Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x
Gregory Pavlov
{"title":"Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions","authors":"Gregory Pavlov","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00333-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45279725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-24DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z
Christoph March, Marco Sahm
Abstract We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.
{"title":"The perks of being in the smaller team: incentives in overlapping contests","authors":"Christoph March, Marco Sahm","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135842904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-26DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7
Yajing Chen, Patrick Harless, Zhenhua Jiao
{"title":"The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization","authors":"Yajing Chen, Patrick Harless, Zhenhua Jiao","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43696589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-07DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8
Makoto Hagiwara, Fumihiro Yonekura
{"title":"King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies","authors":"Makoto Hagiwara, Fumihiro Yonekura","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-02DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00326-w
R. Oddou
{"title":"Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?","authors":"R. Oddou","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00326-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00326-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49541633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-05DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00325-3
Bahar Leventoğlu
{"title":"Bargaining power in crisis bargaining","authors":"Bahar Leventoğlu","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00325-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00325-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48505355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01Epub Date: 2022-11-04DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4
Daniel Rehsmann
We address the optimal allocation of stochastically dependent resource bundles to a set of simultaneous contests. For this purpose, we study a modification of the Colonel Blotto Game called the Tennis Coach Problem. We devise a thoroughly probabilistic method of payoff representation and fully characterize equilibria in this class of games. We further formalize the idea of strategic team training in a comparative static setting. The problem applies to several distinct economic interactions but seems most prevalent in team sports with individual matches, for instance, in Tennis and Sumo.
{"title":"The Sumo coach problem.","authors":"Daniel Rehsmann","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10058-022-00316-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We address the optimal allocation of stochastically dependent resource bundles to a set of simultaneous contests. For this purpose, we study a modification of the Colonel Blotto Game called the Tennis Coach Problem. We devise a thoroughly probabilistic method of payoff representation and fully characterize equilibria in this class of games. We further formalize the idea of strategic team training in a comparative static setting. The problem applies to several distinct economic interactions but seems most prevalent in team sports with individual matches, for instance, in Tennis and Sumo.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"669-700"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10768571/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42323687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-16DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00313-7
Colin von Negenborn
{"title":"The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions","authors":"Colin von Negenborn","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00313-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00313-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"603 - 634"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44903120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：