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The stock market reaction to political and economic changes: the Spanish case 股市对政治和经济变化的反应:西班牙案例
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00353-1
Leticia Castaño, José E. Farinós, Ana M. Ibáñez

As other European countries, Spain has experienced a turmoil in which new political parties emerged with force after the global financial crisis in 2008. In this context, we analyze whether the empirical implications of the opportunistic and partisan theories, as well as the Uncertain Information Hypothesis, are met in the Spanish stock market, considering the size and the industry of the companies. The horizon of our study takes into account the seven general elections, 24 regional elections and 4 European elections held from 2002 to 2019, period in which Spain is fully integrated in the economic and monetary union and under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. Our results do not support the opportunistic and partisan theories, or the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that the short-term negative market reaction to the general elections is linked to the uncertainty with a change in the political sign of the incumbent. Besides, it is not related to size or industry characteristics.

与其他欧洲国家一样,西班牙也经历了一场动荡,2008 年全球金融危机后,新政党强势崛起。在此背景下,我们分析了机会主义和党派理论以及不确定信息假说的实证含义在西班牙股票市场上是否得到了满足,同时考虑到了公司的规模和行业。我们的研究范围考虑了 2002 年至 2019 年期间举行的 7 次大选、24 次地区选举和 4 次欧洲选举,在此期间,西班牙完全融入了经济和货币联盟,并处于宏观经济失衡程序之下。我们的研究结果不支持机会主义和党派理论,也不支持不确定信息假说。我们的证据表明,市场对大选的短期负面反应与执政者政治倾向变化的不确定性有关。此外,这与企业规模或行业特征无关。
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引用次数: 0
Generalized cumulative offer processes 广义累积报价过程
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4
Inácio Bó, Jörgen Kratz, Makoto Shimoji

In the context of the matching-with-contracts model, we generalize the cumulative offer process to allow for arbitrary subsets of doctors to make proposals in each round. We show that, under a condition on the hospitals’ choice functions, the outcome of this generalized cumulative offer process is independent of the sets of doctors making proposals in each round. The flexibility of the resulting model allows it to be used to describe different dynamic processes and their final outcomes.

在 "匹配-签约 "模型的背景下,我们对累积报价过程进行了概括,允许医生的任意子集在每一轮中提出建议。我们的研究表明,在医院选择函数的条件下,这种广义累积报价过程的结果与每轮报价的医生集无关。由此产生的模型具有灵活性,可用于描述不同的动态过程及其最终结果。
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引用次数: 0
Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields 互补战场上的多场战斗竞赛
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00351-3
Daniel Stephenson

This paper studies contests with complementary prizes where each agent simultaneously distributes a fixed budget over multiple battlefields. Each battlefield has a single prize which is divided among the competitors in proportion to an arbitrary power function of their investment levels. A unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is shown to exist under arbitrarily sensitive battlefield success functions if objective functions exhibit constant subunitary elasticity of substitution between prize shares. In contrast, Blotto contests with linear objectives have only mixed strategy Nash equilibria if battlefield success functions are sufficiently sensitive to investment levels. Sufficient complementarity between prize shares allows pure strategy Nash equilibria to exist under arbitrarily sensitive battlefield success functions.

本文研究的是具有互补奖品的竞赛,每个参与者同时将固定预算分配给多个战场。每个战场都有一个单一奖项,该奖项按竞争者投资水平的任意幂函数比例分配给竞争者。如果目标函数在奖金份额之间表现出恒定的亚单位替代弹性,那么在任意敏感的战场成功函数条件下,就会出现唯一的纯策略纳什均衡。相反,如果战场成功函数对投资水平足够敏感,那么具有线性目标的布洛托竞赛只有混合策略纳什均衡。奖金份额之间的充分互补性使得纯策略纳什均衡在任意敏感的战场成功函数下都能存在。
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引用次数: 0
Optimal student allocation with peer effects 具有同伴效应的最佳学生分配
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00349-x
Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita

This paper studies an optimal assignment problem of heterogenous students to schools with a particular kind of preference complementarity: peer effects, defined by the average ability of those in the same school. The tractability of the problem allows us to characterize the optimal assignment mechanism, which has a simple “(stochastic) pass-fail” structure. Its shape is mainly determined by the convexity/concavity of the attainment function, interpreted as the preference for/against having diverse-ability students in different schools. We also provide comparative statics as to when more or less mixture of heterogenous ability types would be desirable.

本文研究的是异质学生在具有特殊偏好互补性的学校的最优派位问题:同伴效应,由同一学校学生的平均能力决定。问题的可操作性使我们能够描述最优派位机制的特征,该机制具有简单的"(随机)及格-不及格 "结构。它的形状主要由成绩函数的凸性/凹性决定,成绩函数被解释为希望/反对不同能力的学生在不同学校就读的偏好。我们还提供了比较静态数据,说明何时需要更多或更少的异质能力类型混合。
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引用次数: 0
A fair procedure in a marriage market 婚姻市场中的公平程序
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina

We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.

我们在双面婚姻市场中提出了一种新算法,市场双方在每一轮中都会提出建议。该算法总能得到稳定的匹配结果。而且,如果男女人数相等,结果就是罗尔斯稳定匹配。最后,该算法可以在多项式时间内计算,从实用的角度来看,可以用于对公平性有重要考虑的市场。
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引用次数: 0
Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale 有转售的拍卖中的价值排序解密
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5
Sanyyam Khurana

Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, when the value-rankings are revealed, the classic result of “bid symmetrization” does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid distribution than the bidder with the highest valuation. We also show that the revelation of value-rankings in auctions with resale asymmetrizes the bidding strategies. Finally, for a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.

考虑一个有转售的单件拍卖和两个风险中性的投标人。竞买人和出价人都知道估值的排序,也就是说,竞买人知道估值最高和最低的竞买人的身份。我们的研究表明,当价值排名被揭示时,经典的 "出价对称 "结果并不成立。令人惊讶的是,估值最低的投标人的出价分布比估值最高的投标人更强。我们还证明,在有转售的拍卖中,价值排名的揭示会使出价策略不对称。最后,对于一个特殊的概率分布系列,我们证明了第一价格拍卖的收益优于第二价格拍卖。
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引用次数: 0
The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency 公共治理的层次:资源分配与官僚低效
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8
Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao

Should a social program be run at a higher or lower level of government? We consider a government-run program supplying a private good to consumers. We focus on a tradeoff between the advantage of a high level of government in resource allocation and its disadvantage in consumer information. We look into the effect of differences in income levels, marginal costs, and preferences on the organization of public governance. One general conclusion is that when regional differences are large, the central government should be in charge; otherwise, local governments should be in charge.

一项社会计划应该由更高一级还是更低一级的政府来管理?我们考虑的是一个由政府管理、向消费者提供私人产品的项目。我们的重点是权衡高水平政府在资源分配方面的优势和在消费者信息方面的劣势。我们研究了收入水平、边际成本和偏好的差异对公共管理组织的影响。一个普遍的结论是,当地区差异较大时,应由中央政府负责;反之,则应由地方政府负责。
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引用次数: 0
On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures 论不合格代理优先权结构下三代理任务分配的可解性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6
Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang

In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.

本文研究了 Ehlers 和 Westkamp(Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018)提出的无资质代理(TAU)优先级结构任务分配的可解性问题。在TAU优先级结构中,在任意位置,要么所有代理人的优先级相等,要么正好存在一个优先级最低的代理人,而其他代理人的优先级相等,且所有代理人的优先级最高。如果一个优先级结构允许一个有约束的高效且不失策略的机制,那么它就是可解的,其中一个有约束的高效机制总是能产生一个稳定匹配,而这个稳定匹配不可能被任何其他稳定匹配所帕累托支配。我们的研究表明,有三个代理人的 TAU 优先权结构是可以通过具有内生平局打破规则的顶级交易循环机制来解决的。
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引用次数: 0
Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis 工作轮换还是专业化?动态匹配模型分析
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7
Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa

Which is better for a firm, job rotation or specialization, can be considered as an endogenously formed worker-indivisible job matching problem. We model this problem as a firm’s profit maximization problem under uncertainty, with and without overlapping generations. In both models, we show that among all possible job allocations, the rotation and specialization schemes are the only variations that can be optimal in terms of profits. Moreover, the rotation scheme is better when the productivity difference between post- and under-training workers is smaller, the uncertainty about job continuation in the future is more significant, or the slope of seniority wages is larger. The results indicate that firms in different environments prefer different worker-job matchings.

对于企业来说,轮岗和专业化孰优孰劣,可视为一个内生形成的工人不可分割岗位匹配问题。我们将这一问题建模为不确定性条件下的企业利润最大化问题,有世代重叠和无世代重叠两种情况。在这两个模型中,我们都证明了在所有可能的岗位分配中,只有轮换方案和专业化方案是利润最优的方案。此外,当培训后工人和培训不足工人之间的生产率差异较小、未来是否继续工作的不确定性较大或工龄工资的斜率较大时,轮岗方案会更好。结果表明,不同环境下的企业倾向于不同的工人-岗位匹配。
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引用次数: 0
Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations 产能受限合作采购的成本分担方法
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9
Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm

This paper analyzes capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations in which a group of cooperating purchasers face two suppliers with limited supply capacity. To minimize the total purchasing costs, we show that two extreme policies have to be compared: order everything at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other. Interestingly, as order quantities increase, various policy switches can occur. To find suitable cost allocations of the total purchasing costs, we model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem. As increasing order quantities also imply concavity breaks due to a forced change in supplier, the corresponding cost function is piecewise concave. For cost sharing problems with concave cost functions, we show that the serial cost sharing mechanism satisfies two desirable properties, unit cost monotonicity (UCM) and monotonic vulnerability for the absence of the smallest player (MOVASP). However, these properties are lost in the setting of piecewise concave cost functions. We develop a new context specific class of piecewise serial rules based on claims rules. We show that the proportional rule is the only claims rule for which the corresponding piecewise serial rule satisfies UCM. Moreover, the piecewise serial rule corresponding to the constrained equal losses rule satisfies MOVASP.

本文分析了一组合作采购面对两个供应能力有限的供应商的产能限制合作采购情况。为了使总采购成本最小化,我们展示了必须比较两种极端策略:在一个供应商处订购所有产品,而在另一个供应商处订购可能的剩余产品。有趣的是,随着订单数量的增加,可能会发生各种策略切换。为了找到合适的总采购成本分配,我们建立了一个成本分担问题模型。由于订单数量的增加也意味着由于供应商的强制改变而导致的凹性断裂,相应的成本函数是分段凹的。对于具有凹代价函数的代价分担问题,我们证明了序列代价分担机制满足两个理想的性质,即单位代价单调性(UCM)和最小参与人缺位时的单调脆弱性(MOVASP)。然而,这些性质在分段凹代价函数的设置中丢失了。我们基于索赔规则开发了一种新的上下文特定的分段串行规则类。我们证明了比例规则是唯一的声明规则,对应的分段序列规则满足UCM。与约束等损失规则相对应的分段序列规则满足MOVASP。
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Review of Economic Design
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