{"title":"Aiming for Moral Mediocrity","authors":"Eric Schwitzgebel","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1806","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.11612/RESPHIL.1806","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48225311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sages, Integrity, and the Paradox of Vulnerability: Reply to Chung, McLeod, and Seok","authors":"M. Ing","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1791","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42802892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I offer an explanation for why certain sequences of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of diachronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in which you had the opportunity to hide something unflattering and failed to do so.
{"title":"If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?","authors":"Ryan Doody","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1721","url":null,"abstract":"I offer an explanation for why certain sequences of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of diachronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in which you had the opportunity to hide something unflattering and failed to do so.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44578017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve significant theoretical resources which themselves can be part of what's being disputed. This means that we will sometimes find otherwise good arguments suggesting their own grounds are problematic. In particular, sometimes revising our beliefs on the basis of an argument can undermine the very justification we used in that argument. This feature, which I'll call self-effacingness, occurs most dramatically in arguments against our standing views on the subject matters mentioned above: logic, mathematics, aesthetics, and morality. This is because these subject matters all play a role in how we reason abductively. This isn't an idle fact; we can resist some challenges to our standing beliefs about these subject matters exactly because the challenges are self-effacing. The self-effacing character of certain arguments is thus both a benefit and limitation of the abductive turn and deserves serious attention. I aim to give it the attention it deserves.
{"title":"The Self-Effacement Gambit","authors":"J. Woods","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve significant theoretical resources which themselves can be part of what's being disputed. This means that we will sometimes find otherwise good arguments suggesting their own grounds are problematic. In particular, sometimes revising our beliefs on the basis of an argument can undermine the very justification we used in that argument. This feature, which I'll call self-effacingness, occurs most dramatically in arguments against our standing views on the subject matters mentioned above: logic, mathematics, aesthetics, and morality. This is because these subject matters all play a role in how we reason abductively. This isn't an idle fact; we can resist some challenges to our standing beliefs about these subject matters exactly because the challenges are self-effacing. The self-effacing character of certain arguments is thus both a benefit and limitation of the abductive turn and deserves serious attention. I aim to give it the attention it deserves.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41652338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Can Phenomenology Bring to Ontology?","authors":"Amie L. Thomasson","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1760","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41392374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson","authors":"Daniel Coren","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1728","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43825555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pr'ecis of A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Bein","authors":"A. Alexandrova","doi":"10.11612/resphil.1804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1804","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.11612/resphil.1804","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64516666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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