. JEL. B52, F55, O17, O31, O33, O35, O43, P10, P14, P48.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117291400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study is to analyze the pricing strategies of French FinTech Firms (FFFs) using quantitative descriptive and correlational research methods. Based on a representative sample of 246 FFF, the study provided consistent support for the hypotheses, which argues that FFFs with high price-setting power may implement a combination of the price-setting strategy (PSS) “skimming” and the price-setting practice (PSP) “value-informed”. FFFs applying “market-based” PSSs tend to use “competition-informed” PSP preferring “pay-per-use” price-setting model (PSM). Whilst FFFs who apply “penetration” PSS tend to use “cost-informed” PSP and “pay-per-use” PSM. The findings support founders and senior management in their pricing decisions. This paper contributes to the existing literature on pricing strategies of early-stage high-tech companies. There is a need for further research about the change of pricing strategies during the lifecycle of a firm using for example a longitudinal quantitative study.
{"title":"Pricing Decisions of FinTech Firms","authors":"Michael Neubert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3634459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3634459","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to analyze the pricing strategies of French FinTech Firms (FFFs) using quantitative descriptive and correlational research methods. Based on a representative sample of 246 FFF, the study provided consistent support for the hypotheses, which argues that FFFs with high price-setting power may implement a combination of the price-setting strategy (PSS) “skimming” and the price-setting practice (PSP) “value-informed”. FFFs applying “market-based” PSSs tend to use “competition-informed” PSP preferring “pay-per-use” price-setting model (PSM). Whilst FFFs who apply “penetration” PSS tend to use “cost-informed” PSP and “pay-per-use” PSM. The findings support founders and senior management in their pricing decisions. This paper contributes to the existing literature on pricing strategies of early-stage high-tech companies. There is a need for further research about the change of pricing strategies during the lifecycle of a firm using for example a longitudinal quantitative study.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117012491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We combine transaction-level data from the largest retail bank in Denmark and individual-level data from government registers to study informal insurance within social networks. Accounting for transfers in cash (money transfers) and in kind (cohabitation), we estimate that family and friends jointly replace around 7 cents of the marginal dollar lost within the bottom income decile, but much less at higher income levels. We document that informal insurance covers other adverse events than income losses: expenditure shocks, family ruptures and financial distress. Parents appear to be the key providers of informal insurance with a small amount of insurance coming from siblings and virtually none from grandparents and friends. Replacement rates vary monotonically with parent economic resources.
{"title":"Bailing Out the Kids: New Evidence on Informal Insurance from One Billion Bank Transfers","authors":"A. Andersen, Niels Johannesen, Adam Sheridan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3624022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3624022","url":null,"abstract":"We combine transaction-level data from the largest retail bank in Denmark and individual-level data from government registers to study informal insurance within social networks. Accounting for transfers in cash (money transfers) and in kind (cohabitation), we estimate that family and friends jointly replace around 7 cents of the marginal dollar lost within the bottom income decile, but much less at higher income levels. We document that informal insurance covers other adverse events than income losses: expenditure shocks, family ruptures and financial distress. Parents appear to be the key providers of informal insurance with a small amount of insurance coming from siblings and virtually none from grandparents and friends. Replacement rates vary monotonically with parent economic resources.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126814974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-01DOI: 10.35188/unu-wider/2019/708-8
S. Jayachandran
This paper discusses cultural barriers to women's participation and success in the labor market in developing countries. I begin by describing how gender norms influence the relationship between economic development and female employment, as well as how gender norms differ substantially across societies at the same level of economic development. I then discuss in more detail specific gender-related social norms and how they constrain women's employment. I present examples of policies aimed at dismantling these cultural barriers to female employment and the impacts they have.
{"title":"Social Norms as a Barrier to Women&Apos;S Employment in Developing Countries","authors":"S. Jayachandran","doi":"10.35188/unu-wider/2019/708-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35188/unu-wider/2019/708-8","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses cultural barriers to women's participation and success in the labor market in developing countries. I begin by describing how gender norms influence the relationship between economic development and female employment, as well as how gender norms differ substantially across societies at the same level of economic development. I then discuss in more detail specific gender-related social norms and how they constrain women's employment. I present examples of policies aimed at dismantling these cultural barriers to female employment and the impacts they have.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"179 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125719857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the rise and risks in bank issuance of Wealth Management Products (WMPs), which are off-balance-sheet substitutes for deposits without the regulatory interest rate ceilings and constitute the largest shadow banking segment in China. We show that competition for deposits has a causal effect on the WMP issuance of small and medium sized banks (SMBs), where we instrument deposit competition by SMBs' geographical exposure to the large (Big Four) banks. The Big Four banks substantially increased their loan supply to support the RMB 4 trillion stimulus initiated in response to the global financial crisis, and thereafter grew more aggressive in the deposit markets in order to stay below the regulatory ceiling on the loan-to-deposit ratio. In response, SMBs issued more WMPs and more frequently, besides also establishing fewer branches in cities with greater competition from the Big Four banks. We find that this growth of WMPs imposed rollover risks for all the bank issuers, as reflected in higher yields on new WMPs, higher borrowing rates in the inter-bank market, and adverse stock market performance of WMP-issuing banks on days with heightened rollover risks.
{"title":"In the Shadow of Banks: Wealth Management Products and Issuing Banks' Risks in China","authors":"V. Acharya, Jun Qian, Yang Su, Zhishu Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3401597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3401597","url":null,"abstract":"We study the rise and risks in bank issuance of Wealth Management Products (WMPs), which are off-balance-sheet substitutes for deposits without the regulatory interest rate ceilings and constitute the largest shadow banking segment in China. We show that competition for deposits has a causal effect on the WMP issuance of small and medium sized banks (SMBs), where we instrument deposit competition by SMBs' geographical exposure to the large (Big Four) banks. The Big Four banks substantially increased their loan supply to support the RMB 4 trillion stimulus initiated in response to the global financial crisis, and thereafter grew more aggressive in the deposit markets in order to stay below the regulatory ceiling on the loan-to-deposit ratio. In response, SMBs issued more WMPs and more frequently, besides also establishing fewer branches in cities with greater competition from the Big Four banks. We find that this growth of WMPs imposed rollover risks for all the bank issuers, as reflected in higher yields on new WMPs, higher borrowing rates in the inter-bank market, and adverse stock market performance of WMP-issuing banks on days with heightened rollover risks.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130790913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of reserve of India to monitor or control the payment system. The reserve bank of the act is suitable amendment-ed in light of the The payment & settlement system act 2007.
{"title":"Role of RBI in Digital Payment System of India","authors":"Mr Shiv shankar Banerjee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3614968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3614968","url":null,"abstract":"The role of reserve of India to monitor or control the payment system. The reserve bank of the act is suitable amendment-ed in light of the The payment & settlement system act 2007.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116023247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Agurto, H. Djebbari, B. Silupu, Carolina Triveli, J. Torres
We experiment with a novel way to boost information acquisition that exploits existing social ties between the promoter of a new financial technology and community members. We offer information and training workshops on a new mobile-money platform in periurban and rural areas in Peru. In the treatment group, workshops are led by promoters who are personally known to the invited participants. In the control group, comparable individuals are invited to attend similar workshops, but the workshops are led by agents external to the community. Our findings suggest that lack of information impedes product adoption, which is itself limited by lack of trust in the individual who provides the information.
{"title":"Local Ambassadors Promote Mobile Banking in Northern Peru","authors":"M. Agurto, H. Djebbari, B. Silupu, Carolina Triveli, J. Torres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3600997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3600997","url":null,"abstract":"We experiment with a novel way to boost information acquisition that exploits existing social ties between the promoter of a new financial technology and community members. We offer information and training workshops on a new mobile-money platform in periurban and rural areas in Peru. In the treatment group, workshops are led by promoters who are personally known to the invited participants. In the control group, comparable individuals are invited to attend similar workshops, but the workshops are led by agents external to the community. Our findings suggest that lack of information impedes product adoption, which is itself limited by lack of trust in the individual who provides the information.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125062035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing research on political risks in foreign direct investment focuses on supranational rights protection regimes for multinational corporations. Drawing attention to domestic institutions within host countries, we demonstrate that foreign investors frequently use host country courts to protect their interests even in a country that lacks judicial independence. Furthermore, we investigate two channels whereby foreign enterprises can influence the rulings of courts that are susceptible to political interference: personal connections and institutional capture. We argue that establishing joint venture partnerships with state actors can co-opt local authorities by incorporating the state as a stakeholder of the foreign company's performance. Therefore, institutional capture delivers more substantial litigation success than conventional types of state-business linkages built upon personal relations. By constructing a novel dataset and applying it to a broad set of empirical tests, we provide the first systematic analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit activities in China during the period 2002–17.
{"title":"Settling Disputes in Authoritarian Courts: Multinational Corporations and State Capture","authors":"Frederick R. Chen, Jian Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3597182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3597182","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research on political risks in foreign direct investment focuses on supranational rights protection regimes for multinational corporations. Drawing attention to domestic institutions within host countries, we demonstrate that foreign investors frequently use host country courts to protect their interests even in a country that lacks judicial independence. Furthermore, we investigate two channels whereby foreign enterprises can influence the rulings of courts that are susceptible to political interference: personal connections and institutional capture. We argue that establishing joint venture partnerships with state actors can co-opt local authorities by incorporating the state as a stakeholder of the foreign company's performance. Therefore, institutional capture delivers more substantial litigation success than conventional types of state-business linkages built upon personal relations. By constructing a novel dataset and applying it to a broad set of empirical tests, we provide the first systematic analysis of foreign firms’ lawsuit activities in China during the period 2002–17.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133558753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do coercive societies respond to negative economic shocks? We explore this question in the early 20th-Century United States South. Since before the nation's founding, cotton cultivation formed the politics and institutions in the South, including the development of slavery, the lack of democratic institutions, and intergroup relations between whites and blacks. We leverage the natural experiment generated by the boll weevil infestation from 1892-1922, which disrupted cotton production in the region. Panel difference-in-differences results provide evidence that Southern society became less violent and repressive in response to this shock with fewer lynchings and less Confederate monument construction. Cross-sectional results leveraging spatial variation in the infestation and historical cotton specialization show that affected counties had less KKK activity, higher non-white voter registration, and were less likely to experience contentious politics in the form of protests during the 1960s. To assess mechanisms, we show that the reductions in coercion were responses to African American out-migration. Even in a context of antidemocratic institutions, ordinary people can retain political power through the ability to ``vote with their feet.''
{"title":"When Coercive Economies Fail: The Political Economy of the Us South after the Boll Weevil","authors":"J. Feigenbaum, Soumyajit Mazumder, Cory B. Smith","doi":"10.3386/w27161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w27161","url":null,"abstract":"How do coercive societies respond to negative economic shocks? We explore this question in the early 20th-Century United States South. Since before the nation's founding, cotton cultivation formed the politics and institutions in the South, including the development of slavery, the lack of democratic institutions, and intergroup relations between whites and blacks. We leverage the natural experiment generated by the boll weevil infestation from 1892-1922, which disrupted cotton production in the region. Panel difference-in-differences results provide evidence that Southern society became less violent and repressive in response to this shock with fewer lynchings and less Confederate monument construction. Cross-sectional results leveraging spatial variation in the infestation and historical cotton specialization show that affected counties had less KKK activity, higher non-white voter registration, and were less likely to experience contentious politics in the form of protests during the 1960s. To assess mechanisms, we show that the reductions in coercion were responses to African American out-migration. Even in a context of antidemocratic institutions, ordinary people can retain political power through the ability to ``vote with their feet.''","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123365039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper investigates determinants of investments in state capacity and institutional change in contemporary Ukraine. After formulating a simple sequential two-stage model of investments in state capacity, the paper estimates auto-regressive distributed lag and vector auto-regressive models to verify its predictions. The paper finds little evidence for the impact of conflict intensity and access to international credit on the pace of reform progress. It finds a statistically significant effect for the intensity of political competition and changes of real wages, albeit these results are sensitive to robustness checks.
{"title":"Marching to Good Laws: The Impact of War, Politics, and International Credit on Reforms in Ukraine","authors":"A. Kochnev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3579111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3579111","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates determinants of investments in state capacity and institutional change in contemporary Ukraine. After formulating a simple sequential two-stage model of investments in state capacity, the paper estimates auto-regressive distributed lag and vector auto-regressive models to verify its predictions. The paper finds little evidence for the impact of conflict intensity and access to international credit on the pace of reform progress. It finds a statistically significant effect for the intensity of political competition and changes of real wages, albeit these results are sensitive to robustness checks.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130615845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：