Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053
G. Petropoulos
Phenomenology, broadly construed, is the study of the meaningful structure of human experience. It is a philosophical tradition that begins with Edmund Husserl, develops with thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and is still practiced today, contributing to diverse disciplines like health studies, education and political science. But while the contribution of phenomenology to the study of the self, the body and the world has been widely recognized, there is also another way in which phenomenology remains relevant today. Both phenomenologists and scholars of ancient Greek philosophy are becoming increasingly interested in examining the ways in which the phenomenological tradition intersects, sheds new light on, and re-appropriates Greek philosophy. It is well known that Heidegger’s thought showed a vigorous interest in ancient Greek philosophy, resulting in unorthodox and even violent interpretations of Greek texts. Notwithstanding the idiosyncratic nature of Heidegger’s interpretations, his phenomenological readings of Greek texts during the 1920s exerted influence on a wide range of philosophers and scholars. Gadamer, for example, writes that he visited Freiburg in 1923 “not so much for Husserl’s phenomenology as to learn about Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle”. Strauss, Klein, Arendt and Gadamer are only a few of the philosophers who attended Heidegger’s lectures and who continued to focus on Greek philosophy, albeit in ways that differ significantly from Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger, however, is not the only phenomenologist who sought to incorporate Greek philosophy into his thinking. Husserl, for example, made extensive use of Greek terms (e.g. epoché, noesis, noema, etc.) in order to introduce the innovative elements of his phenomenology. Apart from the appropriation of Greek terms for the explication of his own phenomenological intuitions, Husserl’s work exhibits an interest in the genesis of meaning and its historical development, which brings about an explicit emphasis on ancient Greek thinking. Husserl’s and Heidegger’s understanding of their own philosophical projects as having a peculiar relation to a Greek origin, can be taken as an indication that a good understanding of the phenomenological tradition requires a thorough examination of its relation to Greek philosophy. The invigorating interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy offered by thinkers, strictly or loosely related to the phenomenological tradition, such as Arendt, Fink, Patočka and Levinas, to name a few, reinforces this view. Given the vast number of phenomenologists who have shown an interest in Greek philosophy, one way of doing research on the topic of Phenomenology and Ancient Greek Philosophy is to examine the various – and at times
{"title":"Phenomenology and Ancient Greek Philosophy: An Introduction","authors":"G. Petropoulos","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology, broadly construed, is the study of the meaningful structure of human experience. It is a philosophical tradition that begins with Edmund Husserl, develops with thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and is still practiced today, contributing to diverse disciplines like health studies, education and political science. But while the contribution of phenomenology to the study of the self, the body and the world has been widely recognized, there is also another way in which phenomenology remains relevant today. Both phenomenologists and scholars of ancient Greek philosophy are becoming increasingly interested in examining the ways in which the phenomenological tradition intersects, sheds new light on, and re-appropriates Greek philosophy. It is well known that Heidegger’s thought showed a vigorous interest in ancient Greek philosophy, resulting in unorthodox and even violent interpretations of Greek texts. Notwithstanding the idiosyncratic nature of Heidegger’s interpretations, his phenomenological readings of Greek texts during the 1920s exerted influence on a wide range of philosophers and scholars. Gadamer, for example, writes that he visited Freiburg in 1923 “not so much for Husserl’s phenomenology as to learn about Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle”. Strauss, Klein, Arendt and Gadamer are only a few of the philosophers who attended Heidegger’s lectures and who continued to focus on Greek philosophy, albeit in ways that differ significantly from Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger, however, is not the only phenomenologist who sought to incorporate Greek philosophy into his thinking. Husserl, for example, made extensive use of Greek terms (e.g. epoché, noesis, noema, etc.) in order to introduce the innovative elements of his phenomenology. Apart from the appropriation of Greek terms for the explication of his own phenomenological intuitions, Husserl’s work exhibits an interest in the genesis of meaning and its historical development, which brings about an explicit emphasis on ancient Greek thinking. Husserl’s and Heidegger’s understanding of their own philosophical projects as having a peculiar relation to a Greek origin, can be taken as an indication that a good understanding of the phenomenological tradition requires a thorough examination of its relation to Greek philosophy. The invigorating interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy offered by thinkers, strictly or loosely related to the phenomenological tradition, such as Arendt, Fink, Patočka and Levinas, to name a few, reinforces this view. Given the vast number of phenomenologists who have shown an interest in Greek philosophy, one way of doing research on the topic of Phenomenology and Ancient Greek Philosophy is to examine the various – and at times","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"95 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46559002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487
J. Slaby
ABSTRACT What I call the active mind approach revolves around the claim that what is “on” a person’s mind is in an important sense brought on and held on to through the agent’s self-conscious rational activity. In the first part, I state the gist of this perspective in a deliberately strong way in order to create a touchstone for critical discussion. In the second part, I engage with two categories of our mental lives that seem to speak against construing the mind as active. First, I discuss affectivity, in particular emotion, and show that emotional episodes are active engagements. Second, I discuss habitual action, and in particular those manifestations of habit which are initially opaque to the agent. In my responses to both objections, the notion of a practical self-understanding will play a central role. The result will be a qualified defence and expansion of the active mind position.
{"title":"Expanding the Active Mind","authors":"J. Slaby","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What I call the active mind approach revolves around the claim that what is “on” a person’s mind is in an important sense brought on and held on to through the agent’s self-conscious rational activity. In the first part, I state the gist of this perspective in a deliberately strong way in order to create a touchstone for critical discussion. In the second part, I engage with two categories of our mental lives that seem to speak against construing the mind as active. First, I discuss affectivity, in particular emotion, and show that emotional episodes are active engagements. Second, I discuss habitual action, and in particular those manifestations of habit which are initially opaque to the agent. In my responses to both objections, the notion of a practical self-understanding will play a central role. The result will be a qualified defence and expansion of the active mind position.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"193 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48282003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-30DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160
T. Greaves
ABSTRACT This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions, drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwood. I develop a concept of “practical metabolism” and show that emotions need to be understood not only as transformations from determinate to indeterminate practical intuitions, but also as transformations in the reverse direction. Firstly, I provide a new conception of the dynamic phenomenal structure of the emotions that can resolve significant tensions in the Sartre’s theory. Secondly, I develop that theory to shed light on the diverse socially mediated roles of emotions in practical life by drawing on Collingwood’s philosophy of magic. Thirdly, I deploy the notion of practical metabolism to address the appraisal of emotions, setting out a framework for understanding the various ways in which emotional expression is subject to structural breakdown.
{"title":"Magic, Emotion and Practical Metabolism: Affective Praxis in Sartre and Collingwood","authors":"T. Greaves","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions, drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwood. I develop a concept of “practical metabolism” and show that emotions need to be understood not only as transformations from determinate to indeterminate practical intuitions, but also as transformations in the reverse direction. Firstly, I provide a new conception of the dynamic phenomenal structure of the emotions that can resolve significant tensions in the Sartre’s theory. Secondly, I develop that theory to shed light on the diverse socially mediated roles of emotions in practical life by drawing on Collingwood’s philosophy of magic. Thirdly, I deploy the notion of practical metabolism to address the appraisal of emotions, setting out a framework for understanding the various ways in which emotional expression is subject to structural breakdown.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"276 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47288133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609
R. Desantis
ABSTRACT This paper offers a reading of passages in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures in which Heidegger describes love as a feeling which grants an essential vision. I contend that by invoking this language of vision while simultaneously contrasting love with infatuation, Heidegger is implicitly attempting to situate love within his category of fundamental attunements. While Heidegger does not explicitly follow this thought through, I argue that doing so leads to a problem—namely, how can love be a fundamental attunement if such attunements are necessarily objectless? I suggest we can see a response to this problem in Heidegger’s treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus within the same lecture course. I conclude by claiming that while Heidegger attempts to follow Plato in arguing that love is most properly directed towards Being, love nonetheless poses a challenge to Heidegger’s category of fundamental attunements which also strikes at the heart of his claim that ontology is first philosophy.
{"title":"Love’s Resistance: Heidegger and the Problem of First Philosophy","authors":"R. Desantis","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper offers a reading of passages in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures in which Heidegger describes love as a feeling which grants an essential vision. I contend that by invoking this language of vision while simultaneously contrasting love with infatuation, Heidegger is implicitly attempting to situate love within his category of fundamental attunements. While Heidegger does not explicitly follow this thought through, I argue that doing so leads to a problem—namely, how can love be a fundamental attunement if such attunements are necessarily objectless? I suggest we can see a response to this problem in Heidegger’s treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus within the same lecture course. I conclude by claiming that while Heidegger attempts to follow Plato in arguing that love is most properly directed towards Being, love nonetheless poses a challenge to Heidegger’s category of fundamental attunements which also strikes at the heart of his claim that ontology is first philosophy.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"61 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47660441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-15DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963
Timothy J. Nulty
ABSTRACT There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those beings have distinct sets of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism.
{"title":"Heidegger’s Relative Essentialism","authors":"Timothy J. Nulty","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those beings have distinct sets of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"40 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45366319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954
Suraj Chaudhary
ABSTRACT Phenomenological approaches to space have consistently made a distinction between a plurality of inhabited spaces and the single homogenous extendedness of Euclidean space. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty postulate unique spatial wholes pertaining to human life that pose a counterpoint to objective space and provide the necessary context for understanding all our spatial relations. However, the spatial wholes that are posited to clarify these relations are themselves far from univocal. Specifically, differences exist regarding what precisely unites various entities into a meaningful spatial whole and how any such whole relates to others. Showing how Heidegger’s idea of Ort and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of espace vécu rely on multiple senses of nearness, this paper argues that the privileged sense of nearness in each case fails to delimit the spatial context, thereby putting into question the very possibility of a unified and distinct spatial whole.
{"title":"The Ambiguity of Nearness in Heidegger’s Ort and Merleau-Ponty’s Espace Vécu","authors":"Suraj Chaudhary","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Phenomenological approaches to space have consistently made a distinction between a plurality of inhabited spaces and the single homogenous extendedness of Euclidean space. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty postulate unique spatial wholes pertaining to human life that pose a counterpoint to objective space and provide the necessary context for understanding all our spatial relations. However, the spatial wholes that are posited to clarify these relations are themselves far from univocal. Specifically, differences exist regarding what precisely unites various entities into a meaningful spatial whole and how any such whole relates to others. Showing how Heidegger’s idea of Ort and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of espace vécu rely on multiple senses of nearness, this paper argues that the privileged sense of nearness in each case fails to delimit the spatial context, thereby putting into question the very possibility of a unified and distinct spatial whole.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"33 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43998075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-29DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1859071
Galen A. Johnson
Mauro Carbone’s most recent book, Philosophy-Screens: From Cinema to the Digital Revolution (SUNY Press, 2019) advances the work and thought of his Flesh of Images: Merleau-Ponty Between Painting a...
Mauro Carbone的最新著作《哲学屏幕：从电影到数字革命》（纽约州立大学出版社，2019）推进了他的作品和思想：Merleau Ponti Between Painting a。。。
{"title":"From Philosophy-Cinema to Philosophy-Screens: Reflections on the Thought of Mauro Carbone","authors":"Galen A. Johnson","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1859071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1859071","url":null,"abstract":"Mauro Carbone’s most recent book, Philosophy-Screens: From Cinema to the Digital Revolution (SUNY Press, 2019) advances the work and thought of his Flesh of Images: Merleau-Ponty Between Painting a...","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"251 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1859071","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41776713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-09DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1856022
J. L. Imanaka
Blok makes a compelling case for renewed consideration of philosophical method in the pressing context of environmental threats, plunging readers into the depths of Heidegger’s philosophical method...
{"title":"Heidegger’s Concept of Philosophical Method: Innovating Philosophy in the Age of Global Warming","authors":"J. L. Imanaka","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1856022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1856022","url":null,"abstract":"Blok makes a compelling case for renewed consideration of philosophical method in the pressing context of environmental threats, plunging readers into the depths of Heidegger’s philosophical method...","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"262 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1856022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43143554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-29DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1836978
Antony Fredriksson, Silvia Panizza
ABSTRACT As attention, in philosophy, is mainly discussed in the philosophy of mind, its ethical aspects have remained relatively unexplored. One notable exception is Iris Murdoch. Another philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considers attention to be central for his phenomenology of perception, with important ethical implications. This paper explores the role of attention in ethics by drawing on both Murdoch and Merleau-Ponty and uses the resources they variously offer to address two questions relating to the enigmatic role of the self in attention: how should we understand agency in the attending subject? And: to what extent is the subject responsible for the quality of her attention? Addressing these difficulties about the self is the key to articulating its ethical value, as well as the main apparent difference between the ethical concept and the one in ordinary language and philosophy of mind.
{"title":"Ethical Attention and the Self in Iris Murdoch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty","authors":"Antony Fredriksson, Silvia Panizza","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1836978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1836978","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As attention, in philosophy, is mainly discussed in the philosophy of mind, its ethical aspects have remained relatively unexplored. One notable exception is Iris Murdoch. Another philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considers attention to be central for his phenomenology of perception, with important ethical implications. This paper explores the role of attention in ethics by drawing on both Murdoch and Merleau-Ponty and uses the resources they variously offer to address two questions relating to the enigmatic role of the self in attention: how should we understand agency in the attending subject? And: to what extent is the subject responsible for the quality of her attention? Addressing these difficulties about the self is the key to articulating its ethical value, as well as the main apparent difference between the ethical concept and the one in ordinary language and philosophy of mind.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"53 1","pages":"24 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1836978","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46221326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-21DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2020.1833128
Adrian James Staples
ABSTRACT Heidegger’s remarks about language in Being and Time do not constitute a comprehensive theory of language. Hubert Dreyfus, William Blattner and Mark Wrathall each propose a derivativist reading of these remarks. Derivativism is the theory that language is derivative of a pre-linguistically articulated experience of the world – but derivativism is not quite right. It does not account adequately for the relationship between the disclosedness of being-in-the-world and what Heidegger calls discourse [Rede]. I claim that although language has its ontological foundation in the constitution of disclosedness, this does not mean that language is prefigured by a way of being-in-the-world that is existentially prelinguistic. Finally, I develop Wrathall’s claims about disclosedness into a more palatable account of the relationship between discourse and language, which I test against Heidegger’s claims about the relationship between discourse and language in Being and Time.
{"title":"The Derivativist Reading of Heidegger’s Remarks about Language in Being and Time: A Critique","authors":"Adrian James Staples","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1833128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1833128","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Heidegger’s remarks about language in Being and Time do not constitute a comprehensive theory of language. Hubert Dreyfus, William Blattner and Mark Wrathall each propose a derivativist reading of these remarks. Derivativism is the theory that language is derivative of a pre-linguistically articulated experience of the world – but derivativism is not quite right. It does not account adequately for the relationship between the disclosedness of being-in-the-world and what Heidegger calls discourse [Rede]. I claim that although language has its ontological foundation in the constitution of disclosedness, this does not mean that language is prefigured by a way of being-in-the-world that is existentially prelinguistic. Finally, I develop Wrathall’s claims about disclosedness into a more palatable account of the relationship between discourse and language, which I test against Heidegger’s claims about the relationship between discourse and language in Being and Time.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"52 1","pages":"236 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1833128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47788211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：