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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results 论议价的公理化理论:近期研究结果综述
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00319-1
W. Thomson
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引用次数: 2
Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies 交换经济中具有本地效率和不受策略限制的分配机制
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00324-4
Takeshi Momi
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引用次数: 0
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources 外部选择中立分配离散资源
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7
M. Pycia, M. Utku Ünver
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引用次数: 4
Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria 递归委托均衡的极限定理
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5
Semih Koray, M. Sertel
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引用次数: 1
Religious affiliations of Chinese people and prosocial behavior: evidence from field experiments 中国人的宗教信仰与亲社会行为:来自实地实验的证据
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00317-3
Weiwei Xia, Xiaohan Guo, Jun Luo, Hang Ye, Yefeng Chen, Shu Chen, Weisen Xia
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引用次数: 1
Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence 竞赛与报名费:理论和证据
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2
J. Duffy, Alexander Matros, Zehra Valencia
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引用次数: 0
Trade of a common value good 有共同价值的商品的贸易
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6
Steven R. Williams

When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the good and estimation of the common value based upon the traders’ private information. We explore sufficient conditions for nonexistence of trading mechanisms in which trade of a common good occurs, along with cases in which such mechanisms exist.

当交易者拥有关于共同价值商品的私人信息时,仅凭逆向选择不足以阻止该商品的交易和基于交易者的私人信息对共同价值的估计。我们探讨了共同利益的贸易机制不存在的充分条件,以及这种机制存在的情况。
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引用次数: 0
Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects 多件物品保留价格的维克里拍卖的特征
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8
R. Basu, Conan Mukherjee
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引用次数: 0
And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests 亚军是…:比较多赢家图洛克竞赛的获胜者选拔程序
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy

We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

我们用同时和顺序的赢家选择来描述k赢家竞争中的策略等价。我们通过一系列的实验室实验来验证这一战略等价的预测,对比了1胜和2胜的竞争,后者的结果是顺序显示的还是在单个阶段显示的。我们发现,从长远来看,在战略对等的竞争中,平均出价水平是相似的。然而,在双胜者竞赛中,适应速度较慢且缺乏系统性,这与同时选择胜者的结果比单胜者的结果更具随机性的特性是一致的。
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引用次数: 0
Designing randomized response surveys to support honest answers to stigmatizing questions 设计随机反应调查,以支持对污名化问题的诚实回答
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00314-6
James C. D. Fisher, Timothy Flannery
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引用次数: 0
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Review of Economic Design
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